Awareness and Knowledge — 2014-04-29

1 h 24 min · 3,009 words · 29 April 2014 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Awareness and Knowledge (Khensur Rinpoche)
Awareness and Knowledge (Khensur Rinpoche)
Awareness and Knowledge — 2014-04-29
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 85-minute teaching, His Holiness the Dalai Lama establishes the foundation of Lorig, or epistemology, by examining how to distinguish correct minds from mistaken ones. He begins with anger as a concrete case study, showing how it mistakes both its object and the aspect it imputes, then broadens into a systematic exploration of the four tenet schools of Buddhism, emphasizing why the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka view alone eliminates the misconception of a self existing independently from the aggregates. He moves through the sevenfold divisions of awareness and knowledge: valid cognizers, subsequent cognizers, conviction, and inattentive minds, illustrating each with practical examples such as impermanence of a tablecloth, the driver learning to steer, and listening to music without noticing what passes before your eyes. The teaching concludes with audience questions on empirical verification of philosophical views and the precise English rendering of conviction. Pitched at serious students with some prior familiarity with Buddhist tenet study.

File metadata (for organising)

File: 2014-04-29 – KR.mp3

UUID: bf3a50fa-711e-4c2c-9999-5f98e4415015

Teacher: HH Dalai Lama

Collection: Awareness and Knowledge

Date: 2014-04-29

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~3,006

So as usual, we will generate the motivation for receiving these teachings. Since we are at present presenting the actual topic of Lorig or awareness and knowledge, it is important to understand the purpose of Lorig. The purpose of Lorig is to distinguish or differentiate between correct and mistaken minds. Correct minds, which we should follow and mistaken minds, which we should not follow. If we take the case of anger, for instance, we can ascertain the presence or the absence of anger based on physical and verbal behavior.

Then as to anger’s nefariousness, all of us are fully aware of that. Then from within the sevenfold subdivisions of mind, probably anger would have to be included within wrong views. Then not all minds are included within the sevenfold subdivision of minds, but it is instructive to examine whether or not anger is actually included within wrong minds. Then in respect to what is anger mistaken, Anger is definitely mistaken with respect to its object as well as to its aspect. Then all of us know from experience how anger functions.

All of us have people we dislike, enemies or even foes, then whether we see them talking to another person, walking, eating or sitting, whatever they do, we find offensive and unpleasant. Then even if our opponent is trying to be friendly and to befriend us, under the power of anger, whatever he does, whatever he says, whatever he attempts is seen as offensive and as harmful. This is a case of mistaken view where what is not is seen as being. Then we can see for ourselves that when we see such a person whom we dislike, we are convinced that he is up to all those things, whether or not he from his side is up to them or not. Then anger increases under the power of a multitude of inappropriate states of mind and eventually becomes so powerful that we beckon to our opponent and want to start to fight with him or engage in another type of harmful or inappropriate activity.

It is however possible to eliminate, to dispel anger. Then if we analyze clearly in such a case, anger is probably not mistaken with respect to its object since after all its object is someone whom we actually dislike, whom we find unpleasant. But what does anger do? Anger imputes an aspect of unwanted, unpleasantness and harmfulness upon this person. Therefore anger is definitely mistaken with respect to the aspect of the mind and perhaps partially with respect to its object.

This is the way to look at how such a mind proceeds with respect to a mistaken object. Then, well, in my opinion, there are no major differences between the great religious traditions regarding the method aspect of the path. In other words, the training in love, in compassion, and in the wish to benefit others which we see as bodhicitta. There are important differences in the wisdom aspect of the path, and this is where Lorig is important. Now much of this depends on the tenet systems from which one analyzes the situation.

In the LAMRIM, we use as our basic tenet system the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka system. The lower schools of tenets on the other hand were formulated largely to counter the view of the non-Buddhist tirthikas, in other words, the Hindu and Jain practitioners, who believe in the existence of a permanent person. It is to counter this view that the teachings that the person is empty of being permanent one and independent were uttered, and this enables the Buddhists to say to these practitioners, you assert a samsaric existence in which a permanent person transmigrates. Such a thing cannot happen. In addition, the Buddhists assert to the non-Buddhist, your system, is no such thing as a moksha or a liberation from samsaric existence.

