Audio recorded at Buddha House Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 34.5-minute teaching, Ven Jampa Ignyen explains how the mind constructs all conceptions through generic sound—the internal repetition of words—and generic image, permanent mental forms that represent rather than duplicate their objects. Working from Sūtra School epistemology, he establishes why impermanent phenomena appear to direct perception while permanent things appear to conception alone. The teaching addresses questions central to Buddhist philosophy: whether conceptions of absent things rely solely on generic image, how non-visual senses fit this sound-and-image framework, and what allows permanent generic images to come into existence and cease. Intended for serious students of Buddhist epistemology.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 12 M and C 2001 05 29.mp3
UUID: 151215f2-0dbe-472a-a522-ce2f390c6a1e
Teacher: Ven Jampa Ignyen
Collection: y Mind and Cognition 2001 Month 04-06 (Ven Jampa Ignyen)
Date: 2001-05-29
Recorded at: Buddha House Adelaide
Duration: 34.5 minutes
Words: ~3,642
You have the words describing something, and we we repeat them over and over again internally through generic sound. Something like uncompounded space. When we we develop a conception of uncompounded space, really, probably in the beginning, it’s generic sound mainly. We get these words, uncompounded space. Uncompounded space.
What is it? That’s our conception of it is mainly based on the generic sound, uncompounded space. Then we may actually introduce something like, you know, vast area like the sky, And we can actually see the sky with our eye awareness. So then we can introduce some, like, visual data. Conception of feeling?
Yes. That but then it’s based also on the word feeling. And so we’re using that initially initially in our conception of feeling. Even though we might not know what the meaning is, at least we have the word feeling. And then Specific emotions.
Oh, specific emotions like hatred. For instance, if we think of hatred, we might have a, you know, an image of an angry face or angry words or or whatever. The feeling itself, well, depends. If we’re looking at our own feelings, then we can we certainly develop conceptions about those as well. But how we develop conceptions about them is said to be either through generic sound or generic image or a combination.
It may be possible. Well it can be just mental too, I think, feelings. Right. It it had a physical impact, and you remember that. Yeah.
Yeah. So is that generic? I think that’s probably its image, but I think there’s a possibility that that image does extend to include other sensory types as well. So that’s possible. This we should investigate.
For Purbuchok, he’s only giving really two types, generic sound and generic image. But it’s true. We do remember the smells of things. We do remember the feeling of something, the touch of silk, and we have a conception of that. Whether that’s just generic sound, generic image, or whether it is something that goes beyond that.
The smell an image. Yeah. This we need to investigate because often, you know, like in the touch of silk, we have then the image of silk, something shiny and a particular color and so forth. Maybe even the sound of our hands rubbing against it. And the smell of smoke, we might hear the crackle of the fire, if it’s a wood fire.
I think here that it would be permitted that these other sensory types we could almost include with an image. But I think here it’s these two are the central ones, sound and an actual visual image are really the two central ones. They’re the two main senses that we have. Generic and our conception primarily relies on those two. And probably we can include other sensory types in the image.
And sound because you said you said you need a written word to be included in the sound. Yes. Words that appear on a page. That’s right. They’re the visual representation of the word.
Yeah. They’re not. Because words are actually sound or they’re defined as sound. The words on the page aren’t actually words in a sense. They’re the visual representation of words.
Yeah. Now if it is a selfless, its generic image is the appearing object. It is pervasive. We can put it this way. If it is selfless, it is pervasive that its generic image is the appearing object of the conception holding it.
Oh, it doesn’t matter what it is. If it exists in the universe anywhere, its generic image is the appearing object of the conception holding it. It’s not saying a great deal, actually. Whether it exists or it doesn’t exist in the universe. Everything is selfless.
So Everything is selfless, whether it exists or not. Whenever selfless is stated in the text, means existing and non existing entities, both. No. No. Can’t say that.
But isn’t everything in the universe perceived by anyway? Sorry? It is. Yes. Which is perceptual.
Is perceptual. Yes. So it’s perceived by perception. You can say if it’s selfless, it is it is comprehended by perception. You can say that as well.
Comprehended by perception because it’s comprehended by omniscience. That you can say. Can put it that way around. Okay. So that okay.
And the next debate going down. It follows valid awareness is not an object from among objects and object possessors. Why? Because omniscience is not an object from amongst objects and object possessors. Well, that’s true.
