Tenets — 2015-04-07

Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)

Tenets — 2015-04-07

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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 72-minute session, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen explores how Buddhist philosophical schools understand the nature of phenomena through their tenet systems, focusing especially on the contrasts between Cittamātra, Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, and Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka views. He explains that each school asserts an ultimate view avoiding the extremes of permanence and nihilism, but differs on whether phenomena require mental imputation to exist. Using vivid examples—a magician conjuring horses and elephants on pebbles and twigs, a multicolored rope mistaken for a snake, and modern parallels like film directors and spectators—he shows why Svatāntrika requires both objective characteristics and mental positing, whereas Prāsaṇgika sees phenomena as purely mental constructs. The talk emphasizes the complementary relationship between conventional and ultimate truth across all schools and concludes with guidance to reflect on how mind posits phenomena in Svatāntrika Madhyamaka.

Minutes. When we refer to tenet system, we are referring to one’s ultimate view. And each system of tenets asserts that it is the ultimate view which lies between the extremes of permanence and of nihilism. Now if we take the case of the School of the Cittamātra School of Tenets posits its ultimate view, non duality, on the basis of form. Whether that assertion of non duality on the basis of form can be extended to all phenomena without exception within the Cittamātra view is a difficult issue.

If it were the case that the Cittamātra view of non nonduality could be posited not only of forms but of all phenomena without exception, then this would counter the positing or the presentation of the positing of the two truths since when it is possible to posit the conventional truth of a phenomenon, by implication, it is possible to posit the ultimate truth of that phenomenon. And reciprocally, when it is possible to posit the ultimate truth of a phenomenon, it is possible to posit the conventional truth of that phenomenon. As Ārya Nāgārjuna says in his root verses on Madhyamaka, The middle way is that way whereby from interdependence occurs emptiness and from emptiness occurs interdependence. And indeed, emptiness is posited or in dependence on interdependence and interdependence is posited in dependence on emptiness. Whether it is possible to extend the Cittamātra view of nonduality to all phenomena in this way seems very difficult.

However, in the case of Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, the view of emptiness in Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, in other words, phenomena being empty of being truly established, can be extended to all phenomena without exception, both composite and noncomposite phenomena, phenomena included within a continuum and phenomena not included within a continuum. In the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka system, the object of refutation of that view of the emptiness of true establishment of phenomena is nothing else than the true establishment of phenomena. What specifically is the object of refutation for Svatāntrika Madhyamaka. It is the view that phenomena are not merely posited by mind, but are established from their own side. Excuse me.

Are established as their own mode of abiding. So for Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, therefore, phenomena are posited by minds. Now there are, generally speaking, two types of minds, conceptual and nonconceptual minds, and this calls for further investigation. From the standpoint of Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, the object of refutation is phenomena’s not being posited by mind, but being established by their in their own mode of abiding. So what is the mode of existence of phenomena according to Svatāntrika Madhyamaka?

For Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, phenomena are the composite of, on the one hand, being posited by mind and, on the other hand, being established as the being established as their own mode of abiding. It is important to understand that while, for Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, there is no phenomenon which is not posited by mind and which is merely established on the basis of its own mode of abiding. For Cittamātra, it is exactly the opposite. Phenomena which are not established

On the basis of mind are nonetheless truly established in as much as they arise in dependence on causes and conditions. So the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka view is more subtle than the Cittamātra view since for the Cittamātra view, phenomena are merely established and dependent on their causes and conditions. Whereas for this Svatāntrika Madhyamaka view, in addition to being established in dependence on their causes and conditions, phenomena must also be posited by the minds apprehending them. So in the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka system, an example or a metaphor is given for phenomenas being posited by mind. And this metaphor, the metaphor of the illusion, is critical to understanding the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka view.

So what precisely is the example of an illusion? An illusion in ancient India used to be generated on a physical base of pebbles and twigs. On a base of pebbles and twigs, illusory elephants and horses would appear. Mhmm. So in the context of the manifestation of illusory horses and elephant on the physical base of twigs and pebbles, which are the base of emanation.

There are two observers, the magician, if you wish, who creates the illusion, and the spectator, in other words, ourselves, who observes the illusory horses and elephants. Now it is asserted that to be able to see such illusory horses and elephants, a substance, which is a physical substrate, is necessary for our eye consciousness. Then on this physical basis, a mistaken consciousness arises. The magician or the prestidigitator, when he creates the illusion of horses and elephants on a physical base of pebbles and twigs, does this through mantra. This mantra cause his own visual consciousness to be contaminated.

