Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 54-minute commentary on Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, Kyabje Rinpoche works systematically through Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen’s tenets text, isolating what distinguishes this philosophical school from others. He opens with the core definition—a Mādhyamika who rejects true existence even at the conventional level—then covers the two subdivisions (Sautrāntika and Yogachara Svatāntrika Madhyamikas), the precise meaning of “establishment by its own characteristics,” and a critical distinction from Cittamātra regarding the selflessness of persons. Throughout, he uses concrete examples (a table and its relation to its four corners; a student uncertain whether Tenzin is in a closed office) to illuminate how Svatāntrika holds that phenomena must be both established by their own characteristics AND observed by a valid cognizer. The talk concludes with students raising questions about the subtle points. For serious practitioners studying Buddhist philosophical systems.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2015-04-21.mp3
UUID: dace7eb8-7d30-46ce-81e1-f3c63b3f1d41
Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche
Collection: Tenets
Date: 2015-04-21
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~2,011
So regarding the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika School on page 25 of the English translation of Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen’s tenets, a Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, the last paragraph, is defined as a Mādhyamika who does not assert even conventionally actual true existence by means of a verbally formulated autonomous reason. Here, by means of a verbally formulated autonomous reasons refers to by means of these three modes established from their own side. This is a somewhat complex way of formulating things. One could just as well say a Mādhyamika who does not assert even conventionally actual true existence while acknowledging existence by its own characteristics. And regarding the divisions on page 26, Svatāntrika Madhyamikas is subdivided into Sautrāntika Svatāntrika Madhyamikas and Yogachara Svatāntrika Madhyamikas.
On page 26, the definition of a Sautrāntika Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is a Mādhyamika who in addition propounds a presentation of conventional phenomena mainly in accordance with the Sautrāntika school. Instances of such Sautrāntika would be, for instance, or. And the definition of a Yogachara Svatāntrika Mādhyamika on page 26, paragraph four, is a Mādhyamika who propounds a presentation of conventional phenomena, mainly in keeping with the Cittamātra school. Examples of Yogachara Svatāntrika Madhyamikas are given in paragraph six. They include So the subdivision between Sautrāntika Svatāntrika Madhyamikas present conventional phenomena mainly in accordance with the Sautrāntika School for the one, mainly in accordance with the Cittamātra School for the other.
Now regarding the third subdivision, etymologies, paragraph six of page 26, the subject is called because it is stated that he accepts autonomous reasons. This could be reformulated and said because he accepts that phenomena are established by their own characteristics. The fourth subdivision, just below on page 27, the mode of asserting objects established by its own characteristics, established from its own side, inherently established are all synonymous. There is an important difference here between the Svatantrik Madhyamikas and the Chittamatras regarding the subtle selflessness of persons. In Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, the subtle selflessness of persons is not said to be an emptiness nor is it said to be an ultimate truth.
Whereas in Cittamātra, the subtle selflessness of persons is both an emptiness and an ultimate truth. As a result of this distinction, for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, emptinesses and ultimate truths are synonymous. So when it is said in the third paragraph fourth paragraph from the bottom of page 26 that established by its own characteristics, establishment from its own side and inherent establishment are all synonymous for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, we have to address the issue at present of the mode of establishment by its own characteristics. So in Je Tsongkhapa’s Legs Bshad Snying Po, The Essence of Eloquence, what precisely is the mode of establishment by its own characteristics for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika? The mode of establishment by its own characteristics for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is understood through the ascertainment of the person.
So regarding establishment by its own characteristics, there is no specific mention of the concept in Vaibhāṣika. However, Sautrandika, Svatāntrika Mādhyamika and Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika have the same understanding of establishment by its own characteristics, are established by their own characteristics phenomena which are not merely conceptually imputed but have an existence from their own side. So in as much as the understanding of establishment by its own characteristics in Svatāntrika is that phenomena are not mere nominal designations but have an existence from their own side. We understand that the person, in other words, that which is both the accumulator of karma and the experiencer of the fruition of karma is established by its own characteristics and this is a critical point which Je Tsongkhapa makes in Legs Bshad Snying Po in the context of a presentation of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. So the person is the accumulator of karma and the experiencer of the fruition of karma.
Should the person not be the experience of the fruition of karma, this accumulated karma would go to waste. And therefore, what is meant here is that it is the continuum of the person which experiences the fruition of karma. Now the accumulator of karma and specifically the experiencer of karma can only be posited for future lives. It would be odd to posit the experience of karma within this life. And therefore, this leads us to the necessity of identifying the person which experiences karma.
Now when we refer here to the person, in other words, the continuum which experiences the fruition of karma, what we are referring to is actually the basis of imputation of the person, which for the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika system is none other than the mental consciousness. And as Bhāvaviveka says in the Tarkajvāla, therefore, I assert none other than the mental consciousness as that. And the rationale for Bhāvaviveka’s presentation in the Tarkajvāla is that it is, after all, the mental consciousness which transmigrates into future lives and which alone can function as a person. And therefore, for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, one first analyzes what the person is, and this investigation leads to the mental consciousness as an instance of the person. This mental consciousness is understood as being established by its own characteristics.
And this line of reasoning is used in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika to justify the existence by its own characteristics of all phenomena without exception. Now in this context, when it refers to the person being established by its own characteristics, it is that which is imputed on the basis of imputation. In other words, imputed on the five aggregates which is referred to here. And this is probably the reason for which the person is considered to be established by its own characteristics. So in this context, once one has understood that the person is said to be established by its own characteristics for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika because it occurs on the basis of its aggregates, it is imputed on the basis of its aggregates.
