1 h 46 min · 5,051 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. Ilia S. Durovic delivers a 107-minute technical exposition on Buddhist epistemology, working through Line 0233 of a commentary on valid cognition. Beginning with the two broad categories of valid cognizers — self-ascertained and other-ascertained awareness — Durovic walks through a series of precise logical debates to clarify what it means for a mind to cognize its object independently versus in dependence on another source. He illustrates the distinction with concrete examples: a direct visual perception of a distant flickering flame that cannot by itself determine whether it is fire (and thus depends on additional testimony), contrasted with an observer who already knows what the object is and recognizes it instantly. The session consists largely of debate and refutation, a methodological tool that examines opposing positions before establishing the school’s own definition. Durovic explains how the foundational Sautrāntika tradition developed this analysis in elaborate detail through texts like the Ornament of Valid Cognition, and fields questions on reflexive consciousness, visualization practice, and the logical structure of syllogistic reasoning. Pitched at advanced students with prior grounding in Buddhist logic and epistemology.
File metadata (for organising)
File: Line in 0233.mp3
UUID: 670872a8-4e2a-47a8-85cb-579e5a9fd13e
Teacher: Ilia S. Durovic
Collection: Awareness and Knowledge
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~5,041
So as usual in Geshe Rinpoche’s tradition, we will generate first the motivation to listen to these teachings, which is to wish for the welfare of all beings and specifically to wish ourselves to attain a state where we can perform the welfare of all beings. So to encapsulate what we have done so far, we have covered the general presentation of mind, its two fold division into valid and invalid cognizers, the division of valid cognizers into direct valid cognizers and inferential valid cognizers. And then within the broader category of direct perceivers, we have covered the four categories of direct perceivers, sense direct perceivers, yogic direct perceivers, reflexive direct perceivers and mental direct perceivers. And we have finished also the exposition of inferential valid cognizers. So an inferential valid cognizer is a mind which arises in dependence on reasons, and the facility or difficulty with which it arises depends on the difficulty of the object it is trying to cognize.
If the object is an object which is easy to understand, it is easy to generate an inferential valid cognizer. If it is a difficult object, it is difficult to generate such a mind. Generally speaking, these are the minds we should strive to generate to understand the impermanence of persons or beings or the selflessness of persons or beings. So at present, we have reached the section on page 19 of your English translation, which is translated as the sustaining mind. These are the causes of inferential valid cognition.
So if we take a topic with respect to which we wish to generate inferential valid cognition, such as, for instance, the fact that sound is impermanent. Inferential valid cognition with respect to the fact that sound is impermanent can only be generated in dependence on reasons, Specifically, the syllogism, the subject sound is impermanent because it is a composite phenomenon. The subject here is sound, is impermanent, is the predicate because it is a composite phenomenon, is the reason composite phenomena here refer to phenomena which arise in dependence on causes and conditions. Now for the mind which realizes that the subject sound is impermanent to arise as an inferential valid cognizer, initially, two other minds must first be generated as its causes. And these are the minds which apprehend the reasons translated here as the sustaining minds.
Respectively, the mind which apprehends that sound is a composite phenomenon, and the mind which apprehends that everything which is the reason of the syllogism is necessarily its predicate, the necessary entailment. In other words, the mind which apprehends that everything which is a composite phenomenon is impermanent. In dependence on these two, the inferential valid cognizer which apprehend sound is impermanent can be generated. And therefore, there are two causes for the inferential valid cognizer which realizes that sound is impermanent. The first is that mind which realizes that sound is a composite phenomenon, and the second is that mind which realizes that every composite phenomenon is necessarily impermanent.
Now in both cases, the mind which realizes that every sound is a composite phenomenon can either be a direct valid cognizer or an inferential valid cognizer or a subsequent mind. Likewise, the mind which realizes that everything which is the reason is necessarily the predicate. In other words, in this example, which realizes that everything which is composite is necessarily impermanent can also be one of the three, a direct valid cognizer which realizes this, an inferential valid cognizer which realizes this, or a subsequent cognizer. Every single case, these two minds are the causes of the generation of the inferential valid cognizer realizing that sound is impermanent. So it is not sufficient for the minds realizing the reasons to be present for the inference to be drawn.
