1 h 42 min · 4,460 words · 13 May 2014 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 102-minute session, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen teaches the sevenfold division of awareness and knowledge from Buddhist epistemology. He begins with a foundational distinction: the person is not identical to consciousness, using the example of deep sleep when consciousness ceases but the physical body persists. He then systematically unpacks each category—direct valid cognizers, inferential valid cognizers, subsequent cognizers, conviction, inattentive minds, doubt, and wrong consciousnesses—illustrating each with concrete examples like the impermanence of a table or the identity of a person. A central theme is the difference between conviction (a tentative state based on reasoning) and genuine inferential valid cognition (a mind that ends doubt through repeated habituation). He explores how states like love, compassion, and bodhicitta fit within these categories, and addresses subtle questions about how inference becomes direct perception over time through practice. The Q&A section reveals active engagement with the material, with students attempting to list and apply the seven divisions themselves. Intended for practitioners already familiar with Buddhist philosophy.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2014-05-13 – KR.mp3
UUID: 13141494-0be8-4647-b19a-c832774f28f8
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Awareness and Knowledge
Date: 2014-05-13
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~4,460
The teachings When you refer to Lorig or Buddhist psychology, one of the key points is to understand the distinction between persons and consciousnesses. What can be a person without being a consciousness? What can be a consciousness without being a person? When we refer to a person, let us say a human being, it is important to understand that it is imputed on a basis of imputation, which in this case comprises the five aggregates, form, sensation, discrimination, compositional factors, and consciousness. We all understand that in deep sleep, the basis of imputation of the person, these five aggregates lose their potency.
Then clearly in deep sleep there is no consciousness, therefore the fifth aggregate has been interrupted. However, we can clearly see that it is still possible to impute a person on the remaining aggregates, specifically the aggregate of form, in other words, physical life. Clearly, in the state of profound sleep, since the four mental aggregates have ceased to function, they are unable to operate. If the person were identical with consciousness, then that person, the imputed phenomenon would cease to exist. This is not the case since it is imputed on the remaining aggregate of form.
So one must understand that the person is different from consciousness and is of a different substance than consciousness. Then during such a state, what is identified with the person? In other words, on which basis is the person imputed none other than the form aggregate. In other words, life, the life force. Then during such a state, the capacity of the life force to act as a basis for consciousness has disappeared.
However, the life force is still able to act as a basis for maintaining the body’s temperature, warmth. Then in this context when we refer to life, what precisely are we referring to? We are referring to the subtle channels in the body. In other words, such an analysis leads us to tantra. Then through understanding clearly the fact that a person can can be, can be different from consciousness, it becomes clear to us that a person is not anger, a person is not desire, a person is not envy, competitiveness or jealousy.
Then when one reflects in this way, one can see how it is possible for one’s mind or one’s consciousness to be the master, to be the lord of anger, for instance, which arises only occasionally. Otherwise, I believe that when anger or jealousy arise, since we would fall completely under their sway, we would experience great mental discomfort. I personally suspect that within the sevenfold division of consciousness and awareness, anger would have to be placed within the last wrong consciousness. But this is to be examined since the identification of both the aspect and the mode of apprehension of anger is not easy. When one studies Lorig or Buddhist psychology, it is important to differentiate between sensory consciousnesses and mental consciousness, between mind and consciousness.
Then within mental consciousnesses, we have the important category of conviction. As conviction increases in its power, it eventually turns into inference, what is known as an inferential valid cognizer in Buddhist scriptures. Then we do know of one school of non-Buddhist tenets in ancient India, the nihilists, the so called charvakas or Lokayatas, did not accept the existence of inferential valid cognizers. They recognized that there were valid cognizers, but refuted the existence of inferential valid cognizers. The crux of the meaning of an inferential valid cognizer in Buddhist texts is a valid cognizer which arises in dependence on a correct reason.
