1 h 5 min · 3,259 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen leads a 65-minute seminar on Cittamātra (Mind-Only) Buddhist philosophy, focusing on the Alaya Vijñāna, or store-consciousness, and its role in linking consciousness across states like sleep and death. He begins with a difficult technical debate: whether an Arhat’s consciousness-stream is severed when they relinquish their physical aggregates, a question that hinges on how the Alaya Vijñāna functions as the only mind present in deep sleep. He then walks through how the afflicted mind perpetually grasps the Alaya Vijñāna as a permanent, independent self, even in dreamless sleep when the six sensory consciousnesses have ceased. Throughout, the teacher shifts from doctrinal explanation to lived observation, urging students to examine their own experience: how do you maintain identity across gaps in waking consciousness; what mind persists when mental activity stops. The session includes extended Q&A on the nature of dreams, the subtle dissolution of minds at death (parallel to falling asleep), and how visualisation engages the visual cortex, before closing with discussion pairs on how the impermanent Alaya Vijñāna actually undergoes moment-to-moment change. Pitched at practitioners familiar with Buddhist epistemology and Madhyamaka contrasts.
File metadata (for organising)
File: Cittamātra 07112017 2.mp3
UUID: 18cf688f-559c-413e-aa26-c4bf4474e5c7
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Cittamātra
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~3,262
Geshe-la, I’m struggling with understanding the argument for the continuum of an Arhat being severed at the time where they relinquished their aggregates. A difficult point made all the more difficult by the fact that actually, the assertion that Hīnayāna’s Arhat’s continuum is severed when they relinquish their aggregates is a shared assertion of Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, and all Chittamatras who teach eight collections of consciousness. And specifically in the case of Chittamatras, since this would entail the severance of the Alāyavijñāna, there’s a particular connection. So if the Alaya Vijñāna was severed at the time of Arhat’s relinquishing their coarse aggregates, then they would have to depend on these coarse aggregates. And here, when one refers to coarse aggregates, one is referring to these six collections of consciousness.
In other words, the five sensory consciousnesseses and the mental consciousness. Then should this be the case this would cause problems with the definition of the ālaya vijnana, which is given in Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen’s tenets. So it’s a difficult point. As Geshela mentioned last time, a majority of scholars consider that the ālaya vijnana and actually, the continuum of consciousness is severed when the Arhats relinquish their aggregates. Then, as he said, a minority asserts that the non contaminated component continues.
But what sort of non contaminated component continues when the six collections of consciousness have themselves been severed? Then this would mean among others that the ālaya vijnana could engage in virtue. And it is clear that the ālaya vijnana cannot engage in virtue until one attains full enlightenment. So moving onwards now, it’s always in stanza 36. The third proof of the existence of the ālaya vijnana is clarity in 9.34.5.
And clarity here refers actually to a commentary on the second proof. The first, as you remember last time, Geshela explained that the second proof hinged on passages of sūtra according to which two minds could not coexist concurrently within the same mental continuum, and this was explained. And then the example Geshe would like to give is that of a visual consciousness perceiving, for instance, a color yellow or blue or a shape, and the mental consciousness which concurrently with it thinks this is yellow, this is blue, or this is a shape. So this third proof, therefore, is a commentary on the second one. And as Geshela explained last time, if the ālaya vijnana did not exist, then there would be no basis of infusion for virtuous and non virtuous karmic imprints, And the mental consciousness would have to perform this function, which creates considerable problems at the time of deep sleep, or for instance, at the time of passing away.
So here we have to reflect on Gunamati and Pratyakavarman’s definition of the which is a main mind, which is neutral and obscured, acts as the basis of infusion of virtuous and non virtuous karmic imprints, and has an extremely stable continuum. So in keeping with the definition, the ālaya vijnana has an extremely stable continuum. Therefore, the component of clarity of the component of cognitive clarity of the ālaya vijnana is uninterrupted, unlike, for instance, the six collections of consciousness, which exist occasionally since they depend on their object. So the way to look at it is to consider that the alia vijnana, therefore, is uninterrupted, and that the afflicted mind, on the other hand, is continually present within cyclic existence with the exception of three occasions. The first is the initial attainment of the state of an Arhat.
The second is the attainment of the path of no more learning. And the third is meditative equipoise on cessation. So how do you understand this statement that Alaya Vijñāna and the afflicted mind are continually present within our mind streams. So we set We set grounds and paths aside since basically it doesn’t concern us. We don’t have those levels.
All we know about that is through Buddhist texts. So as far as we are concerned, how does this affect us? How do what do you think about it? We need to posit a continuum that will lead us from life to life and so therefore we have an ālaya vijnana within our continuum and we need to posit an ignorance that grasps to the self and so we have a within our continuum. And other?
What do you think? It’s up to you to think about it yourself. Yeah, to not speak in general Buddhist terms and to make it specific to myself. To posit that I’m the same person today that I was yesterday with deep sleep in the interim, I have to posit a consciousness that links the two. Therefore a stable continuum is necessary for that connection.
