TBI Recordings

1 h 8 min · 3,236 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 68-minute session, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen explores a central debate in Cittamātra philosophy: how many collections of consciousness exist in the mind? The school asserts eight, rejecting positions that claim either six, nine, or only one. Gyaltsen systematically presents competing arguments: the nine-consciousness view posits an extra permanent consciousness apprehending the four noble truths; the one-consciousness view argues the five sensory consciousnesses are merely variations of mental consciousness, illustrated by the analogy of a house with five windows but one soldier. He counters the latter by showing sensory consciousness cannot apprehend past, future, or subtle objects as the mental consciousness does. The second half focuses on a deep logical puzzle Gyaltsen develops through close questioning: in deep sleep, if the afflicted mind apprehends the ālaya vijnana as a self, must there also be a separate mind apprehending that self as permanent? If so, that consciousness fits none of the eight categories, potentially collapsing Cittamātra’s framework. The discussion is technical and pitched at practitioners with sustained engagement in Buddhist logic and epistemology.

File metadata (for organising)

File: 21112017 Cittamātra.mp3

UUID: 98f2d4e6-576f-4eb6-971e-51ca4ac47367

Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen

Collection: Cittamātra

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~3,228

So within the fourfold divisions of the text on Cittamātra, which we are studying, the first subdivision is the definitions. The second are the proofs of the existence of the ālaya vijnana. And the third is an important topic, which is demonstrating that there are neither less nor more collections of consciousness. Some schools of tenets assert the existence of nine collections of consciousness. Others assert the existence of only one collection of consciousness.

Now, Cittamātra asserts existence of eight and only eight collections of consciousness. So, obviously, the position of six collections of consciousness is rejected by Cittamātra, which asserts eight collections of consciousness. And Cittamātra does not consider that the ālaya vijnana or the kliṣṭamanas, the mind basis of all, or the afflicted mind, are part of the mental consciousness, or even for that matter, a subtle mental consciousness. No one is outside. Why don’t we turn the AC off in the foyer?

To save money, right? So if we’re not gonna use it, then it is something which is empty of being able to perform a function. We have a distinction between what is able to perform a function, what is empty of being able to perform a function. TBI need to. We have to preserve money for TBI.

Right? So when we speak of the six collections of consciousness, we are not referring here to ordinary consciousness, and the English term is very misleading. Six collections of consciousness is Vijñāna in Sanskrit. This refers to the main minds, as opposed to mental factors which are countless in number. So as you know, Abhidharma Samuchaya, Asaṇga’s Abhidharma Samuchaya lists 51 mental factors, and Vinaya lists 71 mental factors, but in reality they are countless.

However, the question is how many categories of main minds there are? That is what the debates on the greater or lesser number of collections of consciousness hinges on. So this abuts on the topic of minds and mental factors, which is a difficult topic. Geshe-la will be covering it next year in the context of his teachings on Lorig, awareness and cognition. And from your side, if you put effort, then you will be able to understand these topics.

And then after explaining Lorig or Buddhist psychology, Geshe-la will teach Buddha nature next year. So there is in the this the context of this debate, no debate regarding the number of sensory consciousnesses or sensory main minds. There are only five. The five sensory consciousnesses. The question is, is there only one mental consciousness or are there multiple subtle forms thereof?

So now regarding the assertion of the school’s teaching existence of nine collections of consciousness. These schools teach that in addition to the eight collections of consciousness of Cittamātra, there is a ninth collection of consciousness, which is known as stainless consciousness or stainless main minds. And these stainless consciousnesses have as object the four noble truths. In other words, probably what is meant here is emptiness, and they would be permanent by nature. Then the root text teaches that for this school, apart from the ālaya vijnana, there is therefore a ninth consciousness, a ninth main mind, which is the stainless consciousness focused on the four noble truths whose nature is permanent.

And this position is countered by stating that all consciousnesses within main minds and mental factors are necessary necessarily functioning phenomena. And all such functioning phenomena are necessarily impermanent. So this school seems to be saying that there is a common locus between functioning phenomena and permanent phenomena, which is not possible. Then the teacher of the teacher of this position was a Sanskrit scholar whose name is Acharya and I have only the Tibetan name. So this position of the existence of nine collections of consciousness is expounded by the Chinese-Korean scholar, actually Woncheuk, in the so-called great commentary on the Then the other position, the position of those who assert a single collection of consciousness is a very elegant one. They say that there is only one collection of consciousness, the mental consciousness.

