Awareness and Knowledge — 2014-05-06

1 h 33 min · 3,956 words · 6 May 2014 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Awareness and Knowledge (Khensur Rinpoche)
Awareness and Knowledge (Khensur Rinpoche)
Awareness and Knowledge — 2014-05-06
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 94-minute teaching, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen explores the philosophical foundations of how we know what we know, examining valid cognizers and inference through the classical Buddhist epistemology texts of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāna Vartika and Dignāgā’s Pramāna Samuccaya. He explains why direct perception must come first—when you read a text, you see the words before understanding them—and how doubt naturally arises about meaning, then gradually dissolves into conviction as you study and reflect. Through the sevenfold division of awareness and knowledge, he maps how inference works in practice: from sensory experience, a mental consciousness engages the meaning; doubt emerges; conviction builds; and finally, certainty becomes an inferential valid cognizer. He illustrates this with everyday examples: seeing someone remarkably gifted and reasoning backward to the causes (good family, education, effort) that created them. The talk includes extended Q&A where students test their understanding against his explanations, exploring why inattentive minds cannot be conceptual and what distinguishes doubt in philosophical contexts from doubt as a mental affliction. Suitable for those studying Buddhist logic or investigating how reliable knowledge arises.

File metadata (for organising)

File: 2014-05-06 – KR.mp3

UUID: 0114af40-42bb-4efa-bd29-91b0540c1292

Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen

Collection: Awareness and Knowledge

Date: 2014-05-06

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~3,945

As usual, we will generate the motivation to listen to these teachings. Regarding the process of generation within our mind stream of direct valid cognizers and of inferential valid cognizers, there are slightly different explanations between Dignāgā’s Pramāna Samuccaya and its latter commentary, Dharmakīrti’s Pramāna Vartika. In the Dharmakīrti’s Pramāna Vartika, initially, an inferential valid cognizer is generated in general and in dependence on this later on, a direct valid cognizer arises. Why is this the case? Because the process of generation of inferential valid cognizers and direct valid cognizers in Pramāna Vartika is done from the standpoint of the ascertainment of the four noble truths.

For more than the four chapters of Pramāna Vartika, the second chapter is dedicated to the establishment of the teacher, in other words, Buddha Śākyamūni, as a valid cognizer. Within Marek, as you remember, valid cognizers are divided into three. Mental valid cognizers, valid cognizers which are speech and valid cognizers which are persons. The importance of the second chapter of Pramāna Vartika is to establish the teacher, Buddha Śākyamūni, as a valid cognizer which is a person. When one refers to a being who is a valid cognizer, what is meant by this?

What is meant by this is a true being, a being whose utterances are bereft of deception. And for this, it is insufficient that the mere base of the being be a good one. Just as for an ordinary being, to determine whether that being is truthful or not, one examines its speech. Likewise, to examine to see whether Buddha Śākyamūni is a being which is a valid cognizer or not, one examines his utterances. And in this context, the examination of the utterances of Buddha Śākyamūni is done to establish whether they are incontrovertible or not.

When one refers to the incontrovertibility of his utterances in this context, it is the incontrovertibility of the utterance within the context of the first turning of the wheel of the law. In other words, the incontrovertibility of the utterances regarding the four noble truths. Therefore, through establishing that the utterances regarding the four noble truths are incontrovertible, one establishes that the utterances of Buddha Śākyamūni in this context are incontrovertible, And through establishing this, one establishes that the Buddha Śākyamūni is a person which is a valid cognizer. And this is done through demonstrating that there exists an inferential valid cognizer realizing the Four Noble Truths. It is precisely to understand what inferential valid cognizers are that the preceding chapter of Pramāna Vartika, the first chapter, defines inferential valid cognizers in terms of valid reasons, which are reasons which satisfy these three modes.

Then, after having established what inferential valid cognizers are, inferential valid cognizers eventually connect to direct valid cognizers. This is why direct valid cognizers are presented in the third chapter of Pramāna Vartika. On the other hand, as was mentioned, the presentation of direct valid cognizers and inferential valid cognizers is reversed in DIGNAGA’s Pramāna Samuccaya. The reason for which within the six chapters of the Pramāna Samuccaya direct valid cognizers are presented first and inferential valid cognizers are present presented secondly is because this is the order of generation in in the continuum of an ordinary being. Then, when one refers to the order of generation of direct valid cognizers and inferential valid cognizers, Clearly, terms of our personal experience, direct valid cognizers come first and inferential valid cognizers come after.