Since to attain liberation from samsaric existence, it is necessary to counter the apprehension of the person as permanent one and independent. It is once this view is countered that one can attain liberation. And this is the reason for which the lower schools of tenets, non-Prāsaṇgika schools of tenets, in other words, affirm the existence of a person which entertains an intimate connection with the aggregates, either a person which is connected to the continuum of the of the aggregates or to the aggregate of consciousness. In opposition to the lower schools of tenets, which consider that the person exists from its own side and is not a mere nominal and terminological designation. The Prāsaṇgika School asserts that a person does not exist from its own side and counters the view of the lower schools of tenets by saying, there is no liberation which is possible unless one eliminates the apprehension of the person as existing from its own side.

And this is why the Prāsaṇgika School asserts when debating with the proponents of the lower schools of tenets, there is no liberation possible in your system when you assert the existence of a person which is permanent, one and independent and which is not merely nominally existent, but which exists from its own side. It is only upon abandoning the apprehension of the person existing from its own side that it is possible to attain liberation as Pänchen Losang Chökyi Gyaltsen states in his praise of dependent origination. Otherwise, your views continue to perpetuate the figment of a person existing from its own side. And it is therefore in this respect that the distinction between correct and mistaken object arises from the standpoint of the schools of tenets. In function of the assessment of the object, it can be seen as correct or incorrect in function of the school of tenets.

Then the distinction between correct and mistaken minds is relevant in this way. Correct minds include valid cognizers, in other words, both direct valid cognizers and inferential valid cognizers, and also include conviction, which is also a correct mind. Then we both have inferential valid cognizers and convictions within our mind stream. It’s not the case that we don’t have inferential valid cognizers or convictions within our mind stream, we do. And this is something we must understand.

It is clear that in the case of bodhicitta or the wisdom realizing emptiness, since we are bereft of these, understanding them is difficult. If we have a valid cognizer within our mind stream when we observe this table cover, then upon observing it, an unmistaken mind which understands its impermanence will dawn. Then within the sevenfold presentation of Lorig, as you remember, as a prelude, valid cognizers were presented, they are subdivided into direct and inferential valid cognizers, and then within the sevenfold division of awareness and knowledge, we have subsequent cognizers and conviction. Then let us take the case of conviction, the conviction which apprehends this tablecloth, the small tablecloth as impermanent. Such a mind is not a mistaken mind.

It apprehends the tablecloth as it is, but it is not a stable mind. It is not a stable mind because if one stops observing the tablecloth, one might wonder whether this tablecloth is exactly the same as a tablecloth one saw yesterday. Then let us take the case of our own aggregates as it will make it clearer for us. If we actually had the direct realization of the impermanence of our aggregates, in other words, a direct valid cognizer realizing the impermanence of our aggregates, then our predilection for this life would dwindle and our predilection for future lives would increase. Now if we observe our behavior, we can see that this is clearly not the case.

Therefore, it is obvious that we don’t have a valid cognizer realizing the impermanence of our aggregates. What we might have is a conviction that our aggregates are impermanent. This conviction is a correct mind, but it is less stable. Then let us take an example from driving. When one drives, if one has many years of experience in driving, then one is 100% certain about how to steer the car to the right, to the left, to change gears and so forth, there is no doubt whatsoever in one’s mind.

This corresponds to a valid cognizer whose object is driving a car. On the other hand, if one has studied driving and attended driving courses, but is not quite proficient, when one drives, one has a doubt, is this what I should be doing or not? This is still a factually concordant mind, but it is not a certain mind. This is a conviction. Conviction has or shares a component with doubt.

In our case, when we study the Lamrim, the stages of the path, we will rely exclusively on conviction. In other words, we rely exclusively on what we have heard and read. This is why Yongdzin said in a famous quote that as long as one has not severed doubt, one cannot refer to that mind as a valid cognizer. But when doubt has been severed, that mind is a valid cognizer.

