TBI Recordings

1 h 13 min · 3,220 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 73-minute talk, Kyabje Rinpoche emphasizes that authentic Buddhism rests not on ritual or recitation but on reasoned understanding that the person is impermanent and lacks permanent independence. He then builds to explain Cittamātra, the Mind-Only school of Mahāyāna Buddhism, which rejects truly established exterior objects while asserting other-powered phenomena are truly established. The talk proceeds systematically: how Cittamātra differs from lower schools (Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika) and Mādhyamika; how karmic imprints in the Alaya Vijñāna generate all appearances without external objects existing; how this distinguishes composite phenomena from emptiness. The final half features extensive student Q&A, with practitioners pressing hard on apparent contradictions—particularly how something can be both non-existent and truly established. For those with prior Buddhist philosophical study.

File metadata (for organising)

File: 28022017cittamatra.mp3

UUID: a4f8f491-240b-4bb1-b80c-08a586051e76

Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche

Collection: Cittamātra

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~3,230

Oh. So we spoke last time of propounders of tenets, and in this context, it is very helpful to reflect on what is meant by the establishment of tenets, in Tibetan. Now here when we speak of the establishment of tenets, we are not referring to one’s goal or one’s philosophy, if you prefer in worldly affairs. Instead, the establishment of tenets refers to what goes beyond this life, after this life. What counters this life, and we have to ask ourselves in this context, do I have such an establishment of tenets or not?

In other words, an establishment of tenets certainly from a Buddhist standpoint is a path to liberation. Then once we understand this, we can ask ourselves, is this present within my mind stream or not? So here, what in terms of philosophy or establishment of the view is the boundary between Buddhists and non Buddhists? It is the assertion or the rejection of a person’s being permanent one and independent. Non Buddhists assert a permanent a person being permanent one and independent.

Buddhists assert the emptiness or the absence of a person being permanent one and independent. And here as a person’s being empty of being permanent one and independent is difficult to understand, it is easier to formulate it in the following terms. A Buddhist is, or an authentic Buddhist, is someone who asserts that the experience of of pleasant and unpleasant sensations, in other words, a person, is impermanent. As soon as one has asserted that, it is a logical deduction of this, that such an entity is also not one and not independent. This is explicitly stated by Je Tsongkhapa in his Praise of Dependent Origination, Ten Nyid Topa, in which he states that the distinction between these two scholars hinges precisely on whether or not one accepts the emptiness of a person being permanent one and independent.

Buddhists accept the emptiness, non Buddhists do not. Then this is a fundamental concept. I would like to think all of you have studied tenets,, and therefore, is something you must keep in mind. We are studying the Cittamātra view. Then to understand the Cittamātra view, we must understand the establishment of the Buddhist view.

Now here, to be a Buddhist, Nangpa in Tibet, in other words, an insider, an authentic Buddhist, it is not sufficient to recite one’s commitments or to recite mantra. As Je Tsongkhapa makes clear in his praise of dependent origination, it hinges on the establishment of the view. So here, the I, the person, in other words, if you prefer the experiencer of pleasant and unpleasant sensations or alternatively, the experiencer of the maturation of pleasant, of virtuous and non virtuous karma is impermanent. Now, why it is impermanent, what is meant by it’s being impermanent, this is something which calls for analysis. There is no person apart from the aggregates and therefore, when we posit the person on the basis of what is clear, what is undifferentiated, we are actually positing the person on the basis of mind.

Whereas, when we posit the person on the basis of going and coming, walking, then we are positing it on the basis of the body. Now we can also say of someone he is old. In that case, the person is posited on the basis of white hair on the body aggregate, Or this person is tall, then that is posited on the basis of a long body. He is short. He is fat.

Now, most fundamental distinction is that between girls and boys or men and women, that is posited exclusively on the basis of the physical aggregate. Men and women have the same hands, hands, legs. The difference is posited only in terms of genitalia. Today I have been to the beach. No, no, no, for example, I’m going to the market.

So basically then, whether you go downtown or you go to the beach, in every single case, the I is posited on the basis of the aggregates which are moving. There is no I or no person apart or independently of these aggregates. Then if you insist on positing an I which is independent of the aggregates, in keeping with the famous verse of Je Tsongkhapa in Lekshe Nyingpo, the propounder of tenets which are at odds with reason is not suitable to be a speaker who is a valid cognizer.