In an academic context, clearly, one generates initially a direct valid cognizer and in dependence on this an inferential valid cognizer. For instance, to study, one must first actually have seen the text, one cannot read it without having seen it. Then one must have memorized it in the Tibetan tradition and one must have received teachings on it. Then on this basis an inferential valid cognizer can arise. Therefore in the context of study, it is probably impossible within our minds for an inferential valid cognizer to arise independently of a direct valid cognizer.

Then it is obviously impossible to say that one has studied through merely looking at a text or that one has studied through merely memorizing a text. Study begins with the process of reflection. And this process of reflection is not a process which is intrinsic to the visual or to the auditory consciousness. It is one which is intrinsic to the mental consciousness. This is something we can check within our own experience.

Then in dependence on the visual and the auditory consciousness, a mental consciousness, which reflects on the meaning of what one has studied arises. It is at this point that within the sevenfold division of awareness and knowledge, doubt arises. Doubt is that state of mind which wonders whether what one has read is correct or not, which doubts and then inquires from one’s teacher regarding this. Then, when doubt has arisen, one dispels the doubt progressively through either interrogating one’s teacher or studying other texts. As the doubt is dispelled, eventually, conviction arises.

Within the process of the sevenfold awarenesses and knowledge, this is how conviction arises, in dependence on doubt. All of us have direct experience of this through our studies. Hence, through dispelling doubt, eventually a conviction, which is an understanding of the topic arises. When through repeated analysis and investigation, the power of conviction increases until it becomes definite with respect to its object of investigation, then at that point, that definite state of mind is a valid cognizer, it is an inferential valid cognizer. This is the process of study which we have to understand for our own practice.

Initially doubt is present, the process of dispelling of doubt leads eventually to conviction, the increase in the potency of conviction leads to certainty regarding the topic, and this is a valid cognizer, specifically an inferential valid cognizer. So in the context of our presentation of valid cognizers, initially direct valid cognizers were explained and the mode of explanation led to inferential valid cognizers. As is said in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāna Vartika, the seen and the unseen are ascertained by direct and inferential valid cognizers. Here the seen refers to manifest phenomena and the unseen refers to slightly hidden phenomena. Direct valid cognizers are that which ascertains manifest phenomena and in dependence on direct valid cognizers, inferential valid cognizers can arise.

And therefore, that which realizes the manifest phenomena, which are euphemistically called seen, is a direct valid cognizer and that which realizes in dependence on that slightly hidden phenomena is known as an inferential valid cognizer. Objects of knowledge are subdivided within manifest phenomena and slightly hidden phenomena. When one refers to slightly hidden phenomena, one is referring to phenomena which cannot be ascertained in the way manifest phenomena are by a direct valid cognizer, but which can only be ascertained by an inferential valid cognizer. These are slightly hidden phenomena. We have direct experience of the fact that there are objects of knowledge, in other words phenomena, which cannot be ascertained by direct valid cognizers.

This is something we see through the process of study when through wisdom, the scope of our understanding expands. We know from Buddhist scriptures that there was a Darśana, a school of philosophy in ancient India called the nihilist school, the Charvaka or Lokāyata school, which asserted that valid cognizers or Pramāna had only one subdivision, direct valid cognizers. Then this school did not accept the existence of inferential valid cognizers. They were however forced to accept the existence of slightly hidden phenomena. The question arose for them then, what precisely realizes these slightly hidden phenomena if inferentially valid cognizers do not exist?

Then, whether the Lokayatas and Nihilists accepted or not the existence of inferential valid cognizers, inferential valid cognizers still do exist both within our continuum and that of the Lokayatas. How can we establish its existence? Through certain reasons. If one accepts the existence of a valid cognizer which arises on the basis of a reason, even if one does not directly acknowledge that this valid cognizer is an inferential valid cognizer, nonetheless, one will have accepted the existence of inferential valid cognizers. We can see this for instance with an example.

