Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. Kyabje Rinpoche illuminates Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika through Āryadeva’s image of a rope mistaken for a snake in twilight—showing how all phenomena, like the illusory serpent, lack any existence independent of conceptual imputation. He methodically contrasts Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, and Svatantika Mādhyamika positions on whether objects are truly established, before presenting Prāsaṇgika’s distinctive claim: nothing exists from its own side even conventionally. A key section examines how Prāsaṇgika and Svatantika differ in their approach to logical debate, particularly the role of the three modes in reasoning. Rinpoche then explains how selflessness of persons and selflessness of phenomena are treated differently across schools, showing how the “I” is a mere imputation on the five aggregates—ultimately unfindable under analysis, much like the snake in the rope. Includes Q&A on logical terminology. Best suited to practitioners with foundational Buddhist philosophy knowledge.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2015-07-07.mp3
UUID: 7c5af7c4-0cf1-4804-bcf4-63cf0ec9b29b
Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche
Collection: Tenets
Date: 2015-07-07
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~3,328
So let us generate, as usual, the motivation for receiving these teachings. The Sautrāntika School of Tenets asserts that all of the objects of the consciousnesses of the five doors, I do not mention specifically the consciousnesses which are valid cognizers of the five doors are truly established. Apart from these five sensory consciousnesses, we also have the mental consciousness and valid cognizer, which is a mental consciousness. All of the objects of these consciousnesses and valid cognizers are truly established. This is the position of the Sautrāntika School that all of the objects which are perceived by any of these sense consciousnesses is thereby truly established.
The Cittamātra School of Tenets, on the other hand, asserts that all of the objects of the five sense consciousnesses, in other words, forms, shapes and so forth, are truly established. And in addition, that they dwell within their own uncommon mode of abiding. In other words, they arise in dependence on causes and conditions, but are not imputed by conceptuality nor are they imputed by mind. Now regarding the Svatantika Mādhyamika School of Tenets, its presentation regarding the mode of abiding of form and so forth is different from that in both Sautrāntika and Cittamātra. For Svatantika Mādhyamika, all phenomena without exception are not mere conceptual imputations but do abide within their mode of abiding or not abiding within their uncommon mode of abiding.
In other words, for Svatantika Mādhyamika, all composite phenomena occur at the intersection of the imputation by a mind or by conception on the one hand and on the other hand at the intersection of being established by their own characteristics. Therefore, the Svatantika Mādhyamika do not agree with the presentation in Cittamātra regarding composite phenomena. In Cittamātra, composite phenomena are said to be established as abiding within their own uncommon mode of abiding and not to be conceptual or mental imputations. This is a position which Svatantika Mādhyamika disagrees with. Likewise, Svatantika Mādhyamika disagrees with the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika position according to which all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations.
Instead, Svatantika Mādhyamika asserts that phenomena are conceptual imputations but not mere conceptual imputations. Were they to assert that phenomena were mere conceptual imputations, they would have to reject the position that phenomena are established, from their own side. Therefore, Svatantika Mādhyamika disagrees both with Cittamātra and with Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. So the Svatantika Mādhyamika, both Sautrāntika Svatantika Mādhyamika and Yogachara Svatantika Mādhyamika, neither accept in the slightest phenomena being truly established. And this is at odds with the position of Cittamātra for which both other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena are truly established.
Now in our development of tenets, we have reached the presentation of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. There are two modes of presenting the definition of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. They are identical in meaning. The first is that a prasangika Mādhyamika is defined as a Mādhyamika who does not accept in the slightest any phenomena being established from its own side. So regarding the second definition on Page 30 of your translation of Jetsünpa Chökyi Gyaltsen’s Tenets, The definition of a Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika is a Mādhyamika who does not accept true existence even conventionally by means of the verbal statement of a mere consequence renowned to others.
Now as far as the refutation of the existence of true existence, Prāsaṇgika and Svatantika Mādhyamika are identical. They differ however in their acceptance or non acceptance of the existence of consequences renowned to others. In this context, Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika considers that consequences renowned to others can generate an inferential valid cognizer realizing the predicate in the continuum of an opponent. And the definitions of Svatantika Mādhyamika and Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika are clearly encapsulated within the actual names of the schools. Prāsaṇgika, as Geshe-la explained last time, is Thal gyur in Tibetan.
