Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2014-07-29 – KR.mp3
UUID: d750ce77-40cf-4947-bc63-df097cd9af1a
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Date: 2014-07-29
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Duration: 1h 7m
Words: 2,721
So as usual, we’ll generate the motivation before receiving these teachings. It is important when one studies tenets to understand the establishment of the view in the various systems of tenets. Since it is mainly the view which differentiates the systems of tenets. And therefore to be able to present and understand the view in the Vaibhashika system, the Sautrantika system, the Chitamatra system and the Madhyamika system. It’s important to understand the uncommon positions of each school of tenets.
So for instance, with the Vaibhashikas, this would be the substantial existence of the three times and the existence of indivisible particles, especially the substantial existence of the three times. The very term or assertors of assertors of instances is etymologically significant. The Vaibhashika system asserts instances with respect to the three times, likewise it understands phenomena in the like of the Mahavibhasha, which subdivides into instances. In brief, what is the presentation of the three times? One effective entity, one thing, proceeds continually from the past to the present and the future without change until the moment of its destruction.
Let us take the example of the small table in front of myself. It is definite that all of us in this room consider that it is the small the same small table today which we perceived yesterday. Now, the Vaibhashika position endorses this common sense view. There are numerous example examples, but the one I will give is that of printing, for instance, printing money. Imagine you have some paper in front of you, and you want to print bills, let us say $100 bills.
Whether you print $100 bills, $50 bills, $20 bills, or $5 bills, the paper itself is the same. It is only what is printed on the paper which diverges. Or to take the example of the table or the table cloth in front of Geshela, actually, it is obvious to all of us in terms of naive perception that yesterday’s table is today’s table will be tomorrow’s table. This is what the Vaibhashikas mean by the substantial existence of the three times. The second point is that of indivisible particles.
Both the Vaibhashikas and the Sautrantikas accept the existence of indivisible particles with a very small difference, which I explained last time. Now clearly if indivisible particles are in contact at any point, then they can no longer be said to be indivisible, since they can be divided from the standpoint of the point of contact. So when one refers to indivisible particles, one refers to the end result of a process of division of matter, which leads to fundamental particles, either of earth, the earth element, the water, the fire, or the air element. And if we take an element, a particle of the water element, this particle will not be commingled in the slightest with particles of any of the other elements. And then these subtle particles concatenate and form ever greater conglomerations of particles, eventually giving rise to coarse matter to the buildings we live in and so forth.
As a result, such entities are said to be truly established, to be established from their own side, or to be exterior phenomena. Generally speaking, all of the Buddhist systems of tenets accept the existence of the selflessness of persons, and distinguish between the selflessness of persons and a self of persons which they may accept or not. This is the case of the Vaibhashikas. There is however a sub school, the Vatsiputriya school, which what it does accept that persons are empty of being permanent one and independent, does not accept that persons are empty of being a substantially existent autonomous entities, because it asserts on the bottom of page five of your tenets text. The Vaci Poutrias accept the selflessness of persons, which is an emptiness of permanent unity and autonomy, but do not accept the surfaces of persons, which is an emptiness of a substantially existing independent entity, because they accept a substantially existing independent self, which is inexpressible in as much as it is either neither of one nature, nor of different nature from the aggregates, and neither permanent nor impermanent.
When one wishes to understand this distinction, one must make the distinction which is made in all of the schools of tenets beneath the Prasanika Madhyamika school of substantially existent versus imputedly existent persons. When one refers to an imputedly existent person, one refers to a person which is imputed on a basis of designation or a basis of imputation, which are the aggregates of that person. Now regarding the position of the Vatsiputrias, the Vatsiputriyas, the subsect of the Vaibhashikas assert the existence of a person which is neither permanent nor impermanent. When they assert that the person is not impermanent, they understand the term impermanence in the ordinary sense of the term as dependent on causes and conditions, and they assert that the person is not dependent on causes and conditions. And therefore the person is not impermanent.
On the other hand, the Vatsiputriya is saying, if one were to assert, after all the person has to be permanent, if it’s not impermanent, the person cannot be permanent either, simply because the continuum of the person changes, since it is possible for instance to attain the grounds and paths. This is therefore, in my opinion, the meaning of the assertion that the person is neither impermanent nor permanent. The issue of the person’s neither being permanent nor impermanent, and in keeping with the assertion, ineffable, is however unrelated to the actual existence of a self. The Vatsyaputriya assert the existence of a self, which is a substantially existent autonomous entity. What is meant by substantially existent autonomous entity?