Then, generally speaking, mental consciousness is subdivided into conceptual and non conceptual mental consciousnesses. And within these, it is first to examine where conviction lies. We do not dwell indefinitely in a state of conviction, As conviction enhances its potency, it eventually transforms according to Buddhist texts into an inferential valid cognizer. Then it does become an inference. One must be able to differentiate between conviction and an inferential valid cognizer.
Let us take an example, the small table in front of me. Through various lines of reasoning, we can see that this small table has to be impermanent. Then all of us are able, if we think over it again and again, to generate this conviction that the table is impermanent. It has to be impermanent. Then, when we think about it, we get the strong sense that the table is impermanent.
When we don’t, we don’t. Such a strong sense at the table is impermanent when we think about it is conviction. This is how one should think about it. However, in that context, we lack the certainty, the definiteness that the table is impermanent. What happens?
Let us take the case of our entering in this temple in this world of ours. When we enter in this temple and we see this small table, if the near sight of that small table is able to induce the strong certainty that table is impermanent, at that point one is speaking of a valid cognizer. I think probably for all of us, the generation of the thought, this table is impermanent when we entered in the temple and saw it would be difficult. Yes? No?
Therefore, what is present in our mind is a conviction of the impermanence of table based on study and on lines of reasoning. However, if upon entering this temple and seeing the table spontaneously, a sense this table is impermanent arose as a result of that, then one could posit an inferential valid cognizer realizing impermanence within our mind stream. Such a presentation of the distinction between conviction and inferential valid cognizers is easy to understand. There is such a thing as inferential valid cognizers. It is taught in Buddhist texts that as convictions increase in potency, eventually they turn into a mind which puts an end to doubt.
This mind is called an inferential valid cognizer, it is a conceptual valid cognizer. All of us have valid cognizers within our minds. For instance, when you see the bodily aggregates of your translator, immediately that sight of his bodily aggregates induces the conviction, the certainty. This is Ilya. There is no doubt in your mind that this is Ilya.
It is not somebody else. That is a valid cognizer. Then when you see Ilya, does the mind, thinking Illya is impermanent arise or not? 100%? Ilya is impermanent.
Right? However, when you see ilia, you do not immediately think ilia is impermanent. Therefore, the valid cognizer realizing the impermanence of Ilya is absent within our mind stream. So a large amount of study, you can generate the conviction based on reasoning that Ilya is impermanent. However, when you meet Ilya and you see him, that mind which believes Ilya is impermanent does not arise spontaneously.
When that mind arises spontaneously through repeated habituation with the conviction that Ilya is impermanent, at that point you will have a direct, you will have a valid cognizer realizing Ilya’s impermanence. If you differentiate conviction and inferentially valid cognizers in this way, it’ll be easy to understand. Very easy. Do you understand? Good.
Do you understand? Oh yeah. Yeah, that’s good. Then really the nihilist view, the materialist view we would say nowadays, is a stupid view. To say that all the experience is this is stupid.
Then in the nihilist tenets, probably the rationale for affirming that inferential valid cognizers do not exist is connected with their refusal of karma and causality. Then this enables one to understand the reason, the purpose, the rationale for studying logic. Then within the sevenfold division of awareness and knowledge, direct perception can be conceptual can be sensory direct perception or mental direct perception, but it is always non conceptual. There’s no conceptuality. Then inferential valid cognizers never are sensory consciousnesses.
They are never non conceptual. They are necessarily conceptual. Then if we look at the definition of direct perception, a non conceptual unmistaken mind, this definition calls for careful analysis. Generally speaking, direct perception is divided between in two broad categories, sensory direct perception and mental direct perception. That sensory direct perception be a mind which is non conceptual and unmistaken is fairly straightforward.
