Tenets — 2015-10-04

Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets — 2015-10-04
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

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File: 2015-10-04 – KR.mp3

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Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen

Collection: Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)

Date: 2015-10-04

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Duration: 1h 28m

Words: 4,014

So we will now present selflessness. Please listen carefully since there’s only one hour really in the afternoon session. And as you know, there are numerous disagreements regarding the nature of the I. There are presentations specific to the non Buddhist Indian traditions, presentations of the Atman and then each of the Buddhist schools of tenets has its own understanding of selflessness and of the I. Now there are multiple presentations of the I and of the self.

For instance, the non Buddhist Indian philosophers view the I as follows. When we are young, most of us around perhaps the age of six or seven start to have some self awareness and at this point, we think of ourselves as a child. Then later on around 10 or 15, we think of ourselves as a teenager, later again as an adult and later again as an old person. In every single case, there is a sense of continuity of the I. So the non Buddhist Indian philosophers consider that there is therefore a self, an Atman which is separate from the aggregates and the relationship between the Atman or the soul or the self and the aggregates, the body and so forth is that of a king to its subject or a Lord to his serfs.

It’s a bit of a medieval metaphor, but basically, a king does not depend on his subjects. His subjects depend on him. A lord does not depend on his serfs or his slaves, his slaves depend on him. Likewise, the aggregates do not, excuse me, the Atman does not depend on the aggregates, the aggregates depend on the Atman. Now, this is a viewpoint of the ancient Buddhist philosophers and it is a viewpoint we must analyze the ancient Indian non Buddhist philosophers, my apology, and it is a viewpoint we must analyze carefully.

It is completely inappropriate to say we are Buddhist, therefore the non Buddhist philosophers must be in the wrong. This is nonsense. Instead, one must analyze carefully their position to see whether it is in accordance with logic and reason or not. Otherwise, one is in the situation which Dzogchenko describes in Lexin Yinpo when he says one who asserts tenets at odds with logic cannot be a being which is a valid cognizer. So here we have to see, is it true as the ancient Indian Buddhist philosophers say that the Atman does not depend on the aggregates?

We can see through experience that we say I am hungry, my hand hurts. Now that clearly implies a relationship between the aggregates and the I. Then we can clearly see in the way people express themselves that there is in their thoughts a relationship between the I and the aggregates. People say, I am young. I am old.

I am aging. You hear people say I am young and cute. Then you hear this. Therefore, is a relationship between the I and the aggregates. Is this something which is compatible or incompatible with the system of the ancient Buddhist, the ancient non Buddhist Indian philosophers.

So it should be self evident now that the I is not independent of anything else as the ancient non Buddhist Indian philosophers taught, but is clearly dependent on other things. Then I think it is pretty evident that the Atman of the non Buddhist Indian philosophers which is permanent one and independent does not exist. So this is the critical juncture, the boundary between outsiders and insiders literally, in other words, non Buddhist philosophers and Buddhist philosophers. Those who accept the existence of an Atman or a soul which is permanent, one and independent are non Buddhist. Those who do not accept the existence of an Atman or a soul which is permanent one and independent are Buddhist.

I think it is very difficult to posit the criterion for being a Buddhist in terms of refuge. All of the Buddhist schools of tenets reject the viewpoint that the self is permanent one and independent. Now when we present the view, we present the prasanika madhyamika view, but as a matter of fact, the schools of tenets beneath prasanika madhyamika all the way from Vaibhashika to Svatantrika madhyamika all also reject the existence of an Atman or a soul which is permanent, one and independent. Then when they try to identify the I, they either identify it with something which is within the aggregates such as mental consciousness or a composite of the aggregates or for that matter an imputation on the basis of imputation of the aggregates. So this is an understanding which will definitely not come through looking over the topic once or twice.

It will call for repeated study and analysis. You should discuss about this with each other over and again and then understanding will dawn progressively. There is nothing more important than this. Do you understand? Okay.

