Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2010-10-03 – IS.mp3
UUID: dc8ce3cc-590b-45d3-ac3e-f6a4dceb296c
Teacher: Ilia Durovic
Collection: TBI Symposium (Khensur Rinpoche)
Date: 2010-10-03
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Duration: 1h 36m
Words: 8,726
Well, thank you very much, Chris, for the introductions. And as a sign of lack of compassion today, we are going to conclude with a difficult conference. So the issue is actually encapsulated in a French proverb, To translate is to betray. And what I would like to address today with you is the issue of translation which we generally take for granted. What precisely is translation?
What translation from cognate language to cognate language, languages of the same family group is? And more fundamentally, whether translation is actually possible in the sense we understand it. You have some handouts. The two first handouts, Alan Wallace’s article and Alex Bazin’s article, specifically refer to yesterday’s talk. The two last handouts will be of relevance for today.
I think the first handout, Alan Wallace’s article, is one if all of us could read, I think there would be tremendous benefit. Wallace is addressing directly in an interview the issue of reception of Tibetan Buddhism in the West or the lack thereof. And even though it’s a ten year old interview, the issues are very pregnant for us. The, second printout is actually something which was originally confidential. I think you’ll find it very interesting.
It was the address Alexander Berzin, who as you know was for some twenty years translator at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, was asked by his Holiness the Dalai Lama to give to the assembled monks of Ganden, Drepung and Sera in 1989, if memory serves me well, as a preparation to their coming to the West to teach. And it is, it was not supposed to be made available to Westerners. Berzin made it available on his website, so I feel free to hand it out to you. It is a highly educated Westerner trained in the Tibetan traditions vision of the specific problems of westerners and how Tibetan teachers have to address them. So I think you will find this of considerable interest.
And I apologize those two articles are my personal copy so they’re underlined. So the underlining are my my private notes. The two last articles are related to today’s conference, and the issues of language translation and perception. So I’m going to use the topic of translation today as a pretext, having drawn you in to address the fundamental issues two articles. So there are two more articles which are handed out to you.
I think you didn’t maybe enough copies were not made. We have we have run now. So my apologies. I I I did not expect so many of you to be interested in translation. And then what I would like to address having drawn you in with a topic of translation is a much more fundamental issue of language and conceptuality as the underlying vehicle for communication.
What fundamentally is translation? The naive view of translation which is dominant is it’s just a matter of converting one word into another word. In other words, linguists would say, translation in the naive viewpoint is translation from denotation to denotation, from the specific meaning of one term to the specific meaning of another term. So it’s a truism that languages have different denotations. This was pointed out centuries ago by John Locke.
Different languages look at the world differently. It’s a well known fact to Tibetan translators that for the Tibetan physical vocabulary and especially the technological vocabulary is very poor, the Tibetan mental and psychological vocabulary is far richer and more subtle than that of most western languages with the possible exception of English. However, the issues of translation go far beyond issues of vocabulary and denotation and involve directly issues of connotation, which is the indirect or involuntary meaning a word accumulates through its usage in a culture over time. Both have to be taken into account within the process of translation. As I mentioned yesterday, a word such as guilt, which was a word which had broadly speaking a positive connotation in the nineteenth century, has an overwhelmingly negative connotation in the beginning of the twenty first century.
And a word such as self actualization, which hadn’t been understood in the nineteenth century, would probably have had a rather negative connotation, has an extremely positive connotation in the twenty first century. These issues of connotation are several seldom addressed in translation and this can lead to absolute hooters. A recent case in point has been the decision by the Lamrim Chenmo Committee when they translated Lamrim Cemo into English, which is otherwise an excellent translation, to depart from many of Geoffrey Hopkins’ traditional translations, which despite their occasional awkwardness were chosen because the terms used had no connotation in English, to use terms which often have strong connotation in English. A case in point is Shine. Shine or Shamatha is translated by Jeffrey Hopkins as calm abiding, which is actually a translation of the two Tibetan roots, Shiva, peace and nepa, to abide or to dwell.
There’s no connotation at all. The Lamrim Chemo Committee chooses to translate it as serenity, which has a very, very substantial connotation in English and actually exposes us if this translation is received to major problems in the practice of Shamatha on par with those which took hold in Tibet before Je Tsongkhapa’s time. So just to mention this specific case, Shamatha is not a practice fostering serenity. As a matter of fact, if anything, those who train in say that it often induces lung, nervous tension. The goal of is not to attain serenity.
But if this translation is received, irrespective of its denotation, the connotation is such that it will influence heavily the practice of Shamatha. It will influence those who are attracted to the practice. It will influence how they strive and what they hope to attain. So you can see these are not value neutral issues. And here we are only addressing the very surface of language, which is the issue of connotation.
