Audio recorded at Buddha House Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 103-minute teaching, Ven Jamyang begins by cultivating bodhicitta—the mind dedicated to establishing all beings in liberation—then shifts to a rigorous philosophical examination using classical debate format. The central question: the Mind-Only school claims external objects are not different in substance from mind. Using point-by-point refutation, Jamyang works through the Middle Way Consequentialist response: if things truly exist (as Mind-Only asserts), they must be external; if not external, they lack true existence, contradicting the school’s own position. He explores why both schools posit emptiness yet define it fundamentally differently, and why this disagreement matters for serious practitioners studying the Gelug texts.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2009 03 03.mp3
UUID: f1e38697-3884-40aa-99d9-9125f39346e6
Teacher: Ven Jamyang
Collection: Bodhi Way (Ven Jamyang)
Date: 2009-03-03
Recorded at: Buddha House Adelaide
Duration: 103.3 minutes
Words: ~6,832
K. So I guess she’s instructing us to give us a good motivation. Then with the with with a proper motivation, then we can turn we can transform every how can I say that? Any spare time that we have or any meaningless activity, we can make it extremely meaningful with the right motivation. So it is important anyway that we take advantage of this.
Just by the by just giving rise to a good motivation, transform all our actions, and we we we give them great meaning. And so Geshe says, so it’s important that we then take advantage in of our of being here and give rise to the best possible motivation, which is then the mind of enlightenment, which is then the motivation of establishing the wisdom to establish all sentient beings in the state of enlightenment, free of every suffering and endowed with every happiness. And with with that intention in mind and one gives rise to that determination, may I then attain enlightenment? Because how is it that I can that I can establish also human beings in enlightenment? It is by attaining enlightenment myself.
So the may I attain enlightenment in order to establish all beings, to benefit all beings, and establish them in the state of enlightenment. And Geshe says, so with regards to the mind of enlightenment itself, to bodhicitta itself, it has there are two aspects to regarding the mind of enlightenment. One one aspect of the mind of enlightenment has to do is in relation to oneself, to one’s own attainment of enlightenment. And the other aspect of the mind of enlightenment, which is the most important is with regards to others, to the welfare of others, to the well-being of others, which is then accomplishing the welfare of others. And when we’re talking about others, we’re talking about all other sentient beings other than oneself, all other beings other than oneself.
And we then give rise to this determination to accomplish their well-being, perfectly accomplish their well-being of all of all other sentient beings. And Geshe says, so we we we work then to accomplish the welfare of others, of all other sentient beings. We develop this wish. May I then accomplish the perfect well-being of all sentient beings. In order to accomplish that, may I myself attain enlightenment.
And Geshe says it is the of enlightenment when it’s properly understood and and and produced or given rise to in this way is extremely beneficial. The benefit the great vast benefit of the mind of enlightenment ensues from the fact that it is it is a motivation to benefit all other sentient beings, to benefit countless sentient beings. So we’re talking about a countless amount of benefit, a countless amount of merit. So and and that’s why it is so very important and so very profound. So we think in this way.
We give rise. We think about what the Geshe said. We give rise to this motivation in this way. And with this motivation in our hearts, then we start with the recitation of the Heart Sūtra. Be, go for refuge to the Buddha, go for refuge to the Dharma, go for refuge to the Sangha.
We prostrate to the great Bhagavad, by all the children, by the assemblies of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas of the ten directions. By depending on my prostrations to all of you, may these words of truth be actualized. In the past, the working Indra dispelled [harm] by reflecting the profound meaning of the wisdom. You recite in the profound the profound meaning of the wisdom, recite profound words in daily recitation. May all diseases, people’s diseases, bad conditions, all the negative conditions that which happens due to past karma and immediate conditions.
May all these be dispelled may become nonexistent and be pacified. So we next topic we’re approaching the next topic we’re approaching is called refuting that the illusion is not different from mind and its inexpressibility to others. In in this has to do with a with a position of the proponents of the mind only school in which they state that from the the the mind, there is no So Geshe lah is explaining. So that has to do a position of the proponents of the mind only school in which they say that the mind and the illusion or the mind and the taste or, you know, the sense the consciousness of the taste, the sound, the visual form and so forth. The mind and and and and and all those things, each one of those things, they are they are of the same substance.
