1 h 44 min · 5,463 words · 20 May 2014 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 105-minute session, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen conducts an in-depth examination of how consciousness is categorized within Tibetan Buddhist epistemology, focusing especially on the relationship between mind and mental factors. He begins by mapping the sevenfold subdivision of awareness and knowledge—valid and invalid cognizers, mistaken and unmistaken consciousnesses, conceptual and non-conceptual minds, sensory and mental consciousnesses—then turns to the sixth subdivision: mind and mental factors. Using the concrete example of reflecting on death and impermanence, Geshe-la explains how a main mind apprehends the essential nature of its object while five omnipresent mental factors simultaneously engage specific features—attention, discrimination, intention, application, and contact. He introduces the five similarities that bind mind and mental factors (shared base, time, substance, object, and aspect), then spends considerable time teaching the logical-analytical tool of “mu” (logical possibilities), showing how understanding the four, three, two, or one-possibility relationships between concepts deepens Buddhist philosophical reasoning. Pitched at serious students of Buddhist epistemology with some familiarity with Tibetan categorizations.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2014-05-20 – KR.mp3
UUID: ef568c15-1416-47f7-b60e-3015069c66a1
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Awareness and Knowledge
Date: 2014-05-20
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~5,460
As usual, we will generate the motivation before receiving the teachings. There is therefore a sevenfold subdivision of awareness and knowledge. First, the sevenfold subdivision of awareness and knowledge. Then the subdivision thereof into valid and inverted cognizers. The subdivision into mistaken and unmistaken mind.
The subdivision into conceptual and non conceptual consciousnesses, the subdivision into sense consciousnesses and mental consciousnesses. Into And the mind and mental factors. So the sub subdivision of consciousness into awareness, the sevenfold subdivision of consciousness into awareness and knowledge is probably positive in terms of the mode of engagement consciousness has with respect to its object. It seems difficult, however, to assert that all instances of consciousness must necessarily belong to one of the categories of the seven fold subdivision of awareness and knowledge. For instance, bodhicitta or great compassion for that matter, in the mind of a first ground bodhisattva may or may not be included within the seven fold subdivision.
It is something one has to analyze. Likewise, the mind which projects an ethics of the abandonment of the 10 virtues within our mind stream exists, whether such a mind can be included within the seven fold subdivision of awareness and knowledge or not, or for that matter whether the mind which engages in generosity can be included within that subdivision or not, is something which must be investigated. However, it is absolutely hopeless to try to understand whether or not, for instance, ethics or generosity fit within the sevenfold subdivision of awareness and knowledge, if one doesn’t at first understand clearly the sevenfold subdivision of awareness and knowledge and the respective definitions of the subdivisions. However, the second second of the six fold subdivision in of minds into valid and invalid invalid cognizers is probably exhaustive. Whatever is a mind is necessarily either a valid or an invalid cognizer.
Likewise, the third of the six fold subdivision of minds into mistaken and unmistaken consciousnesses is also probably exhaustive. As you remember, a mistaken consciousness is a consciousness with respect to which the mode of appearance of the object is different from its actual mode of existence. Whereas an unmistaken consciousness is a consciousness for which the mode of appearance and the mode of existence of an object are identical. Consciousnesses are either mistaken or unmistaken. Likewise, for the fourth subdivision into conceptual and non conceptual consciousnesses, this is also an exhaustive subdivision.
A simple definition or a simple presentation of the meaning of conceptual consciousnesses is that conceptual consciousnesses engage their objects through imputation. Non conceptual consciousnesses on the other hand engage their object nakedly. Regarding the fifth subdivision of consciousness into sensory and mental consciousnesses, as you remember, a sensory consciousness is a consciousness whose uncommon controlling condition is a physical sense organ, whereas a mental consciousness is a consciousness whose uncommon controlling condition is a preceding instant of a mental consciousness. Whether this subdivision is exhaustive or not is contingent on the school of tenets one is positing. Fundamentally, from the standpoint of Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, it is an exhaustive division.
