Audio recorded at Buddha House Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 45-minute session, Ven Jampa Ignyen guides students through debate-form commentary on objects and object-possessors—the foundational subject-object duality of ordinary experience. Working through logical exchanges including the thought experiment of conceiving a rabbit with horns, he explores how awareness engages its objects, and how conceptions grasp non-existent things through generic images—superimposed mental appearances that enable thinking about anything, real or imagined. The teaching covers valid awareness, persons, and expressive sound as types of object-possessors, with emphasis on patience with the rigorous, debate-based material. Understanding these basics is presented as essential groundwork before studying emptiness and non-duality. For practitioners following a structured philosophical curriculum.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 11 M and C 2001 05 29.mp3
UUID: 84360af9-22c7-4b57-81c5-eb6e25d087d2
Teacher: Ven Jampa Ignyen
Collection: y Mind and Cognition 2001 Month 04-06 (Ven Jampa Ignyen)
Date: 2001-05-29
Recorded at: Buddha House Adelaide
Duration: 45.0 minutes
Words: ~4,955
Which means metaphysics, also the presentation that exists within logic and other related texts. So in a sense, it’s distilling various teachings on the nature of the mind. The presentation is not so easy for us if we’re not familiar with this type of presentation, which is in the form of debate. But the advantage of the debate is that it’s able to condense a lot of information into a short amount of space. And if we’re able to read through the debates, it’s a very efficient way of presenting information for us.
But in the beginning, it’s going to be confusing, and we’ve really only just begun reading through the text. And if we haven’t understood certain parts of it to date, then we shouldn’t be concerned in the least. Developing an understanding of the nature of the mind will take some time. So we need to be a little bit easy with ourselves, have patience with ourselves and the material and the text, the translators of the text, and so forth. Anyway, up till now, we’ve just been dealing really with the debates, and so that’s made it somewhat more difficult for us.
But it’s good we’ve been able to persevere so far. Now in future, we’ll go back on to some easier sections where just definitions are given and classifications and so forth. So the text itself, it’s often good just to have a look through the index or the contents page on page number two just to remind ourselves what the text is about because it’s not always evident from reading through the debates exactly what is being taught. So really in the content section, we can see that this text is just about two things on the far left hand side. It’s about objects and object possessors.
And at present, we’re studying really the section on objects, what objects are. And then comes object possessors. And then object possessors of three types, person persons or and then discernment, and then the expressive sound right at the end. And firstly, start with persons. That’s very brief.
It’s only a few lines. Then we deal with discernment. Discernment just means awareness or cognition. And then right towards the end we do expressive sound. We can see from this that the most important section is discernment or awareness.
So this is how the topic of awareness is discussed. Now, of course, at present, we’re dealing with objects and working out what objects are and how they’re defined in relation to object possessors, mainly awareness. So I think last week, we finished on about page number six. Is that okay? I think we’d already started some of the debates on the difference between objects and object possessors.
Now this is a very basic level of the the text, just presenting what an object is, what an object possessor is. Now, we know that valid awareness we know awareness, persons, and expressive sound are divisions of object possessors. Now also a further division is given here or divisions are given here that is objects from among objects and object possessors and object possessors from among objects and object possessors. Anyway, it’s not so important that we that we fully understand all the intricacies of these debates to begin with. The main thing here is that we’re just getting used to the idea of objects and object possessors, which actually forms the basic duality in which we live.
We’re just this great bundle of objects and object possessors. And the fact that the object and the object possessor are distinct is the basic duality in which we exist. Ultimately, we have to comprehend nonduality, but before we comprehend nonduality, which requires understanding emptiness, we need to know what objects an object possessors are. That’s true, isn’t it? Anyone disagree with that?
So in fact, this is what we’re doing here. We’re just finding out what objects and object possessors are, the basic ground of duality in which we live, the duality of subject and object. Right. Now the second debate on page number six, we’ll read through this. I think the rest of this evening, we’ll continue with debates.
And then from next week, we’ll start more with the section of the author himself in presenting his view. So that will make it a bit easier. So we just do a few more debates this evening. If we can get through to about page number nine tonight, that would be good. But we’ll see.
We might not get that far. The rest we can just put to one side. Has everyone been reading through these debates? Much success with understanding them? A little bit.
That’s good. Sufficient. Right. Now, the first debate on page number six, really, the last two lines the last line there is maybe important for us where it says, it is an object possessor because its object exists. So if its object exists, then it must be an object possessor.
So that’s true of awareness, sound, expressive sound, and persons. Now, again, a further debate occurs under that. It follows expressive sound is an object possessor. Now, last week, we did talk a little bit about expressive sound. Right?