They are not of a different substance. So it this has to do with with with this one particular position of the mind only school. And and so with regards to this topic, the first thing that we that we do is go for the the next verse. And the first two lines of the verse has to do with the position, expressing the position of the mind only school. And it reads, illusion is not different from the mind neither is regarded as non different.
So, Geshe-la is going through the the commentary to that to that half of that verse. So it starts something like this. The proponents of the mind only, they say that there are there is no external. There does not exist an external reality. And and by that, they mean that how can I put that in English?
Construct that in English. So they just like an illusion is not different from the mind. It’s not of of a different substance than the mind in the same way form, sound, and so forth. They are also, not of a same not not of a different substance than the mind. That’s what they are saying.
Okay? So and and by saying that and and with what has been said before, And this gets a bit technical but so what just before we started with this one verse, and those who haven’t been here in the last class and the last previous previous few classes might have a bit of a hard time, but there was a whole debate debate regarding that which sees and that which has that which is seen and the conscious that sees and that which is perceived. And and so by saying that, that whatever whatever it is that sees and and and and is seen by having this this dichotomy of subject and object in this way, then they say we fall we fall, back to the same fault that we have been discussing up until now. And they say, even it’s a complicated thing. Even though they are not of a different they are not different substance, they still posit that they are other.
Okay. Okay. And so what is being said is I don’t know if you if you remember what we have been discussing up until now. Right? We have the whole idea of the self cognizing awareness.
And and if if what they are saying here is that the subject and the object are are not of different substance, if that they they are of the same substance, then what they are saying is that we fall back into the same old problem that we have been debating up until now, which is that there’s a conscious perceiving, conscious mind perceiving mind, and we have come to the conclusion that is that is not the case. But they try to rectify it by saying, okay. They are not of different substance, but they are still different. They are still other. And by saying so, by positing it in this way, they they intended to get around that problem that we have been discussing.
The whole problem of the the self-cognizing awareness. Okay? Okay. Let’s go. And we get and this is gonna get very, very complicated.
Okay? I promise you. So so the the the the middle way consequentialist then answers that in the second half of that verse. The answer says, if it really exists, how can it be non different from the mind? And if it is non different from the mind, it does not exist in reality.
And that pertains to the position. Because I was explaining something. They say he says something that you must you must understand first, that the proponents of the mind only school, they hold that there are there there are truly existent phenomena. So they say that functioning things things, they are truly existent. They say that emptinesses are truly existent.
And on the other hand, they say that permanent phenomena are not truly existent. And even though emptinesses are permanent, so there are different type of phenomena which are are truly existent. And it says it’s it’s important that you understand this first. So and and and this so it’s important why to understand this so we know where where the the argument of the middle way school is is is is leading, you know, where where we are being guided to. So the middle way consequentialists are saying, you posit the true existence that that that things or functioning things are truly existent.
Now don’t you? This is what we we are saying. And and if you say that they are truly existent, if they are truly existent, then they must exist in the way that they appear to exist. And the way that they appear to exist as as is as external phenomena. So they must be external phenomena.
So external existence must be that must be the case that there does exist external phenomena. And that’s then defeats their position that there that there’s not exist external phenomena. One little expression. The term means it it is what is this talk about? It’s it’s it’s being of not of a different substance from the mind.
What is it? What is this talk of the illusion and and and the sound and the form and so forth not being different from the mind that’s perceiving it? If it exists in that way, if it exists as external phenomenon, if it is to be truly established in the way and then exist in the way that appears to exist as external phenomena, if it has this external existence, so what is this talk about about the lack of of of of exist of of it having a different substance coming from? It does have a different substance. It must have a different substance than the mind.
And then the second half, the second line of the verse, this is a lot of compact knowledge in this line. So the second line of the verse is saying, if you say then that it is not of a different substance, that it does not have a different substance, that it is not a different substance, then what follows, it is it is that it is not a functioning thing. In that, it is not then a truly existing phenomenon. But you posit from the beginning that functioning things are truly existent. So you see, again, we are pointing out the contradictions in their in their positions.