And that the five sensory consciousness are merely a diversification of the mental consciousness when it interacts with the five sensory organs. So the example which is given is a very cute one. Let us take the example of a house with five windows. In this house, there’s only one soldier. But outside, at each window, there is a soldier.

Then each of the outside soldiers thinks he’s seeing one soldier, therefore they think they are seeing five soldiers. So This position is actually supported by a lot of sutras such as the smaller perfection of wisdom sūtra. Do you understand? So the propounders of one consciousness. There’s only one consciousness, the mental consciousness.

And then when one debates the school and says, but what about the five sensory consciousnesses? They say, oh, well, this is just a diversification of the mental consciousness when it proceeds outwards to the sense organs. Then when our system tries to counter this position, it points out that there are defects or faults with this position, and one of the major faults is the following one. This school asserts that all so called five sensory consciousnesses, in actuality, are the mental consciousness. Then we would say to those who have this position, in that case, the visual consciousness, for instance, should be able to apprehend the past, the future, and subtle objects, since after all, this is what the mental consciousness is able to do.

Yet sensory consciousnesses can only apprehend present objects. Have you understood the way by which the Chittamatrans counter the position of the propounders of one consciousness. Then obviously, Cittamātra considers that its own presentation with eight collections of consciousness is faultless. But there are faults with the Cittamātra position. For instance, after all Prāsaṇgika does not assert eight collections of consciousness.

And do you remember the faults Geshe-la brought up last time? So as you remember, Cittamātra asserts eight collections of consciousness, and says that there is no main mind which cannot be included within these eight collections of consciousness. Obviously, other schools of tenets, such as Sautrāntika or the Mādhyamika schools of tenets, assert six collections of consciousness. Now can we think of consciousnesses which cannot be included within the eight collections of consciousness of Cittamātra? The matured consciousness is not the ālaya vijnana.

It might be the same substantial continuum, but it is not The eight the matured consciousness is part of the substantial continuum of the ālaya vijnana. So the matured consciousness, you remember, appears at the level of the eighth ground for a practitioner on the Mahāyāna path, and it appears otherwise for Hinayanists in the mind stream of an Arhat. So set that aside, from your own standpoint, is there a consciousness which doesn’t fit within these eight? Are you a quick one? So I actually I’ve had a question about this.

So science can recognize 20 or more sense consciousnesses and I was wondering if the sense consciousness such as heat or a sense of balance and so forth, these are considered to be sense consciousnesses and I’m wondering if they are main minds or mental factors And if they are main minds, then that would mean that there are more than eight collections of consciousness. Those are mental factors, right? There’s many many mental factors. Mental factors in main minds are different, aren’t they? It’s hard to evaluate the number of mental factors.

So as was explained, the mind basis of all is the instance of the person. And when in dependence on this mind basis of all, the thought that this mind basis of all is autonomous and truly existent arises at that point one can say that the afflicted mind has arisen. But the question is, what about the apprehension of one’s own permanence? So then in deep sleep, or in the state a state of coma when one has fainted, Cittamātra, as you remember, asserts that the six collections of consciousness have disappeared. But nonetheless asserts that the afflicted mind is still present.

Now the question which arises is what is the mode of existence of this afflicted mind in deep sleep? And in addition, what is the mode of existence of the apprehension of one’s own permanence apprehending one’s own permanence in deep sleep? These are these are Geshe-la’s doubts. Right? Do you understand them?

So Cittamātra asserts we’re we’re speaking of Cittamātra here. Cittamātra asserts the existence of the afflicted mind, the kliṣṭamanas, in deep sleep. Then what is its mode of existence? How does it exist? So what’s the reason for which the afflicted mind exists within our continuum in deep sleep?

You have to think by yourselves, right? What’s the mode of existence of the afflicted mind? The absence of wisdom and when you’re talking about the afflictions, you’ve talked about desire and The afflicted mind, Afflicted mind. Okay. Well, I’d say ignorance is the cause of The afflicted mind is not ignorance, but it does have ignorance.

So in deep sleep, as you know, the ālaya vijnana is present, then the afflicted mind is present, and the afflicted mind is none other than the the apprehension of a self, but we’re talking here of a subtle apprehension of a self, or the apprehension of a subtle self. So Could its existence be inferential? I’m thinking back to the example of when we inferred that we have a retina by the means of seeing and having a visual consciousness, then when we wake up in the mornings and we can think I had a good night’s sleep or I didn’t have a good night’s sleep, that presence of that I, with that presence we infer that there was the kliṣṭamanas during deep sleep. I’m just wondering if perhaps the afflicted mind is somehow connected to the breath, and sort of rides in some way on the breath and that’s its mode of existence during sleep. Those are very, very coarse minds.