As you well know, in ancient India, it was widely believed that sound was permanent because it was a phenomenon which arose in dependence on space. It was as it were a manifestation of space, and space was permanent. And these syllogisms are addressed to Indians who subscribe to this view. So in such cases, one would give first an example to strengthen the syllogism which is being addressed to the third party. The example here might be the example of a vase.
The syllogism would then run the subject sound. It follows that it is impermanent because it is a composite phenomenon. For instance, a vase. The for instance, a vase refers to something which the person who is being addressed actually accepts. The person who is being addressed actually accepts that vase is a composite phenomenon.
The person who is being addressed, however, considers that sound itself is permanent, And therefore, has to shake that initial conviction before addressing one’s syllogism to them. And the way this initial conviction is shaken is by pointing out to the respondent that the subject sound, if it were indeed a permanent phenomenon, which is a position which is being accepted by the respondent, would necessarily be as a consequence of that uncomposite, non compounded. And then at this point, this is a position which a respondent does not wish to accept. So doubt arises in their mind. They think perhaps sound actually may not be a permanent phenomenon since it is clearly even in my system not a composite a non-composite phenomenon.
And at this point, one addresses the syllogism to them, the subject sound, it follows that it is an impermanent phenomenon because it is a composite phenomenon. And the definition of the mind which apprehends the reason is as follows. It is a mind within the continuum of a valid cognizer.
Which establishes that sound is impermanent, in dependence upon the reason of its being composite, and which is the common locus or the common denominator of a its incontrovertible understanding of either sounds being composite or of whatever being composite necessarily being impermanent, as well as the cause of the inferential valid cognizer, which establishes that sound is impermanent in dependence upon the reason of its being a composite phenomena from which it arises as its cause and condition. So you have an alternate translation of this difficult definition on page the middle of page 19 of your English translation. So we have explained the meaning of this definition, and then its individual parts are explained in the following part of the text. What is crucial here is to understand clearly that these minds which apprehend reasons can either be the subject being the reason of the syllogism or the reason necessarily being the predicate of the syllogism which establishes that the subject is the predicate. And then at present, there is a presentation of the six categories of the minds which apprehend the reason.
As you remember, there are two broad categories, which which are respectively the subject of the reason being the the subject of the syllogism being the reason, which is the first broad category of mind. And the second is the reason necessarily being the predicate. Now the minds apprehending the subject being the reason and the minds apprehending the reason being necessarily the predicate can either be, as Geshe-la explained, direct valid cognizers, inferential valid cognizers, or subsequent mind, which gives us all in all two times three equals six minds, and these are explained as follows. So for instance, the direct valid cognizer which realizes that the subject sound is a composite would be an instance of a mind apprehending the reason which is a valid cognizer. The second instant of the direct valid cognizer realizing that sound is a composite phenomenon would be an instance of a mind apprehending the reason, which is a subsequent cognizer, and the inferential valid cognizer realizing that the subject sound is composite.
Compositeness would be a third instance of a mind realizing the reason which is an inferential valid cognizer. And at present, the rationale for explaining the minds which apprehended the reasons are obviously that we have covered inferential valid cognizers and those minds which are the cause for the generation of inferential valid cognizers have to be explained. They have been explained and at present we pass onwards to an alternative or an alternate division of valid cognizers. So this is chapter three at present, which is an alternate twofold division of valid cognizers on page 21 of your English translation. Again, if valid awareness or valid cognizers is classified, it has two types, self ascertained valid awareness and other ascertained valid awareness.
Literally, these might be translated as valid cognizers which ascertain through another and valid cognizers which ascertain through oneself. Now valid cognizers which ascertain through oneself or through ones own power are simply most ordinary valid cognizers. For instance, the eye consciousness apprehending the first the first instance of the eye consciousness apprehending the color blue would be such a valid cognizer which apprehends by itself since it apprehends the color blue without depending on anything else. And you have in this category both direct and inferential valid cognizers. The examples which are traditionally given for the second category, which are valid cognizers, which ascertain through another, would be for instance, the eye consciousness which apprehends what looks like a fire at a very great distance.