The question which arises is, is this sufficient from the standpoint of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika to enable one to assert the existence of the person? This is not sufficient. In addition, the person must be posited by mind. Then let us take the example of this table. For Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, this table is established by its own characteristics.
It is an imputed phenomenon, imputed on which basis of imputation? On the basis of the square, the four corners of the table. Are there characteristics of this table apart from these four corners or not? This is something which is food for thought. So this is asserted in Tsongkhapa’s Legs Bshad Snying Po, The Essence of Eloquence.
Therefore, from the standpoint of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, is it sufficient for a phenomenon such as this table to be established by its own characteristics for it to be an existent? No, it is not. In addition to this, since the definition of existence is what is observed by a valid cognizer, this table must also be posited by mind. Both are necessary. And therefore, the mere establishment of phenomena from their own side, the mere establishment of phenomena by their own characteristics, for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, is not sufficient to warrant existence.
In addition, phenomena must be observed by a valid cognizer. They must be posited by mind. So an example will make this clear. Let us imagine after lunch at the center one day, one of the students comes and I ask him, is Tenzin in the office using the evidential mood of certainty in Tibetan. Then if the student has actually seen Tenzin in the office and knows for sure that Tenzin is in the office, he can answer, yes, he is.
Otherwise, it is inappropriate to answer this. Do you understand? It’s similar. Then one can only use the evidential mood of certainty here. Tenzin is in the office, when the person actually knows this for a fact.
Should the door be closed, then it is not possible to say this. And one has to understand this as a simile of the Svatantica Mediamica presentation of the status of phenomena. Normally, in Svatantrika Madhyamika, the mode of existence of phenomena is explained using the metaphor of an illusion, which is difficult to understand. So in general, we all know that Tenzin exists. But in this context, is Tenzin in the office or not?
Does Tenzin exist in the office or not? This is open to question, open to doubt. This is how we should be thinking about it. How’s that? Really?
So I had direct experience of this once at the monastery shortly after lunch around 12:30 or so. Three of us were involved. Tenzin was in the office. I had just finished lunch and one of my students came in. And I asked the student, is Tenzin in the office or not?
Now the student had not actually seen Tenzin in the office and therefore was unable to engage or answer my question. This is a very good simile for the mode of existence within Svatāntrika Mādhyamika and explains how to understand the metaphor of an illusion in Svatāntrika So Tenzin exists, that the existence of Tenzin is not realized in particular by the omniscient mind. As is said in clarifying the intent, is not whether it’s realized by an omniscient mind or not which is the issue. In brief, the Svatantrikas do not understand how Tenzin’s existence is contingent on the mind. If they did understand how Tenzin’s existence is contingent on the mind, then their view of emptiness would be identical to that of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika.
If you have questions, please ask your questions. So that is not too much of a problem. In general, when one gives as an instance of persons the mental consciousness that is not too much of an issue, things become problematic when we take ourselves as an example and we say, what is an instance of myself as a person? Then if we say my mental consciousness, after all, I myself as a person am a physical entity as well. My mental consciousness obviously does not have a head, limbs and so forth.
So the way around this is to give as instance of myself, the I, and then as instance of the I, the mental consciousness. So there doesn’t seem to be any particular problem here. The carpenter makes the table. Now you are not asking whether the table exists before the carpenter makes it, do you? So I suggested to Geshe la that your doubt is that anything which has a maker is by that fact not established by its own characteristics.
Then Geshe la said exactly the opposite. Both for Cittamātra and other schools, actually, what is established independence and causes and characteristics by that fact alone is established by its own characteristics. So I think there is a slight difference between being established by its own characteristics, being established from its own side, and being established by its own nature. The definition of conventional and ultimate truth in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is the same as in Cittamātra. And you can find these definitions in the Cittamātra section of tenets.
No. There’s no contradiction. The definitions are identical. What is addressed is a possibility of positing or engaging the two truths on one basis as opposed to Svatāntrika. In Cittamātra, is difficult to posit the two truths on one basis as they must be posited on the basis of form.
In Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, it is possible to do so. They are absolutely identical. There is no difference whatsoever except name. In Sautrāntika, they are also absolutely identical. In Prāsaṇgika, there is a difference in terms of the object of imputation, the object of negation, excuse me, otherwise known.
And therefore, for discussion tonight, the first topic is since we have said that the person is established by its own characteristics in Svatāntrika Madhyamica and have given an instance of the person the mental consciousness. Discuss the mode of establishment by its own characteristics in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. What does this mean? Secondly, please discuss the mode of being posited by the mind in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. Then as usual, pair with different partners the last time.
Key terms in this teaching
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamika
- The Sutra Middle Way Autonomy school, a division of the Svatantrika (Autonomy school) of Buddhist philosophy. The proponent asserts a presentation of conventionalities through mostly conforming with the Sautrantika (Sutra school). LYWA
- true existence den par yö pa (Tib)
- The concrete, real existence from its own side that everything appears to possess; in fact, both self and phenomena are empty of true existence. LYWA
- two truths den pa nyi (Tib)
- The two ways of relating to phenomena, as conventional or all-obscuring truth, the truth to a worldly mind, and ultimate truth, the truth to a mind engaged in ultimate analysis. LYWA
- Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika
- The Yogic Middle Way Autonomy school, a division of the Svatantrika (Autonomy school) of Buddhist philosophy. The proponent asserts a presentation of conventionalities through mostly conforming with the Cittamatra (Mind Only school). LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.