When we encounter someone who is extraordinarily gifted, both in terms of material endowments and in terms of interior quality, we will ask the question, where do all these material gifts and interior qualities arise from and search for a reason? We are therefore naturally and spontaneously searching for a reason. This is something which cannot be understood by a sensory valid cognizer. For instance, if somebody has uncommon material endowments, as well as inner qualities, we will analyze where this comes from. This is something which cannot be perceived by the senses, but we will find that this comes from being born in a good family, receiving good advice and a good education from one’s parents, receiving a good education from one’s teachers, from one’s own side, having the right way of thinking.

The concatenation of all these conditions gives rise to such a person, the reasoning which leads from the person to the conditions which gave rise to that person is what leads us to the understanding that inferential valid cognizers do exist. Then the reasoning which leads from the understanding of the existence of these conditions to that of the arrival of such a person is an inferential valid cognizer, and this is how one debates with the Lokayatas, with the nihilists, saying this is something which cannot be realized by direct perception. Whether this is something you from your side understand or not, I do not know. This is something which is obvious, which is visible. The nihilist view is one which contradicts reality.

And therefore, in dependence on the five sensory consciousnesses, in turn a mental consciousness arises. This mental consciousness can engage objects which are inaccessible to the sensory consciousnesses. What is such a mental consciousness? Such a mental consciousness is an inferential valid cognizer. Then this would be a classic instance of an effect correct reason.

This is a reason which from the existence of the effect deduces the existence of the collection of worthy causes which have given rise to such an effect, in this case, a good birth. Such a reason and the mind which understands it is an inferential valid cognizer. Then, if we don’t accept that a result such as a remarkable person arises in dependence on a cause, we are asserting that this person is remarkable in terms of his or her wealth and inner qualities by his or her very own nature. In this case, there is no need for that person to make any effort, nor is there any need for us to make any effort. We obviously know that this is wrong.

One must make effort to attain qualities. This is how one can understand an inferential valid cognizer. So this is the mode of explanation of the generation of valid cognizers. Initially, a direct valid cognizer arises and progressively, in dependence on this, an inferential valid cognizer will be generated. Then within the sevenfold division of awareness and knowledge, as you remember, after valid cognizers came the presentation of subsequent cognizers.

Subsequent cognizers are simply the second instance of an inferential valid cognizer. A valid cognizer cognizes an object through its own power. A subsequent cognizer still cognizes the object but no longer through its own power. And one can see how a sequence of the minds listed in the sevenfold subdivision of awareness and knowledge would arise. Initially, direct valid cognizer, then doubt, then conviction, then an inferential valid cognizer, and then a subsequent cognizer.

Then one can clearly see that there is a common denominator between an inferentially valid cognizer and a conviction. Both are conceptions and those are minds which engage their objects. There is likewise commonality between conviction and an inattentive mind. Both are minds which actually are related somehow to their object. Then, one should reflect on the fact that inattentive minds, in other words, minds which engage objects but to which they do not appear, are always non conceptual minds.

There are no conceptual inattentive minds. We have yet to present doubt. Doubt is defined as knowledge which hesitates between two extremes by its own power, by its own strength. This underlines the fact that there is a distinction between doubt as presented between these in the sevenfold subdivision of awareness and knowledge and the doubt which is a mental factor referred to within the 51 divisions of mind and mental factors. The second doubt is a doubt which does not hesitate by its own strength.

The first doubt does. So within the sevenfold subdivision of awareness and knowledge, doubt, conviction, and inferential valid cognizers are necessarily conceptual. Likewise, direct valid cognizers and inattentive minds are necessarily non conceptual. They are never conceptual. As to subsequent cognizers and wrong consciousnesses, they can either be conceptual or non conceptual.

There are instances of both. And therefore one should reflect on these topics at present by oneself, and ask oneself why is it that convictions are necessarily conceptual and never non conceptual? Why is it that doubt is necessarily conceptual and never non conceptual? Why is it that inattentive minds are necessarily non conceptual and never conceptual? In the definition of doubt as a knowledge which hesitates between two extremes by its own power, the two extremes referred to here are probably that something which exists does not exist, and that something which does not exist exists.