And this clearly entails the acceptance of consequences renowned to others. Whereas, Svatantika Mādhyamika in its definition, which I have not traced in your text, you’ll find it in the English text, necessarily accept the existence of autonomous syllogisms. Apart from this, they are identical in their rejection of the true existence of phenomena. So we will not rush in this matter, but, go carefully through a presentation of the various definitions. The definition of Svatantika Mādhyamika is on page 25.
A being who is a propounder, excuse me, further down. A Mādhyamika who does not assert even semiotically actual true existence by means of a verbally formulated autonomous reason. So within the definition of a Prāsaṇgika on page 30 of your English translation, mere consequences renowned to others refer to consequences which are asserted by the debater to his opponent to counter a wrong view. These consequences are able to give rise to these three modes within the mind stream of the opponent without the three modes having to be generated within the mind stream of the debater. So in the definition of a Svatantika Mādhyamika on page 25, a Mādhyamika who does not assert even conventionally actual true existence by means of a verbally formulated autonomous reason.
Autonomous reason or Svatantra refers to a reason which has or satisfies the three modes. In other words, the presence of the subject within the reason. The forward pervasion, in other words, whatever is the reason is necessarily the predicate. And the reverse or counter pervasion, whatever is the opposite of the predicate is necessarily the opposite of the reason. And these three must be understood for Svatantika Mādhyamika by the propounder of the debate through a valid cognizer realizing their establishment by their own characteristics before such a debate can be addressed to the recipient of the debate.
So for instance, here when we refer to a reason, the classic reason given would be the syllogism, the subject sound, is necessarily impermanent because of being composite. In other words, the subject sound is impermanent out of the reason of being composite. On the other hand, the position, is that it is not necessary for the debater to generate within the continuum of the recipient of the debate the realization by means of a valid cognizer which does not consider that phenomena are established by their own characteristics of the three modes of the reason. In other words, the presence of the reason in the subject, the forward and the reverse pervasion of a given syllogism such as a syllogism, the subject sound is impermanent because it is fabricated which is addressed to someone who is profoundly convinced that sound is permanent. Instead, Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika considers that this valid cognizer can be generated within the mind of the recipient of the debate without these points having been realized within the mind of the debater.
To put things briefly, those Madhyamikas who accept that all phenomena are established from their own side are Svatandika Madhyamikas. Those Madhyamikas who accept that no phenomenon is established from its own side are Prāsaṇgika Madhyamikas. Then there is an important difference between the Prasanika Mādhyamika School and the lower schools of tenets, which is that there are no subdivisions of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. Svatantika Mādhyamika is, for instance, subdivided into Sautrāntika Mādhyamika and Yogachara Sautrāntika Mādhyamika. Sautrāntika Mādhyamika is subdivided into true and false aspectarians.
Sautrāntika itself is subdivided into Sautrantikas following scripture and Sautrantikas following reasoning and Vaibhāṣika has numerous subdivisions. In the case of Prāsaṇgika, there is no subdivision. So this covers the presentation of the definition of Prasangikas within Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen’s Tenet Systems. Then at present, we must present the view of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, which is not expounded extensively in Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen’s Tenets, but is in Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen’s treatise from the standpoint of the presentation in terms of base, path and result. Now regarding the presentation of the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena, within the, schools of tenets beneath Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, there is an important difference in the presentation of the selflessness of persons and phenomena in both Sautrāntika Mādhyamika and Cittamātra, in terms of the object of negation.
And it is possible according to both Sautrāntika Mādhyamika and Cittamātra to eliminate the afflictions through meditating only on the selflessness of persons. Within Cittamātra and Sautrāntika Mādhyamika, it is possible to attain the state of an Arhat, arhathood, through relying exclusively on the selflessness of persons. And this is the case since there is a difference in terms of the object of negation between the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena. This is not the position of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. For Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika to attain the state of arhathood, it is necessary to rely or meditate both on the subtle selflessness of persons and on the subtle selflessness of phenomena.
This is the case because Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika does not consider that there is a difference between the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena in terms of the object of negation, but that there is a difference in terms of the basis of imputation. And therefore reliance on both is necessary to attain liberation from the afflictions. And therefore, for Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, since there is no difference between the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena from the standpoint of the object of negation, but only a difference from the standpoint of the basis of imputation, when we understand what is discordant with them, we understand what is discordant in terms of the basis of negation. So it is critical in this matter to gain a clear understanding of the innate mind involved in this. So when we speak within the context of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika of the mode of appearance of the object of refutation or the object of negation.
