56 min · 2,565 words · 19 May 2015 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 56-minute teaching, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen unfolds the Buddhist philosophical schools of tenets from lowest to highest, examining how each progressively refines the understanding of what it means for things to exist. He opens with the foundational question: how should practitioners align their daily conduct with their philosophical view, whether meditating for half an hour or undertaking full retreats. He then walks through Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools, which assert exterior objects exist independently; Cittamātra, which denies external objects but accepts impermanent phenomena as truly established; and the higher Svatāntrika Mādhyamika school, which asserts all phenomena are established from their own side yet lack true independent existence. The bulk of the discourse probes the subtle difference between phenomena being posited by mind versus established by their own characteristics, how this distinction plays out differently for persons versus tables, and the particular challenge that uncompounded space presents for Svatāntrika analysis. The talk concludes with debate topics for practitioners to contemplate. Pitched at serious students of Buddhist philosophy already familiar with classical tenet distinctions.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2015-05-19.mp3
UUID: 98c1d520-a00f-4d49-84f5-5b9e793c83d4
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Tenets
Date: 2015-05-19
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~2,567
So let us generate the motivation to receive these teachings as usual. When we speak of tenets, we speak mainly of the view, in other words, of one’s own view. So one has to summarize one’s own position, and this is really important for each person. It’s extremely important whether one practices daily or only weekly, whether one practices for two hours or for that matter just for half an hour, during that period of time to focus exclusively on one’s practice. Then it is extremely important whether one engages in retreats or what are known as approximation retreats to do this in a single-pointed focused fashion.
This is why retreats are said to be important and to engage in behavior which is in keeping with one’s view, even for instance when one cooks one’s meals and so forth. There’s no worry, you know. Many students can’t practice every day. No sweat. You practice once a week.
But it is important however long you practice, whether it be half an hour or an hour, and whether you focus on definite emergence, on bodhicitta, on the view, that you focus single-pointedly on this. And when one studies the schools of tenets from the lower to the higher and their positions, it is extremely important to constantly assess them in terms of actual reality. For instance, the non-Buddhist Indian philosophers truly believe in the existence of an Ātman, of a person which is permanent, one, and independent in keeping with a passage from Jetsongkapa’s Lekshe Nyingpo. And they believe in this precisely because they assert that at the time of death, the body is left behind, but something must continue. This something is not an imputation on the basis of the basis of imputation.
It is instead something which exists apart from the basis of imputation. For this reason, they assert the existence of a person which is a substantially existent autonomous entity. Now the non-Buddhist Indian philosophers begin by asserting unambiguously the existence of an autonomous person and derive from that the existence of a substantially existent autonomous entity, which is the person. Now this in Buddhist texts is the object of negation. However, the non-Buddhist Indian philosophers accepting this, accept as a philosophical derivative of this, the existence of a person which is permanent, one, and independent, and which is in keeping with the four measures.
They therefore accept the existence of a person which does not depend on causes and conditions nor depends on its parts or mental imputation. Now from the standpoint of the Buddhist schools of tenets moving from the lower to the highest, let us start with Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika. Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika assert that such a view, the view in other words of the non-Buddhist Indian philosophers, is totally inappropriate and unsuitable. Since the person does depend on its basis of imputation, which are the aggregates, and it is dependent on that that the person arises. Now regarding the actual mode of existence of reality, true reality, from the standpoint of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika.
Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika assert that exterior objects, in other words, objects which are composed of indivisible particles, do exist and that form is merely the concatenation or the conglomerate of these indivisible particles. This is, from their standpoint, the way things truly are. So when these two schools, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, refer to exterior forms and so forth, in other words, to visual objects, sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile sensations, they are referring to our natural innate way of perceiving phenomena, which is that phenomena are out there and our consciousnesses are in here. And therefore, that they maintain or have a causal relationship. It is dependent on the phenomenon out there that the consciousness of that phenomenon in here arises.
And therefore, phenomena such as forms do not depend on the visual consciousness perceiving them and do not depend on consciousness. Now regarding the Cittamātra school of tenets, the Cittamātra school of tenets counters, blocks, rejects the assertions of both Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika regarding the establishment of form as an exterior object. Instead, their assertion regarding the subtlemost nature of phenomena is that phenomena are not established as exterior objects. However, the Cittamātrins consider that the fact that other-powered phenomena, in other words impermanent phenomena, arise dependent on causes and conditions is their actual true mode of abiding. Therefore, they are not mere conceptual imputations and are said to be truly established.