Therefore, even though he creates the illusion, nonetheless, horses and elephants appear to his eye consciousness. However, to the difference of the spectators, he does not subscribe to this illusion since he knows that the visual consciousness perceiving horses and elephants is mistaken. It is contaminated or affected by mantra. So this is akin to the example of actors and actresses in a movie who themselves know that the movie is not real and therefore have no attachment to the figures in the movie. In the case of the spectator who is watching the magical illusion or the movie, the spectator sees the illusory horses and elephants because his eye consciousness is contaminated.

But unlike the magician, he is convinced that they are true and authentic. It is like us when we watch a ghost movie. As we watch the ghost movie, fear arises within us. And we think, yes, it’s a ghost. And the ghost movie makers, however, are not afraid of their illusions.

Right? So it’s more helpful to for you to think in terms of ghost movies than magicians working with pebbles. It doesn’t exist in the West. So even though in Buddhist scriptures, the example of the illusion generated on the basis of pebbles and twigs is given, the contemporary example of movies is better for So both for the magician and for the spectators, two conditions are necessary for the appearance of the illusion. Both require first pebbles and twigs as a physical support to generate the illusion, and both require a contaminated mind which imputes the image of horses and elephants on that physical basis.

And therefore, for the illusory horses and elephants to appear both to the magician and to the spectator, two conditions are required. From the side of the object, one needs pebbles and twigs which have something to provide to the illusion. And from the side of the consciousness of the spectator and the magician, one needs a mistaken consciousness affected by mantra. The collection of these two gives rise to the illusory appearance of horses and elephants. For Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, it is the same thing with the mode of existence of phenomena.

Not only must phenomena exist from their own side, but in addition to this, there must be a mental imputation on phenomena. If phenomena existed only from their own side and there was no mental imputation, then they would not appear. Now if we take the Cittamātra system on the other hand, in the Cittamātra system, setting aside noncomposite phenomenon and focusing on composite phenomena, it is sufficient for a phenomenon to be truly established for it to arise in dependence on causes and conditions. Such a phenomenon is not posited by mind. The Svatāntrika Madhyamaka system is more subtle than this.

While it is true that in Svatāntrika Madhyamaka phenomena do arise, in dependence on causes and conditions, this is not sufficient. In addition to this, they must be posited by a mind, posited by conceptuality. Then it is appropriate here to explain somewhat the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka system. In Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, phenomena are not established in the slightest from their own side. They are only posited merely by mind.

So we can see that there is a very elegant evolution from Cittamātra to Svatāntrika Madhyamaka to Prāsaṇgika. So this is not easy for you to understand, but I think if you reflect over it, understanding will dawn. And at present, we will take So in the case of the mantras or the spells which are recited by the magician, these would be mantras recited on a rosary with which water would be charged. And then the water will be cast on the pebbles and the stones causing the apparition of illusory horses and elephants to bystanders. Another?

Yes. Exactly. Does not appear exactly means does not exist. So this is best understood in terms of the example which was given for Svatāntrika Madhyamaka of the illusory horses and elephant. For the illusory horses and elephants to exist, not only are pebbles and stones required, but in addition, an eye consciousness which is affected either by substances, in other words, poisons or a mantra.

in dependence on these two illusory horses and elephants will appear. Likewise, this is the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka understanding of the mode of existence of phenomena. For Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, phenomena exist from their own side. They are established by their own characteristics. But this alone is not sufficient.

In addition to this, there must be a mental imputation. Another? No. The example of a multicolored strand of rope in the grass which is mistaken for a snake is specific to Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka for the following reason. Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka considers that phenomena have no existence whatsoever from their own side and by their own characteristics and are merely imputed by mind and consciousness.

This is the case of a coil of multicolored rope in the grass mistaken for a snake. Such a coil of rope has nothing whatsoever to do with the snake, either in terms of its parts or its continuum. It is a mere mental imputation from the side of the observer which causes it to be mistakenly taken for a snake. Whereas in Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, phenomena are not just mere mental imputations. They also exist from their own side or by their own characteristics, and this is the reason for which the example of the magician who causes illusory horses and elephants to appear on the basis of pebbles and twigs using mantra and poisons is given.

So, obviously, Svatantrikas, like everyone else, can mistakenly perceive coils of multicolored rope in the grass for snakes. And like everyone else, they impute snakeness on the coil of rope, but they do not use this as an example for the mode of existence of phenomena. Your understanding of the modes of existence of phenomena in Prāsaṇgika and Svatāntrika Madhyamaka will deepen greatly if you reflect on the example of a coil of multicolored rope mistaken for a snake as an example of the mode of existence of phenomena in Prāsaṇgika and the example of a magician generating the illusion of horses and elephants on the basis of pebbles and stones, which do exist as the example of the mode of existence of phenomena in Svatāntrika. The multicolored string exists. Yeah.

Yeah. Yeah. What’s the truth? That’s good. Yeah.