We are endeavoring to understand the innate mind which grasps at true existence. And this can best be done through analyzing how for instance our own sense consciousness function. Now we can see from the standpoint of our own sense consciousnesses that phenomena appear to exist truly and to exist from their own side. Nonetheless, their mode of appearance is at odd with their actual mode of existence. So when we analyze how phenomena appear to the innate mind of self-grasping, we can see that they appear as existing from their own side from the outside independently of any type of conceptual imputation of causes or of conditions.
And they appear therefore as if they were established as abiding within their own mode of abiding. In this respect, Je Tsongkhapa’s Legs Shey Nyingpo, The Essence of Eloquence identifies the object of negation here as that independent thusness. So in the Prāsaṇgika system, when we speak of phenomena being established from their own side, We refer to the fact that houses, books and so forth seem to actually exist from their own side independently of any participation from our own side. This is very subtle, but this is the actual object of refutation within Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. And this is something which we find difficult to understand.
We find it difficult to understand that this establishment from its own side of phenomena does not exist precisely because we ourselves are ordinary beings. Therefore, it is something we must endeavor to understand through repeated reflection and study. Otherwise, if I ask you questions, you’re gonna go dizzy and go to sleep. Then I won’t rush either. So, the identification of the object of negation is, very clearly stated in a stanza of Āryadeva’s Chatuhshataka, the Four Hundred, which I shall not quote here.
But it is expressed in a passage of Je Tsongkhapa’s Legs Shey Nyingpo in which Je Tsongkhapa identifies it as autonomy. Now in this context, what are we referring to by this? For the lower schools of tenets, all phenomena are seen as established from their own side. And we have a natural sense that when we search for phenomena using a conventional analytical mind, phenomena are findable, which is a position of the lowest schools of tenets. For the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika School of Tenets, when phenomena are searched for with, an analytical investigative mind, they are unfindable.
So, here, the other schools of tenets assert that phenomena are not mere conceptual imputations. The position is that they are mere conceptual imputations. In this context, we must identify what is meant by conception. Conception here is that which, for instance, upon seeing yellow, says this is yellow. That which upon seeing blue, says this is blue.
That which upon seeing something which is long, says this is long. It is precisely that mind. So I shall present the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika view from today onwards relying mainly on Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen’s great treatise on tenets, which is translated in English as Emptiness Yoga by Jeffrey Hopkins. Since the presentation in Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen is very concise. Now it is extremely important to try to understand the Prasanika Mādhyamika view, but this is not something which will come at once or easily.
How could it? It will come through repeated reflection, analysis and investigation. Yeshe-la was asking if Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen’s tenet systems exist in English. The prasangika section is translated. So the object of refutation in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika is the notion that phenomena are not mere conceptual imputations but are established from their own side and dwell within their own uncommon mode of abiding.
Refuting this entails asserting that all phenomena without exception are mere conceptual imputations. Listen carefully. Listen carefully, Please. So in the system, all phenomena without any exception are mere conceptual imputations out there. Anything else, any other perception of phenomena is mistaken and wrong.
This can best be understood through an example I would like you to think carefully about. And this example is both easy to understand and very beautiful in contradistinction to the example of the illusion given to illustrate in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, the fact that phenomena are mental imputations which abide within their own mode of abiding or established by their own characteristics. The example is, given by Āryadeva in his Chatuhshataka, and is that of a multicolored, piece of rope in the grass appearing or apprehended as a snake. So in this example, three conditions must be assembled. First, it is evening and, we cannot see quite clearly.
It’s not quite light, night, but we can’t see clearly. Secondly, there is a multicolored piece of rope in the grass. And thirdly, its shape, the way it is made, is similar to that of a snake. At this point, someone else, not ourselves, looking at this says, oh, this is a snake. And that mind or that fear arises within that person.
And at that point, from the standpoint of the mind of that person, the notion this is a snake arises, this is a fully characterized snake. Then the identification snake arises in dependence upon the rope. Now even though the, rope appears to that mind as a fully characterized snake, nonetheless, when that person engages in investigation to see whether a snake is there or not, he can attain definiteness that there is no snake, either from the standpoint of the components of the rope or the location or the continuum of the rope. So apart from the imputation from the standpoint of the mind, which thinks that is a snake, upon that rope, there is nothing in the rope of snakeness. Be patient.