All of us therefore have this sense of an I or a self within us but we have a sense of an I or a self which is autonomous, which exists apart from the aggregates somehow within us. Now, each school of tenets has its own mode of identification of this I. For the lower schools of tenets, it will typically be the mental consciousness. For the Chitamatras, the mind only school, it is the mind basis of all or the Alayavijnana. But in every single case, we have to examine within ourselves to see what precisely is the I.

Then we should examine within the aggregates one by one starting with the form aggregate. Can the eye be found within the form aggregate? Rather self evidently, no. Then, can the eye be found within for instance, the sense consciousnesses? If the I were found within the sense consciousnesses, vision, the auditory consciousness and so forth, then what would happen at the time of sleep?

The time of sleep, these sense consciousnesses are inoperative, they are occulted, The I would cease to exist. This is not possible. Then clearly deep sleep is impossible, as long as the sensory consciousnesses are operative. It’s only when they have ceased to operate that deep sleep occurs. If the I was within the sensory consciousnesses, what would we say about someone who is in deep sleep?

We nonetheless say when we see someone who is sleeping, he sleeps, therefore the I cannot be interrupted. Now, here what is being refuted is an autonomous or an independent self and however subtle consciousness becomes, we can see it still does not qualify as an I which is the experiencer of happy and unhappy, pleasant and unpleasant sensations. Then we are told over and again that personal identity, the I resides in the brain. Then examine for yourselves whether an autonomous independent I could be a product of the brain. Now at present, when we investigate within the aggregates to find this eye, we find that it cannot be found.

This unfindability of the eye might generate fear if we thought that the eye disappeared. But we have already established that the eye exists, it operates. So there’s no ground for this fear. Then what is the mode of existence of this eye? We have said that the I is unfindable within the aggregates, yet it exists.

What is its mode of existence? Then we seek, we seek, we seek for the I within the aggregates. Is it in the form aggregate? Is it in the mental aggregates? It remains unfindable.

It is at this point that the fear there may be no I whatsoever could arise. Then what’s the mode of existence of the young? It does exist. What’s its mode of existence? It exists.

We all accept it exists. So what’s its mode of existence? Why? Why? Speak from your experience.

It exists. It’s impermanent. It changes. Monica. Yeah.

So think when we’re speaking of the I, we’re speaking of that which experiences pleasant and unpleasant sensations. So in Buddhist texts, we refer to the I as the accumulator of karma and the experience of the fruition of karma. Then I will not bring up bring that up here since it calls for an understanding of karma. However, we can simply say that the I is the experience of pleasant and unpleasant sensations. So what experiences?

So in Buddhist texts, the I is understood as a conception. It is what is present when we say this these are my things, this is my car, this is my father, this is my mother and so forth. In every single case, the eye is conceptually present. Then clearly, the greater the intensity of the conception thinking eye in turns, the greater the intensity of the eye. So this implies this relationship between the eye and the conception thinking eye.

So, as we understand that the I arises in dependence upon a conception, in turn this idea of the I existing from its own side within the aggregates is countered. Now, the greater our understanding of the I as a mere conception, the greater the countering of this idea of the I as existing from its own side within the aggregates and with this idea that the eye arises independence on conceptuality, the fear that the I will completely disappear when it is not found should dwindle. How’s that? It will be difficult for you to understand this on the basis of my explanations alone. You should study and think by yourselves then you will understand.

So this sense that the I exists, that the I must exist within the aggregates, This is something which is very profoundly ingrained within us. We have a profound predilection for this. This is the position of all of the lower schools of tenets. It’s perfectly okay for you to say I am unable to assert that the I cannot be found within the five aggregates, the form, sensation, discrimination, compositional factor and consciousness aggregates, since after all, this is a position of all of the lower schools of tenets who say it can be found within the aggregates. It is only Prasanika Madhyamika who says that the I is unfindable within the aggregates.