I will try to cover in this talk the influence language has not merely on conceptuality, but on the actual phenomenon of perception itself. And there is a bevy of studies which have come out in the last decade only, clearly indicating that linguistic constructs affect the very phenomenon of perception to a degree none of us suspected a mere fifteen or twenty years ago. So to do this correctly, I will have to address with you the impact of language on thought and to give some background regarding linguistic theory and the main trends in linguistics in the twentieth century. And then addressing specifically our question of how language affects perception, I will address the issue in three fields where I think there is a considerable amount of evidence of such an impact, which is the impact of language on the perception of color, the impact of language on spatial perception, and the impact of language on gender perception of both living beings and phenomena in general. And then if we have time, we will cover briefly the comparative features of two languages which are of main interest for us, Sanskrit and Tibetan, and then pass on to what I hope to cover with you today, which is translation as hermeneutical choice, the transmission of Buddhism from India to to Tibet.
Well, I hope to show you in instances of translation from Sanskrit into Tibetan that translation was never a hermeneutically neutral act and was frequently a political act. And this political nature of translation was designed to enable certain interpretations and to prevent other interpretations. So first the impact, of language on thought and some background in contemporary linguistics. Broadly speaking twentieth century linguistics has been ruled by two schools of thought: linguistic determinism, which is also often called the Sapir-Whorf School of Linguistics, and linguistic nativism, which was primarily developed by the famous American linguist Noam Chomsky. The first school, the Sapir Whorf School, was tremendously influential, up to the end of the Second World War and then fell into total disrepute.
It came to the point where if you were accused of being a Whorfian, it was more or less a par, on being accused of being a Trotskyist running dog, and you would get hounded out of academia. The paradox actually is that much of the recent research in human brain scanning clearly vindicates Whorf’s positions to a degree which is actually disturbing for professional linguists. So the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has a long history. It actually can be traced back to the founder of modern linguistics, Wilhelm von Humboldt, at the end of the eighteenth century. Humboldt was one of the first linguists who studied seriously known Indo European languages, specifically a language most of you have only heard about, the Basque language.
And he tried to understand, and this was revolutionary for the period, the Basque language in terms of its own internal dynamics, and not to transpose on the Basque language the grammatical structures of Latin. A result, Wilhelm von Humboldt became convinced of the fact that language affected Weltonchaung. Language affected the vision we have of the world. And famously said, the difference between languages is not only in sounds and signs, but in worldview. Herein is found the reason and ultimate goal of all the study of language.
Now I personally feel I can make mine Humboldt’s statement, some two centuries later. The main reason in my life I have studied languages has been to understand the impact of language on perception and conceptuality. And from my side, I have always been convinced that there was such an impact long before the studies which corroborate this came out. So Humboldt’s work remained in the background of linguistics and came very much to the fore, in The United States at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, largely because of interest from American linguists in the language spoken by the American Indians and the influence it had on the world view of the American Indians. There’s a direct lineation actually going from anthropology to linguistics, where leading American anthropologists such as Franz Boas, who pioneered the studies in the Indian cultures, influenced the founder of the Sapir Whorf theory, Edward Sapir himself, to throw a new new look at the Indian languages and to see to which degree, not just the vocabulary, but the grammar, the semantics of the languages in question, could affect the world view of those who spoke them.
Now, this is very much a chicken and egg situation even in the context of the Sapir Whorf theory because it’s an open question to which degree world view engenders language and to which degree in turn language corroborates worldview. It is probably a feedback mechanism which is involved. So Sapir himself was fairly cautious in his assertions. There is a typical phenomenon in all North American Indian languages with the majority at least, which is very rare in other languages, which is a fusion of the noun and the verb. Now, the fusion of the noun and the verb, which are strictly delineated categories in the Indo European languages, was felt by Sapir to be philosophically charged.
Grammatically, the verb symbolizes action, and the noun is basically that which acts or is acted upon. When you have a language in which nouns and verbs are fused, in other words, in which the actor or the object of the action and the action itself are fused, Sapir and Vos to a much greater degree felt that such languages foster a monistic view of the universe, which does not delineate clearly between object and agent, as well as between the process of action. Sapir himself did not claim, as Wharf did later, that speaking such a language prevented certain outlooks from arising. Whorf himself, who was not a linguist initially and trained under Sapir, perhaps pushed Sapir’s hypotheses further than it should have been at the period, And more importantly, based his research on unsubstantiated claims regarding one specific Indian language, the Hopi language, which he had not carefully studied. And claimed that in the Hopi language not only was a noun and verb used as in all or the majority of the North Indian, North American Indian languages studied, but that in addition, the Hopi language lacked a sense of time, which is a revolutionary claim.
Whorf claimed that Hopi languages did not conjugate verbs, did not understand the verb as an autonomous linguistic entity, and therefore that the Hopis functioned in not only a monistic framework as Sapir claimed, but a timeless framework as well. Unfortunately, for him and for us, Whorf’s total acquaintance with the Hopi language was one Hopi American Indian he met in Central Park in New York. He actually never traveled to Arizona to study the Hopi languages, and his claims were taken on face value. And this has been one of the great tragedies of the intellectual history of linguistics. Because when linguists went to study Hopi language on the terrain, they found that the Hopi language had a separate verb, and let alone that it had a separate verb, it had a very complex tense structure.