And this is why in the Lorig of Yongdzin, conviction is defined as a factually concordant conceptual knowledge which is controvertible with respect to what it conceives. The term controvertible here refers precisely to the fact that such a knowledge is not incontrovertible, it is not certain or definite. Then the term factually concordant conception within the definition refers to the fact that convictions are conceptions which establish their object, they apprehend their object as it is. There is a very nice definition in some other texts on Lorig of conviction, which is as follows. A conceptual mind, which engages an object of which it neither has experience nor which it understands in dependence on reason in an uncertain way.

Conviction and inference are related, but there also are some differences. From your side, what do you think is the relationship and the differences? What is the difference between conviction and inference? Then perhaps take a couple of minutes to think about it. You’re looking at your text, aren’t you?

Based on what I’ve written, I think that there is a difference between inference and conviction in the level of dependence on the reason, because both rely on a reason, but there’s an uncertainty present in the conviction. And now I’m messing myself up a bit. Something to do with the level of certainty in relying on a reason is the difference. Conviction is more an unstable mind where an inferential mind is based on a valid cognition and there’s more stability there? Inference necessarily involves logic, so by means of logic one moves from one belief to another.

Inference involves logic, so you’re moving by logical means from one belief to another whereas conviction doesn’t necessarily involve logic. To infer something is to draw a tentative conclusion from a given or known set of circumstances or statement which whilst apparently reasonably based may not be able to be held with conviction because the factual basis upon which a conviction may arise is not available? To infer. Michael. Chris?

Mike? My understanding is that conviction is using reason but the reasons haven’t been followed through to their logical conclusion whereas inference is based on previous experience and an assumption of the smoke and fire. Okay. I thought I had it in words, but it’s escaping me, but I’ll try and think it through again. Inference is a means to gain conviction by understanding a relationship between something so the relationship between smoke and fire and through that relationship you can infer that where there is smoke there is fire.

Whereas conviction perhaps engages its object more directly rather than through In our cases, most of us probably have the conviction, my aggregates are impermanent, but probably very few, if any of us, have the inferential valid cognizer, my aggregates are impermanent. Even though we have the conviction that our aggregates are impermanent, part of us almost certainly believes that our person tomorrow and after tomorrow are the same as our person today. In the following category within the sevenfold division of minds, after subsequent cognizers conviction and convictions, is inattentive minds. Inattentive minds are necessarily non conceptual minds. In other words, they can only engage an object or the object of engagement is only a composite or an impermanent phenomenon.

They cannot engage a permanent phenomenon. These are minds which are unable to recollect their object. A simplified definition from Lorig of an inattentive mind is a non conceptual consciousness to which the specifically characterized phenomena, which is its object of engagement, appears clearly, to which the specifically characterized object, which is its object of engagement, cannot be recollected as ascertained. So a simplified definition of an inattentive mind in is, a non conceptual consciousness to which its object of engagement, which is a specifically characterized phenomenon appears clearly, yet to which its object of engagement, which is a specifically characterized phenomenon, cannot be recollected as ascertained. There is much food for thought with the topic of inattentive minds, since inattentive minds are necessarily non conceptual.

These are not minds which think, for instance, like my mind thinking of the cup, this is a cup, this is a watch, this is a rosary, this mind which thinks this is something is a conceptual mind. The reason for which inattentive minds are necessarily non conceptual is because even though their object appears to them, this mind is unable to recognize the object and say, this is this. Then there is a big difference between inattentive minds and convictions, both indeed are minds which engage their object correctly. Both are minds which do not ascertain their objects. What precisely is the difference between an inattentive mind and a conviction in your opinion?

Do you understand the difference between an inattentive mind and a conviction? Do you understand? Really? A little bit maybe. Yeah.

What? Good. Inattentive minds are non conceptual minds. There is no conceptuality within them. Then for instance, there are beautiful songs in Tibetan.

I’m sure there are beautiful songs in English too, and when you listen to such a beautiful song with beautiful lyrics, then if you listen carefully, you won’t notice what is happening in front of you. That’s an inattentive mind. Then why would such a visual consciousness be an inattentive mind? Because after listening to the song with this such concentration, we cannot recollect what passed in front of our eyes. Then do you now understand the difference between an inattentive mind and a conviction or not?