In other words, all consciousnesses are either sensory or mental consciousnesses. With regarding the other schools of tenets, it is contingent on whether or not the school of tenets accepts the existence of reflexive consciousness. The Sautrāntika school of tenets, for instance, accepts the existence of reflexive consciousness as does the Cittamātra school of tenets. For these two schools of tenets, therefore, the subdivision of consciousness into mental and sensory consciousnesses is not exhaustive. On the other hand, the within the Mādhyamika school, these Svatāntrika Madhyamikas are subdivided into two, one which accepts the existence of reflexive consciousnesses, and the other which does not.
For the one which does, the Yogachara-Svatāntrika, this subdivision is not exhaustive. For the one which does not, the Sautrāntika-Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, this subdivision is exhaustive. The sixth fold subdivision, which we shall be covering today, is that of consciousness subdivided into mind and mental factors. Now from the standpoint of the final viewpoint of the Buddhist philosophical schools of tenets, the Prāsaṇgika School of Tenet, this is an exhaustive subdivision, since this school of tenets does not accept the existence of reflexive consciousnesses. For the other schools of tenets, it is a more delicate matter, the Sautrāntika for instance, accept the existence of reflexive consciousness, and therefore for the Sautrāntika, the subdivision of consciousness into mind and mental factors is not exhaustive.
Probably you go to 08:00, so Christel, since you’re leaving at 08:00, could you answer a question before leaving? Could you give the subdivision sevenfold subdivision of mind of consciousness and awareness, please? Please. I’m sorry. I’m so sorry.
Can you give the seven fold subdivision of awareness Can and you give me? Really? And, Shaya? Oh. Yeah.
Really? What’s the last one? So we will stop for a couple of minutes and if you could please reflect on the meaning of this Sevenfold subdivision. Otherwise, when you go home, you will have wasted your time coming here. Then reflect on the meaning, and then we will talk about it a bit.
Sevenfold? Subdivision of awareness That Ralph just What Ralph gave. Yes. Repeat it for those of us who work there? Can you give Can you give me?
Lordy. Do you understand? They can give the supplication. Give them. I thought I thought maybe you probably No.
No. God lordy. Yeah. Can’t hear you. No problem.
So we’ll go once again in sequence. Valid cognizers are divided into two, direct valid cognizers and inferential valid cognizers. Minds which are not valid cognizers, invalid cognizers are subdivided into five. Subsequent cognizers, conviction, doubt, inattentive minds, and wrong consciousnesses. You believe there is such a thing as a subsequent valid cognizer?
So in the Sautrāntika system of tenets, there is no such thing as a subsequent valid cognizer. But but in the Prāsaṇgika system, there is such a thing as a subsequent valid cognizer. Can you can you give me I understand? The seventh subdivision of awareness and knowledge which we covered over the last month and a half, can you give? What example, what instance would you give of conviction?
I mean, as you said correctly, the difference between convictions and valid cognizers is contingent on controvertibility. Convictions are controvertible, valid cognizers are not. That is the main difference. Controvertibility means the capacity to be certain or not. A mind which is incontrovertible is a mind which is certain.
A mind which is controvertible is a mind which is not 100% certain. Enaminate. Could you Shaya, could you give the meaning of the definition of a direct valid cognizer? But you have to speak louder because I I Really? Good.
Good. 99%. Crystal, what is the definition of an inferential valid cognizer? What example would you give? Smoke and fire are not inferential guided cognizers.
Right? They are they are matter, not they? The mind which apprehends Yes. So it’s a valid cognizer, which on the basis of the presence of smoke on a smoky pass, infers the previous existence of fire. The definition of a subsequent cognizer.
Any area? Subsequence. Subsequence. Non conceptual knowledge of his using parent condition as a previous moment of consciousness. That’s your definition.
There’s no certainty for that. Right? There are both conceptual and non conceptual subsequent cognizers. So a subsequent cognizer is not necessarily either conceptual or non conceptual. Right?
Mhmm. I have such a faulty nerve. I can’t remember. No. No question.