So, as a result, if the Whorfians were not quite dragged by their fellow linguists to heaps of dry kindling to be sent ablaze in a linguistic auto-da-fé, saying you were a Warfian was the surest way of guaranteeing that academic career was in a permanent dead end for the rest of your life. And it is tragic because Whorf’s conclusions were discredited because of faulty methodology. Yet as you will see later on in this talk, much of Whorf’s conclusions are actually sound. And therefore, many philosophers took Whorf’s intuition that language limited the possible descriptions and understanding of reality we have, for much of the linguistic world tiptoed around the whole issue. You still find among leading figures of contemporary linguistics who are a little bit out of the fold, a clear endorsement of the Whorfian view and especially in the work of George Steiner, of you may have heard about, the great theoretician of translation who published, in After Babel, an attempt to understand the impact of language on thought.
And Steiner draws heavily from the Whorfian distinctions and points out, and this is attested in linguistics, that most primitive languages, it’s a case in for instance biblical Hebrew, it seems to have been very much the case in proto Tibetan, most primitive languages lack the notion of a verbal tense. Primitive languages which have verbs, and I use here the term primitive in a very naive, and casual sense. Primitive languages which have verbs tend to see the function of the verb in terms of aspect. And I like to very briefly here the distinction between aspect and tense to give you a sense of how the sense of perception of time which verbs represent has shifted over history. Tense we are all familiar with.
It is basically the situation of action on the linear, vector of time. A past action, a present action, a future action, and then certain languages distinguish between levels of pastness, levels of presentness, ongoing presentness, the present continuous in English, levels of futureness. Aspect is radically different. Languages which have aspect are not interested in when a deed occurred in the past, present, or future. The only question which is asked is whether the deed has been completed or is still in the process of occurring.
Whether it was completed in the past or was in the process of occurring in the past, in the present, or in the future. This is not a minor distinction. It’s actually in the history of Christian theology, a fundamental distinction, which can perhaps not be underrated. And I’ll open a brief parenthesis here. Most of you know that the books which constitute the Old Testament were composed in Hebrew, in classical Hebrew, and were translated in Greek, in the Septuaginta, in the period which stretches Grosso Motto between the fourth century and the second century BC.
The famous verse in Exodus three fourteen, in which Yahweh at Mount Sinai defines himself, reads in classical Hebrew casually translated or commonly translated in English, I am He who I am. This is actually not at all what the Hebrew means. In Hebrew is the imperfective of the verb to be. It means I am becoming. I have not finished becoming literally.
So has to be translated correctly is, I have not finished becoming what I have not finished becoming. So there is a clear concept within the Hebrew Old Testament of the dynamicity of creation. When this is translated in Greek, and by this period, Greek had both aspect and tense, The translators of the Septuagintas translate as I am being. So we have gone from the divine perceived as a process of becoming, which is a semitic conception of the divine to this day, to the divine seen as being. And I would put it to you that that is one of the two nexuses in Western history during which the Western hypnotic fascination with being occurs.
This is one, the Parmenides nexus is the other. This is some of the baggage we bring with us when we enter Buddhist philosophy. So closing this brief parenthesis and returning to linguistics, you can see linguistics is not a value neutral field. It’s very tedious when one gets into it, but if one delves deep enough, there are great rewards. So returning to to linguistics and this brief history of twentieth century linguistics, the Sapir Whorf hypothesis was fundamentally discredited, and a very attenuated form of this hypothesis survived in late twentieth century linguistics.
It was formulated by the great Russian linguist Jakobson, and is often known as the Boas-Jakobson principle, which states that languages differ essentially in what they must convey and not in what they may convey. Now this is an attenuation of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis because for Whorf fundamentally languages prevented one from saying certain things and therefore from thinking certain things. What Jakobson is saying is that languages do not prevent one from thinking or saying certain things, but that there are features in languages which, because they are indispensable, oblige us when we speak that language to make certain distinctions. If you speak to take the case of biblical Hebrew. Biblical Hebrew, if you were a Hebrew prophet of the seventh century BC, by speaking Hebrew, you were constantly obliged to make the decision the distinction between what was completed and what was ongoing.
You never made a distinction of tense. It could be made, but you were not compelled to make it. To take an example from Tibetan, the Tibetan language is one of the languages which has the most complex honorific structure of all Asian languages. One does not use, especially in the Tibetan, which was spoken in Tibet before 1959, the same pronouns, nouns, and verbs depending on whether one is speaking to an inferior, an equal, a superior, or someone who is vastly superior to you. There are diff literally different languages for each level of the social hierarchy.