Okay. Isn’t the I always there? That’s the way to look at this one. Geshe explained this, you’re gonna forget, right? Geshe-la explained already that this issue of the subtle I, but you forgot.

So at the last instant of the path of preparation, in other words, at the last instant of the fourth subdivision of the path of preparation, which is supreme Dharma, when the mind is single pointedly focused on an insight on emptiness. Nonetheless, as Geshe-la explained, there does remain a sense of subtle I. Even though one is meditating on emptiness, there is a subtle apprehension of the self of persons. Then obviously, at the first instant of the path of seeing, the afflictive mind ceases. And therefore in deep sleep, this is how the apprehension of the ālaya vijnana as established as a self is present.

In other words, how the afflictive mind is present. And if we can say that such an afflictive mind is present, we can also say that the apprehension of permanence, apprehending this ālaya vijnana as permanent is present. How’s it going? So in deep sleep, the apprehension of the as established as a self, which is the afflicted mind, is present. And if that is present, we can say that an innate apprehension of the permanence of that I is present.

So this is where the debates on the eight collections of consciousness abut, right? In Cittamātra. So we’ve become scholars in the Cittamātra view. So the debate is as follows. So the debate is as follows.

The six collections of consciousness’s presentation is inappropriate because it is only in the context of the eight collections of consciousness that such mind can be posited. So the afflicted mind is an apprehension of the alia vijnana as established to the self. Right? Then that it is not the alia vijnana has already been determined. So what is this mind?

I don’t know if could go ahead. Is it a ninth collection of consciousness? Wondering if you’re making a distinction between the mind, the kliṣṭamanas that apprehends the ālaya vijnana as a self and the mind that apprehends that self as permanent as being two separate minds. And what? Sorry.

And the mind that apprehends that self as being permanent as two separate minds. Is that the debate? So we all agree that in deep sleep there exists an afflicted mind which apprehends the as established as a self. Then if we say that, we can say that there exists an innate apprehension of the permanence of that self. Now what is that?

It’s not the ālaya vijnana and it’s not the afflicted mind. Which means it is a ninth mind. It can be said to exist. Are you think about it? Is this just Geshe-la’s way of looking at it?

It should exist. So Cittamātra analyzes cognition. Then in deep sleep, there are only two consciousnesses which are present. The ālaya vijnana and the kliṣṭamanas according to Cittamātra. So the ālaya vijnana is the object of the kliṣṭamanas which sees the ālaya vijnana as established as itself.

But if such a kliṣṭamanas exists, then it is possible to say that an innate apprehension of the permanence of the alia vijnana exists, and that is neither of the two. Couldn’t that innate apprehension be equated to the wrong view that’s one of the mental factors of the afflicted mind? No, that’s a good point, but it can’t. It can’t because the modes of apprehension of, on the one hand, the afflicted mind which apprehends the ālaya vijnana as established as a self, and on the other hand, the apprehension of permanence which apprehends the ālaya vijnana as permanent are different. With the apprehension of the I as inherently existent, it twin with the apprehension of permanence and so couldn’t it be argued that the apprehension of the self as inherently existent is inextricably linked to the apprehension of permanence so they can both come from the afflicted mind?

No, they can’t. They cannot be included in the afflicted mind. They have different aspects. It doesn’t behoove us to demonstrate the authenticity or the validity of the Cittamātra view since after all if we succeeded, Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika would also have to assert eight collections of consciousness, which it doesn’t. Right?

So, Well, since we study Cittamātra at present, it is important to understand what is and what is not the case inside Cittamātra. That does not mean that we have to adopt Cittamātra as our own position, nor should we. But we can endorse the idea of a subtle mind without accepting all of its characteristics according to Cittamātra. So when you attain a fully characterized, calm abiding, all sense consciousnesses that you know have ceased. Nonetheless, one can say that there does exist an apprehension of permanence.

It can exist. So Cittamātra asserts that in deep sleep, an ālaya vijnana, a mind basis of all exists. How? Because there is always a subtle sense of the inherently existing I. That is the afflicted mind, right?