Awareness is not an object from among objects and object possessors. Is that okay? This is just following from what went on before. Here we’re making this convention here that awareness is in fact an object possessor from amongst objects and object possessors. Therefore, it’s not an object from among objects and object possessors.
And omniscience is not an object from among objects and object possessors because it’s awareness. So we agree with that. If so, then this opponent says, that one says, take valid awareness. It follows it is an object from among objects and object possessors. He’s disagreeing with what Purbuchok is saying.
And he’s saying, well, take awareness in that second row. It follows it is an object from among objects and object possessors because it is an existent. It exists from among objects and object possessors. And if it exists, it must be an object. So the author says no pervasion.
What yeah. Even though it’s we’re really here just dealing with conventions. And all we really need to understand about these debates is that there are objects and object possessors. And awareness is an object possessor from amongst objects and object possessors. We need to keep that clear here up to this point just to remember that.
Awareness is an object possessor from amongst objects and object possessors. Awareness is not an object from amongst objects and object possessors. It’s not an object. No. It’s not an object.
It’s an object possessor but not an object. It’s something of a convention which is just underlining the importance of awareness. It’s the central object possessor. And anyway, this is just a follow-up debate on this where someone else is disagreeing with that presentation by Purbuchok and Purbuchok is just saying, I don’t agree with it. Okay.
Look, we might just leave the rest of those debates there. They’re just going on and proving what Purbuchok already has asserted. So we move on to page number eight. Now we’ve gone through this before. We might just quickly go through it again.
Okay. So there are two, objects and object possessors. So we’re going over this a number of times. You’ll be sick and tired of objects and object possessors by the end of this. Okay.
So the definition of an object is that cognized by discernment. Does anyone have an issue with that definition? An object is that cognized by discernment, that comprehended by valid awareness. An object is something cognized by awareness, cognized by discernment. Okay?
No problem with that? Now too, we go on to the classification here. If objects are classified, there are appearing objects, conceived objects, and engaged objects. The appearing object of that discernment and the held object of that discernment are equivalent. Now prior to that, appearing objects and engaged objects, they’re the two that we have to keep in mind.
Then the author says, the appearing object of that discernment and the held object of that discernment are equivalent. Here he’s simply restating what’s occurred in sūtra many times in the past and in various commentaries, and he’s just restating these points. But what we need in that line there, all we need to remember is that there are appearing objects and engaged objects. Okay. So then the next line down, if it’s an established base.
Established base just means anything which exists. If it exists in the universe, it’s an established base. It’s an object. It’s a dharma. Okay.
I think we gave a list of these before, didn’t we? If it’s an established base, it’s a dharma. It’s an existent. It’s an object. Okay.
So if it is an established base, it must be an appearing object because if a phenomenon and a phenomenon here referring to anything which is impermanent, it must be the appearing object of perception. And if permanent, it must be the appearing object of conception. Now this is quite a profound statement made from the sūtra school point of view, which anyway, now we’ve mentioned this before, so I think that’s there should be no problem with that. Now, the first is established, meaning if it’s an appearing object, it must if it’s a phenomenon, it must be the appearing object of perception. So that is established.
The first is established because the appearing object of perception, the held object of perception, and phenomenon are equivalent. So if it’s an impermanent object, then it’s the held object of perception. It’s the appearing object of perception. Those terms are completely interchangeable. Whenever we come up to anything impermanent, it’s the appearing object of perception.
And for sense objects, that’s pretty pretty obvious, you know, by like this thing here is the appearing object of perception because it’s the appearing object of eye perception, isn’t it? That’s the appearing object. So appearing and held basically mean the same thing. Here they do. Yeah.
Don’t be too concerned about held object here though. That’s not used very much. Appearing object is what we’re concerned about. So if it’s impermanent, it’s the appearing object of conception. If it’s permanent, it’s the appearing object of conception.
Sorry. I thought I said something wrong. If it’s impermanent, it’s the appearing object of perception. And if it’s permanent, it’s the appearing object of conception. An example of an appearing object is any form that we can see in the room.
They’re all the appearing object of eye awareness. And any sound that we hear, that’s the appearing object of ear awareness. Anything that we can smell is the appearing object of nose awareness. Anything the contact of the floor of our clothing is the appearing object of body perception. The taste in our mouth is the appearing object of tongue perception.
So if it’s impermanent, it’s the appearing object of perception. Okay. Again, if a phenomenon now this one, two, one, two, three, four, five, six, seven lines down. Again, if it is a phenomenon, follows it must be the appearing object of perception because if a phenomenon, it must be that comprehended by perception by clear manifest means. So that means if it’s impermanent or a phenomenon, it must be comprehended by perception by clear manifest means.