Everyone has an idea of what expressive sound is. Is the sound if we put a radio if not a radio. If we put a record on, is that expressive sound? It is, isn’t it? Is it conjoined to awareness?
Providing you’re aware that it’s being played. I’m assuming there’s someone listening to it. Here, we need to have a basic idea of what expressive sound is. Expressive sound engages an object. It’s a sound that has an object, a sound for which its object exists, Holden.
If we say Holden, we know where that what that engages. Forward, we know what that engages, and so on. These are types of expressive sound because they have an object. Okay. Now the second debate there, But it is made by a No.
No. When it’s made, it’s conjoined with awareness. Well, here’s interesting. Like, we’re the sound that we make is conjoined with awareness, isn’t it? True?
When we speak, there’s a level of awareness there that’s guiding them. Teeth and the tongue and the mouth. They will coordinate together with our lungs and produce a sound that has meaning. Hopefully, there’s some meaning there. So that’s really sound conjoined with awareness, isn’t it?
It’s guided by awareness, manufactured by awareness. And there’s some sounds that are not that are not made in that way, aren’t they? Like for instance, the falling of rain makes a sound, but it’s not really conjoined with awareness, is it? Therefore, we need to investigate whether it’s expressive sound or not. Okay.
So here, there is a debate. It follows expressive sound as an object possessor because expressive sound is an audible engaging its object through differentiate differentiating its parts. Reason not established. Take that object. That follows because it is a sound which is a clarifying engager.
A clarifying engager which is sound is a particular this clarifying engager is something that came up in an earlier text that’s studied in a monastery. It’s called the dura text. So we won’t go into much detail on this, but the definition of sound which is a clarifying engager is what occurs directly above that. Expressive and audible engaging its object through differentiating its parts. I think really through engaging its identity and its identity, its identity actually is composed of the the summation of its parts, isn’t it?
The identity of something is the composition there of the parts of that thing. And in a sense, by understanding its identity, identity, then we understand the differentiation of the parts and their assembly to form the identity of that object. Anyway, without going into too much In fact, it would be good if we could actually study this text before this one. There’s three of them. They’re called the Dura or the collected topics, which give a foundation for understanding Lorig.
And if we get time later, maybe that would be very good to do. But it depends on how much time we’ve got. Those earlier texts are even early even easier than this one. They start off with things like color. It’s only this is not easy only for one reason.
We’re not familiar with it. Once we’re familiar with it, it becomes easy. That’s the only factor. Anyway, we can just leave that for the time being because we don’t really have enough time. So anyway, it is sound which is a clarifying engager because it is expressive sound.
No pervasion. A pervasion exists because expressive sound and sound as a clarifying engager are equivalent. The previous reason is accepted. Okay. So they’re just trying to prove that that subject is expressive sound.
Take expressive sound. It is not an object possessor from among objects and object possessors because it is an object from among objects and object possessors because it is matter, because it is sound. Now here the point that Purbu Chok is is making is that expressive sound itself, even though we call it an object possessor, it’s not an object possessor from amongst objects and object possessors. Does that make any sense? Right.
Expressive sound is an object possessor, but it’s not an object possessor from amongst objects and possessors. Now what does that mean? It’s a something of a convention here, but there is a purpose to it. Can we just go down to the next debate below that where it says regarding that, one says, it follows if it is awareness, it must be an object possessor from amongst from among objects and object possessors because if it is matter, it must be an object from among objects an object possesses. Now this is being stated because of what was stated previously.
And we say yes to that. We affirm that. That is so. We say underneath that we say, that is so. Why?
Because object possessors from among objects and object possessors and awareness are equivalent. So he’s really making a statement here. He’s saying that if we have the two categories of objects and object possesses, then object possesses from amongst those two categories is just awareness itself. And on the other hand, if it is an object from among those, from among objects and object possessors, it is equivalent to everything which is other than awareness, which exists. It’s a bit like mental gymnastics, actually.
It’s a it’s a bit like we’re limbering up in order to understand the more difficult stuff that comes later. Okay. So what’s being said there is that, in general, there’s a twofold category of all existing entities into objects and object possessors. But that in a sense is a bit of an artificial division because everything which exists is an object to begin with. But then we can divide existence into objects and object possessors.
And on one hand, everything that exists is an object. On the other hand, object possessors have three types, persons, awareness, and expressive sound. But if we take we can have a dichotomy there if we express it in this way that if we take object possessors from among objects and object possessors, then we just mean awareness. And if we take objects from among objects and object possessors, then we mean everything that exists other than awareness. And what we’re doing there is we’re just pointing to the centrality of awareness itself.