Now, the very existence of what is called the non honorific form, which is a language, let’s say, I was a Tibetan, I would use to speak to a child or to an animal. The honorific form, which is the language I would use to speak to an equal as a sign of respect or to a superior. And the high honorific form, which used to exist before 1959, which is only used to speak to, let’s say, the Dalai Lama means that someone who is speaking Tibetan is constantly engaging in a process of evaluation of social hierarchy. It is impossible to speak Tibetan and not to do this. So the language does not prevent certain things, but in keeping with the Boas Jakobson principle, the language compels its speaker to assess hierarchy.
There are other features of the Tibetan language which are of considerable interest for us here. These And are once again cases where grammar erupts directly into philosophy, what is known as evidentiality. Evidentiality is a concept in linguistics which derives from evidence and is basically a feature of those languages which indicate the degree of certainty of what the speaker is reporting. Now all languages allow this. In English, for instance, when we talk, I can say, I think Joe is tired.
But I do not have to say I think. I can say Joe is tired. The English language does not oblige me to take a position regarding my degree of certitude regarding Joe’s tiredness. The language gives me the choice. There are languages which do not give their speakers this choice.
It’s a case with Tibetan. It’s a case with a Peruvian language known as Matzis. In those languages, the auxiliary at the end of the verb necessarily indicates how sure the speaker is of what he is saying. So if I say of Joe in Tibetan, I am asserting that I am 500% sure that Joe is tired. It sounds strange to a Tibetan ear because the immediate question will be how precisely is Ilya that sure that Joe is totally exhausted.
If I say, I am saying, Joe is probably tired, which is what a Tibetan would say. Now the language, the Tibetan language does not give the speaker of the language the option not to make this distinction. So again, in keeping with the Boas-Jakobson principle, the Tibetan language coerces the speaker in the constant assessment of the degree of truth of his statements, which English for instance does not. If I say Joe is tired, it can mean I think Joe is tired. It may mean that Joe is probably tired.
It may mean I am sure Joe is tired. I do not have to clarify this. Or as a friend of mine said to me once, English is such a practical language because when you say, I had a neighbor come over last night, you don’t have to say whether it’s a man or a woman. Now, French as a language compels you to say this. So French is a very embarrassing language to speak.
If I say a neighbor in English, you don’t know. If I’m speaking in French and I say, it’s in the feminine. It’s in the masculine. The language compels me to give information and the language, in the case of a French language, compels gender assessment, which English as a language does not. So these are applications of the Boas Jakobson principle to linguistics.
Now there was a topic I was going to enter into, but it’s a bit complex, so I think we’re going to skip it here. And I will pass directly, onwards to a very brief presentation of linguistic nativism from Chomsky’s vision of linguistic linguistics. And what I feel is a Buddhist critique of Chomsky’s argument. And then we will enter directly in the issue of the impact of language on perception. One of the major problems which Chomsky and his entire school, actually most of linguistics addresses, is what is known as the poverty of stimulus argument.
It’s a very fundamental problem in the process of acquisition of language. In a nutshell, the amount of linguistic stimuli an infant receives cannot explain the level of grammatical knowledge a child has of the language. There’s too little stimuli to enable the child to learn the language on the basis of the linguistic information provided. If, as a linguist, you try to assess how much information an infant is receiving from his parents when they speak English to him, and then you assess the amount of information that child would need before going to school to speak English at the level the child speaks it at, the stimuli given is insufficient for the child to extrapolate enough of the grammatical structure of the language to allow this. It’s called the poverty of stimuli argument.
And then, there are really only two answers to the poverty of stimuli argument within the framework which, is at present accepted in linguistics. The Chomsky answer is the so called universal grammar answer. In other words, for Chomsky and his disciples, there is actually a universal set of linguistic rules which are inherited, which are actually transmitted genetically, and which are Chomsky does talk about it, it is it is awkward, which are basically part of the way the brain is hardwired. Then everything gets terribly awkward when you ask the Chomskans to say what the rules of this universal grammar are. Because what they come out with is so trite that it’s very, very difficult to see how that counters a poverty of stimulus argument.
And the other classic response to the poverty of stimulus argument has been to invoke non measurable factors. Non measurable factors. There are elements in the acquisition of language which cannot be measured directly in a laboratory setting such as a child seeing the parent engaging in activities and talking about it afterwards, etc. Again, it seems very weak to explain the level of structure which is acquired. And linguistics is sort of stranded within this situation.
We have a universal grammar which basically amounts to a theory which has no predictive power and which in addition as far as we can see is non falsifiable. So it fails basic Popperian criteria for being a scientific theory. And then even should such a theory of universal grammar be true, there’s a very major issue of transmission. I mean, a lot of non linguists would not terribly be terribly keen to hear that grammar is coded in the genetic code. I think we have enough grammar in our life without having to put up with it in the genes.