Okay? In their in their their tenets. Okay? And and and then we we go on to the to the next verse, the next two lines of verse. And this got really confused because I thought it was something else.
And it goes like this. Although illusion is not really existent, it is something observed. And and so so Geshe is then explaining what what it means is that even the illusion, the sound, the visual form, the taste, and so forth, which is then they are they are that which is seen, that which is observed. They are tachi which is meant literally means what is looked at or or or what is what is observed in this case. So they are because they are all all of these things are what is observed by the sense consciousnesses, then the consciousnesses, those six sense consciousnesses, they are the observers.
And and it is alright to posit to posit this in this way. That’s what it was that’s what we’re being we’re being told. To make this distinction in this way, it’s it’s okay. And Geshe says this is the position. This is, again, still the answer of the middle way consequentialist to the argument of the mind only So, again, so then, Geshe is going is going through the the commentary.
And if you remember the first half of the verse is saying again, if it really exists, how can it be non-different from the mind? If it is non-different from the mind, it does not exist in reality. It’s not truly existent. And the the commentary is in explaining. So if if form, sound, and and illusions and so forth, they truly existent, if they do exist truly, then they must they must exist truly in the way that they appear to exist.
And if that is the case, then they appear to exist externally as external objects, as external phenomena. In that case, then then the the the the must be established as, truly established as external phenomena. They they must exist truly as external phenomena. So then these external things then, how can, how can they how, so these external things things then, how can they be, of a, different substance than the mind? They are not of a different substance than the mind.
Sorry. How can how can they not be of a different substance of the mind? They are of a different substance in the mind. Okay? So so again so again the whole point of what we are being directed to understand here what we’re being guided to understand here is you the the the middle way consequential is is saying, you, proponent of the mind only, says that those things, they are truly existent phenomena.
If they are true existent phenomena, then you cannot it is impossible then to posit them as as as having the same substance, as being of the same substance in the mind. They must be of a different substance. So there’s a contradiction again that we’re pointing out to. Okay? If you say and then so the argument goes from that point.
Right? From from that point, if you if you say then, if you mind only, say that they do not have they are not that they are not of a different substance, then what follows follows is that these things are not truly a phenomena. Okay? Then, again, you contradict yourself. So And then so so then you the the argument goes on to conclude.
And, again, you say you say that you accept that these appearances do not exist in the way that they appear to exist. They are not established. How can I say? They are not established in the way that they appear, or they’re not established by way of of their mode of appearance. So and from that, then, you say that they are not.
Them. Them. Tell And so so you are saying that the these appearances are are are not established. You accept them as as false, as being false, I guess I was explaining, meaning that they’re not established, by way of their mode of appearance, by way of their of of their appearances. Because if they were established by way of their appearance, then you have to say that they are, then they will be truly established external phenomena.
And there is no other possibility than that. You say. So then, so again, and and the commentary goes on this is very obscure to me but Geshe la was explaining what what is what it means. He’s saying, again, the consequences go on to say that so, again, these objects, they are not truly established. They are that which is observed.
And then, and that being the case, that if that which is being observed is not truly established, not really existent, then, again, that which observes the subject, again, is not truly existent. And that is alright to say that. I guess, the the way Geshe la is explaining is that the consequences are saying this is how we posit it, and it’s alright for you to correct your view by positing it in this way too. So if if the object was to reestablish, then there were but it would be necessary necessary then to be for the the subject to be truly established, truly existent. And the same way the other way around, if if the subject was to be truly established, the consciousness, the sense of consciousness were truly established, truly existent, again, the objects would have to be truly existent too.
So it is alright then to to to come to the understanding that these objects, these observed observed, things, phenomena, they are not really established. And in this way, then the subject that which is observing is also not really established. Is is pointing out teaching And then is pointing. So if you and then if you say then if that this illusion does not exist then again, by saying that we we come to the position where this this fault, this whole point of debate does not come into being and we are told that in the middle way school we do not have this fault And if you accept this position if you accept this position, it will be it will be in your favor. So And Geshe-la was pointing out that this started, again, in the first one of the first verses that start with the this critique of the, Manoni view is verse number sixteen.