At that point, one has nothing to answer to you, one just smiles at you, beams at you and recites mantra saying, yes, yes, very good. Therefore, in keeping with this line of propounders of tenets which are contradictory with reason are not beings who are valid cognizers. And also in keeping with the verse of Āryadeva from this Chatuhshataka, the 400, the sharp ones, those of sharp acumen should strive, one defines the trainees for teaching such as these. So, regarding the person, in other words, the experiencer of pleasant and unpleasant sensations, it should be self evident that it is one and not many.. It’s only one person who experiences things, even though when we look at the way in which we experience things, it appears under a variety of guises.

Now here, it is extremely important to be mindful of the fact that it is not because phenomena appear in a certain way, that they are truly established in the way in which they appear. And this was made very clear in ancient India by great pundits such as Ārya Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Dignāgā, Dharmakīrti who investigated carefully whether things appear to them as they were or not. None of us in this room, I think, can say that things actually exist in the way in which they appear to us. This is not something which you will be able to ascertain through thinking about it for one day, for one week, or one month, or even one year. It will take a very long time to gain this realization.

In ancient India, the great beings such as had to study alone, because that is what was available at that period, gained this ascertainment. Nowadays, we have numerous other means to do this, but it is not something which will dawn likely in your minds. I suspect many of you feel that it sort of happens in one week like that. Our teacher Buddha Śākyamūni practiced for three countless eons to gain the state of full enlightenment. This is not something which happens quickly or easily.

And therefore, when we reflect on the nature of the person, the fact that the person is impermanent, it is important to be clear in our minds that there aren’t two persons. I mean, would be very odd if there were two persons. Let us say one person which was impermanent and somehow the other person was permanent. That would be very strange. So think like this.

So here therefore, the emptiness of the persons being permanent, one, and independent is critical for the establishment of the Buddhist view. Initially, one must understand the persons being impermanent. Ideally, one would understand through a valid cognizer that the person is impermanent, but if this is not possible, then at the very least, one must gain an understanding, a profound understanding that the person is impermanent, and this is an understanding which is rooted in reason and reasonings not merely a statement of the person is impermanent. I don’t believe that such a statement qualifies. And then on this basis one proceeds.

One must, for this to become a Buddhist view, be able to formulate it in terms of basis, path, and result. Once based on a reason, one is able to demonstrate to one’s satisfaction that the person is impermanent. One is probably a Buddhist and not just a Buddhist, but a Buddhist by tenets. And at this point, having established the view, one must be able to present the base, what is the base, the path, what is the path, and the result, what the result is. At this point, such a being would become a person who is a propounder of Buddhist tenets.

Persons who are propounders of Buddhist tenets can be subdivided into two. Persons who are propounders of Hīnayāna tenets and persons who are propounders of Mahāyāna tenets. The difference between the two is that persons who are propounders of Hīnayāna tenets assert the existence of exterior objects which are truly established, whereas persons who are propounders of Mahāyāna tenets do not assert the existence of exterior objects which are truly established. So here it is important to understand what the establishment of Buddhist views come from. Broadly speaking, there are four Buddhist views, and it is important to be able to define them.

So within the propounders of the Mahāyāna view, we find the propounders of Cittamātra. And here, it is very helpful to reflect on the fact that since Chittamatrans are propounders of the Mahāyāna view, was explained, they necessarily do not accept the existence of exterior objects. Is that sufficient to make someone a Chitamatran? No. Something else, something extra is required.

What is that? One has to add something to this and what does one add? There are three possibilities. One can either say one can either add and a propounder of tenets who accepts that consciousness is truly established or one can add and a propounder of tenets who accepts that reflexive cognizers are truly established, or one can add and a propounder of tenets who accepts that other powered phenomena are truly established. One does not necessarily have to add the second option since reflexive cognizers are a difficult topic.

So therefore, Chitamatrans are propounders of Mahāyāna tenets. As propounders of Mahāyāna tenets, they do not accept exterior objects, whereas the lowest schools of tenets, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, accept the existence of exterior objects. So at this point, we get a clear sense of what Cittamātra is. Now what is the distinction between Cittamātra and Mādhyamika, between the propounders of Mahāyāna schools of tenets? Both do not accept exterior objects, but Cittamātra to separate or distinguish itself from Mādhyamika asserts that other powered phenomena are truly established, other powered phenomena are truly established, and Mādhyamika to distinguish itself from Cittamātra asserts that composite phenomena are not truly established.