Then, since we’re not in a university setting and since most of you are Buddhists, and I checked Pamela does not have a lighter on her, I will throw in my private idea of a possible Buddhist rejoinder to the poverty of stimulus argument. Rejoinder to the poverty of stimulus argument. I think the poverty of stimulus argument is a quandary which can only occur within a strong materialistic reading of the process of acquisition of language. If you have a strong materialistic reading of the process of acquisition of language, there are no previous lives, there are no future lives, structure has to be constructed from birth or maybe even a bit earlier, but certainly not from before the fifth or sixth months of conception, then indeed the poverty of stimulus argument has to be faced full on. Stevenson did some very interesting research, and I quoted his work in your bibliography, Unlearned Language, New Studies in Xenoglossy.
On cases of Xenoglossi, in other words cases where someone who had never learned a language, had no prior exposure to it, actually ended up being familiar with the language and in the case he studied of a young lady, familiar with a level of the German language spoken in 1860 with which she in 1960 and some in The States would have had no means to be familiar with. If Stevenson’s research in this field is corroborated, then we could see how structure would be transmitted from life to life, and then how the poverty of stimulus argument would be obviated. There would be enough remnant linguistic structure received by the child from previous life familiarity either with a Indo European language in general or with the language they spoke specifically to enable a filling up process to occur. Otherwise, we are in the situation of the linguists at present, which is we get to choose between universal grammar and saying that the child is spying on mommy and daddy with binoculars to try to gain extra vocabulary. Both seem improbable.
Now I would like to enter with you into the issue of the degree to which language affects perception and the means which have been used to assess this influence of language on perception. The intuition that the perception of the ancients was different from ours actually is a lot older than most of us realize. We owe it to Gladstone, the English prime minister, who unbeknownst perhaps to most of you was one of the greatest Greek Greek scholars of his age, a Homeric scholar. Gladstone published three gigantic tomes on the Iliad and the Odyssey and engaged in something only a Greek scholar, of his age would do, and keep in mind this was done before the age of computers. He actually went through the Iliad and Odyssey in Greek and counted the adjectives used for colors.
Colors. Now what Glad stone found to his bewilderment is that Homer, is so literate, so articulate, and describes so magnificently the events of the Trojan War, seems for practical purposes to be completely color blind. In the the Iliad and the Odyssey, Homer uses the adjective black, 170 times. He uses the adjective for red 13 times, yellow is used 10 times, blue does not appear. This was so disturbing a discovery that an entire generation of Homeric scholars concluded Homer simply had to be blind.
It really doesn’t fit with everything we know about Homer’s descriptions in the Iliad and the Odyssey, and one would assume had Homer been blind, it would have been reported by the Greek tradition it is not. Yet Homer comes out with the most extraordinary statements. There’s a famous line in the Odyssey in which Homer refers to the wine dark sea. Well, I’ve been in the Mediterranean, I lived there actually, the sea never was the color of wine. And this this excited the imagination of Greek scholars, which launched into all sorts of fancies about the presence of algae and the absence of algae and whatnot.
But literally, this was Homer, the next thing to the Bible for Gladstone. It took a German philologist, Lazarus Geiger, in 1867, to ask the provocative question, Has human sensation, has perception of the senses, a history? Did everything in the human sense organs a thousand years ago function exactly as it does now? It’s a very provocative question, and we can see why it would be when we think that even, for instance, in the Rig Veda, the term blue never appears. If you read the Rig Veda, it is saturated with hymns to the sky and to the sun.
And once again, the color blue is absent. It begs the question. It’s not that the color blue does not exist in Sanskrit. It is absent in the Likewise, in biblical Hebrew, there is no word for blue. So much of the researchers of the nineteenth century then went on a fundamentally forced track at this point, working on the assumption that there had been a development of the eye sense organ or the retina And one ended up with, and this really did happen, I’m not making it up, with ridiculous scenes in 1878 when Nubian, pastoralists were brought.
This is 1878, and it’s in Germany. So I have to set the context because otherwise you will be all of you are postmodern, emancipated Australians. You’ll be very shocked. But Nubian pastoralists were brought brought to Berlin, and where better to host them but the zoo? So they were put up in the zoo, and then anthropologists from the Gesellschaft für Anthropologie went with their little color decks to see whether the Nubians could see the color blue.
You know? To their dismay, they found the Nubians could indeed see the color blue, but had no way of naming it. And the debate pretty much stayed there. Until this is another rather shocking bit of information. Until 1969.
It took one century for two linguists, Brent Berlin and Paul Kay, to publish a book which has revolutionized the understanding of the process of perception of colors. Basic color terms, the universe universality and evolution. And to purely linguistic means, studying 20 languages, informants in 20 languages, what Kay and Berlin determined is that there is a regular and systematic process of generation of the terms for colors in languages independent of the language being used. First terms for black and white arise, then terms for red arise, Then terms either for yellow or green arise, and finally, terms for blue arise. And occasionally in some languages after blue, terms for brown and maroon arise.
Now this answers a question which I had from day one when I started studying Tibetan. Maybe jumping in had the same one. I thought it was very disturbing. All my Tibetan friends very forcefully insisted that the grass was blue. And I found it extremely disturbing, and it destabilized my faith in dictionaries.