The meaning of this example is if we look at the imputed phenomenon, the I, and its basis of imputation, in other words, the five aggregates. Apart from a mere imputation of I, upon the basis of imputation, the five aggregates, there is no I which is findable either within the parts of the aggregates or inside or outside of the aggregates or within the continuum of the aggregates. That I is ultimately unfindable. All phenomena are identical with the imputed phenomenon, the I, in that just as the imputed I is unfindable under analysis in the basis of imputation of the aggregates likewise for all phenomena. So we shall stop here for tonight.
If you have questions, please ask a concise question, one question per person. Geshe-la, the propounder of the debate, Geshe-la said, doesn’t have to realize the topic, but the recipient does. This is from the Prāsaṇgika point of view. This wouldn’t mean that the propounder of the debate, of the syllogism, doesn’t actually understand what he is propounding, but it’s more of a realization. Is that correct?
No. In Prāsaṇgika, the propounder of the debate must understand the three modes. In both So in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, both the, propounder of the debate and the respondent, must, realize the three modes. However, in Prāsaṇgika, there is no definiteness regarding the, propounder. Can I just clarify that then?
That doesn’t mean that the propounder doesn’t understand because if he is trying to convince the recipient, he must at least understand what he’s arguing. Otherwise, he wouldn’t be able to make the proposition. So there is no definiteness that, the propounder of the debate necessarily understands the, or has definiteness with respect to the three modes. In the Prāsaṇgika system, he is able to generate certainty, and actually an inferential valid cognizer within the mind or the continuum of the recipient of the debate without himself having this. Again, I apologize if I’m asking a question that has been asked here before and answered.
What is the status of the three modes? Yeah. I I I need to an answer to that before I can ask a question. What are they, in other words? No.
What is the status? Are they truly existent? What are they? In all systems of tenets from Svatantika Mādhyamika down, these three modes are established from their own side. In Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, they are not.
How could they be established from their own side? Sorry. How could they be established from their own side in any case? Because, clearly, someone has to articulate a rule, a rule about the subject, a rule about the reason, a rule about the pervasion. Basically, you’re saying in any system of tenets, the three modes cannot be established on this.
That’s correct. In the Prāsaṇgika system, the three modes are not established from their own side. In the lower systems, the three modes are truly established. I have no idea at all how that could be how anybody could think that. Numerous commentaries on this.
We won’t enter it because it is a difficult topic. But if we take the three modes, in other words, the presence of the subject and the reason, the necessary entailment, in other words, the pervasion of the predicate by the reason and the counter pervasion, whatever is the opposite of the predicate is necessarily the opposite of the reason. And take the example, the subject sound, it follows that it is impermanent because it is fabricated. We can see this clearly at work there. And if we take the classic example from Buddhist logic, on a smoky hill, there is fire, there is fire because there is smoke.
All three modes can actually be presented through exclusively presenting the reason smoke. If you analyze, you can see that the reason smoke is sufficient to present all three modes. Alright. Alright. Thank you.
So our present discussion for today, the first is the object of negation in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. In other words, the establishment of phenomena from their own side in the very slightest. This object of negation is nonexistent. Please investigate. And the second is the example I gave of the appearance of a snake in the grass on the basis of a multicolored rope.
The snake is a mere imputation from the side of the mind on a multicolored rope, does not exist in the slightest in the components of the of the rope. Please analyze. Mhmm. Please discuss. The first one is the object of negation in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika that the object of negation is that phenomena are established from their own side.
This does not exist in the slightest. Instead, are mere conceptual imputations. Please analyze. Yeah. Bye.
Key terms in this teaching
- arhat dra chom pa (Tib)
- The Tibetan translates as "foe destroyer." A person who has destroyed their inner enemy, the delusions, and attained liberation from cyclic existence. LYWA
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- object of negation gag cha (Tib)
- An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- selflessness of phenomena chö kyi dag me (Tib)
- The absence of a self in phenomena - all things other than the person. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka view, the most subtle form is their lack of inherent existence: they do not exist from their own side. LYWA
- true existence den par yö pa (Tib)
- The concrete, real existence from its own side that everything appears to possess; in fact, both self and phenomena are empty of true existence. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.