I explained last time that the self is mistakenly seen, according to most Buddhist schools of tenets, as in a relationship with the aggregates similar to that of a king to his court. The king does not depend on his court, but the court does depend on the king. Likewise, one mistakenly sees oneself as not depending on one’s aggregates, but one’s aggregates as depending on oneself. It is precisely this view of the self which is endorsed by the Vaziputria School, which considers that the self which exists is in the same relation to our aggregates as a king to his court. In other words, the self does not depend on the aggregates, but the aggregates do depend on the self.
However, from Ospreys perspective, this viewpoint is a wrong view. Since we consider that the person is an imputed existent, which exists independence on its basis of imputation, which are its aggregates. For instance, your translator. Even though the Vatsiputria Vaibhashikas do accept the coarse selflessness of persons, which is a person’s being empty, of being permanent one and independent, it seems to be frankly a verbal assertion, since when they assert at the same time that the person is neither permanent nor impermanent and ineffable, their assertion resembles greatly that of the non Buddhist school schools of tenets regarding the Atman. So regarding the difference in subtlety between the coarse and the subtle selflessness of persons, That difference in subtlety must first be presented in terms of the mode of apprehension of the mind, apprehending these selflessnesses.
If we take the coarse self of a person, which is a person’s being seen as being permanent, one, and independent, which is the coarse object of negation, such a coarse object of negation probably cannot arise independently of tenets. In other words, it is an acquired view. On the other hand, the vision of the subtle self of persons, which is a self which is substantially existent and autonomous, is something which is not acquired initially independence on tenets, but which is actually innately present in all of us. The second difference is from the standpoint of the mode of emptiness. Whereas, the coarse selflessness of persons, in other words, persons being empty of being permanent one and independent, seems to give rise in the mind who up to of one who understands it, to a sense of the impermanence of this person, and would therefore be an affirming negative.
The subtle selflessness of persons, persons being empty of being substantially existent autonomous entities, does not seem to implicate anything. This non implication indicates it is a non affirming negative, and therefore there is a difference in the mode of emptiness between the coarse and the subtle selflessness of persons, one is a non affirming negative, one is an affirming negative, and the second is a non affirming negative. Then finally, whether it is actually necessary to have realized the coarse selflessness of persons, in other words persons being empty of being one permanent and independent before realizing the subtle selflessness of persons, in other words persons being empty of being substantially existent autonomous phenomena, is far from obvious. I am not sure that it is necessary at all myself. On the other hand, when it comes to the realization of these subtle selflessness of persons, it seems indispensable before realizing that persons are empty of being substantially autonomous existence to understand that the person depends on its basis of imputation, which are the aggregates.
Then we should examine for ourselves whether or not upon having apprehended that the person is a substantial existent which exists autonomously, a powerful sense independence of that of the person’s being permanent, one and independent arises or not. If that is the case, then it is clear there is a difference in coarseness and subtlety between these two. Then this is somewhat difficult topic, actually, I shouldn’t say it’s somewhat difficult, it’s a difficult topic, and I think you almost have a bit of a headache after this. But I encourage you to read, to study, to reflect by yourselves, to gain experience, and in the process, one’s understanding will will deepen. Ketzur Rinpoche always said, meditate, meditate.
And when he said meditate, he was not referring to generating calm abiding, he was referring to this process of contemplation, taking an object of contemplation, and circling around it as it were, looking at it from different angles. This is what is known as analytical meditation. And then if you have questions at present on the difference between the coarse and the subtle selflessness of persons, on the three times, and on the other topics we covered, please ask them, we have time. Please. Pamela.
First of all, So Geshela says that actually in Tibetan means the earlobe. Whatever What? The earlobe. Earlobe. Whatever the etymology is.
Yes, please. In in the Vaibhashika presentation of a functioning thing or an effective entity, is there a distinction made between the continuum and its characteristics? Yes. Probably a distinction is made. For instance, when we speak of the continuum of a phenomenon, we refer to the phenomenon yesterday, today and tomorrow, whereas when we speak of the characteristics of a phenomenon, in the case of an impermanent phenomenon, we are referring to its transitoriness, in the case of a composite phenomenon to its being fabricated.
Please. Geshela, have a general question about Vaibhashika. I was rereading some of Liberation in the Palm of your hand this week about confessing and purifying evil deeds. But it said there was seem to be a blanket statement that the Vaibhashika do not believe that you can purify bad karma and evil deeds. So I was wondering if you could confirm that and if so, do they not believe that a deed increases in severity if you don’t confess it?