But in the case of mental direct perception, we are asserting that there is a common locus, a common denominator between direct perception on the one hand and mental consciousness on the other hand, and that there is a mental consciousness which is non conceptual. Now, here let us set aside for the purpose of discussion the issue of yogic direct perceivers, which does not con concern us here. What do we posit as such a common locus? Then the definition of direct perceiver is a non conceptual mind which is unmistaken, isn’t it? Then it is helpful when one tries to posit an example of a mental direct perceiver to think of what happens in our reaction to our parents, with whom we have tremendous familiarity?
Then the next category within awareness and knowledge is an inferential valid cognizer, which is a valid cognizer arising in dependence on a correct reason. Then the following mind was in the sevenfold division of awareness and knowledge, which is the first mind, which is a non-valid cognizer, is subsequent cognizers. Subsequent cognizers are minds which cognize definitely their object, but do so not under their force, but under the force of a previous mind. The previous mind here is a direct or inferentially valid cognizer. Subsequent cognizers are subdivided into two, conceptual and non conceptual subsequent cognizers.
Then the second mind, which is a mind which is not a valid cognizer is conviction. Conviction is necessarily conceptual. Then it is generally explained in Lorig texts that conviction is that state of mind bereft of certainty which arises through reflecting on reasons and leads us to an understanding which is concordant with reality. Then the following category of awareness is inattentive minds or minds to which phenomena appear, but which do not ascertain these. These are necessarily non conceptual and are subdivided into sensory consciousnesses and mental consciousnesses.
Positing an example of a mental consciousness which is an inattentive mind is not easy and you should reflect on it. Then we the following category is excuse me, wrong consciousness, which is defined as knowledge which engages its object mistakenly. Here, what this means is that wrong consciousness do not engage the object in accordance with reality. Wrong consciousnesses are subdivided into sensory and mental wrong consciousnesses. Then it is at present up to us to examine whether we can propose anger or jealousy as instances of wrong consciousnesses or not.
For for instance, to give an example of wrong consciousness, let us imagine that afflicted by a strong cataract, we actually see something which looks like a human being. And it is actually not a human being, but we believe it is a human being and see it as a human being. This is an instance of wrong consciousness. This is a clear case of wrong consciousness because in keeping with the definition, it is a knowledge which engages its object wrongly or mistakenly. It engages its object which is not a human being as if it were a human being.
Then to present ever so slightly doubt, doubt is only conceptual. And from within sensory and mental consciousnesses, doubt can only include mental consciousnesses. The definition of doubt is knowledge which hesitates between two alternatives by its own force. What is the meaning and the definition of doubt of by its own force? This refers to the fact that there is a complex of minds associated with doubt.
These minds which are concordant with doubt include, for instance, the sensations which are associated with doubt, the discrimination which is associated with doubt, and both the sensation and the discrimination associated with doubt will hesitate between two alternatives, but they will not do so under their own force. Then from within minds and mental factors, doubts are exclusively mental factors and never minds. If for example example we examine the status of the consciousness which is associated with doubt, is part of the complex surrounding doubt. Doubt is a mental factor, the consciousness associated with it is not a mental factor. Now this consciousness does oscillate between two alternatives, it does hesitate between two alternatives, but it does so without doing so under its own force.
Setting aside the instances we mentioned where consciousness is interrupted, such as in deep sleep or when one faints, Broadly speaking, one can consider consciousness uninterrupted. This is not the case for afflictions such as doubt or anger, which are sporadic, which arise only from time to time. The if we’re given main mind, in other words, consciousness, there are a series of mental factors which can be associated with it, such as doubt, anger, envy, and so forth. However, there is a difference between the There is a difference in the aspect between the main mind and the mental factors, but there is no difference in the mode of apprehension. If we were to take the case of mental consciousness, mental consciousness comes from beginningless past lives and proceeds to beginningless future lives.
Now, setting aside these schools of tenets which consider that mental consciousness is interrupted or severed when one becomes an arhat, all of the other schools of tenets consider mental consciousness uninterrupted. However, this mental consciousness which is uninterrupted is impermanent. It is a composite phenomenon. And the doubt which might arise is, that mental consciousness being impermanent, is that a permanent phenomenon or not? Now this would be a very fine example of a doubt which could arise.