That’s good. But it no worry. You know? So I I told you so the example of the movie will be easier for you to understand. You’ve never seen magicians at work in India.

If a movie director makes a movie, he needs actors. Right? So the actors who play in the movie, they are like the pebbles and the twigs. The movie director is like the magician. When the movie director has finished making the movie, if you have a movie theater, and in the movie theater, you have the director, the actors, and spectators taken from the crowd.

The director and the actors will see the movie. They see the action scenes in Fast and Furious, say, the action scenes, but they don’t believe in them. They don’t believe in them because they were part of the making of the movie. The spectators, surely do their emotions and happy and unhappy. It’s not the same thing as a director and the actors.

No. And that is the difference. So there is a real basis. There are actors without which the movie could not be made. The actors are, if you wish, the pebbles and the twigs.

In other words, the own characteristics of phenomena. Prāsaṇgika says there are no actors. So as far as Vibashik is concerned, little is said about conceptual imputation at all. Now within the Sautrāntika system, one has to distinguish between composite and noncomposite phenomena. All composite phenomena arise in dependence on causes and conditions and are not conceptual imputations.

All noncomposite phenomena do not arise in dependence on causes and conditions and are necessarily conceptual imputations such as permanent phenomena and so forth. The example which is given in Svatantika Madhyamaka of the illusory horses and elephants generated on the basis of pebbles and twigs is given to demonstrate that phenomena to exist not only must be established by their own characteristics, but must also be posited by mind. This is not a position which is accepted by either Sautrāntika or Cittamātra, who consider that phenomena being posited by their own characteristics is sufficient for their existence. So the examples which are given for Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka’s view of the mode of existence of phenomena and Svatāntrika Madhyamaka are very different. For instance, if we imagine in this temple that we are all looking towards the front door and the light is dim and we see a coil of rope which seems to be slithering, and Geshe la says, beware, there’s this poisonous snake, all of us looking at the rope will immediately be afraid of being bitten by the snake.

However, from the side of the rope itself, there is no snakeness whatsoever. In the case, however, of the example of the illusory horses and elephants generated on the basis of pebbles and twigs, for the generation of illusory horses and elephants, you need pebbles and twigs in addition to mantra or poison to contaminate the eye consciousness. In other words, something is necessary for Svatāntrika Madhyamaka from the side of the object. Something is not necessary from the side of the object for Prāsaṇgika. If you think about this, you will understand better the difference. Hold on.

Is that? Which third party? The example would be the same in Prāsaṇgika, the example of the horses and elephants generated on pebbles and twigs. I’m not saying it would not be the same, but the example is not a metaphor for the mode of existence or phenomena.

The absence of true establishment in Svatāntrika Madhyamaka and Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka has profoundly different meanings even though exactly the same term is used. In Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, when one asserts that phenomena are not truly established, what is meant by this is that phenomena cannot exist only by their own characteristics but must necessarily be imputed by mind. And what is refuted is the uncommon mode of establishment by their own mode of abiding of phenomena. In the case of prasangika on the other hand, when it is asserted that phenomena are not truly existent, what is asserted is that phenomena are mere conceptual or nominal imputations And what is refuted is any type of existence from their own side of phenomena. Yes.

Someone who from the Prāsaṇgika standpoint realizes emptiness also realizes nonduality. So in the Cittamātra system, when one refers to nonduality, one refers to phenomena not being established as exterior entities. In other words, to phenomena not being established as being composed of indivisible particles. Or this can be applied obviously to form, in other words, matter. One does not see how this could be applied to consciousness or to beings which are not material.

Mhmm. So what I was saying was that the every single school of tenets can be presented in the light of its understanding of conventional and ultimate truths. And the the presentation of conventional truths not only does not harm the presentation of ultimate truths, it benefits it. Likewise, the presentation of ultimate truths not only does not harm the presentation of conventional truths, it benefits it. They are mutually beneficial in their presentation.

Now if it were the case that one could extend the view of nonduality in Cittamātra to all phenomena, then one would also have to have this type of situation with nonduality which does not seem to be the case. No. Even within Cittamātra, it is difficult to see how this presentation of the two truths can abut to the present excuse me, how this presentation of nonduality can comport with the presentation of the two truths. Here for today. We will not have a debate session tonight since it’s a bit cold.

And I would like you to reflect for next time on the mode of positing of phenomena by mind in Svatāntrika Madhyamaka since this is fundamental to an understanding of the two truths in Svatāntrika Madhyamaka. So if you could reflect for next time on the mode of positing of phenomena in Svatāntrika Madhyamaka by mind since this is fundamental to the presentation of the two truths. The two truths are very important. Since we speak of the base, the two truths. We shall stop here for today.

Not sure.