However, this Cittamātra assertion that other-powered phenomena, in other words, impermanent phenomena are truly established, is in turn countered by a higher school of tenet, the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika school of tenet, which asserts that other-powered phenomena, and for that matter, all phenomena are not truly established. And this non-true establishment of all phenomena is their subtlemost mode of existence. It is actually their emptiness. So how precisely do the Svatantrikas counter the Cittamātra position? The Cittamātra position that other-powered phenomena in as much as they arise from causes and conditions and are not posited by mind, abide within their uncommon mode of establishment is refuted by Svatāntrika Mādhyamika which asserts that other-powered phenomena, and for that matter, all phenomena are established from their own side and are established by their own characteristics.
Now how precisely do the Svatantrikas go about this? When Svatāntrika Mādhyamika asserts that phenomena are established from their own side, what they probably mean is that when for instance, the visual consciousness perceives the square table in front of me, the squareness of that table would be the establishment from its own side or the own characteristics of that table. The Svatāntrika Mādhyamika position is a difficult position to explain clearly. Since for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, all other-powered phenomena, in other words, impermanent phenomena, are not truly established, which is the Cittamātra position. Nonetheless, for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, other-powered phenomena are established from their own side, and this establishment from their own side counters their true establishment.
For Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, phenomena being established from their own side precludes phenomena being established as abiding within their uncommon mode of abiding, which is the Cittamātra position. In as much as phenomena are established from their own side, they are necessary for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, posited by mind and posited by conceptuality. So whereas for Cittamātra, the mode of existence of other-powered phenomena is an existence in terms of arising from causes and conditions, and hence for Cittamātra, they are necessarily not posited by mind nor posited by conceptuality. For Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, the mode of existence of other-powered phenomena is that they do not arise exclusively dependent on causes and conditions and therefore are not truly established. Instead, they arise at the intersection of being posited by the power of mind and being established by their own characteristics.
So what precisely is the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika position? Svatāntrika Mādhyamika scholars assert that phenomena are both established by their own characteristics and are posited by mind. Therefore, they assert that other-powered phenomena are not mere concepts. Other-powered phenomena are posited by conception. This is in keeping with the viewpoint of both Nāgārjuna in the root verses on Mādhyamika, the Mula Madhyamaka Karika, and Āryadeva in the 400 Stanzas, the Chatuhshataka, both of whom assert that phenomena are conceptual imputations.
And the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika position is a difficult one. Since Svatāntrika Mādhyamika on the one hand, in keeping with Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva in the root verses and the 400, asserts that all phenomena are conceptual imputations. However, they do not assert in keeping with Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations, because if they did assert this, then their viewpoint, the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika viewpoint would disappear. On the other hand, they do not assert in keeping with the lowest school, the Cittamātrins, that other-powered phenomena are not conceptual imputations, since this would be at odds with the Mādhyamika view. Moreover, if we analyze the understanding of true establishment in the Sautrāntika and in the Cittamātra school, for Sautrāntika, apart from composite phenomena, no phenomenon is truly established.
All composite phenomena are truly established. For Cittamātra, not only are all composite phenomena truly established, but in addition phenomena such as emptiness or the truth of cessation are also truly established. Now from the standpoint of the Cittamātra school, while it is true that the Sautrantikas assert that all other-powered phenomena are truly established, it is not the case that, within Cittamātra, truly established phenomena are necessarily other-powered phenomena. For instance, phenomena such as emptiness or the truth of cessation are also truly established phenomena, albeit not being other-powered phenomena.
So all of the schools of tenets from Svatāntrika Mādhyamika downwards accept establishment by its own characteristics, establishment from its own side, and dwelling within its mode of abiding. So all schools of tenets from Svatāntrika Mādhyamika downwards accept that phenomena are established from their own side and accept that phenomena dwell within their mode of abiding. If we take the case of uncompounded space, the issue becomes somewhat delicate. If uncompounded space is said to be established from its own side, from the standpoint of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, then that would mean that it is imputed on a basis of imputation, which must be established by its own characteristics. What basis of imputation could we propose?
Probably the intermediate space is the basis of imputation. However, intermediate space is actually a composite phenomenon, whereas uncompounded space is a noncomposite phenomenon. It is difficult to see how a noncomposite phenomenon can be imputed on such a base. Then in my private opinion, we can see that there is a major risk if we accept this for uncompounded space, that uncompounded space should have to be asserted as being established in accordance with its own uncommon mode of abiding. Why is this the case?
Because if we move downwards to the Cittamātra view, what is said to be in Cittamātra the reason for which all phenomena are established in terms of their uncommon mode of abiding? Precisely this. So if we are going to accept the intermediate space as the basis of establishment, the basis of imputation of uncompounded space, then there is a major risk that uncompounded space in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika would have to be established in terms of its uncommon mode of abiding which cannot be accepted. Because from the standpoint of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, if uncompounded space were to be established as dwelling within its uncommon mode of abiding, then it could no longer be said to be a conceptual imputation. And in this case, it could not be said either to be established from its own side.