Therefore, it’s the appearing object of perception. Because actually, when we look around the room, those objects that appear to the eye awareness really appear through clear manifest means, perceptible, obvious means, don’t they? Yep. That’s all that means there. The second root reason is established because the appearing object of conception, the held object of conception, and permanent are equivalent.
Okay. So if it’s if it’s permanent, it’s the appearing object of conception, like generic image. The generic image is the appearing object of conception. But also other permanent objects are the appearing object of conception. Okay.
Again, the engaged object of perception and the referent object of perception are equivalent. So here the referent object, engaged object, and assessed object refer to the same thing. These are just name equivalents. There’s no okay? Because we had assessed object before.
Is an example of an internal object with theory of conceptual — is not a generic image. Uncompounded space Uncompounded space is permanent. It’s the appearing object of conception, but it’s not a generic image. In a way it’s true, but there are permanent objects which are not generic images.
Images, like emptiness, selflessness. No, things appear to our conception as well. Sorry? Things which are not generic images can appear to conception. But they only appear to conception through a generic image.
But even the object, if we have a conception of a vase, the vase appears to conception. The generic image of a vase appears to that conception. But the vase is not the appearing object of conception. And why is that? No.
Why is the vase not the appearing object of conception? Because it’s Yeah. Because it’s impermanent. And that’s right. It’s just stated here previously that if it’s impermanent, it’s the appearing object of perception.
No. Whether it’s in the room or outside the room, it’s a vase. So it’s the appearing object of perception, not conception. Another unreal Doesn’t matter. Well, of course, we think of a real vase.
Yep. But a vase itself is only the appearing object of perception in this school. But vase can appear to conception, but it’s not the appearing object of Yeah. No. That vase is impermanent because it’s a vase.
Therefore, it’s the appearing object of perception. It’s not appearing to my senses right here now. It’s appearing to your conception here and right now. Yep. But in general, it’s the appearing object of perception because it’s impermanent.
This is a tenet here of the Sūtra School. They don’t make this statement lightly. When you’re it’s impermanent, can I just Yeah? It’s there. Joe’s got it at the home.
Yeah. But it’s not going to stay there so therefore it’s impermanent. Is that what you’re No. No. It’s impermanent moment by moment.
Moment. It’s made up of atoms and molecules that are in motion all the time, so it’s impermanent. Isn’t it like us? Yeah. I just didn’t know why you were putting the impermanent on it because Because it’s changing moment.
Yes. It’s more impermanent because it’s changing moment to moment. Mhmm. Changing. Right.
Therefore, it’s an appearing object of perception. Right? Therefore, it’s not the appearing object of conception. Because it’s not permanent. Conception.
Because it’s not permanent. Yep. That’s all. It’s actually, this particular thought of the sūtra school has quite a profound meaning, but it needs some contemplation to develop an understanding of what’s implied by their particular view. In general, that’s true.
That first we have the perception of something, sense perception of something, and then later we generate conceptions of that thing. We can’t. For uncompounded space, yeah. But even then, we’re generally using we can say that sense awareness does play a part because we have sense awareness of like the sky. And the sky can be taken to be the basis of designation of uncompounded space.
Sorry. We have to be careful here actually with our eyes with our use of conceptual because often I think our usage is not very clear. We’re often using conceptual to mean both the awareness and the object of the awareness. So we have to be very careful in talking with conception that we’re we’re demarcating if we’re talking about the object or the conception itself. In that regards, maybe not even to use the term concept that sometimes comes up maybe useful because but it depends.
If we know if when we’re talking about say concept, we understand that we’re just talking about the awareness holding the object, then that’s fine. But sometimes it seems to, you know, be used for the object as well as the awareness. And in fact, if there is, you know, the danger of of that occurring, it’s probably better to put this term aside for a while. Oh, no. The awareness is not permanent.
Awareness is always momentary. In that, you have the conception of a rabbit with horns, conception is momentary, changing moment to moment. A rabbit with horns doesn’t exist. So the assessed object, the referent object doesn’t exist. Doesn’t even appear to awareness because it doesn’t exist.
The generic image exists that appears to that conception. The generic image is permanent. Now that’s a very good question. It’s said to be permanent. Purbuchok states it to be permanent because he regards it as a negation, an affirming negation.