It laid led me to wonder what things were like in Tibet. Maybe that’s why they left Tibet. You know? Generally speaking, I couldn’t figure this one out. We have this naive assumption that all the languages share in our color terminology and all the languages actually see colors in the same way.
This is not automatic. Now the Berlin and Kay studies have since been refined, but there is one universal rule which now has been established, which is that in every single language ever studied the term for red always arises after the term for black and white. So primary color perception is perception of black and white, and then obviously comes a color for blood. The color what are the colors with which we have the strongest associations? So this is the first, instance where you can see a possible impact of language upon perception.
We will go into greater detail in this when I’ve covered the two other cases I want to study with you. Perhaps today, we will see whether we have time to enter into the actual issues of translation or not. The second issue I wanted to enter with, with you is the degree to which language conditions our perception of space. Now we tend to assume that our perception of space is, broadly speaking, a given acquired during the first years of childhood. Piaget did many studies on the topic.
And most of us naively assume that the perception of space is an invariant throughout cultures. In the same way as we naively assume that the perception of color is an invariant throughout cultures and languages. It’s actually studies in Australia, made by American anthropologists of the Aborigines, which have demonstrated that this is completely false. It’s an odd thing about Australia that it is the, non Australian scientists who are far more interested in the Aborigines than the Australian scientists. Sad comment on Australia perhaps.
But these two anthropologists, John Haviland and Stephen Levinson, studied the sense of direction among an Aborigine tribe, the Guugu Yimithirr, which live in Queensland. And they found something quite extraordinary, actually. Most of us function with what is called the anthropocentric sense of direction. In other words, when we give directions, we are given with respect to ourselves. So when I speak to you, will say you are sitting in front of me, the whiteboard is to the right, Judy is to the left, and the Buddha is behind me.
And every single one of you will understand fully what I am saying. And this was seen basically until the study of the Guugu Yimithirr by Haviland as a universal feature of language, and perhaps because it was seen as universal feature of language, as something fundamental in the way the perception of space occurred. What was found in the case of the Guugu Yimithirr is that the Guugu Yimithirr, which is a minority of a mere 1,000 at present, only use a geocentric set of coordinates. In other words, when they refer to objects or events, they always give their location in terms of the cardinal coordinates. So I would say that Pamela is to the south of me, the black board the white board is, let’s say, to the West, the Buddha is to the North, and Judy is to the East.
And Judy talking to me would use the same terms. However, the seem to have an innate sense of cardinal direction, irrespective of whether they talk by day or by night, and oddly enough, irrespective of where they are as long as it’s not too far removed from where they originally were brought up. So some were taken by a particularly twisted anthropologist from Queensland to Melbourne and shown the rising sun, and it had an extremely perturbing effect on them because they said in Melbourne, the sun doesn’t rise in the East and demanded to return to Queensland as quickly as possible. Now what is striking here is not that the Guugu Yimithirr should use geocentric coordinates instead of egocentric coordinates. That is a cultural choice, a strange cultural choice by our standards, but it would make sense in the bush.
If you are outside all the time, especially if you never leave the area you were raised in, you would have a very accurate sense of the common directions. What is striking is the impact the language has on perception. Because using the Boas-Jakobson principle, if one wants to speak Guugu Yimithirr, one must know where the cardinal coordinates are at every single instant of one’s waking life. It is impossible to speak otherwise. It’s impossible to give directions.
It’s impossible to define location. This, one would expect, would train extreme acuity to the cardinal coordinates. But what is more striking is that it affects the sense of identity of speakers of Guugu Yimithirr. I look at this table, and I was raised, as an English and French speaker in languages which use, anthropocentric or egocentric coordinates, I see my cup to the right and I see the clock to the left. And when I turn around the table, because I am functioning with egocentric coordinates, I automatically factor out the process of rotation.
From the standpoint not of his own perception of them, but of the cardinal directions. And this is so far reaching that, in a rather amusing anecdote, one of the as always, the grammars in the dictionaries of the primitive languages are composed by missionaries. Our debt is a debt to the missionaries. The first major dictionary of Tibetan was composed by a Moravian missionary, Jäschke. It’s the same thing with Guugu Yimithirr.
The first dictionary was composed by Schwarz, a Lutheran missionary. So Schwarz had a Guugu Yimithirr servant who was sent on an errand in a boat. And when he came back, the boat capsized, and he barely survived, being eaten by a shark. And when he recounted the experience to John Haveland some thirty, forty years later, Haveland was flawed to see that the description this indigenous servant of Schwarz gave of the location, the geocentric location of every part of the boat in the shark matched perfectly that given by another one of the persons on the boat who had capsized as well. So the geocentric coordinates had become part of the mnemonic process.
And this leads us directly to something which, I will perhaps only allude to here, which is the impact spatial metaphors have on our perception of time. Time is extremely difficult to represent, but typically we visualize time in a function of something else. And we all seem to take for granted that we have this vector based image of time. A current horizontal line going in a certain direction with events located on this time. We’re actually using to visualize time spatial metaphors in that context.