There are therefore two possible definitions of a Chittamatran. The first definition is a Chittamatran is a propounder of Mahāyāna tenets who does not accept the existence of exterior objects and accepts that reflexive consciousnesses are truly established. The second definition is a Chittamatran is a propounder of Mahāyāna tenets who does not accept that exterior objects are truly established and accepts that other powered phenomena are truly established. Both definitions are synonymous. So what is the purpose or the rationale of Cittamātra school?

It is to provide a foundation or a base for seeds, karmic imprints, and some of you mentioned memories. Why not? So what is the Cittamātra position to the difference of the lower schools of tenets, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, which assert the existence of exterior objects. Cittamātra says that exterior objects, in other words, the objects of the five senses do not exist. Nonetheless, they do appear.

How is this possible? Because they arise as appearances through the exhaustion of the karmic imprints which are implanted in the Alaya Vijñāna. So therefore, according to Cittamātra, everything which appears to us, appears as the dawning of the potency of the karmic imprints within our minds. Now where are these karmic imprints? They are not outside, they are within our minds, and away within our minds, within the mind basis of all the Alaya Vijñāna.

Therefore, for Cittamātra, the Alaya Vijñāna is the person. Now, Cittamātra, as was explained, asserts that there are no exterior objects. At the same time, Cittamātra teaches that composite phenomena, in other words, other powered phenomena are truly established. Why are they said to be truly established? Because they arise in dependence on causes and conditions.

This means according to the Cittamātra, that they cannot be made or imputed by the mind, in as much as they arise from causes and conditions. Nothing else is meant by the fact that composite phenomena or other-powered phenomena are truly established in Cittamātra. Now regarding the second nature, thoroughly established phenomena, Parinishpanna in Sanskrit, These are emptinesses. Cittamātra teaches that emptinesses as well as other powered phenomena are truly established, are established by their own characteristics, are established from their own side, are established from the beginning. Why is this the case?

Because the emptiness of this table is there independently of a mind fabricating or imputing it on the table. Then you asked last time about reflexive consciousnesses, Svasamvedana in Sanskrit. Now this is a difficult topic. Basically, if we take mind or consciousness, consciousness has a component of itself which is aware of itself. This component of itself which is part of the collection, constitutes that consciousness and is of one substance with it, without being different from it, while cognizing itself, is reflexive consciousness.

Then in logic, reflexive consciousnesses are defined as the perception of an aspect. This is a very difficult definition to understand. Certainly, reflexive consciousnesses do not arise in dependence on common or uncommon controlling or object causes like other consciousnesses. So at present, in the context of generating the motivation, let us reflect during a couple of minutes. First, on the fact that the person is impermanent based on reasons, and I suspect once one has understood this, one has become a Buddhist by tenets.

And secondly, on the definitions of Chitamatrans, which were given in this class. Please open the prayer book, page one. We shall recite one verse of refuge and bodhicitta. So I’ll take a couple of questions. Please short questions, otherwise we waste time.

Yeah. I may be hearing everything completely wrongly. So if I am, please excuse this question. But I do not understand how something that does not truly exist is also truly established. Because external phenomena are in general tables, chairs, other people, that sort of thing, are composite composite phenomena.

So there are other powered phenomena. So how can they not exist truly and also be truly established? You think they’re not truly existent? Well, they’re truly according to the Yogachara, the first point of their viewpoint is that exterior objects are not truly existent. They do not exist at all.

But most of the most of the things that the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrantikas and probably even Prasangikas and Madhyamikas would say are exterior objects are composites. They’re impermanent phenomena that are that have been brought together by causes and conditions. Are causes and conditions thoroughly established? Is that how external objects are thoroughly established? Or are these two completely separate lines of reasoning that have no crossover like this like the Sūtra vehicle and the Tantra vehicle?

I mean, can other powered phenomena and and the nonexistence of exterior phenomena be brought into into into conversation? And if so, how? When Cittamātra says that other powered phenomenon are truly established because they arise in dependence on causes and conditions, the causes and conditions they posit are only karmic imprints within the mind basis of all. And those causes and conditions, those imprints are truly established? Yes.

Yes. Yes. They are composite. Alright, alright, please. You don’t know.

Just just in a couple minutes, you know. Think think think think again. Think and then, you know. But they they seem like two separate things. It seems to me that if you can say that something is nonexistent and truly established because exterior no.