Some assert that it’s impermanent. Why can’t a generic image change moment to moment? It appears to awareness, but it’s not actually held by the awareness. Okay. That’s a little bit misleading.
It it occurs as the held object, but it’s not actually held in the sense that it’s not comprehended. If we were able to comprehend the generic image, to be a generic image, we’d be close to becoming ārya beings because it’s very, very subtle. Because what we have with conception is we have conception that’s focused on on an object through a generic image. And at present, we’re mixing those together. We tend to mix the generic image and the reference object together and have that mixed appearance.
We hold that mixed appearance as being the object itself. That is the mixture of the generic image and the object as being the object. Therefore, it’s said that the the conception itself is a mistaken awareness. Therefore, conception is always mistaken. We We have a memory of a vase.
That’s not a perception, that’s conception. A conception of a vase. That actually exists. The conception exists and the object of that conception exists. Yeah.
Yeah. Because it’s an authentic conception. Yeah. So what is the generic image then? If I think if when you say, you know, take a vase, if I think of my vase at home Yep.
Or any of the vase behind you. Yeah. Then what is the generic image? It’s just this permanent image that appears to conception. It’s not memory.
The memory is conception. It’s awareness. Yes, it’s not vase? No. It’s permanent.
No. It’s just an image of vase, which is not a vase. The generic image of a vase is something appearing to be a vase when it’s not a vase. Why is it Yes, so why is it generic image? Why is it Because the short answer is it’s emptiness.
Sorry? Well, that would mean, following on from that, that the generic image is empty. It’s not emptiness. It’s a non affirming negation. The short answer there is it’s a non affirming negation, therefore permanent.
Sorry, not a non affirming, it’s an affirming negation. An affirming negation, therefore it’s permanent. It’s something that doesn’t change. It’s a little bit like I mean, we can have generic images. We can conceive of movement, know, something it’s a person running down the street, can’t we?
A horse running. We can stop and we can see sort of horse running along. Hard when we try to conceive it, it doesn’t really come up very clearly. We can almost hear the clop clop clop clop clop clop clop clop over there and so forth. But in answer to that, it’s sometimes it’s stated that it’s a little bit like a, you know, a movie, you know, where you have all these still frames that make up a give the impression of movement if they’re put together one after the other.
It does. Absolutely. Oh, everything permanent depends on its parts. So the generic image always existed from the beginning of this time? No.
To be permanent, it doesn’t have to have existed from the beginning of this time. Part and just coming to being and being become permanent? No. It’s permanent to begin with. It’s a bit like the emptiness of this only existed from the time that this came into existence.
Then the emptiness of self is permanent. But it’s Emptiness is permanent. Yes. I’ll say the emptiness itself. Is permanent.
Absolutely. Emptiness always is permanent. And the emptiness of that will cease to exist when that ceases to That’s right. All the attributes of this object here, its impermanence, its attribute of existence, its attribute of weight, color, etcetera, of selflessness, its attribute of emptiness, its attribute of nonduality, its attributes of anything. It has countless attributes.
They all cease to exist when it when the basis itself ceases to exist. So permanent things such as generic images can cease to exist? Absolutely. It’s hard to under or conceive of how they might stop existing. But they can come into existence at a particular point, but it doesn’t mean to say that they’re impermanent if that’s the case.
Just as, you know, these objects come you know, this might have been made in nineteen seventy five on, you know, June the first nineteen seventy five. But it doesn’t mean to say because its emptiness began at that point that its emptiness is impermanent. But that’s some of the schools have a definition of impermanence as something that that arises, abide, and then subsides? Some say that But that’s like a generic image that rises, abides for a while for a short time. They just But that’s impermanence.
They said to do that, to arise, abide, and then pass away. Yeah. But the generic image is permanent. How come they can have the same characteristics? How does it permanent and impermanent?
Don’t have the same characteristics. Even if it arises, abides in some size? The basis itself abides is generated, abides for a certain period then is destroyed, but the emptiness isn’t. The emptiness doesn’t possess those characteristics. The permanence of of emptiness.
Of the generic image. Well, it’s permanent. Yeah. It exists. As long as the generic image exists, its permanent also exists.
But its permanence wasn’t created. Just the well, the generic image itself was not created. It’s a dependent arising, but it’s not a causally dependent object. It doesn’t depend on causes. It depends on its basis of designation.
It depends on its parts, but not on causes. Okay. We should have a break here. I think we can have a little bit.