Now what has been found out very recently, it’s actually a study in cognitive psychology from 02/2001 in your bibliography, is that whereas most speakers of Indo European languages overwhelmingly refer to time in terms of horizontal spatial metaphors, speakers of Mandarin Chinese refer to time in terms of vertical metaphors. And we find the same thing in Tibetan. The terms and in Tibetan means above. It also means formerly, previously. In Tibetan means below.
Actually, in Tibetan it also means later. These were terms I found very difficult to acquire when I learned Tibetan. Because Tibetan does use the horizontal metaphors for time, but classical Tibetan privileges the vertical metaphors for time in keeping with Mandarin Chinese. In the case of Mandarin, one might wonder whether it is connected with the way in which characters are written, But that certainly doesn’t apply to Tibetan. So this is another case where we have a very powerful influence of language upon core perceptions.
And the final issue I would like to address, and perhaps we will talk of translation as a hermeneutical and doctrinal choice some other time, I think we will all get dizzy otherwise, is the impact the gender of nouns in languages which have gender and which differentiate, in gender has upon perception. And this is quite extraordinary. As English speakers, we function on the assumption I should first perhaps clarify what gender is grammatically. So in grammar, gender does not refer to exclusively the male female distinction or male female neutral distinction with which we are accustomed. Gender is just a means of classifying categories of words.
So in some languages like French, we have two genders, male and female, which are marked on pronouns, on nouns, adjectives, and even on past participles. In other languages like German, have three genders, male, female, and neutral. But there are many languages in which the gender marker does not refer to sex actually, but to the category of the object. For instance, in many African languages, there is a gender for vegetables. When you have when you talk of a vegetable, you put at the end of the noun referring to the vegetable a particle indicating it’s of the vegetable gender.
This is very helpful in the Aristotelian for Pamela, typologies of the phenomenal world. The problem is gender, like the golem, gets a life of its own. So it starts by making sense. Men are male, women are female, and then there is a process of extension which occurs. So the language takes a life of its own, and gender is applied through homophony, the noun ends in the in a vowel, therefore it will be in the female gender even though there’s no terrible reason, also a process of association.
So this is a reason for which in one of the Australian Aboriginal languages, planes actually, airplanes, are of the gender of vegetables. And this goes to confirm the opinion of most Australians that the aborigines really fell on their head. Until you understand the process which led to this, the Aboriginal language concerned has a gender category for vegetables, and this gender category is applied by extension to trees. Now from trees, this gender category is applied to canoes, which are made from trees. And then quite naturally, when the society encounters airplanes, airplanes perform the same function as canoes, therefore airplanes belong to the vegetable gender.
This is how planes end up by being by being courgettes. However, what is striking is not this process whereby gender is extended to phenomena, so much as the impact those languages actually have on the perceptions of those who speak them. And here, as English speakers, and I must say, those of us who speak Tibetan, we are at a definite disadvantage because English and Tibetan do not mark gender, generally speaking, on inanimate objects. Classical Tibetan marked gender could mark gender on certain nouns such as dog. Kyi becomes Kyimo.
It’s not necessary, but it can be marked. It’s generally not marked on inanimate objects. So, for the English speaker, the physical world is asexual. It’s inanimate and asexual. You’ll be As of now, ships are also asexual.
It’s a decision of Lloyds. Oh, by Lloyds? By Lloyds. It caused a furious email, which I cannot even begin to report to you from a Greek ship owner, which made a lot of very derogatory comments on Englishman as lovers. But basically, as English speakers, we refer to the totality of the physical world as neutral.
You’ll be delighted to learn that French, Italian, and Spanish speakers see the physical world as sexualized. So I was looking at, the wall yesterday, and I noticed that the door female in French was gently and delicately swinging into the wall. Masculine in French. In the French language, my door is female and my wall is masculine. And some Russian scientists decided to test what impact this had on association and connotation in 1915.
Now, in Russian, the days of the week are either masculine or feminine. So what they did was they tested free association on the basis of the days of the week without telling the subjects what they were testing. And they found actually that an overwhelming proportion of native Russian speakers associated the days of the week which are masculine with bearded, intimidating figures, and the days of the week which were feminine in gender with sensitive and thoughtful figures. Now, this experiment fell into oblivion basically until one of the foremost researchers in the field, and I I really gave her large exposure in the bibliography, Lera Boroditsky, investigated the impact of gender in languages which have gender on the perception of phenomena. And she specifically found that Spanish speakers and French speakers, both languages, are languages in which every phenomenon is genderfied, has gender, but both languages are languages in which the genders differ.
Actually, the Spanish and German speakers, excuse me. Associated different qualities to the objects they perceived when they were interrogated in English in a function of their mother tongue. So for instance, in German, brooks, in German bridges are female. It’s in German. In Spanish, bridges are male.