No No questions. After, yeah, eight. So we will pass on to the final of the six fold subdivisions, the presentation of mind in terms of of consciousness, in terms of mind and mental factors. So mind or main minds, the two terms are synonymous, is defined as follows. A main consciousness which is posited in terms of apprehending the nature of its object.
What does this mean? If for instance we reflect on death and impermanence, When we reflect on death and impermanence, actually the main mind apprehends what? It apprehends our body, the aggregates, in other words. Now, when on top of this mind which apprehends the mere aggregates, certain functions of the mind intervene. These functions are called mental factors.
For instance, the function of focusing single pointedly on the on the object, in this case the aggregates, the function of analyzing the object, the aggregate, The function of not forgetting, of recollection, in other words, of the aggregates. These are all mental factors. Now according to Jangkya Rolpay Dorje’s Lorig, the definition of mental factors are a knowledge which belongs to the circle of any of the main minds which are similar to it and which apprehends whichever feature of its object. So when we say that mental factors apprehend whichever feature of their object, What is referred to is the fact that mental factors apprehend, for instance, features of the objects through analysis on the basis of the aggregates, or they focus single pointedly on the object on the basis of the aggregates, and so forth. Now within the definition of mental factors, when one says that mental factors are knowledges which apprehend whichever feature of their object, this is something one must understand clearly.
In Tibetan generally, mind is sem and mental factors are semjung. Semjung means literally what is arisen from mind. Then it can be understood in a very coarse fashion as an effect of mind, although it’s a little bit dangerous to put it in these terms. It is a byproduct. It is literally one of the components of a mind which is focused on an object.
For instance, if the main mind is focused on the aggregates, then that component which is single pointedly focused is a mental factor. That other component which analyzes the aggregates is also a mental factor. The other component which does not forget the aggregates is likewise a mental factor. In the multiple presentations of Lorig, of awareness and knowledge, there are different subdivisions of mind and mental factors, but the essence is the same. And in the definition of mental factors, when it is said that mental factors are knowledges which belong to the circle of whichever main mind which is similar to them them, these similarities are fivefold.
So when one refers to the five similarities between a main mind and the mental factors which surround it, this can best be understood with our example of the aggregates. If the main mind is focused on the aggregates or the body, then that mental factor which has the same base as it, in other words, which is focused on the same object, is the mental factor of wisdom which examines the aggregates. Then these five similarities between mind and mental factor are a similarity of base, a similarity of object, a similarity of aspect, a similarity of time, and a similarity of substance. Now when we regarding the first similarity, similarity of base, when we speak of a similarity of base between the main mind observing the aggregates and, for instance, the mental factor of wisdom analyzing the aggregates, this means that the uncommon controlling condition of both the main mind and of the mental factor are the same. In this case, this uncommon controlling condition is the mental consciousness.
The second, the order of this represents a similarity is a bit different at present. The second similarity is similarity of time. This means that mind and mental factor are simultaneous. The third similarity is that of substance. This means that if the main mind is a sense consciousness, the mental factor is necessarily a sense consciousness.
If the main mind is a mental consciousness, then the mental factor is necessarily a mental consciousness as well. The fourth similarity is the similarity of object. This means that if the main mind is focused on the aggregates, then likewise the mental factors are focused on the aggregates. And the fifth similarity, the similarity of aspect means that if the main mind is focusing on the aggregates in the aspect of death and impermanence, likewise, the mental factor is doing the same. It’s very helpful to analyze these topics in terms of logical possibilities, what is called Mu in Tibetan.
These are the logical options which two sets entertain. For instance, if we take main minds and mental consciousnesses, how many logical possibilities are there? There is something which is a main mind and not a mental consciousness. This would be for instance, the eye consciousness perceiving form. There is something which is a mental consciousness and not a main mind.
This would be for instance the sensation sensation associated with the eye consciousness perceiving form. There is something which is both a main mind and a mental consciousness, it is just an instant of mental consciousness, and there is something which is neither a main mind nor a mental consciousness, and this would for instance be a sensory consciousness, which is a mental factor. So I told Geshe-la, you don’t necessarily know what Mu or logical possibilities are. The term Mu in Tibetan means boundary. Now this corresponds almost exactly to set theory in English.