But for anything to be an object possessor depends on its being conjoined with awareness or being awareness itself. Right? So awareness is always central. Even though we say the person is an object possessor and sound is an object possessor, expressive sound, they’re only object possessors because they’re conjoined with awareness. The person is conjoined with awareness.
And just as we say, I hear, you know, I heard, know, the latest, you know, disc of that last night. When I say I heard, we really mean my ear awareness heard, didn’t it? Because I’m conjoined with my ear awareness, I also heard. So the person is regarded as an object possessor, but they’re an object possessor because the person is conjoined with awareness. In fact, we are sentient beings, and the main element there is sentient.
So our main part is being sentient, being aware. Similarly, expressive sound is expressive because in general, it must be conjoined with awareness when it’s made or blessed by awareness when it’s made. For instance, there is a sūtra, I think we we mentioned last week. There’s a sūtra called Dhumisara Patha Madhuram, which is a sūtra on teaching compounds. The sūtra teaching compounds, which was taught by the Buddha by wind rustling the leaves in a tree.
In other words, by the blessing of the Buddha, the leaves in the tree were rustled. That sound actually taught taught impermanence, taught compounds, what compounds are. So in general, that’s not expressive sound. But in that instance, it’s expressive sound because it’s blessed by the continuum of a Buddha, by the omniscient mind of a Buddha. So what this is saying is that the central object possessor is awareness itself, and the other two become object possessors through the being associated with awareness.
So therefore, we have this division. Object possesses from amongst objects and object possesses means just awareness itself. It’s the uncommon specific type of object possessor. The real object possessor in a sense. Now a further debate under this.
Regarding that, he says, now this former person that was engaging in debate with the author then says, well, then take conception holding a rabbit with horns. Now we have a conception at present of a rabbit with horns, don’t we? Okay. That exists. It follows it is an object possessor from among objects and object possessors.
It is an object possessor, isn’t it? Our conception of a rabbit with horns. It’s an object possessor. Why is that? Because it holds an object.
Why is that? Because it’s awareness. It’s awareness. That’s sufficient. Yep.
If it’s awareness, it must be an object possessor. Okay? So what about the conception of a rabbit with horns? It’s awareness, isn’t it? Because it’s the conception of a rabbit with horns, is it awareness or something other than awareness?
Conception. Exactly. If it’s conception, it must be awareness. If it’s perception, it must be awareness, and there’s no third type of awareness other than those two. Okay.
So it’s an object possessor from amongst objects and object possessors. True? Why? Because it is awareness. We accept that, don’t we?
If so, take that subject, meaning we take conception holding a rabbit with horns. It follows its object exists. Does its object exist? Well, we know that exist means that observed by valid awareness. Is a rabbit with horns observed by valid awareness?
It’s not, is it? Therefore, it doesn’t exist. Anyway, it says, it follows its object exists. What would we say there? Why or yes?
We’ve only got two options. We either say why or yes at that point. Because it is an object possessor. Because it is awareness. Because is awareness.
It is awareness. Yep. If it if it’s an object, it’s an object possessor, it must have an object. Otherwise, it couldn’t be an object possessor. Okay.
Because we’ve accepted that form of reason. It is an object possessor because its object exists. Yeah. Okay. It has to have an object Yeah.
To be an object possessor. Okay. If so, next page, take that subject. Take a the conception of a rabbit with horns. It follows its assessed object exists.
What would we say there? Why? That the awareness you’ve got is a non-affirming negation. No. No.
Awareness. Here, we’re just talking about the conception of a rabbit with horns. That’s just ordinary awareness. Just conception. Okay.
It follows its assessed object exists. What would we say to that? Yes or why? Why? Why?
Because its object exists. Here, we say no pervasion. So what we mean there is that even though its object exists, it doesn’t mean its assessed object exists. Object exists. Okay.
Now here we’re giving different divisions of objects. So we should keep this in mind. There’s something called an assessed object. Maybe we could write that down somewhere. Assessed object and a few question marks after it.
What is that? We say, if that is not established now what we mean by saying that is that, okay, if that last reason wasn’t established, meaning its object exists, is not established, then the author is gonna go ahead and prove that the conception of a rabbit with horns has an object. Okay. So we say, take conception holding a rabbit with horns. It follows its object exists.
Why? Because its appearing object exists. True? What’s its appearing object? The way it’s No.
The conception of a rabbit with horns is what has the object. Right? Now it says that it because its appearing object exists. A rabbit with horns? Sorry?
Is the appearing object a rabbit with horns? The appearing object has to exist. So it’s not a rabbit with horns? A rabbit with horns doesn’t exist. So the rabbit with horn a rabbit with horns can’t be an appearing object.