It’s When interrogated native German speakers and native Spanish speakers about the qualities of bridges in English, The German speakers said that bridges were delicate, gracile, and often fragile things. And the Spanish speakers said that bridges were large, looming, ugly structures. Now, this study was made in 02/2003, so it’s not exactly, you know, ancient. But it raises fundamental questions. Because Spanish and German speakers who speak gendered language languages, who are raised in gendered languages, are being interrogated in a third language, English.
In English phenomena are neutral, inanimate phenomena are neutral. And yet, the speakers of those two two languages cannot escape the chain of associations which was imprinted in their minds by their native tongue. This is this is halting. It seems to imply that grammatical gender is a network of associations which functions as a jail from which we cannot escape. And then the obvious is is obviously true that an English speaker who sees the entire material world as it would, I mean, I’m gonna take a big, you know, inductive leap here, be, and I’m sure you don’t recognize yourselves in this, a much more pragmatic, materialistic, unemotive, somewhat insensitive, common sense sort of type.
Good for commerce. Good for commerce. You said it. I didn’t say it. Good for commerce.
Good for commerce. So I think what these three topics introduce, color, space, and gender, and I I will stop here for today, is a notion of deep conceptuality. In other words, the idea that language, which is acquired, extends downward into the process of perception itself. How far down is something which is open to question. But one of the handouts I gave to you, it’s just a recent report in Nature Neuroscience, is quite haunting in this respect.
It shows that the perception of color, prior perception of color, extends into present perception of an object. A team in Germany which exposed a series of subjects who had seen bananas before, I’m sure all Germans have seen bananas, to gray images of bananas and ask them to correct the color of the gray image of the banana showed to them so that it was a perfect neutral gray. So far, good. It’s a simple experiment. What they found to their great surprise is that systematically the subjects over colored the levels of gray to such a degree that it would compensate for a banana’s appearing to be yellow.
It’s a clear indication that past memories of the yellowness of the banana carry on into present perception of the shape of a gray banana and lead when the subject is given the possibility to a correction which clearly indicates this. Then how far deep conceptuality extends is an open question. What I’ve chosen to call here deep conceptuality in a Buddhist context would be called imputation. This is a process of imputation at work. Not in the Sattrantika sense, limited sense of conceptuality, but in a far deeper sense of conceptuality, which I think we only begin to start to understand.
Now, and I will perhaps stop with this for today, whether we have on the basis of this and further research to turn ourselves more towards a Svatāntrika-Mādhyamika vision in which phenomena would seem to have some type of own characteristics on which imputation occurs or whether we have to orient ourselves towards a Prāsaṇgika viewpoint in which phenomena have no basis under ultimate investigation by an ultimate reasoning consciousness, that I think some cognitive science research will help us with. What we have talked about today, however, I think shows to you quite clearly that to translate is to betray. That even if you translate every every single word a teacher teaches, it will be impossible to translate to start with the realm of connotation. And depending on the language you are translating from, the language you are translating to, there are unformulated connotations which are semantically linked, which may be linked in Tibetan to honorific structure or evidentiality, which may be linked in French or German to the presence of gender, which are impossible to convey. Thank you very much.
There’s time for questions. Perhaps we’ve got time for a quick question. Yes Pamela. It beats kindling no end. How?
It beats kindling no end. Yeah, it does. Well, some of this, some of those, I think it’s a classic case of being trapped in the paradigm, isn’t it? Yeah. And then challenging the paradigm is too threatening, so one just creates these constructs which, at a certain point, are incredible, aren’t they?
I I I really I can’t say I look forward to hearing about Joe Joe’s early childhood. Sorry. On that note, sorry, Richard. So, to further the welfare of the center and to increase its activities, Rinpoche thought it was good for the students to assemble here and to talk about their studies and their topics of interest, and he’s very glad this has occurred. And which he would be very glad if in the future we could assemble in this way from time to time.
But you think there is real benefit in this process of connecting what we have studied with our practice and linking our lives with our practice. He hopes this will continue in the future and that we will continue to be able to connect our studies and experiences with our practice. Rinpoche is particularly happy that we have had this symposium in which the Western Weltanschauung, the scientific viewpoint, and the Tibetan viewpoint have been put in parallel and compared. He thinks there is huge benefit in this. And Rinpoche himself was not able to attend, these teachings, but he’s very glad that we all assembled and engaged in these discussions.
And Rinpoche is very happy that the instructors were able to talk about the topics they had studied and hopes this will continue and they will come again in the future. And Rinpoche hopes that next year we will continue to be able to have such a meeting where those who have improved themselves are able to talk a little bit about these topics. He thinks there will be great benefit. We’ll have some time for a cup of tea and a wee break.
Key terms in this teaching
- lamrim
- The graduated path. A presentation of Shakyamuni Buddha’s teachings in a form suitable for the step-by-step training of a disciple. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- shamatha zhi nä (Tib)
- Calm abiding; a state of concentration in which the mind is able to abide steadily, without effort and for as long as desired, on an object of meditation. There are nine stages in its development. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.