So you need to gain experience but I think you’re totally lost right now. So, there is no difference whatsoever in the schools of tenets as far as the practice of generosity, ethics, forbearance, enthusiasm and concentration are concerned. There are major differences regarding the view. It is precisely because the view is such a difficult topic that there are such differences. Okay.

And therefore, the Prasangika madhyamikas assert that as the understanding that the I exists only independence on conception increases in power, at the same time, the ignorance which apprehends the I as existing from its own side within the aggregates as being findable within the aggregates decreases and eventually disappears. So it is clear that the thought or the conception that the I exists independence on conceptuality is contradictory. It is a direct opposite to the ignorance which apprehends the I as existing from its own side within the aggregates. In the self same way as light and darkness are opposite. As light appears, darkness disappears.

When darkness increases, light disappears. So as one understands that the I is unfindable within the aggregates, that mere non existence, that mere absence of the I within the aggregates is emptiness. The mind which understands that the I is absent within the aggregates and the mind which believes mistakenly that the I is present within the aggregates are mutually contradictory. Therefore, as the mind which cannot find the I within the aggregates increases in power, the ignorance which believes that the I can be found within the aggregates decreases. When that ignorance has totally disappeared, it has ceased.

That cessation is what is known as the truth of cessation. This is why the noble truth of cessation is taught in the third place. Actually, emptinesses are cessation. So this is the foremost reason for which the noble truth of cessation is explained third. So what shall we do?

So I have explained the mode of abiding of the I to you as I understand it and at present, I would like to take your questions. Please short, concise questions. Elaborate on how the ‘I’ actually comes into existence? The source, the origin of the I is conceptuality, one’s own conceptuality. This is something one has to gain direct experience of.

At present, is very difficult for us but when we experience extremely intense emotions of joy or of suffering, at this point, if we can stand back and look at our minds and say this is how the I is arising. As I explained several times, let us take the example of taking notes. When we take notes, the conception thinking, I take notes, imputes the I on a multiplicity of elements such as the hand taking notes, the process of taking notes and so forth. Definitely. Yeah.

Yeah. Yeah. My genius. The I has a continuity, a continuum. It must have a continuum.

Otherwise, how would it be possible for an I which has accumulated karma in this life to experience in a future life the maturation of that karma? So what we have to do is to be very clear about what is to be refuted. I think no one in this room believes in an I which is outside of themselves, at least I hope so. Then as if the I is within us, then what sort of an I is it? And is this something we can refute and how?

This is a difficulty. I don’t think we can take on board your distinction of a conventional and an ultimate I. Now, the question which is quite legitimate in which you raised is what exactly transmigrates? If we look at the mind, there are ever more subtle layers of the mind. It is the I which is imputed on the subtle most layer of the mind which is the I which transmigrates.

For instance, the Chitamatra School of Tenets or at least some Chitamatrans assert the existence of an Alayavijnana, a mind basis of all, which is an extraordinarily subtle mind, the receptacle of karmic imprints. We ourselves are unable to use or access this mind at present. But for Chitamatra, this or those which accept the mind basis of all, this is the person which transmigrates. This viewpoint is very similar to that which asserts that there is a fundamental mind, which is an extraordinarily subtle mind and which is that which transmigrates. Yeah.

The I is a is an object of dependent arising. It arises depends on the aggregates. Mhmm. Therefore therefore, it contradicts the ignorance that thinks there exist an an independent I. And that’s the that’s the argument.

Am I correct? Indeed. The I is from the standpoint of Prasangika madhyamika, a mere conceptual imputation on the aggregates. In that sense, it is said to be dependent origination. As the understanding of this increases, the ignorance which apprehends the I as existing from its own side within the aggregates decreases and disappears.

Okay. What is the difference between a generic image of eye and conception of eye? There’s a big difference. The generic image of the eye is the factor which appears to conceptuality, the factor of appearance. Whereas the conception which apprehends I is a mind.