When we’re speaking of logical possibilities, we are speaking of the number of possibilities between two sets. Are these two sets separate? For instance, cars and persons. These are completely separate sets. Someone is a car and not a person, or a person and not a car.
Nothing is both, and nothing is neither. In this case, we say we have two possibilities, something which is a car and not a person, something which is a person and not a car. On the other hand, if there is an intersection of the sets, in other words, if there is something which is both, let us say for instance, a person and a person who is Caucasian, then it is clear that we have something which is both a person and a person which is Caucasian. And if we analyze the possibilities, have something which is both a person and a person which is Caucasian, something which is a person and not a person which is Caucasian, but we have no instance of something which is a person which is Caucasian and not a person, and we have an instance of something which is neither. We have therefore three possibilities.
In terms of logic, you can have four, three, or two possibilities. And Geshe-la says, it is very helpful to analyze the relationship between main minds and sense consciousnesses in the same way. So just as main minds and mental consciousness, consciousness present four logical possibilities. These are two sets which intersect, and in addition, there’s an element which is neither of the two sets. Likewise, main minds and sensory consciousnesses also present four possibilities.
You should find them by yourselves. Generally speaking, mental factors are subdivided into 51. These are the five omnipresent mental factors. The five mental factors which determine their object, the 11 virtuous mental factors, the six root non virtues, and the 20 subsidiary non virtues. These are listed on page thirty five and thirty six of mind in Tibetan Buddhism, if you have it.
Page 36, excuse me. Then it is indispensable that you memorize these five subdivisions on page 36. Omnipresent, determining virtuous, with afflictions, secondary afflictions, and changeable mental factors. It’s very difficult to understand the 51 mental factors, if you haven’t initially memorized the five subdivisions, the five omnipresent, the five determining, the 11 virtuous, the six root afflictions, the 20 secondary afflictions, and the four changeable mental factors. The first subdivision are the five omnipresent mental factors in Tibetan they go to all, literally.
These are feeling, discrimination, intention, and I will translate the force as application, instead of mental engagement, and contact. Now these five omnipresent mental factors necessarily engage any any object a main mind apprehends. As you remember, when we were talking about doubt within the seven fold division of consciousnesses into awareness and knowledge. The definition of doubt is a mind which oscillates between two alternatives by its own force. And Geshe-la pointed out the importance of the term by its own force in this context.
When the mind oscillates between two extremes by its own force, it is a main mind. However, if we take a doubtful mind, there is a mental factor of sensation, which is one of the five omnipresent factors necessarily associated with this main mind. Precisely because it is one of the five omnipresent factors. This mental factor of sensation, because it is similar in aspect to the main mind, shares that doubting component with the main mind. In other words, it alternates between two possibilities.
However, it does not do so by its own force. Because it does not do so by its own force, the sensation which is associated to a main mind of doubt is not doubt from within the seven fold subdivision of awareness and knowledge. So what is really important for you to understand here is that within the five similarities between a main mind and the associated mental factors, which are, as you remember, base, object, aspect, time, and substance. The third similarity, which is aspect in the context of the example of doubt and the associated sensation, manifests through doubt and its associated sensation alternating between two extremes. This is the aspect which they share.
Then I have answered Richard’s question of yours. You asked me a long time ago this question, I have answered your question. Then I will stop here for today. If you have questions, I will take three questions today. Okay.
Pamela? Just the belief the belief or the conviction that the belief that the sun will rise tomorrow is a conviction, is it not? Because the planet could be destroyed between now and then. Or is that considered something that is certain? Proposition is the sum I can translate this two ways.
I can translate this in function of conviction, which is one of the seven subdivisions, or of belief, which is a mental factor. Do it as don’t do it as a mental factor. A main main mind. Okay. And you want to know Do it in terms of the sevenfold.