It can. The awareness of Is the the appearing object just the idea of No. The idea of a rabbit with horns is the conception of a rabbit with horns. Here, we’re talking about the object itself that that conception is holding. That object itself.
Like, here, we have this thought of a rabbit with horns, conception of a rabbit with horns. That rabbit with horns is appearing to that conception, isn’t it? It says he has a generic image. You should read ahead. Quickly.
Okay. But anyway, its appearing object exists, he says. We say its appearing object exists. And that follows why? Because the generic image of a rabbit with horns is the appearing object of it.
Okay. So we have a conception of a rabbit with horns. That conception has an appearing object. The appearing object is the generic image of a rabbit with horns. Okay?
Reason not established. So again, we say again, the author says, take a rabbit with horns. It follows its generic image is the appearing object of the conception holding it because it is selfless. Meaning, whether it exists or it doesn’t exist, the generic image, its generic image is the appearing object of the conception holding it. Okay.
Let’s say that again. Whether it exists on the one hand or whether it doesn’t exist, we can generate a conception of it. And whether it exists or it doesn’t exist, the generic image of it is the appearing object which appears to conception. Why does it then say reason not established? Oh, that’s the opponent is still not convinced.
Not the opponent. Yeah. Because yeah. It’s here we’re stating that. So we state the thesis and the reason and the respondent.
Yes? Do you mind repeating that because I like to write down Right. All of exist or not. Right. Okay.
All it is saying is the last here, really, if you can see this if we can see that section there. Right? Because it is selfless. Right? Where it says because it is selfless, here we’re just restating the pervasion that exists in that in that syllogism.
And that is, if it is selfless, in the fourth column, it follows it must be the generic its generic image is the appearing object of the conception holding it. That’s the pervasion that we should understand. Okay? If it is selfless, its appearing object I mean, its generic image is the appearing object of the conception holding it. Sorry?
Any mental image? Not necessarily. No. Because even images appear to non conceptual awareness. Or very images can can appear to non conceptual awareness.
Even if a hallucination is possible, yes. We can have sensory awareness to which appearances we don’t actually exist or objects we don’t actually exist can appear. Anyway, oh, no. Sometimes we can that’s like we go to a movie, you know, we can be sitting in front of a movie and, right, we can be carried away with what’s in the movie even though we know it’s you know, there’s nothing there. There’s just images on a screen being, you know, changed rapidly.
It appears as if there’s a herd of elephants charging right at us and, you know, we might that react. Yeah. For instance, there are no elephants there. Even though we know it, you know, we walked into the theater to begin with and we were you know, we know there’s just a screen there. Why did you say that’s non conceptual though?
That’s non conceptual, yes. That’s sensory perception, that’s what we’re looking at with our eyes. Conception Conception is also coexist. Yeah, exactly. So how can it be non conception?
Is the concept exist? Or is it conception? Because we’re the form of an elephant or whatever is a physical object which is a since the physical form of an elephant is an object of is an object of eye awareness, isn’t it? It is. But as we just said, it coexists along with concept.
Yeah. We’re sitting there thinking, god, it’s an elephant that’s coming right at me. Yeah. A concept. But it’s eye awareness that’s actually holding the image, isn’t it?
So the eye awareness is holding something that doesn’t exist. No. The eye awareness is actually holding these images on the screen, isn’t it? That color and shape does exist there. They’re appearing here.
They look like an elephant moving, for instance, but they’re not. Well, I don’t know if you it depends on the circumstances, and conception also exists at that point. Can fear arise without us conceptualizing that they’re a herd of elephants? Okay. If you don’t have the concept that there’s a herd of elephants, Even if you didn’t have the concept that there’s herd of elephants, I’d say that if you saw them coming, you’d probably run.
Whether you knew they were elephants or Well, you’d have the concept concept of elephants, but you’d have a concept of something running towards you. Yeah. So, it’s still conjoined with concept. I can’t see that there’s no concept at all. No, was not saying there’s no concept at all, but still, what’s seeing the image there is the eye awareness, isn’t it?
I mean, it wouldn’t without there being a sensory awareness there, you wouldn’t have that same experience. If you just sat there in the picture theater and imagined that there well, depends on your imagination perhaps. But it’s not to say that conception is not important. It is important in this, but we need to be able to differentiate them. So, but when you’re watching the video, because this even though you can’t see it, the image is completely changing.
Do we see more of it with that valid set another diagonal than usual? When we’re watching a movie, because it’s constantly changing. Well, everything’s constantly changing anyway. With our I awareness, your awareness. There’s nothing that remains fixed for an instant.