This morning, Geshela was saying that it was very, very difficult if I heard correctly he said that it was very, very difficult to attain an understanding just based on hearing and that reflecting was necessary in which case with, you know, hopefully at which point a valid cognizer might arise and then meditation follows. My question is this: How can you have a conceptual valid cognizer of something like emptiness which is non conceptual, the direct experience of it, so I’m told, is non conceptual and non dual. So how could you have a valid a conceptual valid cognizer before realizing emptiness? So when one seeks for the eye within the aggregates and one does not find it, that thought, the eye is unfindable within the aggregates is a thought about emptiness. It arises within the context of the wisdom arisen from thinking.

At the point where one has decided the I does not exist within the aggregates, that thought is the wisdom arisen from thinking. So, it would not be sufficient to have decided one would need to have a sensation, a feeling about this. At present, we are just talking about it verbally. However, just independence on such a wisdom arisen from thinking which thinks the I is unfindable within the aggregates, it would be difficult to attain the noble truth of cessation. We need to generate after this a wisdom arisen from meditation.

Another. Prefacing, I think it’s Tonglen, sending and receiving, I find reduces suffering in my own mind. And I’m wondering if it also reduces self grasping. I’m asking this question. Is that clear?

Could you repeat your question? Yeah. So practicing Tonglen, sending and receiving. Tonglen, okay. Sorry.

I find reduces suffering, my own suffering because I’m focusing on suffering of others. And I I’m it feels to me that it’s reducing self grasping as well. And I’m wondering if that’s an accurate perception. Definitely that is precisely what it should be doing. However, to eliminate self grasping independence on Tonglen giving and taking alone would be difficult.

Look at it this way, we’re talking right now of the prasanika madhyamika viewpoint for which the I is a mere conceptual imputation. Extraordinary scholars such as Bhavaviveka, Shantarakshita and Kamalashila were unable to posit an I which is a mere conceptual imputation. They did not accept this viewpoint. This is something we should think about. If they had been able to posit an I which was a mere conceptual imputation, the Sotaterica Madiamica view would become void.

He needs a microphone to answer his wife who sits next to him. So this is a particular sensation when the I is not found within the aggregates and at that point one thinks, yes this is exactly what Nagarajuna and Ariadeva were talking about. It’s a bit what Martin Garner used to call in English an moment. Then, at that point, one has an extraordinary feeling of joy at the thought that this is what Nagarthuna, what Aryadeva wrote about in Jitsongpa upon this realization wrote works like In Praise of Dependent Rising. Then when that feeling of extraordinary joy arises, then one has a wisdom arisen from thinking.

Until then it’s a wisdom arisen from hearing. So Nagarjuna wrote a number of praises of Dependent Arising which summarize his work likewise, Jasung Kopar’s Essence of Eloquence, Selection Ningpo is summarized also in his praise of Dependent Arising. Generic image only appear to a mistaken consciousness? Generally speaking, a mind to which a meaning generality appears is a mistaken mind. However, mind, the mind to which a generality, meaning generality appears cannot ascertain it itself.

Another mind must ascertain the meaning generality. Meaning generality. Meaning generality, don’t she? Generic image, if you prefer, in English. I’m just looking for maybe some clarification or understanding.

So if the I dissolves, from the aggregate, this is what I’ve come to understand through listening today, But it’s a dependent arising so it depends on something to arise. And did I also hear that the I then gets carried on the subtle mind from rebirth? So then does it fit not on depending on the aggregates, is it depending on the subtle mind then? So, no, your understanding is not incorrect. Basically, the various schools of tenets posit different aspects as the I.

Generally speaking, the School of Tenets from Svatantrika Madhyamika downwards posit the mental consciousness or the continuum of the mental consciousness as the I. The issue which arises is at the time of death during transmigration, what is the I posited upon? At that point, the I is posited on the basis of the subtle mind or the fundamental mind. What is it that posits the self or the eye on the subtle mind at the time of death? The imputer is the I.