Okay. And you want to know if it’s certain or not? Yes. Then the certainty that the mind that the sun will be rising tomorrow is not a conviction, conviction, since it is present definitely within all our minds, it is a valid cognizer. And precisely because nobody has any doubt whatsoever that the sun will rise tomorrow, I would put it to you that it is a direct valid cognizer.
Then the belief that we will have breakfast tomorrow is a very different affair altogether. Some of us may, others may not. Hey, Mach. Is it an appropriate analogy to think of a main mind as the palm of the hand that holds an object and the five omnipresence mental factors is like the fingers that feel out the features of the object? Yes.
It’s pretty good. It’s better to think of main minds and mental factors in terms of the trunk of a tree and the branches of a tree. A tree necessarily has a trunk, and obviously there are branches, roots, and so forth. Richard? Yes.
I’m I’m not clear as to why the sun will rise tomorrow, why that is a direct valid cognizer as opposed to an inferential one where it’s based on one’s reasoning that it’s sun has risen on all previous days, therefore it will rise tomorrow. If it were an inferential valid cognizer, you’d have to posit a reason, but what reason could you posit? On the other hand, every one of us is completely certain that the sun will rise tomorrow. There’s no doubt whatsoever in our minds. So it has to be a valid cognizer.
Then I will put it to you, it’s a direct valid cognizer. There’s food for thought in this one. For instance, if we take the relationship between smoke and fire, it is definite that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. For instance, if we see smoke on a snowy peak, we infer from the presence of smoke, the presence of fire at some point. Yeah.
Natalie. Natalie. In relation to the six subdivisions, I’m not really I don’t understand what exhaustive actually means in that context. An exhaustive division is a division with no remainder. So if you say everything which is a mind is necessarily mistaken, a mistaken mind, an unmistaken mind, that’s an exhaustive division, because there’s nothing which is a mind, which is neither a mistaken nor an unmistaken mind.
If on the other hand, you say that cars are subdivided into Holdens and Toyotas, that’s not an exhaustive division, because there are Fords. Right? But if you say cars are subdivided into Toyotas, and cars which aren’t Toyotas, that’s an exhaustive subdivision, because any car is either a Toyota or not a Toyota. Is it possible that the idea that everyone accepts is an unstable guarantee. Everyone at one point in history accepted that the earth was flat.
It is not. Everyone accepted that the sun traveled around the earth. It does not. Is that not an unstable basis? Maybe your question is related to the sun’s rising.
Right? Yes. It’s a little bit of a valid reason. So it’s it’s something which calls for analysis, for instance at dawn, which is around 06:00 here, when the sun rises over the horizon, we see the light of the sun, then obviously the light of the sun is the sun, isn’t it? Then the moment we see the light of the sun, we have seen the sun.
So it is related to the topic in terms of generating the inferential valid cognizer, which is certain of the existence of fire based on the existence of smoke. This inferential valid cognizer arises in dependence on the object and on the time of the observation of smoke. Based on this, even though fire is unseen, an inferential valid cognizer, which is certain of the existence of fire, arises. Yeah. Would you please tell Geshe-la that this very question, will the sun rise tomorrow, was raised by a very famous Western philosopher in the seventeenth century, and we’re still talking about it today in Western epistemology.
When I was at the Swiss Federal Polytechnic, I’m studying mathematics, this question was addressed in the first year of probabilities. The calculations were made by Laplace, and it’s not a probability of one. There is a little bit of a debate about this one. 99%. It doesn’t stay.
Valid cognition and all the states of mind. Is that present state of mind? I might be getting confused. It’s I think of it as being present, not past or future. While the object of a valid cognizer may be past, present, or future, a valid cognizer itself is present.
Yeah. Just for the record, I told Geshe-la I don’t accept that the sun’s dawning tomorrow is a valid cognizer. No. It’s conviction. It’s a very powerful conviction, but you can calculate the probability that the sun not rise tomorrow and it’s not one.
If it were one, it would be a certainty, you know. Then you have to look for yourself, right, whether it’s true or not. So regarding logical possibilities, which Tibetans call ‘mu’, it’s really, it’s a way of understanding the relationship of two concepts. It’s the best way for you to deepen your understanding of Buddhist philosophy without debating. So in the monasteries, we used it all the time.