Why do you it’s because there’s a new image on the screen every single time? Same. Well, it’s even faster in the real world. And in fact, even the television set and the molecules and the atoms are changing infinitely quickly. There’s no limit to their speed in which they change.
From the higher school point of view, it’s yeah. It’s all mistaken awareness. Even our sense awareness is all mistaken, all distorted. But from this school’s point of view, the sūtra school point of view, we can have valid sense awareness. Okay.
Yes. That’s gonna come up in little bit, but that means the referent object. Referent. Referent. What does referent mean?
Referent means. Okay. It’s the object that’s actually engaged. Oh, wait a minute. Before we say that, I’ll just check ahead.
Yes. Engaged object. Sorry? Just wondering how that applies to the development of the form. Yeah.
Well, here, for that conception, the assessed object doesn’t exist. Exist. The referent object doesn’t exist. The referent object there is the rabbit with horns. The appearing object is the generic image of a rabbit with horns.
Okay. Now what we should also discuss here a little bit is what a generic image is. Now we have a conception. A conception is a type of awareness that is accessing a generic image in order to hold its object. A generic image is really it’s a permanent permanent image.
Did I didn’t bring all the I should have bought some other material with me tonight. I could have handed it out. We’ll do it next week. So did you say conception is part of the way of accessing the whole object? Yes.
Yep. It’s for instance, if there’s an object is not near at hand or even if it is near inherently near at hand and we wanna think about it, we employ a generic image to do it. And in fact, most of our the work of our mental awareness is conceptual. And how we understand words, images, and so forth is through conceptual awareness. And this conceptual awareness holds its objects through accessing a generic image of that object.
The generic image of the object is permanent, said to be permanent. There’s some debate about this, but in general, it’s said to be permanent. And it is an image the definition of a generic image of a vase is which means the superimposed image. Which appears to be a vase, but is not a vase for the conception of a vase or to the conception of a vase. So what that that means is, for instance, if we take the conception of a vase and we can like, if we conceive of a vase in the present, the generic image of the vase is that which appears to that conception.
And it appears to be a vase, although it’s not a vase. But through it appearing to the conception, conception is able to hold the vase. It’s able to grasp vase. Right. Then there are two types there.
There’s generic image and generic sound. And often, when we conceive of something, we have a mixture of both. Generic sound is like if we sit here and we think about a song, like I don’t know. What’s a what’s a song? Pop goes the weasel. Pop goes There’s an imaginative song.
That when we hear that pop goes the weasel, can get the sound of what that what that’s like. And it it’s a conception of what the sound is. And often, we can conceive of an object that both has image and sound together. What’s an example of that? Sorry?
Naming. Naming? Sorry. Labeling? Right.
Or even we can remember an incident where we were talking with someone, and we can even hear what they say to us. Right? So we can have image and sound together like a television. That indicates that the generic there is generic image, which is the the symbolic image, a visual image, and generic sound, which is the sound that accompanies that. We can have them separate.
We can have either one or the other or both mixed. And generic sound is very similar to generic image in its definition. It’s something which appears to be the to be sound, but it is not sound to conception holding that sound. For instance, if we sit and think about a tune, is the tune does the tune exist as sound? No.
No. It doesn’t, does it? It to be sound. It appears to our conception to be sound, but it’s not actually sound. Similarly, when we conceive of a vase, where we hold a vase, but it’s not actually a vase that we’re holding, is it?
Or, actually, that’s a little bit wrong. The generic image itself appears to be a vase, but it’s not vase. We don’t actually hold that. It just appears to us. in dependence on that, we hold the actual vase.
Because the con the conception holding a vase does hold a vase, doesn’t it? Yeah. Now this is a anyway, without going too far into this question at present. Now what’s important here is that the generic image is the appearing object of conception. It’s the main appearing object of conception.
Okay. And what the generic image also is can be explained as the appearance of that which is not not the object. It’s a type of appearance which illustrates the opposite of what the object is not. It’s the image of the opposite of what the object is not. Everything else now.
No. Not everything else. Yeah. It’s negating everything that the object is not. Yeah.
But it’s not just that, it’s the image of that. That’s the main appearing image. We can have a secondary appearing main appearing object. There’s also a secondary appearing object, but we won’t go into that just at present. Okay.
So generic images. We conceive through generic images. Without them, conception is impossible. Well, that’s right. But I think if we investigate, we come we do come down to actually the one or the other.
Because even, for instance, if we when we’re trying to investigate the meaning of something, we’ve generally, we just have the words to begin with. So it’s probably just coming down to generic sound.