Then it is extremely important and difficult to understand where to place within the sevenfold division of awareness, love, compassion, and for instance, bodhicitta as generated within the sevenfold cause-and-effect instruction. It is the main difficulty, literally the main danger of LORIG to see where to place within the sevenfold subdivision of awareness and knowledge, mind such as love, compassion and bodhicitta. Then probably love, compassion and bodhicitta are until the state of full enlightenment conceptions. Most probably there is no non conceptual component, no direct perception to them. Then when you leave, you should try to reflect on this where precisely should we place within the seven fold subdivision of awareness and knowledge, love, compassion, bodhicitta as generated through the sevenfold cause and effect instruction.
Then, obviously, as far as the mind realizing emptiness is concerned, this is a lot easier since this has been studied in detail. And you for yourselves understand what love, compassion and bodhicitta are, you know for a fact whether you have them within your mind stream or not. Therefore, I would like to encourage you to try to find their setting within the sevenfold division of awareness which we have studied. Then time has come for your questions. Do you have question?
Geshe-la has often used the example of the love of an animal, of a mother bird to its chick and yet he said that love is not non conceptual. So how do we see the behaviour that we would impute love onto or is that not love? How do we classify instinct? Instinct. Animals have conceptuality.
They have conceptions. They have thoughts. Yes. I mean, they don’t have conceptuality us, but they have conceptuality. I was telling you, they recognize their name.
Right? So a mother bird helping a chick out of its egg would be a conceptual Obviously here in our minds, love and compassion are imputed, designated love and compassion, they’re not authentic love and compassion. It’s not the love and compassion referred to in Buddhist Buddhist scriptures. Do you have question? Yeah.
Come, come. No problem. No problem, you know. Very important. And yet says he thinks you are I would translate shy.
He said afraid, but afraid of what? So I suggested that he ask you questions. It’s easier if you ask him questions. If you want to ask, I will ask. About a definition of a conviction mind?
A what? A conviction mind. A conviction, yes. Yes. Which I’ve got down his bereft of certainty and he said more but I didn’t catch it all.
So you want to know what the definition of conviction is. I was confused by the description of a conviction mind, bereft of certainty, which I thought I must have misheard. You confused conviction and uncertainty? A mind bereft of certainty. Good.
It’s a good question. It’s a dangerous one. A mind which is unable to induce certainty in its subject regarding the actual mode of existence of a phenomenon is controvertible. It cannot induce certainty, definiteness. Good, good question, know.
Another question, do I have? Jade was saved by the bell. I read in two other books, one by the Dalai Lama and one by Jeffrey Hopkins that the inferential valid cognition can be a means to direct cognition. Can be what? Can be a means to direct cognition.
I wonder if Geshe-la could comment on that. The way the transition from an inferential valid cognizer to a direct valid cognizer occurs is as follows. If we take the case of the table in front of Geshe-la, if over time, through repeated habituation with an inferential valid cognizer, which understands that this table is impermanent based on a correct reason for this, the force of that inferential valid cognizer increases. Eventually, when we see the table, instantaneously the mere sight of the table induces the certainty of the impermanence of the table. That probably qualifies as a direct valid cognizer realizing the impermanence of the table.
Precisely because it is a direct perception of the impermanence of the table table, which is no longer contingent or dependent on a reason, but upon experience. The transition from inferential valid cognizers to direct valid cognizers is a difficult topic which calls for careful examination. And the hero? And the hero? Do you have question?
No, I do. Mark? And with the fact that impermanence does not come to mind, so we’re correct in regards to or we have no doubt that this is ileo but impermanence doesn’t appear in the mind. I just wanted to understand that a little better. Is that that we are correct with regard to the way the object appears but not about the nature of the object?