Then this is really something which is only meaningful for people who have some type of experience of the fundamental mind. Otherwise for me to talk about this here, there is no meaning. You should receive teachings on taking the three bodies on the path in Tantra and then through repeatedly studying and meditating on these topics, eventually experience will arise and you will understand how the I can be posited on the basis of the fundamental mind. Is the conception of the eye, is that made up of memories and perceptions within the mind? When you speak of the conception of the eye, is that the conception which is imputing the eye?

Is that what you mean? So when we say that conceptuality is imputing the I, it is best understood with an example. Imputing is an English term to translate Tibetan Dhaka which can mean just placing something on something else. If I say I am writing something, then the conception which thinks I am writing imputes or places the I on parts of the aggregate such as the hand, which is doing the writing. That is what we mean by imputing.

You If you prefer, you can translate imputing by projecting. Does that help? So there’s there’s like a false sense of having an I, it’s and that’s a completely false concept. That’s a conceptual a conceptual thing. Right?

That because there’s no inherent I as far as I can understand. And but is that conception is the mode that that how we create this false I is that made up of our perceptions of what we see in the world and our memories of past events. Does that make any sense? Yes, this I which exists is an I which is constituted or built on the basis of our memories, our experiences, our conceptions, etcetera. Exactly.

Okay, the hand was doing the writing. So where’s the I? Ah. The hand was doing the writing. How can that be possible?

Because the hand, if you cut it off from the body, can’t do anything. So what is, controlling a hand? The example of the hand taking notes or writing is an example which enables us to understand the process of imputation of the I. Independence on the thought which thinks, I am taking notes as well as the hand which is a part of the physical aggregate, the I is imputed. Now clearly, if we cut the eye, the hand off, the I still exists.

Yes. The hand is useless. I better hide my hands. So you can see that in the same way as the eye is said not to exist within the aggregates. Likewise, clearly if the hand were cut, the eye would still exist therefore the eye is not in the hand.

I like. Keshe likes. I struggle. There’s no terms in Tibetan. Are you saying that the mind is unfindable within the brain?

There are numerous modes of assertion of the mind. The more subtle modes of assertion of the mind hinge on a presentation of subtle energies or winds. Yes, I don’t think that the subtle minds have any relationship to the brain. Excuse me, the subtle winds or energies have any relationship to the brain. The coarse energies or winds perhaps.

And we shall stop here, shortly. So we had a bit of a hard time of it today, didn’t we, presenting difficult topics like this after lunch when everyone was dull from too much food. But tomorrow morning, we will cover the sequence again to make it stable. So we will do the dedications on page nine, the short mandala offering. Long life prayer to his holiness, the Dalai Lama, the brief prayer, increase of merit and for the benefit of sentient beings.

Key terms in this teaching

atman dag (Tib)
Self; as opposed to anatman (no-self), the Buddha’s explanation of selflessness in the Four Noble Truths Sutra. LYWA
basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
dependent origination pratityasamutpada (Skt); ten drel (Tib)
Also called dependent arising. The way that the self and phenomena exist conventionally as relative and interdependent. LYWA
Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
mind basis of all alayavijana (Skt); kun zhi nam shä (Tib)
A main consciousness posited by the Cittamatra school, the consciousness they say is needed to carry karmic imprints. LYWA
self-grasping dag dzin (Tib)
The mind that apprehends the self as inherently existent. This refers to both the self of persons and the self of phenomena. LYWA
taking and giving tonglen (Tib)
The meditation practice of generating bodhicitta by taking on the suffering of others and giving them happiness. LYWA
Vaibhashika jedrag mawa (Tib)
The Great Exposition school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Great Exposition school asserts truly established external objects but does not assert self-knowers. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

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