Now for such an eye consciousness, the color of the fire can be ascertained, there is no doubt with that respect, and this eye consciousness itself because of the distance is unable to ascertain for sure that it is a fire it is observing. So it has to rely on another source of information for this. This does not mean that there is doubt in the conscious in the context of valid cognition. Simply, it means that the eye consciousness is unable to ascertain by itself that it is observing a fire. So this is a general meaning of the distinction between valid cognizers which ascertain by themselves and valid cognizers which ascertain by another.
Now at present, there are a series of debates on this topic. And since Geshe la says you are quite a bright class, he thinks he’s going to go into this technical material. So what one has to understand, however, is that first, the core position of the Lorig texts of the mind and awareness texts has been clearly posited. And then the reason for which one actually presents these debates is because, thereby, one is able to present a view of other scholars and analyze them and see whether it is suitable or not. These other scholars are called in Tibetan kachik, which means somebody else, literally another voice.
So one must understand that these texts of Lorig and the collected text here which are Düra and Tarig as well, all are rooted in the great Sautrāntika tradition of Buddhist logic epitomized in Pramānavārttika, and that they are an elaboration on this. And while the very notion of a valid cognizer which ascertains by itself and a valid cognizer which ascertains by another are present in Pramānavārttika. They are developed here in great detail. The way this is done is that one would present the position of another scholar, And then one would debate this position and see whether it is suitable or not. And if it is not suitable, then refute it before affirming clearly or presenting clearly the suitable position.
So this is how the debates are structured. So this is the first debate on page 21 of your text. One asserts one here is Kachik who is the scholar with whom we disagree. New nondeceptive cognition ascertained by itself to be valid awareness is a definition of self ascertained valid awareness or what we have called a valid cognizer by itself. Now here, the opponent is proposing an alternate definition
Of, self ascertained, valid awareness. The author of our check of our text response, it follows if it is self ascertained valid awareness, it is necessarily ascertained by itself to be awareness because you accept this thesis. The thesis refers to the position of the opponent scholar. If so, it it if it is if so, if it is that it follows it must ascertain itself because you accept that. In other words, it ascertains itself as a consciousness.
And jumping down a little bit, if so, take sense perception holding form. In other words, a sense valid cognizer apprehending a form. It follows that this sense valid cognizer apprehending a form apprehends itself because it satisfies the definition you have proposed. Now this is not possible since the reason is given to the right in the middle of your text from a both sense perception holding form or form, it comprehends only form since otherwise, it would be a reflexive consciousness. So we have led the core thesis of the opponent’s scholar through a series of reasonings to an inner contradiction.
So the core position here is that when something is a valid cognizer, it does not necessarily realize itself. And this is the core position which the opponent scholar does not accept. In the following debate, second part of page 21, again, one asserts this is a second opponent. If something is self ascertained valid awareness, self perception experiencing it necessarily ascertains it to be valid awareness. Yes.
The author of the text, the author of the text responds, take the subject sense perception holding blue or apprehending blue. It follows self perception, in other words, reflexive cognition experiencing it determines it to be valid awareness. Why is this the case? Because it is self ascertained valid awareness. So this is something which is accepted by both the opponent and by ourselves.
Now the reason is established. Why? The reason here is it is self ascertained valid awareness. Why is it self ascertained valid awareness? Because it belongs to one of the two categories thereof, which is it is either self ascertained valid valid awareness or other ascertained valid awareness, and it is not the second category.
In other words, it is not other ascertained valid awareness. The first is established. The first here refers to the fact that it is self ascertained valid awareness. Why is it self ascertained valid awareness? Because it is valid awareness.
The second is established, in other words, it is not other ascertained valid awareness. Why? Because sense perception holding form is not other ascertained valid awareness. Why is it not other ascertained valid awareness? Because it is self ascertained valid awareness, the two are mutually incompatible.
Why is this the case? Because take form, it follows self perception holding in it. In other words, self perception apprehending it is self ascertained valid awareness. Why is this the case? Because it is matter.