And for the basis of my afflictions, for my anger and desire, I need to posit a consciousness which is at the root of that. And the ālaya vijnana, the kliṣṭamanas fits that description. Therefore it’s necessary. So according to Cittamātra, all consciousnesses are always manifest. Then what precisely do we mean when the Alaya Vijñāna or the Klistamanas are said to be manifest?
So Geshela noticed that you rely excessively on doctrinal material and not on observation of what’s happening within one’s own mind. If we look within ourselves, what we see is that this sense of I is manifest. Then there must therefore be a mind which thinks I I. That is the afflicted mind. And that mind must have an object.
That object is the ālaya vijnana. Understood. Did you understand? So what you said is very doctrinal. It’s rooted in the texts.
Then what Geshela would like is a personal experience. So there is food for thought in the Chitamatra school. For instance, in our cases, when we get up, when we rise in the morning, we think my breakfast and so forth. Perhaps, everything we think is blended or linked to the I. So therefore, this mind which thinks I I, that is the afflicted mind, and its object is the ālaya vijnana.
Then whether the alia vijnana actually is the person, that calls for careful analysis according to Chitamatra. Mhmm. Do you understand? So according to Chitamatra, it is at the time of analysis or investigation that the eye can be posited as the ālaya vijnana. You cannot say in general the I is the alia vijnana.
That would be very strange. So within general experience, my experience is that I posit the I on emotions, on thoughts, on my body. Unless I analyze it, that is my experience. I’m not positing the I on a subtle mind that I cannot apprehend. Under general experience, that’s my experience, I’m positing the I on emotions, thoughts and body, not not on the ālaya vijnana, not on a subtle mind.
As a lot of material for analysis here, because we have to investigate what is meant by my car, my book, my house, my friend. So as is said, apart from in deep sleep and so forth, now this refers to the afflicted mind. So according to Chitamatra, the afflicted mind exists apart at those moments. Now in your opinion, how can you account for this when it is said that in Chitamatra, both ālāyavijñāna and the afflicted mind are always manifest? My apologies.
I mistranslated. So what is being said is that in deep sleep, the six collections of consciousness including the mental consciousness are severed. They’re absent. But Chitamatra asserts that both the afflicted mind and the mind bases of all are always manifest. So what does this mean?
Do you understand? Have you? Yeah, so it means that even when we have no sense of self in the dreamless state that the ignorance grasping at a self is still present. I find that hard to understand. I can see how the, in the dream state there is still grasping itself.
But in the sleepless, in the dreamless state I cannot understand how the kliṣṭamanas can be present because I have no experience of self in that state. Obviously, the dream state is a state where we’re waking up from sleep. Right? In deep sleep, the ālaya vijnana is manifest. Yet we have no sensation that I am sleeping.
So as Geshela said, many times if someone ask you when exactly did you go to sleep, then no one can answer. Right? So every one of us can answer the question, what time did you go to bed? But no one in this room can answer the question, what time precisely did you fall asleep? So this is a clear demonstration that at the time of falling asleep, the sensory consciousnesses cease.
Maybe with a very delicate machine, it would be possible for an exterior observer to determine when exactly we fell asleep. I wanna clarify. Whilst I have no experience in deep sleep of myself as being asleep in deep sleep, when I’m tired and I’m falling asleep, there’s a sense I am falling asleep. And if I’m woken from deep sleep, there’s a sense I was woken from deep sleep. And if I wake the next morning I can posit I had a bad sleep or I had a good sleep.
So it seems the sense of self, whilst not apparent to the mental consciousness, would still persist through the state of deep sleep. So how exactly is this related to the experience of the I in deep sleep? It’s ad post hoc. One thing, one example Geshela gave at one point was of a bodhisattva. For example, they’re positive as being a bodhisattva in deep sleep because they fall asleep with the motivation of bodhichitta before falling asleep.
So it would seem that if one falls asleep with the sense that I am falling asleep, that sense of inherent self as one falls asleep, then that sense of self would persist through deep sleep in the same way. Okay. I can only think that mind basis of all is not manifest to the person who is in deep sleep but to an observer when the person turns in their sleep that there is something happening and so it’s inferred that there is this subtle thought that there’s consciousness happening there, that the person’s not dead. So as you remember, Geshela explained that when we fall asleep, there is a process of dissolution of coarse minds into ever more subtle minds until we enter the mind of sleep. And likewise, when we wake up, there is a process of coarsening of the subtle minds through the dream state until we wake out of sleep.
And this is similar to the death process. So in the death process, we have a process where the coarse minds progressively disappear, they dissolve, and eventually when the subtle mind of death appears at that point, and at that point alone, one can be said to be dead. And therefore, as you remember, Geshe-la explained that training in the sleep state is a preliminary to training for the death state. Ours is a difficult predicament because if we don’t stop thinking as we fall asleep, we won’t fall asleep. The moment we stop thinking, we collapse into sleep.
So how precisely do we train for the death state? Then when one attains fully characterized calm abiding, in other words, one fully attains calm abiding, obviously, the sensory consciousnesses become non manifest. Otherwise, there is no calm abiding focused on its object. And then there are obviously much higher states than calm abiding. So generally speaking, it is still that in the dream state, there are no sensory consciousnesses.