It goes, if for you, illusion itself does not exist, then what is to be ascertained? You may respond that in reality, it exists otherwise simply as an expression of the mind. So external objects do not exist. They’re saying all possible entities are the nature of the subject mind, they’re saying, subjective mind. They are substance of the mind lacking any other substance.
Then according to you, then this is the position of the mind only then the middle way consequentialists are saying according to you then if these entities existed externally as, as they appear to, they would not be illusory. And so and then we started this whole debate of with this whole critique of the mind only from this point onwards. And then again, so if if you accept if you accept then your mind-only position is. So if if you so if if you then say that illusion So so then this whole fault of of your system that comes about by ascertaining that illusions do not exist. When you come to ascertain that illusions do not exist, this whole fault comes about in your system.
And if you if you if you give that up and ascertain and accept then that, these external phenomena are not really they are of a different substance, and they’re not really established, again, the same vein as as the subject, then and then your position will gain consistency, and that will be that will be good for your position. And we do we’re saying that we are do we do like that. That’s we’re saying. So it will be good for you if you do the same. You can see how how there is consistency in our position.
So, again, the the the the middle way consequentialist view is that things, functioning things, those external objects, they do perform functions. They do act as that which is being observed as as observed objects. And then again, the the the subjects, this consciousness, the sense consciousnesses, which are the subjects, also do perform functions. And by ascertaining that both both of them are do not exist truly, they are not truly existent or truly established, you know, the the objects and the subjects, then, again, your position, your whole system, your whole view gains consistency. And that is that is the position of the middle way consequentialist.
That is our position. So so the the reason it’s important to understand. The reason why the proponents of the mind only assert that certain phenomena are truly existent or are truly established. So they say that functioning things and emptinesses every emptinesses, they are truly existent. And explain that these functioning things, the the visual objects, objects of touch and sensation and so forth, of physical, tactile sensations and so forth.
Functioning things. They perform functions. They serve they perform they do perform functions, and they act how to say? They have and they arise because they arise in dependence on cause and conditions and because they do perform functions, they say they are truly existent. That’s what they’re saying.
They also say that emptinesses are truly existent. And now, again, we say, well, they are not emptinesses do not come about due to causing conditions, but they are for the awareness of an ārya being for an awareness of an ārya being, they do exist truly. They do appear to exist truly. Sorry. They do exist truly.
For the awareness of an ārya being. Okay? And they also say the permanent phenomena. They say the permanent phenomena do not exist truly. Do not are not truly established.
They say that for two reasons. First, it again, the permanent phenomenon such as space, for example, does not arise due to causing conditions, and, also, is not cannot be observed for the space. It’s not something that can be seen with the eyes, cannot be an object observation of the eyes, cannot be observed. So for for those two reasons, they say that permanent phenomena are not truly existent. So we have the this is the position of the mind only.
And we can so they are saying that there are two categories of phenomena. There are positive as being truly established, truly existent, and one that is positive as not being truly existent. In this, we have can can you can you already see there’s a little bit of trouble here? There’s a little bit of a problem here.
And what we are saying in the middle way consequentialist position, we say, we don’t have any troubles with our view, with our position. Because we say what we’re saying is that every phenomenon or every and all phenomena do not have they are not are not truly existent. They are not truly established. There’s no phenomena which is truly established. They only exist as merely imputed, merely labeled by the mind, or every phenomena is like that.
So both all all the all these three categories here, things things in general, emptiness, and and and permanent phenomena, they are all of them lack true existence. None of none of it exists They all exist only as merely labeled, merely imputed. Yes. Yeah. Yes.
I guess I thought it’s gonna be hard to translate, but I’m gonna try. Well, there must be something to be empty, isn’t it? That’s true. You do not have emptiness without Without the object, which is There is no emptiness without the object, is it? There’s no object there.
So it is dependent. That’s that’s let see let me see what I can do with that. And it’s oh, I I I think I did the best I could here. So, yes, every phenomena has its emptiness. So there is when we’re talking about emptiness, logically, technically speaking, you have to talk about the emptiness of this or that, of one thing of the or the other.