So this is very difficult topic Geshe-la is bringing up with with you because basically, when we differentiate easily between the eye, the subtle I, which is basically the ālaya vijnana, and the apprehension of a self of persons. In theory, in reality, when we check within our mind stream, is very difficult to make the differentiation between these two. In addition, since Cittamātra teaches the selflessness of phenomena in deep sleep, in addition to the existence of an apprehension of the self of persons, there can also be posited an apprehension of the self of phenomena. So suddenly we have a lot of main minds not included within the eight, right? Are you starting to understand some of these doubts?

Or are you all thinking? Geshe-la explained all this for one year now. So at present So at present on these topics, what are your questions? Just wanted to, I’ve got a question but also a clarification. Just, I’m just wondering if I misheard an early statement tonight which could you just check if I got this right?

The Cittamātra does not assert that the ālaya vijnana or the afflicted mind are part of the mental consciousness. So did I write that down correctly? I didn’t say that. Okay, so could I get the correct interpretation of what that was? What did you write down?

I wrote down Cittamātra does not assert that the ālaya vijnana or the afflicted mind are part of the mental consciousness. And then I went, oh why did I write that down? I had a question. Both are consciousnesses, right? Yeah that’s what I thought.

That’s why I had a question mark next to it. It’s a mistake. Yeah. Both are consciousnesses. Yeah, okay.

So that wasn’t my question. My question actually is about this Korean lama who asserted the nine consciousnesses adding the stainless consciousness and saying it was the object was the four noble truths or emptiness. Was his assertion that it’s like an innate mind, like a Buddha nature, that extra consciousness? Well, from the standpoint of Cittamātra, this ninth collection of consciousness is non existent. Because cittamatra says on the one hand, you say it is permanent.

On the other hand, you say it is an effective phenomenon. No such thing exists. It doesn’t exist. Yes, understand that from Cittamātra’s point of view they would totally argue against that but from the lama’s point of view, was he asserting this extra consciousness as a type of Buddha nature because of the fact that it was permanent? So Woncheuk himself did not assert the existence of nine collections of consciousness.

He asserted the coexistence of eight collections of consciousness, but he explains in his commentary the view of those Indian scholars who asserted a ninth collection of consciousness. Could it be that there was interaction between these levels of consciousness such that something emerged, therefore not increasing the number or decreasing but just as a person’s consciousness becomes less afflicted or that there is a conjoinment. So when you said that there is a sense of self that persists in deep sleep, well if a person was enlightened they wouldn’t be sleeping and so there could be something to do with if one progresses, things come together. They unify. I’m gonna hand the mic.

So even though one attains higher grounds and paths, and eventually for enlightenment, there is no more than the eight collections of consciousness according to Cittamātra. So we will now do the recitations, and then generate the motivation. Please open the prayer book page one. We recite one B, two, three, four, and a page five. Number six, my offering.

Verse one and three. So the topic of debate or discussion for tonight is the following. In deep sleep, as you know, the ālaya vijnana is present. The mind basis of all is present. And therefore, the afflicted mind of which it is the object is present as well.

If the afflicted mind is present, then the mind which apprehends the permanence of this afflicted mind must be present too. Then that mind is neither the ālaya vijnana nor the afflicted mind, does this mean that the system of the eight collections of consciousness collapses. If you can’t in pairs, three maximum.

Key terms in this teaching

buddha nature sugatagarbha, tathagatagarbha (Skt); desheg nyingpo, dezhin shegpe nyingpo (Tib)
The clear light nature of mind possessed by all sentient beings; the potential for all sentient beings to become enlightened by removing the two obscurations: to liberation and omniscience. LYWA
Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
four noble truths denpa zhi (Tib)
The subject of the Buddha's first turning of the wheel of Dharma. The truths of suffering, the origin of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path to the cessation of suffering as seen by an arya. LYWA
lorig
Awareness and knowledge, the study of mind and mental factors, in order to understand and control the delusions. LYWA
mental factors chaita (Skt); sem jung (Tib)
Literally arising from the mind, a mental factor is a cognition that apprehends an attribute of its object and accompanies any principal consciousness that is concordant with it. LYWA
mind basis of all alayavijana (Skt); kun zhi nam shä (Tib)
A main consciousness posited by the Cittamatra school, the consciousness they say is needed to carry karmic imprints. LYWA
path of preparation prayoga-marga (Skt); jor lam (Tib)
The second of the five paths leading to buddhahood. LYWA
principal consciousness vijnana (Skt); nam shë (Tib)
The main cognition posited by means of apprehending the entity of its object. Synonymous with main mind, it is one of the two divisions of mind, the other being mental factors. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

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