There is a distinction between in the Vaibhashika system between literally partless non virtuous deeds, and non virtuous deeds which have parts. Partless non virtuous deeds can be purified in this life, but so called non virtuous deeds with parts, such as for instance breaking bhikshu ordination cannot be purified in this life for the Vaibhashika. I’d have to say that my headache really took hold tonight when you started talking about affirming negative and non affirming negative and I’m just wondering if there is like kindergarten version of those terminology for such as me. I will explain these in detail next week since we have little time left now. Does the Babashika accept that this autonomous self is an ultimate truth?
The self that is Which Sai Bhaskar? Just the general Babasika system that you know if an ultimate truth is one that is not discarded by the mind apprehending it when it is destroyed, the sense that there’s this essence that is the autonomous self, does that fit with their understanding of an ultimate truth? No, you must differentiate between the Vaibhashikas and the sub school we were talking about the Vatsiputrias. The Vaibhashikas in general do not accept the existence of a self which is a substantially existent autonomous entity, they refute such a thing. The Vatsiputrias do accept it.
Then would they consider it an ultimate truth or not? Well, the definition of an ultimate truth is a phenomenon which cannot be discarded or destroyed by the mind apprehending it. Clearly it is difficult to see how the self could be discarded or destroyed, so it is unclear. Last week Kishna said that there was some debate about whether that subtle self is imputed or not, and if it was imputed then that would come under the category of a conventional truth because that’s my understanding of what a conventional truth is what the imputation of a pot for example. I wonder if I’m in the right territory in terms of what Geshele was alluding to last week about you know the debate as to whether that subtle self is imputed, is an imputation.
When did the Gishwara speak of the subtle self? What was the context? A subtle self of persons or a subtle self? What’s subtle self of person. It’s not so much of an issue which arises in Vaibhashika, the Vaibhashika assert that all objects of knowledge are substantial existence.
There is no real place left for imputed existence. For Chris’s point there I just found my little notes on it so I’m not sure if it’s 100% correct but they’re just scratchings. One must investigate whether this self accepted by the Vibashika is or is not an imputed existence. Okay, there’s no subtle stuff then. Perhaps this is referring to the person which engages in activities activities such as waking, sleeping, and so forth, which is asserted by the Vaibhashikas to be truly existing and is also an imputed existent.
Does that answer your question? If my notes are correct Geshela, the three times something proceeding continually from past, present and future without change until a moment of its destruction. So I’m just curious how do the Vaibhashikas account for the destruction if there’s no change? What causes something to be destroyed? So, yes, indeed, the Vaibhashikas say that yesterday, the vase exist, today it exist, tomorrow it will exist, then how is it destroyed?
Geshela says, with a hammer. Because you see, if they accepted a destruction which was of the same type as a substantial continuum in which it arose, they would have to accept subtle impermanence, which would be very problematical for them. So they must accept destruction come from the outside. Have a question. He’s a he’s a follower of tenets, a particular tenant’s school, a description of a disciple following a path, or is it a description of a mind at a particular stage?
The followers of a tenet system are not necessarily followers of a particular spiritual tradition. For instance, the Charvaka, the Lokayatas of ancient India, definitely had a tenet system, but one cannot speak of a spiritual tradition. And tenets are not states of mind, tenets are mere assertions. Then we will have debate or discussion as usual. Have separate partners from last time, two by two, please.
So the topics are the differences between the coarse and the subtle selflessness of persons, the difference between the three times, and the meaning of indivisible particles. Geshela has got the jump on me. So and then of course the following weekend seminar and with Ilya which will be a great event. So if you’re not registered then there’s still time. Thank you.
Key terms in this teaching
- atman dag (Tib)
- Self; as opposed to anatman (no-self), the Buddha’s explanation of selflessness in the Four Noble Truths Sutra. LYWA
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- conventional truth samvriti satya (Skt); kun dzob den pa (Tib)
- As opposed to ultimate truth, which is the understanding of the ultimate nature of reality (emptiness), conventional truth is what is true to the valid conventional consciousness. LYWA
- grounds and paths sa lam (Tib)
- Various advanced mental states that are achieved through meditation and practice. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- object of negation gag cha (Tib)
- An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
- tenet system drubtha(Tib)
- A general term for a religious and/or philosophical system, whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist. It is often used as shorthand to refer to the four major Buddhist tenet systems that emerged from India. LYWA
- Vaibhashika jedrag mawa (Tib)
- The Great Exposition school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Great Exposition school asserts truly established external objects but does not assert self-knowers. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.