If we see in the distance, for instance, something which looks like water, then the doubt which wonders, is this something which looks like water which is water or is this something which looks like water which is not water or is this something else altogether may arise within our mind? This is the type of doubt which arises within the mind of all of us whether we have studied or not. On the other hand, when we consider a topic such as consciousness, and reflect on the fact that consciousness has come from the beginningless past, the doubt which wonders, is this consciousness an impermanent phenomenon, or is it a permanent phenomenon may arise within our mind stream? Then in our case, even though we do not recollect our previous lives, we have some type of conviction in the existence of future lives. And when we reflect on the consciousness which transmigrates, we might wonder generating doubt, is this consciousness permanent or is it impermanent?

However, have no doubt within your minds, consciousness is not a permanent phenomenon, it is an impermanent phenomenon because it is a changeable phenomenon. It can improve if one reflects on wholesome and worthy topics and it can also degenerate if one reflects on unwholesome perverse topics. I would like to ask you at present, what is the difference between conviction and an inattentive mind? And why are inattentive minds never conceptual? Is this a question, Geshe, I would like you to answer?

Yeah. Can you ask them, everybody? Conviction through conceptualizing something, so you’re thinking and you’re understanding it whereas inattentive mind can never conceptualize. Why? Why here?

Can’t an inattentive mind be conceptual? That last question, why can’t an inattentive mind be a conviction because No, non conceptual. An inattentive mind. It’s not a conviction, it’s not a debate. Why can’t it be non why can’t it be conceptual?

Why can’t it why must it be non conceptual in other words? It is, the sensory awareness is cognizant of sound, for example, but if the person is distracted then there’s no recollection or memory of that sound. Sorry, I better think about that a bit more. Really? Alright, good.

Yeah. I’m thinking of it in terms of analogy with the visual consciousness so if for instance the eye didn’t focus then that would be similar to an inattentive mind because so in that like the there would never be a concept there like the actual object would not be apprehended because it only ever looks foggy if you see what I mean. So it never gets to the point of grasping a concept or similarly the visual consciousness grasping an object. Attention requires the presence or the action of the mental aggregates of What is attention? Attention.

Attention, you were talking about inattentive mind. So attention requires the actual presence of the mental aggregates being discrimination and compositional factors. So in their absence you are inattentive therefore you cannot be a conceptual mind because the aggregates of discrimination and compositional factors aren’t present. The example was given last time of the auditory sense consciousness being absorbed in listening to music whilst the visual sense consciousness was perceiving nothing perhaps other than maybe color and shape but in other respects inattentive and was therefore an inattentive mind. I think because inattentive minds only arise through a sense faculty or a sense power and not through mental consciousness.

And conceptuality is necessarily a mental process or a mental consciousness arisen from a previous moment of This is also an answer, but an inattentive mind is not necessarily a sense consciousness. There’s a common locus, and there’s something which is both an inattentive mind and a mental consciousness. Possibly the difference between conviction and inattentive minds is that inattentive minds do not hold their object and that conviction does hold its object, but I’m not quite sure why the object would be held, like what holds the object. Then, the time has come for you to ask your questions. Why?

Where are you laughing about? Chris? The reason for which one should study Lorig is to be able to separate or differentiate correct and incorrect minds. There are numerous states of mind within our mind stream, some are correct, some are incorrect and we don’t know the difference. Correct minds engage correct objects, incorrect minds engage mistaken objects.

Through Lorig, we can make the difference between the two. Geshe-la, the difference between the doubt which is one of the 51 mental factors the, which is Geshe-la said that it is not knowing, doesn’t know by its own strength or its own power compared to the doubt which is one of the subdivisions that we’ve just been talking about which does have its own power. I wonder if Geshe-la could just explain what by its own power means. The doubt within the sevenfold subdivision of mind and awareness is a doubt which has within it the potency or the capacity to oscillate between two extremes. The doubt which is listed within the 51 mental factors, which is actually one of the six root afflictions, is a doubt which does not have that inherent capacity to oscillate between two possibilities.