I don’t want to. Because because exterior objects would be composite. Are are we saying they don’t exist at all? So if if if if there’s if there’s a bus coming directly at me, that’s basically my mind coming at me, and that it has it has no it has no sort of conventional force at all? So when in Cittamātra one refers to exterior objects not being truly established, the meaning of that statement is that exterior objects are not established as being composed of indivisible particles to the opposition of the position in Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika according to which there are exterior objects which are composed of indivisible particles.

You must think of indivisible particles here. Okay. And second, please. Vishala, how does the exhaustion of a karmic imprint give rise to an appearance? It’s a good question but maybe later.

Okay, third. I’m having a problem with the five sense consciousness because given that, well I thought until just now that Cittamātra do not assert the existence of outer objects. And given, I thought, that the five sense consciousnesses are non conceptual and perceive things, have to perceive things directly in the present, then if there are no exterior objects, nothing to touch, no flowers to smell, no food to taste, what is the function of the five sense consciousnesses according to Cittamātra? Both the sense consciousness and the object perceived by the sense consciousness are the exhaustion of the karmic imprint. One is the object condition and the other is the mental condition.

Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But a karmic imprint or a seed or a potency, it’s a potential. It’s not seeing the object directly.

So in Cittamātra, imprints, seeds and potencies are the same thing. Then we’re obviously not talking of exterior seeds here. Okay. Richard, have you a question? Quick.

Quick. Quick. Please. I’m still unclear as to what the basis of this appearance is apart from the karmic imprints imprinted on the Alaya Vijñāna. The basis of appearance is mind.

Mind itself. Okay. So go back to the bus. Mhmm. Yeah.

Go back to the bus. Maybe it’s not indivisible particles. It’s divisible particles. So these divisible particles are coming hurtling towards me, and I perceive them. Yes.

Yes. Run away. Okay. Natalie, please. Natalie, think.

Just only. Quick, quick, quick. My question is about deity practice. Can Cittamātra do deity practice given that deity practice is a mere conceptual imputation? Deity practice is what?

Deity practice is a mere conceptual imputation. A mere conceptual imputation. Okay, good. Thank you. Your question, even though we are presenting Cittamātra, is predicated from the standpoint of Prāsaṇgika.

However, it is clearly stated that one can practice deity yoga only on the basis of Cittamātra or Mādhyamika, and the Cittamātra view is particularly helpful in the practice of deity yoga, but this is not something which you will understand quickly. It will take time to understand this. Good time. Okay, yeah. Just one question.

Please, short one, know. No, no. Please. Quickly. How can the emptiness of an object exist prior to the mind’s establishing it or imputing it if the object itself is not other than the mind or an appearance to the mind As I said, emptiness is not a mere conceptual imputation.

It’s not a mental imputation in Cittamātra. It is established from its own side. That is their position. Okay. So at present tonight, please debate.

You must debate on this topic. It’s not optional. On why the person is impermanent, and this must be grounded in reasoning. You must give reasons for this. .

Cool.

Key terms in this teaching

Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
dependent origination pratityasamutpada (Skt); ten drel (Tib)
Also called dependent arising. The way that the self and phenomena exist conventionally as relative and interdependent. LYWA
Hinayana theg mäen (Tib)
Literally, Small, or Lesser, Vehicle. It is one of the two general divisions of Buddhism. The Hinayana practitioner's motivation for following the Dharma path is principally the intense wish for personal liberation from conditioned existence, or samsara. LYWA
Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
Mahayana teg chen (Tib)
Literally, Great Vehicle. It is one of the two general divisions of Buddhism. LYWA
mantra ngag (Tib)
Literally, mind protection. Mantras are Sanskrit syllables usually recited in conjunction with the practice of a particular meditational deity and embody the qualities of that deity. LYWA
mind basis of all alayavijana (Skt); kun zhi nam shä (Tib)
A main consciousness posited by the Cittamatra school, the consciousness they say is needed to carry karmic imprints. LYWA
Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

Questions answered in this teaching

Can followers of the Cittamātra view practice deity yoga, given that deity practice is a mere conceptual imputation?

The question is framed from the standpoint of Prāsaṇgika, even though the topic being presented is Cittamātra. It is clearly stated that deity yoga can be practiced only on the basis of the Cittamātra or Mādhyamika view. The Cittamātra view is particularly helpful for the practice of deity yoga. This is not something that can be understood quickly, and it will take time to understand.

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