All form is necessarily matter. So as you remember, Geshe-la gave us an example of a valid cognizer whose ascertainment depends on another. The instance of a flickering flame of a lamp or color orange in the distance, which is far enough that it is not possible on the basis of its appearance alone to establish whether or not it is a flame and one must rely on other sources of information. So here, this debate has been led to its logical conclusion with the rejoinder that the position of the opponent is impossible since the form which is apprehended by a visual consciousness is matter. And Geshe la says, a classical rejoinder by a sneaky opponent, he actually said a rather dirty opponent, would be one who says that the form excuse me, the subject actually is an invalid subject.
So this is rather unethical approach in debate to eliminate the lines of reasoning of your opponent by saying that the subject itself is internally contradictory and is not valid as a subject. He says this is not nice debating. So moving onwards on page 22, I will translate directly from the text. The, thrust of the debate here is what precisely the, reflexive consciousness which perceives a consciousness perceives. So our text moves onwards and says, if one accepts the root, in other words, if one accepts this core position, then it would follow that the direct reflexive consciousness which experiences the sense consciousness apprehending the color blue would realize that this sense consciousness apprehending the color blue is a direct valid cognizer, because it is a valid cognizer itself.
You have asserted the reason, but you have asserted that all valid cognizers are reflexive consciousnesses which realize themselves to be valid cognizers. This is unacceptable because although it is a consciousness, it does not necessarily realize that it is a valid cognizer. In other words, the reflexive consciousness realizes the consciousness nature of itself, but does not realize the attributes of itself. And then moving onwards, these are the debates in the middle of page 22 of your text. I will translate directly.
If one says, this is another opponent, that reflexive direct perceiver which experiences the sense consciousness realizing blue. It follows that it realizes its being a valid cognizer, which is a sense direct perceiver realizing blue, because it has apprehended itself being a valid cognizer, which realizes that it is a sense direct cognizer apprehending the color blue. To this position, we answer, there is no necessary entailment. In other words, whatever is the reason is not necessarily the predicate. The reason itself, however, is established because it, in other words, a core subject of the debate, has apprehended that it is a direct valid cognizer, which realizes the sense direct cognizer apprehending the color blue.
However, even though it is a valid cognizer, and even though it has indeed apprehended this fact, this in no way entails that it has realized it. And moving onwards with our text, we are at the bottom or the bottom part of page 22. Again, this is another line of reasoning which is presented. It follows self perception here, we always translate as reflexive cognition. The reflexive cognition experiencing the sense perception apprehending blue does not comprehend the sense perception holding blue to be valid awareness.
This is the core of the debates we have had throughout. Why? Because though it can comprehend the nature of sense perception apprehending blue, and that sense perception apprehending blue is an awareness, that sense perception apprehending blue is valid awareness must be ascertained in dependence on another conventional valid awareness occurring after it. So the question here is what mind actually realizes that the sense perception, the fact that the sense perception apprehending blue is a valid awareness. What mind actually realizes this if it is not realized by that mind itself or by the reflexive consciousness of that mind?
And the answer is it can only be realized by a mind which occurs after it. And then at present, we posit our own system. This is the core system which is accepted by the author of the Lorig text. The definitions may be positive according to the ornament of cognition which states, and Geshe la will continue.
And the definitions of these two valid cognizers posited in a text which is called the ornament of cognition. It’s actually the ornament of valid cognition. One of the Pramāna text which states the definition of at the bottom of page 22 of your text, The definition of self ascertained valid awareness is valid awareness that is capable of initiating ascertainment by its own strength such that it would not occur if its object that was ascertained did not occur. And the meaning of this in a nutshell is, as Geshe la explained, that it is a valid cognition, which is able to ascertain its own object by its own strength. On the other hand, the valid cognitions which so called other ascertained valid awarenesses are defined in the ornament of cognition as valid awarenesses that necessarily initiate ascertainment by another strength such that it would not occur if its object that was ascertained did not occur.
These are for instance, the valid cognizers which perceive the appearance in a distance of the flame of the orange flame of a butter lamp, and because of the distance are not able to ascertain definitely whether this is an orange flame or not, but have to rely on another mind for this. Now, all the direct sense perceiver which sees this object is itself not afflicted by doubt. Doubt is nonetheless present in the mind, and for this reason, such minds are called by Zhabaiyin, other ascertained valid awarenesses or we could also call them valid awarenesses which ascertain through another. So if you have, we will stop here. If you have any questions on this, difficult material, please feel free to ask them.