There’s not one universal emptiness, so to speak. Pardon? That’s okay. But there’s no there’s no ideal platonic emptiness. It it comes in dependence on each object.
Now when we say that it depend the the the word that you chose there, the the depend that depends on the object. No. There’s there’s no dependence there because emptiness is not arising due to cause and conditions. Emptiness does not every phenomena is empty. Every phenomena in the sense that emptiness is a lack of something.
Right? It’s a lack of true existence. Every phenomena has that lack. So the cup has a lack of being a true existing cup. I don’t have a cup.
The bottle has a lack of being a true existing bottle. That’s what it means. So, again, again, what what might occur to us oh, I guess I was saying what what usually we we we’re inclined to think is that when we think of emptiness or we think of the emptiness of a person, you know, I guess I was saying Rodrigo or Jim Young or or Jen or anybody, you know, we think, oh, there’s there’s the emptiness of Jim Young. There’s the emptiness of Jen. There’s the emptiness of the bottle.
So we have big emptiness, small emptiness, green emptiness, red emptiness, you know, and we we we inclined maybe to think to think in those lines. But that is that that’s not the case. Emptiness. When we’re talking about emptiness, emptiness of this, that, we’re talking about a lack lack of something, and that is the lack of true existence. I guess in English, it is lack of is one of the best ways to translate this word.
We nominate it as calling it, calling into calling it emptiness, but it is a lack it is a lack of true existence. It’s a lack of inherent existence, a lack of an existence from its own side or independent existence. It’s a lack, and everything has this lack of true existence. No. I got really confused.
Sorry. What she’s saying, also, what might come to mind is, again, if if every phenomenon is empty, we might come to think so is every all this the realization of emptiness or or the of of a ārya being, a buddha ārya being or bodhisattva ārya being, and the realization of emptiness of containing in the continuum of a a ordinary being, are they the same? Is every phenomena the same in that? Is every emptiness, every realization of emptiness the same? Guess I was gonna say no.
That also does not apply. Okay. Let me put it in a better English. So it’s like this. The emptiness.
Is every emptiness then the same? Because I wasn’t saying no. Some emptiness are the emptiness of an ārya being. Some emptiness are emptiness of ordinary being. Some emptiness are the emptiness of object of the body.
So the the the the a difference can be posited in this in this way. In this way. It’s technical. Okay? It’s you’re you’re like Okay.
Again, this again, this expression is a very rigorous logical expression that’s been used. Are saying that this emptiness are all the same thing? Is the emptiness of Anthony and Jain and Jem Yang and the Buddha and the bottle of water? The thing, one thing and the same thing? No.
They’re not. They’re still the emptiness of Anthony, the emptiness of Jane, the emptiness of Jamyang, the emptiness of the bottle. They’re not the same thing. Now we can say that in terms of of of identity, from the point of view of identity from the point of view of existence, they’re they’re they’re not the same thing. From the point of view of identity, emptiness and this is a lack.
Everywhere, everything has lacks of true existence.
And so from the point of view of identity of what emptiness is, you could you you can say that emptiness is always a lack of true existence. But from the point of view of of existence and I’m using this is the thing with the Tibetan language, and so verbs of existence. And and these are verbs of identity. And in in So because I was explaining the concept of. It said, if something is if something is the the same thing or one thing, then what so we take we’re talking about consciousness and impermanence.
So if it is if something is consciousness, if something is consciousness, it must be impermanent. And, again, the same the other way around if it is if it is consciousness, it must be impermanent. Sorry. If it is impermanent, it must it be consciousness. It’s it has it has to if something is, it has to be it has to be it has to have this two way pervasion or necessity, logical necessity.
So if it is one, it must be the other. If it is the other, it must be the one. Okay? If it is if it is the same in this sense. So, again, in the case in the case of these emptinesses, this pervasion, two way pervasion doesn’t doesn’t hold is that’s not the case with with emptiness.