Have I got my terminology correct? Then could you repeat the end part of your question, please? Trying to remember the terminology if it was that we are correct with regard to the way to the appearing object but not to with regard to the hidden aspects of the object. What is correct with regard to the So we’re correct in having no doubt that that is ilea that we are like, that appears to us. I’m trying to separate the way that the object appears to us so we’re correct in saying that when we see you that that is ilea.
That is correct. But the fact that we don’t see your impermanence that is like the hidden aspect of the nature of the object that appears to us. And I’m trying to separate that out, and I can’t even put it into words properly. Do you have another question? Yet?
Subsequent cognisers are divided into two conceptual and non conceptual. What they are? A subsequent cognizer is a mind which understands its object. It is definite with respect to its object, but it does not understand its object by its own power or by its own force. It understands its object through the power of a previous valid cognizer.
That’s why it is called a subsequent cognizer. Then all this is the case in all of the Tenet systems apart from Prāsaṇgika. Then Prāsaṇgika has a different definition of valid cognizers. As a result, they don’t make a distinction between valid cognizers and subsequent cognizers. For instance, when we see Ilya at present after being accustomed to seeing him, then this is a subsequent cogniser.
Thank you, Geshe-la. This is a little bit related to impermanence. So I’ve read that the cause must precede the effect, so cause comes before effect, and that for instance the arising of something or the birth of something is within the 12 links an effect. But then there’s a line within debate in Tibetan Buddhism which I don’t quite understand. It says the illustration: Because a product which is a cause of functioning thing is a substantial cause of functioning thing.
I take it that the product is the cause is actually the cause for something different other than the first effect. Does that make sense? What’s your line from the debate in Tibetan Buddhism? It says there is an illustration because a product which is a cause of functioning thing is a substantial cause of functioning thing. So I thought the product couldn’t be the cause of its own functioning thing, it must be the cause of a different functioning thing.
You can’t say that what is fabricated precedes things. Is what is fabricated, more both things. They’re synonymous, they’re simultaneous. Then I have some questions for you. I have question for you.
Just one. So direct valid cognizers can be subdivided into sensory and mental direct valid cognizers. What example is there of a mental valid cognizer? Mental direct valid cognizer? Three armrest time.
Good. Good. The first instance of a mental consciousness perceiving a sense consciousness is a mental direct perception albeit an inattentive mind still mental direct perception? Lily, what’s your answer? I’m cheating, I can remember one of the examples from the book, Perceiving Others Minds.
Other than that, can’t think of anything off the top of my head. So I’d like to remind you that direct perceivers are non conceptual. So what example do you give of a mental direct perceiver? Perceiving another being’s mind. Then it’s good that you think about it by yourself.
Obviously, if you were a yogi, we could talk about it. Geshe But, la would like you to give answers from the side of your own experience. So could you Joe, could you give all seven subdivisions of awareness? Really? Valid cognizers have two subdivisions.
What are those two subdivisions? And what are these seven subdivisions of awareness? Natalie, can you? The seven subdivisions, Natalie. Don’t look at your book.
Do they need to be in order? That’s good. So wrong consciousnesses, which know are the last of the seven. Subsequent cognizers, inferential valid cognizers, direct valid cognizers, Inattentive minds. Conviction.
How many is that? Six. Oh, one. Just on my left. Doubt.
I have to say that Chris helped me with the last one. Very good. Good. And then Joe behind the throat. Camilla, what is it?
Who is behind Joe? Yes. The lady with the glasses. Yes. George.
George. George. Yeah. Angela. Angela.
Angela. Angela, could you give these seven subdivisions of awareness? And Sandy? Margaret? Yet?
Direct by the cognition Inferential cognition Doubt Conviction inattentive mind subsequent mind Thank you. Wrong. Wrong. Brochet. Mhmm.
Good. Good. Very good. Very good. Good.
Yeah. Yeah. And Judy, Teacher? Yeah. Yeah.