I don’t understand your question. Take your time. Think it clearly. Think about it quietly. Let’s have some other questions.
Think about it quietly, formulated clearly, and we’ll come back to it. Yes, please. It is a valid cognizer from its own side. So it cognizes only its factor of clarity and only its factor of clarity. And this is the existence of these reflexive consciousnesses is asserted by three of the schools of tenets, which is the Sautrāntika school, the Cittamātra school, and the Yogachara-Svatāntrika Madhyamaka school.
And the main reason for which they accept the existence of reflexive consciousness is because they accept true existence. Because they accept establishment by its own characteristics. Can I ask a follow-up question? In general ballpark. The presentation of is this says there is big doubt about this.
He has not put great thought into whether ants or not have other powered valid cognizers, but he will. Also, one must keep in mind, he says that ants don’t really have very developed eye faculties and they rely heavily on their sense of smell. Are there other questions? Have you clarified your doubt? Excuse me.
It’s easier to distance. It can be sure of what? To give another example, may be clear, Geshe-la says, imagine that on a table you have an Utpala flower and you yourself or someone who knows what the flower is, but have never seen an Utpala flower even though you know the name Utpala. The eye consciousness which apprehends the Utpala flower is a valid cognizer with respect to the Utpala flower as being a flower. It is sure that the Utpala flower is a flower.
On the other hand, in dependence on the eye consciousness apprehending this flower, the conceptual doubt, is this an Utpala or not arises. So even though this eye consciousness is a valid cognizer, in dependence on it, a state of doubt arises, and therefore, it is said to be a valid cognizer whose ascertainment depends on others. If at this point a third party enters the room who knows what the flower is, sees the Utpala flower on the table and in dependence on this, an eye consciousness, which is a direct valid cognizer with respect to Utpala flower arises. That eye consciousness is a valid cognizer which ascertains in dependence upon itself and not in dependence upon another. The eye consciousness in the mind of the person who knows this is a flower, but is not sure whether it’s an Utpala flower or not, is a an eye consciousness which is a valid cognizer with respect to the fact it is a flower, and precisely because doubt arises in dependence on this whether or not it is a Utpala is a valid cognizer which ascertains to the power of others.
So here, for instance, the eye consciousness which apprehends an orangish color at a distance is indeed a valid cognizer with respect to that orangish color. It cannot by itself as an eye consciousness alone determine whether that orangish color is a flame or not. It must rely on something else. That alone is sufficient to make or to turn it into a valid cognizer which relies on another. Generally speaking, valid cognizers are divided into two, valid cognizers which rely on themselves and those which rely on others or on another.
Both are fully valid cognizers.
So the process here, Geshe la says, is for instance, one where the eye consciousness which perceives this color orange at a great distance is unable because of the distance by its own force, by its own power to determine whether this flickering orange color is or is not a flame. So the valid cognizer perceiving the color orange gives rise to this doubt whether or not it is a flame. Then if a third party enters the room and tells us incontrovertibly this is a flame, then a conception which is a subsequent cognizer, this is a flame arises within our mind. in dependence upon that, it is possible for the valid cognizer which relies, the valid cognizer which apprehends this as a flame to arise, but it cannot arise by its own force. Oh, yes.
Yes. Yes, please. Where do So Geshe says if we analyze the process, we would find that the initial step prior to visualization is observing a physical representation, which might be a thangka or a statue. And then this observation would actually lead to the generation of a valid cognizer. For instance, a visual consciousness which perceives the first instant of the thangka one is visualizing.
Then after this, when one visualizes, one is dealing with a mental consciousness which is conceptual in nature. It is a subsequent consciousness since it arises in dependence on a first instance of a valid cognizer. And then through repeated familiarization with this subsequent consciousness, this subsequent conceptual consciousness, it would become clearer and clearer. Becomes very much like a valid cognizer. Yeah.