Okay? But so, again, again, in English, it’s not coming I’m I’m I’m not thinking very clearly in English, but so in so we cannot say that that these all these emptinesses are in this way, that they are the same in this one way that we just examined. But you can say that they are all of the same nature or they are all of the same essence, and that they are all all of them are a lack of true existence. Is that okay? Is that making sense?
It’s not making sense to me. I’m glad it is making to you. So, again, we we we see going back to what we’ve been examining here, if someone says, we see the problem then with the mind only position that they say that they are they are phenomena, things, and emptinesses, are truly established, existence. And for the middle way consequentialist, our point of view, we say that there’s nothing whatsoever which has not even a gram or milligram of of true existence. Okay?
So, again, the and and and the mind only school then they say they say this, again, that this phenomena these two categories of phenomena are truly existent. And they on top of that, they say that there there are no external objects. They do not exist. And and the the the the lack of of different substance of the observed and what is being and the observer, the subject and the object, is what they posit as being the subtle emptiness. This lack of of duality of of of subject subject and object being of different substance is what they posit as being a subtle emptiness.
That’s their ultimate view. The mind only. The mind only. Yes. Yes.
So in in the mind only sorry. In the consequentialist middle way consequentialist, what we posit what we posit as the subtle emptiness is that every phenomena every phenomena lacks Oh, yeah. Is empty of inherent existence or lacks inherent existence. And in the mind only, we call, what we refer to as subtle emptiness is this lack of subject and object being of different substance. Okay?
So both both posit emptiness. They both posit the realization of emptiness, the realization of emptiness of of other beings, and so forth. Both schools posit emptiness. But what is it it that they posit what is it that they call emptiness is is not exactly the same not precisely the same thing. Okay?
How how how they explain the emptiness out is not exactly the same thing. Not exactly the same way. So again, the mind only, the position of the mind only is that there is external objects do not exist. They say they are all of the same substance as the mind. And that all these phenomena that we call external, they arise out of the out of mental imprints, out of the imprints that are in the mind.
So Geshe la is explaining so in a in a rough rough way, Geshe la is explaining roughly it is the case is that we see a a form now, and that leaves an imprint. And then, again, in the future, we see we are we see then another form which is similar or or or related to the the the form that we have seen due to by the force of imprint, we can we can see it again. Point of view of the middle way consequentialist is every phenomenon lacks inherent existence. Every phenomenon can be is established or comes into being due to causes and conditions. Even permanent phenomena can be posited in this way because permanent phenomena can be dependent its parts.
And okay? It’s relative permanent phenomena also has you can pause it. It comes in dependence on its parts. Okay? So even space has directions of north, south, east, west, western space, southern space, eastern space, and stuff like that.
So we can see how how their views, the view of the mind only and the view of middle way consequentialist are different in this. So we see one is saying that phenomena arise in dependence on others, on others, on another. That’s the middle way consequentialist. And the other one is saying, this mind only is saying, the phenomena arise in dependence on the mental imprint. Mind says that phenomena arise in dependence on vasana, on the mental imprint.
And the middle way consequentialist says that phenomena arise in dependence on another. One of them? Another phenomena. Causing conditions. Many others.
Others. Infinite. So there’s two definitions of true existence according to the two different categories. So one is that which arises, depends on cause and conditions. So things, functioning things.
And the the correct perception of an object Oh, yeah. Or the correct ultimate perception of an object, which is then by by another being, which is then also truly existent. So that that instance. Again, you see what Geshe la is doing is is speaking in debate format. So Geshe la is saying, if if you are asked in the debate to posit what is emptiness for the mind only, you have to answer this way.
It is that which arises due to cause and conditions, in dependence on cause and conditions, and and that which is the ultimate perception of an ārya being. Existence? If they ask you what is true existence, you have to give this to what is emptiness. Oh, what is true existence? Yeah.
But this yeah. Yeah. Things are empty. Yes. Yes.
Have to pause at that. Yes. Sorry. Yes. That’s alright.
Yes. So how how do you debate when you do not agree on your definition? Because my only school has a completely different definition for true existence and the consequence school. But that’s what we’ve we’ve been we’ve been doing. I know.