Really? Why? Why? Because of not being conceptual. The inattentive mind is getting at its object, not through conceptuality like a conviction Inattentive minds, right?

In Buddhist texts it is said that inattentive minds are not only non conceptual minds but direct perceivers. Why? Conviction discriminates its object and commits it to memory, whereas an inattentive mind does not discriminate the object. In that case, what is the extent of the discrimination? In the example of the music or the song, there is the perception this is music or this is a song.

It evaporates from the mind after having heard it, that at least the discriminator, there is a recognition that there has been listening to music or listening to a song. Is that not the case? I mean it’s still an inattentive mind because there is no recollection beyond the recollection of having heard a song or having heard music. We’re not saying that the ear consciousness which listens to the song is an inattentive mind, that’s a valid a direct valid cognizer. We’re saying that the visual consciousness which cannot recollect its object, because one is listening to a song is an inattentive mind.

In reality, these seven subdivisions of awareness and knowledge are present within the continuum of all of us. While it is easy to understand these seven subdivisions of awareness and knowledge, it is much more difficult to try to place or integrate love, compassion and bodhicitta within them. The analysis to do so is very elegant. I will tonight take two questions. Just two question.

Finished. The the nature of the person, is there no empirical decider, any way to decide empirically between the claims of various schools? Or is this something that is strictly a matter for logic and developing The various Buddhist schools or all the schools of India? Buddhist schools. Say for example between Mind Only and Prāsaṇgika, for example, is there any way to decide empirically between those two?

The differences between the four schools of tenets, all the way from the Vaibhāṣika up to the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka is contingent on the view. Then as one meditates, starting with the view of the lower system of tenets, one will progressively evolve towards higher and higher system of tenets, until one eventually attains a realization of the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka view. Therefore, there is an ascertainment of the view based on experience. We’re gaining an understanding of the view according to the respective system of tenets in actuality is very difficult, through experience in meditation one will deepen one’s understanding. There seems to be a problem with the words.

In the dictionary, conviction in one definition is an unshakable belief in something without need for proof or evidence. And so, Ilya, the word conviction therefore seems to be not quite appropriate because that’s not implying what we’re saying is that it’s not implying an absolute unshaken belief. I cannot comment on that. I can point out that the definition of conviction in the Lorig entails that conviction not only be incontrovertible, but factually concordant. I’m not quite sure that your definition in the English dictionary has to be factually concordant.

Speaking of inference and conviction, George has kindly donated this wonderful DVD, Unmistaken Child, the searching of the reincarnation of his holiness’s teacher. But if anybody would like to borrow it before we process it in the library then you’d be happy with that George.

Key terms in this teaching

bodhicitta jang chub sem (Tib)
A principal consciousness that combines the two factors of wishing to free all beings from suffering and of wishing to attain enlightenment in order to achieve that; the spontaneous altruistic mind of enlightenment can be either aspirational or engaging. LYWA
dependent origination pratityasamutpada (Skt); ten drel (Tib)
Also called dependent arising. The way that the self and phenomena exist conventionally as relative and interdependent. LYWA
lamrim
The graduated path. A presentation of Shakyamuni Buddha’s teachings in a form suitable for the step-by-step training of a disciple. LYWA
lorig
Awareness and knowledge, the study of mind and mental factors, in order to understand and control the delusions. LYWA
Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
Prasangika Madhyamaka u ma thäl gyur pa (Tib)
The Middle Way Consequence school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Consequence school accepts mere consequences known to others and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
tenet system drubtha(Tib)
A general term for a religious and/or philosophical system, whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist. It is often used as shorthand to refer to the four major Buddhist tenet systems that emerged from India. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

Questions answered in this teaching

Is there any empirical way to decide between the Mind Only and Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka views?

The differences between the four schools of tenets, from the Vaibhāṣika up to the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, depend on the view. As one meditates, starting with the view of the lower system of tenets, one progressively evolves towards higher and higher systems of tenets, until one eventually attains a realization of the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka view. So there is an ascertainment of the view based on experience. Gaining an understanding of the view of each system of tenets in actuality is very difficult, but through experience in meditation one will deepen one's understanding.

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