Now basically, I’ll explain it through examples. Those of you who’ve studied a bit of math, it’s very easy to understand through set theory, but I think nobody has math, so examples is the best way to do it. Right? So what would be an example of four four logical possibilities? For instance, let us take, Let me think about it, because I have to give you examples which are easy for you, and I think in terms of debate, so they don’t work very well.
What about cause and effect? Yeah, but that’s what I’m trying to avoid. I’d like examples with Hornets and Holdens. Okay. Let us take the example of somebody who has an apartment in Paris and somebody who has an apartment in London.
Okay? That’s a good example. Apartment in Paris and apartment in London. So, that’s why we’re asking, we have two sets, right? The people who have an apartment in London and the people who have an apartment in Paris.
Now in your opinion, what is the relationship between these two sets? The people. So you have somebody who owns you have a group of people who owns an apartment in London and another group of people who owns an apartment in Paris. So first question, is it possible to have someone who has both? Yes.
So you have people who are very wealthy, they have an apartment in both London and Paris. Right? So if we draw our set, we call it a set, a set is just a group, right? People who have an apartment in Paris, we already know that there are some people who also have an apartment in London, right? That we know for sure.
Then are there people who have an apartment in Paris who don’t have an apartment in London? Sure, right? Are there people who have an apartment in London who don’t have an apartment in Paris? Sure, right? So these two sets intersect, right?
You have most people have Well actually, some people have apartments in Paris, some people have apartments in London, then some very privileged people have apartments in both, and most of us poor chaps have apartments in neither, right? So most of us have nothing. So this is a case where two sets, apartment in Paris and apartment in London, have four logical possibilities. You have some you have an intersection, something which is both, you have something which is the one apartment in Paris and not the other apartment in London, you have something which is the other apartment in London and not the first, and you have something which is neither. Do you understand?
These are four possibilities, right? Then whenever you deal with concepts in Buddhist philosophy, ask the question of possibilities. For instance, if we now take a more complicated case, the one Geshe-la gave, Main minds and Main minds and mental consciousness. Right? And Geshe-la said there was four possibilities.
What does that mean? That means that there is something which is both a main mind and a mental consciousness. Right? What would be both a main mind and a mental consciousness? Just mental consciousness.
Right? Then there is something which is a main mind but not a mental consciousness. Right? Now what example would we give of that? A sense consciousness.
Right? There is something which is a mental consciousness but not a main mind. Do you remember the example he gave? Sensation which is associated with a mental consciousness. And there’s something which is neither, which could be, for instance, this pen.
So there are four logical possibilities. Now in debate you just do this all the time, are there four, three, two, then one, there’s a technicality, you can say this one possibility is an example, it means two sets are identical. So this is what four possibilities are. Three logical possibilities, you have the following possible scenarios. Let us take for instance, let’s be anthropomorphic, Australians and human beings.
How many possibilities are there? And by Australian we mean someone who’s entitled to an Australian passport, so kangaroos don’t qualify. How many possibilities, in your opinion? Yes. Why?
Because somebody can be an Australian, somebody can be an Australian and a human being, and somebody can be neither. Yes. So you can have Australian and human being, you can have human being and not Australian, you can have neither, but you can’t have Australian and not human being. So if you just show this in terms of sets, what would you have? You have the set of human beings, right, then you have the set of Australians which are subset, and you have people which are neither.
Right? Those are three logical possibilities. So in set theory, this is literally a intersect b, right? And in set theory, would be b, or in this case a is black, right? So a is included in b.
Right? Now what would be two possibilities? Can someone come up with an example for us? Cars which are Toyotas and cars which are not Toyotas. Okay.
Then what about human beings? A human being is neither a car which is a Toyota nor a car which is not a Toyota. You have three possibilities for your example. So I want an example of two possibilities. Very good.