So with your syllogism, the most important would be the pervasion. In other words, that the reason is necessarily the predicate, that everything which is composite is necessarily impermanent since it’s broader in scope. Well, there’s a lot of debates about this one. No. It is not necessarily compositeness which has to be given as a reason for sound being impermanent.
One can also give as a reason for sounds being impermanent, that it is a thing, that it is a cause, that it is caused, in other words, an effect, and so forth. However, there is an uncommon intrinsic relation between a phenomenon being composite and a phenomenon being impermanent, in other words, changing instant by instant, which leads one to prefer to give the reason that it’s composite to justify the fact that it is impermanent. So the Buddha said many times that sound is composite, but that would not be the reason which would be advanced here since we are on the path of analysis or reasoning. And, one would then rely for these demonstrations on, the methods taught in Pramāna Vartika, which rely in turn on the Pramāna Sutras and so forth. So in this case, we would not rely on quotes at all, however, since we would be practicing the path of reasoning, and we would rely exclusively on the stainless reasoning.
So one would not quote passages from the to justify this, but would instead give reasons. I didn’t understand. Can you repeat? Once that is realized, yes? When when you first when you first say sound is impermanent, there are two lines that have to be involved there.
But once those two lines have arisen, sound is impermanent. So if we take it as as an example, the syllogism of subject sound is impermanent because of being a composite phenomenon. This syllogism is addressed to a valid opponent who actually does not believe that the subject sound is impermanent, but suspect it may be. He, however, does believe that the subject sound is composite and that everything which is composite is necessarily impermanent. These two minds which realize the reasons are therefore present within his mind stream.
And then one points out to him, this subject sound of which you think that it might be permanent. Were it to be permanent, it could not be composite, which is something which you accept. And this generates sufficient doubt to then impel the syllogism, which one asserts to him, which is the subject sound. It follows. Well, in this case, the consequence
It follows that it is impermanent because it is a composite phenomenon. Now at that point, the two minds realizing, the reasons, which are respectively the mind realizing that the subject sound is composite and the mind realizing that everything which is composite is necessarily impermanent, give rise to a new mind. The new mind is the first instant actually of the inferential valid cognizer realizing that the subject sound is impermanent. At that instant, he ceases to be an authentic opponent since he has actually realized that the subject sound is impermanent. And at that very instant, even though within his mind stream subsists the two minds which, consider that sound is composite and that everything which is composite is necessarily impermanent.
These two minds are no longer called minds ascertaining the reasons since the syllogism itself would no more be valid for him. Are there any other doubts? Generally speaking, most visualizations are memories. A memory is a state of mind which rises in dependence on a valid cognition which actually gives rise to it or which impels it. However, not all visualizations are memories.
For instance, the visualization of a deity for which one has not read the description and which arises spontaneously in the mind would actually be a Geshe-la thinks probably a mind of belief, but would not be a memory because there would be no first instance of valid cognition, for instance, perception of a body or representation, which would impel it. So then in dependence on memories, then one would cause the image to arise within one’s mind, one would flesh it out based upon what one has studied and so forth. But for it to appear as the actual Buddha would be very difficult. Now Geshe la would like to point out that one can generate the mind of Shamatha or Shine in dependence on any representation, not merely that of a Buddha. We will stop here for today.
Okay. Thank you.
Key terms in this teaching
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- lorig
- Awareness and knowledge, the study of mind and mental factors, in order to understand and control the delusions. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- shamatha zhi nä (Tib)
- Calm abiding; a state of concentration in which the mind is able to abide steadily, without effort and for as long as desired, on an object of meditation. There are nine stages in its development. LYWA
- Svatantrika Madhyamaka u ma rang gyü pa (Tib)
- The Middle Way Autonomy school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Autonomy school accepts autonomous reasons and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
- true existence den par yö pa (Tib)
- The concrete, real existence from its own side that everything appears to possess; in fact, both self and phenomena are empty of true existence. LYWA
- valid awareness pramana (Skt); tshema (Tib)
- A new non-deceptive cognition. There are two types: valid perception, such as the eye consciousness seeing a flower, and valid inference, such as inferring fire from seeing smoke. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.