It is dependent on other minds for this. Why is it conceptual? When we speak of a mind which is inattentive, in Tibetan’s term is nang la ma nges pa, a mind to which something appears but is not ascertained, we mean that this is a consciousness to which the object appears, but which cannot give rise to that recognition which says this is this, that is that, and as a result of this the memory which recollects this object cannot arise. I’m just checking if I have noted down correctly the sevenfold division of mind. Is it valid cognition, valid inference, subsequent cognition, conviction, inattentive awareness, doubt and is the last one wrong awareness or have I got it completely wrong?

Yes, indeed. Yes. Wrong consciousness is the last. Consciousness is the last. Am I to understand that there are two kinds of doubts.

One is the doubt which oscillates between the two extremes between you said that it was Geshe-la said it was doubt which is defined as knowledge which hovers between two extremes by its own power. That’s one kind of doubt. And the other kind of doubt, which I think was said, does not hesitate by its own strength and that this is dependent on other minds. Is that correct? If And that is correct, what can Geshe-la provide an example of the second kind of doubt?

Then Geshe-la will present them next time, if it’s okay with you, the examples. After next time. Probably I’m not going have not understood it but I just wanted to run past Geshe-la’s example of the study leading to the inferential valid cogniser and he said first comes the direct valid cogniser. For example, you read the text or you hear the instruction But I’m having difficulty understanding what I would be directly cognising because I’m seeing with my sense consciousness the pages and the text and then that’s giving rise to a conception but I’m thinking I wouldn’t be directly cognising the conception that has arisen from the text. You have to summarise your question.

I don’t think I can. But I think I understand. So the object of the direct valid cognizer at the very beginning of the study process is whatever you are studying. Whatever, let’s say you’re studying medicine, the object of the direct valid cognizer would be the medical topic. So, is that a two stage process then?

The stage process of validly cognizing the reading of the words from the page and the second, the understanding of what is written on the page. It doesn’t happen simultaneously. This you should think about for yourself in terms of your own experience. When we study for instance, let’s say a text initially, we see the text and therefore the direct sensory consciousnesses are involved. Then doubt arises with respect to the meaning of what we see, and this doubt is progressively clarified until we are more and more certain regarding the meaning of what we read.

When absolute certainty has arisen, then at this point we are dealing with a valid cognizer, specifically an inferential valid cognizer. Finish it? Have you finished it? Yeah, sure. So I will need to reflect about this for quite some time to come.

So the object of the direct valid cogniser in the study example and the later inferential valid cogniser the object is the same. The object of the direct valid cognizer at the beginning of the process of study gives rise to the object of the inferential valid cognizer at the end of the study process, they are related but there is a difference between the mode of understanding of the inferential of the direct valid cognizer and the inferential valid cognizer. Well, this is how I have explained things to you. It is really important for you to think by yourselves on this. In the explanation of this is that that we have a problem separating sensory to the mental process with these questions that are coming up because we read and read is a function but it’s not a mental process.

It’s not so much arisen from a confusion of sensory and mental consciousnesses as from lack of reflection on the topic. This is not something which the understanding of which arises quickly. It takes a long time of personal reflection to understand. If one doesn’t think about it, it will be difficult. Just a couple of announcements if people aren’t going to be here.

Foundation Day, which is usually held on the April 25, which has been shifted to the Sunday, May 18, shared lunch at 11:30. And then there’ll be a special commemoration for Rinpoche on Saturday the thirty first. And then his that’ll be two to five. And then his Holiness’s birthday, Saturday, June 5 in the evening. And we’ll be in a notice about that soon.

Key terms in this teaching

four noble truths denpa zhi (Tib)
The subject of the Buddha's first turning of the wheel of Dharma. The truths of suffering, the origin of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path to the cessation of suffering as seen by an arya. LYWA
lorig
Awareness and knowledge, the study of mind and mental factors, in order to understand and control the delusions. LYWA
mental factors chaita (Skt); sem jung (Tib)
Literally arising from the mind, a mental factor is a cognition that apprehends an attribute of its object and accompanies any principal consciousness that is concordant with it. LYWA
two extremes tha nyi (Tib)
Eternalism, seeing things as having an intrinsic reality, and nihilism, seeing things as having no reality at all. LYWA
valid inference jepag tshema (Tib)
A new non-deceptive outer cognition directly generated in dependence on its support, a correct reason. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

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