Close. Human beings which are dead and human beings which are alive. What about dogs? Dogs are neither human beings which are dead nor human beings which are alive. Three possibilities.
Yes. Why? Exactly. So if something’s a table, it’s a table. You are all close, but you need a complete exclusion.
Aaron was very close, but you have instances of phenomena which don’t exist, right? Like the horns of a rabbit. Horns of a rabbit are neither permanent nor impermanent, but, you know, you can still list them, right? So that’s exactly it. So you need two moves, in other words, if you take the set of everything which exists and does not exist, must be subdivided into two: a mutual exclusion, like for instance human beings and not human beings, not non-human beings, but non-human beings.
Two logical possibilities. Can anyone think of one logical possibility? And? And what is not? So one logical possibility.
No, no, we’ve covered two, two with the exhaustive. Now can you actually formulate one logical possibility? You need to give one logical possibility between two sets, right? So two logical possibilities, we said for instance that he said table and not table, dog and not dog, cat and not cat, fine, but one logical possibility? Yeah, what would you give?
Tables and tables. Close? Anyone? Because tables and tables, it’s two times the same thing, right? Oh, oh, two right, right, right, right.
Tree and trunk. Sorry? Tree and trunk. What about burns? Tables and furniture.
You have something which is a table, something which is furniture, something which is both, something which is neither. What can you give? In Buddhist philosophy you can give it easily: Selflessness and not not selflessness. Selflessness, everything which exists and does not exist is selfless, so it’s everything. Not not selflessness is actually the same thing as selflessness, it’s got a different name.
Everything is necessarily both, there’s nothing which is the one and not the other, the other and not the one or neither, it’s a technical example, but you can actually postulate one possibility. Yeah. Okay, is that is that clear? Four three two one possibilities. Then basically if two classes are contradictory, they are either they either have three or two more, right?
If they are contradictory and there’s nothing which is neither of the two classes, they are two more, two logical possibilities, if they are contradictory and they appear like this in terms of set theory, one and two, for instance, let’s say Ford’s and Holden’s, right? How many logical possibilities? Something which is both? Yes, why? Yeah, exactly.
So you can have when you have three possibilities, you can either have inclusion, like with Australia is included in human beings, or you can have contradiction but non exclusive contradiction. Let’s say if you take Ford and Holden, and I’m sure Ford and Holden would agree with me, if it’s a Ford it’s not a Holden, if it’s a Holden it’s not a Ford, and a Toyota is neither. You have three logical possibilities. Right? So it’s very helpful when you study Lorig, everything.
Mind and mental factors, how many possibilities? Doubt, which is a main mind, versus a mental factor, how many possibilities? Permanent and impermanent phenomena, how many possibilities? It just goes through. This is the main tool of investigation for Buddhist scholars.
It’s exactly, it’s in Buddhist philosophy the exact equivalent of set theory in mathematics. Then thank you very much. You have a very good explanation of this in debate in Tibetan Buddhism, and those of you who are interested in math, have Patrick Suppes’s set theory. Those renditions, very good.
Key terms in this teaching
- lorig
- Awareness and knowledge, the study of mind and mental factors, in order to understand and control the delusions. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- mental factors chaita (Skt); sem jung (Tib)
- Literally arising from the mind, a mental factor is a cognition that apprehends an attribute of its object and accompanies any principal consciousness that is concordant with it. LYWA
- omnipresent mental factors sarvatraga-chaitta (Skt); sem jung kun dro (Tib)
- One of the six groups of mental factors, these accompany every main mind. There are five: feeling, discrimination, intention, mental engagement and contact. LYWA
- principal consciousness vijnana (Skt); nam shë (Tib)
- The main cognition posited by means of apprehending the entity of its object. Synonymous with main mind, it is one of the two divisions of mind, the other being mental factors. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- Svatantrika Madhyamaka u ma rang gyü pa (Tib)
- The Middle Way Autonomy school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Autonomy school accepts autonomous reasons and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
- two extremes tha nyi (Tib)
- Eternalism, seeing things as having an intrinsic reality, and nihilism, seeing things as having no reality at all. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.