Direct valid cognizer. Inferential valid cognizer. Subsequent cogniser Inattentive mind Conviction Doubt and Wrong conscious weren’t reading your text, were you? I think Good. Good.
Good. And Yeah. Yeah. Good. Yeah.
Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Subsequent or subsequent conviction Inattentive. And mistaken or wrong.
So that was direct, inferential, subsequent, conviction, inattentive, doubt, and wrong. Good. Good. Good. Thank you.
Good. Thank you. Yeah. Really? What is that?
I think I’ve got it wrong, but an example of a direct perceiver that is a mental consciousness, mental consciousness perceiving a meaning generality of a table or something? I don’t have a concrete example of a direct valid cogniser, but an abstract one would be a mind which apprehends a specifically characterised phenomenon, not a meaning generality. Yeah. Yeah. Alright.
Good. Thank you. Good. Thank you. Okay.
The Foundation Day is coming and also the Rinpoche’s, what do you call, commemoration day on the thirty first and Foundation Day on this weekend. And I would really like to to you all join and to to celebrate our ninth year. So to bring a plate and join with Geshe-la and us and and to meet all the members and the friends, so that’d be a great time. It’s our ninth year, maybe before it’s ten years, you know, we should also have a wonderful Foundation Day. And it is very important part of event for TBI.
So we you know, how we came about TBI, etcetera. You know, please join and have a you know, we will have a great time with Geshe-la and all together. All right? Oh, yeah. This we had the plan is I think I talked about that on that day.
So we long time ago, we held Foundation Day at Girls’ Guide Hall at Kenilworth Garden. You someone maybe you remember, and at the time we have some analogy how the TBI is moving forwards. So we can carry on that again. So it would be great if you can join and bring your, you know, the other members, please tell other members and bring your friends, That’s a good having have a good time on that day. All right?
And also, the commemorating day is coming in the end of the month. So again, I’d like to ask to join and share the how the Rinpoche’s life in his time. And okay. Foundation Day, also, can watch a beautiful DVD for His Holiness visit that we had here in last year so that we can join and you may luck, you know, might get one copy each. Just joking.
Anyway, that’s you know, it’s a good good time to a good time to see the His Holiness visit. It’s really wonderful, you know. We all have, what do you call, the joy in our heart, you know, so that we can imprint and create lots of merits just having a, you know, joy. So that’s we can do that on that day as well. So please come along and bring a plate and that’s it.
Yeah. Yeah, empty plate. That’s when I first came to here in Australia and went to English class. And towards the end of English class, they said, you know, bring a plate. And I said, what?
You know, bring a plate. I thought, you know, oh, that’s very strange to party. So anyway, there’s some, you know, sticks in my mind there, you know. Okay. Thank you.
Chai and biscuits, please.
Key terms in this teaching
- arhat dra chom pa (Tib)
- The Tibetan translates as "foe destroyer." A person who has destroyed their inner enemy, the delusions, and attained liberation from cyclic existence. LYWA
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- bodhicitta jang chub sem (Tib)
- A principal consciousness that combines the two factors of wishing to free all beings from suffering and of wishing to attain enlightenment in order to achieve that; the spontaneous altruistic mind of enlightenment can be either aspirational or engaging. LYWA
- lorig
- Awareness and knowledge, the study of mind and mental factors, in order to understand and control the delusions. LYWA
- mental factors chaita (Skt); sem jung (Tib)
- Literally arising from the mind, a mental factor is a cognition that apprehends an attribute of its object and accompanies any principal consciousness that is concordant with it. LYWA
- principal consciousness vijnana (Skt); nam shë (Tib)
- The main cognition posited by means of apprehending the entity of its object. Synonymous with main mind, it is one of the two divisions of mind, the other being mental factors. LYWA
- tantra gyü (Tib)
- Literally, thread, or continuity. The secret teachings of the Buddha; a scriptural text and the teachings and practices it contains. Also called Vajrayana or Mantrayana. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.