But it’s like it’s like, I thought that you debate and that you first agree on the definitions, and then you then start a debate. But they don’t agree on the definitions, and then they start a debate. So it’s almost like you have two people you know, it’s it’s it’s like talking about one is talking about cows and the other is talking about apples. Okay. So, I guess I was pointing out that precisely because their views are different, there is debate.
So one is saying one is saying, you know, phenomena certain phenomena are truly existent, and the other the one is saying that all phenomena are not truly existent, they’re not truly existent. So the debate starts. So if if the mind only comes and and ask the the consequential, so what is your view? Our view is that every phenomenon without exception lacks true existence. And then the mind only thinks to himself or herself, think, well, if all phenomena lack true existent, then they they do not exist.
There’s no existent phenomena whatsoever. That is a problem in your view. And then and but then so there must be phenomena which are truly existent. Phenomenal which arise of course, in conditions and perform functions, they must be truly existent. That’s the only way they can understand it.
But then we come back and say, look, if if if they are truly existent, then there is this and that contradiction in your view. Then, you know, your view cannot hold. Cannot hold the water. Right? Cannot hold water.
Right? So, you know, if if phenomena truly exist, then they cannot be of a different substance than the mind and so on and so on. What we’ve been doing here is exactly that, deconstructing in a way or pointing out the contradictions on the mind only view. Are trying to remedy that. Always they try to remedy that by one way or another, and then we point out the contradiction, more and more contradiction, how they do not hold.
Did they both agree that if something is true existence, then it exists in the way it appears? And Geshe la said, no. No. They do not view it as as the same in the same way. No.
This is, again, one point of debate again. And Geshe la, I don’t know why he gave this example, but he’s saying, if you take a husband and a wife who are going and they want to buy a car, so one of them want to buy a small car, the other one want to buy a big car, then you have a debate. So the point of view, again, in this regard is also different, so again, there’s debate with regards to that too. Yeah. Yeah.
So I was just I was just checking on on my Tibetan here. So, yes, they do not if a phenomenon is truly, it it it is not they do not see that they exist truly in the same way than the way they appear to exist. Yeah. So, yeah, I was just checking the Tibetan. I said it right.
Yeah. I said your brain. Yeah? So these two scores So, basically, everything else explained as the same in the same way. Emptiness, ignorance sorry.
Emptiness, anger, all the physical emotions and compassion and bodhicitta and all that. But they disagree with regards to emptiness. And, again, they they they disagree here because the emphasis is something which is very, very difficult to understand, very, very difficult to grasp hold of. So when when the the middle way explained and what is emptiness, you know, many people have this difficulty of understanding. If you say that it’s not truly that every phenomena likes true existence, what comes to their mind is that they do not exist altogether.
And again, we even we we if when we study when we study the teachings, we see that the Buddha himself taught all these different views, all these different tendencies. And he taught for the specific needs of the the people who came to see him. So for for one particular individual, he taught emptiness in this way. For another individual, he taught emptiness in that way, and so on and so on. So, again, for for some people, you know, the Buddha came and taught again, when they came and and asked, what is emptiness?
What is all this talk about emptiness? And then the Buddha said, emptiness is lack of true existence of all phenomena, of every phenomena. And then but but some people couldn’t understand that. So for some other people, you know, he thought, you know, that emptiness is is a lack of subject and object of being of a different substance, of being different. That’s the then from that, they came they came the mind only school.
And Geshe-la is saying that this view of the mind only in relationship to the view of the middle way consequentialist is easier to understand. Okay? In relationship to the consequentialist view, yes. It is easier than the consequentialist view. Still, it’s not easy, but it’s easier than the consequentialist.
What is for us to do is to investigate, analyze, and study this carefully. Study the view of the mind only. If we study if we are careful enough, and if we are serious enough, again, we we will come to develop our capacities to understand that and to understand that the consequentialist view is probably the right one. But we have to exercise that. We have to exercise our analytical powers, discernment powers, our investigative powers.
Okay? So, Geshe-la was saying it is it is without engaging these other views or the views of the mind only school and and exercising, so to speak, one one’s one’s discernment with that, and this will become it’s gonna become very difficult to come to understand the the consequentialist view. Okay? Is that okay?