Then we end up with meaningless statements in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. So this is how we have to analyze things. Moreover, all of these schools of tenets beneath Svatāntrika Mādhyamika accept that both the table in front of myself and persons are established from their own side. Now whether or not the mode of establishment from their own side is the same is something which is worth analyzing. In addition, Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is subdivided into two, Yogachara Svatāntrika Mādhyamika and Sautrāntika Svatāntrika Mādhyamika.
The definition of Yogachara Svatāntrika Mādhyamika on page 26 of your English translation is a Mādhyamika who propounds presentation of conventional phenomena mainly in keeping with the Cittamātra school, which means that such a Mādhyamika would accept the existence of nonduality and would accept the existence of reflexive consciousness in keeping with Cittamātra. Then cases of Yogachara Svatāntrika Mādhyamika would be Shāntarakshita and Kamalaśīla. And in the monasteries, we study the works of Haribhādra, so we include Haribhādra within it as well. Now the scholars of Yogachara Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, since their position is mainly in accordance with Cittamātra, accept nonduality, and they accept the nonexistence of exterior phenomena. They therefore accept that phenomena and the consciousnesses perceiving them arise from karmic imprints.
They however do not accept the existence of the Alaya Vijñāna, the mind basis of all, nor of the eight collections of consciousness. Yogachara Svatāntrika Mādhyamika accepts three aspects of the view. The subtle selflessness of persons, the coarse selflessness of phenomena, and the subtle selflessness of phenomena. Within the last two, the coarse selflessness of phenomena refers to nonduality and the subtle selflessness of phenomena refers to non-true existence. So we shall stop here for tonight.
If you have questions, please ask concise and clear questions. Thank you for holding the microphone to your chin so that the transcribers can hear it and all the people listening as well. If the Yogachara Svatāntrika Madhyamikas do not accept the mind basis of all, what do they posit as the entity that carries karmic seeds? Mental consciousness. They only accept the six collections of consciousness.
The karmic imprints are implanted within the mental consciousness. And mother. That microphone is cursed. No one wants to be close to it. So for tonight, the debate topics are: the first topic is establishment from its own side.
Now when we speak of a person’s being established from its own side in all of the schools of tenets beneath Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, what is meant by this is that the person is imputed upon its basis of designation, which are the five aggregates. If we however take the case of this little table in front of me, this little table is also established from its own side, but it seems difficult for its establishment from its own side to be performed in the same way. So what is the difference? The second topic of debate is uncompounded space. It is obvious in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika that uncompounded space must be established from its own side.
If it is established from its own side, do we assert that it is imputed on a basis of imputation, which is the intermediate space? And if we do, we face problems because the intermediate space is a composite phenomenon. If on the other hand we don’t, then uncompounded space is no longer established from its own side and becomes nonexistent. And therefore, on the fact that for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, if uncompounded space is established from its own side, then really it would have to be established from its own side on its basis of imputation, and we face major problems because the only basis of imputation which can be proposed is intermediate space. If on the other hand, it were not to be established from its own side, then for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, it will become a nonexistent phenomenon like the horns of a rabbit.
And therefore, it will help you to reflect in these terms. When we say that a person is imputed, a person is imputed on a base, which is its base of imputation. However, if we compare this with the relationship between fire and hot and burning, fire is an imputation on a nominality, which is hot and burning. So the reason for which fire is said to be an imputation on a nominality as a basis of imputation, which is hot and burning is because hot and burning on the one hand and fire on the other hand are mutually inclusive. So we shall stop here by groups of two for discussion.
Key terms in this teaching
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- mind basis of all alayavijana (Skt); kun zhi nam shä (Tib)
- A main consciousness posited by the Cittamatra school, the consciousness they say is needed to carry karmic imprints. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamika
- The Sutra Middle Way Autonomy school, a division of the Svatantrika (Autonomy school) of Buddhist philosophy. The proponent asserts a presentation of conventionalities through mostly conforming with the Sautrantika (Sutra school). LYWA
- selflessness of phenomena chö kyi dag me (Tib)
- The absence of a self in phenomena - all things other than the person. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka view, the most subtle form is their lack of inherent existence: they do not exist from their own side. LYWA
- Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika
- The Yogic Middle Way Autonomy school, a division of the Svatantrika (Autonomy school) of Buddhist philosophy. The proponent asserts a presentation of conventionalities through mostly conforming with the Cittamatra (Mind Only school). LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.