Then in your opinion during dreams, do we see as we see when we are awake? At the moment. So right now, for instance, if Geshela who is not dreaming closes his eyes, he doesn’t see anything. So in dreams, is it the same thing or not? If you close your eyes in dreams, do you see or not?
So within a, this actually come up in discussion group, within a dream, you still perceive form, you still hear sounds, you still smell, and so they don’t seem to depend on the sense organs or what are normally the uncommon empowering conditions. Well, obviously, in the dream state, if someone makes a very loud sound, that does enter the dream, doesn’t it? So Dharmakīrti says, in the dream, there is only mental consciousness. In other words, there are no sensory consciousnesses. So let’s take the case now.
If you close your eyes, can you read something? Same thing. In the dream, there are appearances to my consciousness and in the dream, if I see something I don’t know that I’m dreaming, it appears as if I’m actually apprehending something. You’re unable to identify the dream as a dream in the dream state. Usually, yes.
So let us imagine that in the dream state, we saw letters very clearly. Characters in other words. Then those characters are form. Then within the five sensory objects. In other words, visual objects, sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile objects.
Which of these five are they? We’ve decided they’re form. If it’s formed, then it’s visual. What about sound? It would be perceived as Sound is not formed.
Sound waves. Waves. Sound is matter, right? In physics, sound is matter, Yep. Pressure differentials.
Also in the dream state sometimes, we recite what we have memorized. Then what exactly is that? Does it happen to you? These are karmic imprints, right? It was mentioned that the visual cortex could be considered part of the uncommon controlling condition for vision and as you’d be aware, often when we visualise something and the brain is measured, visual cortex is activated in the same way as whether you’d actually physically perceive it or just visualised it in your mind.
And so that would seem to imply that the uncommon controlling condition for the visual consciousness doesn’t necessarily, it’s not, yeah it’s not necessary contingent on a form or a visual object. This is something we have to analyze in detail. It is taught that the uncommon controlling condition of the visual consciousness is physical visual organ, probably the retina. So today, we’re adopting a very Today, we’re adopting a very unstructured approach to talk about these things. And Geshela would like to bring up the issue of the mind of the death state and the initial mind at birth.
Then you asked last time the question or someone asked, what exactly is the mind of the death state? According to Cittamātra, there are only eight collections of consciousness. It has to be one of the eight. Right? Which one?
So we covered the 12 limbs of the dependent origination already. I wasn’t here for the 12 limbs but I would suggest that the mind of the death state would be the The mind of the death state. Could you think about this? During the dissolution of the body and the senses it’s going from coarse into more and more subtle states and eventually with the clear light of death it’s a very subtle mind. So does that indicate that it becomes So at present, we are only talking of Chitamatra.
Right? So we say when we fall asleep, right? We fall asleep, we fall asleep, we fall asleep. What is deep sleep in Chitamatra? It’s a mind.
It’s better, do you say? Sleeper. So in the sleep state, there are two minds present, the ālaya vijnana and the kliṣṭamanas. The other collections, the six collections of consciousness are in sleep. So in deep sleep, in deep sleep, sleep has ceased.
Right? The mind of sleep has ceased. Right? So the So in deep sleep, the afflicted mind is a So in deep sleep, sleep has ceased because sleep is a mental factor, right? Neutrally.
Neutrally. How do you define the difference between sleep and dream? Is it dream a mental factor or it’s it’s unconsciousness? So is sleep a mental factor of the dream conscious? You know?
So dreams are part of the awakening process. Dreams feel like something which takes a very long time, but actually, it’s very short. We’re waking up. We’re waking out of sleep. So is a dream a main mind and sleep its mental factor?
Would that be the relationship between the two? Are you talking of dreams or the dream consciousness? I don’t the difference, but Dream consciousness. So dreams are the process of waking out of sleep. Then sleep is subdivided into two.
You have core sleep and subtle sleep. Subtle sleep is deep sleep. Okay. So Geshela ask you, in your opinion, what the mind of deep sleep was? Then one of you said, it is the aliyah vijnana, and there is good reason for saying that.
Obviously, it’s not the afflicted mind, and in deep sleep, all six collections of consciousness have ceased. Likewise, Geshela ask you, what the mind of the death state was? Then again, there is good reasons in Chitamatra to say it is the alia vijnana, and this is the rationale for other parties engaging in virtuous deeds when one die when one dies, trying to transform the ālaya vijnana into a virtuous state of mind. So in Chitamatra, therefore, the subtle mind of death is the ālaya vijnana. Then in In the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, let us take Sautrāntika, in deep sleep, consciousness has ceased.
So they do not accept an ālaya vijnana, and they consider that in deep sleep, the six collections of consciousness have stopped. Then both Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, therefore, assert that there is no consciousness at all in deep sleep. Then when one wakes up from deep sleep, how is it possible for consciousness to reappear? They assert that the last instance of consciousness before falling asleep is a substantial cause of the first instance of consciousness after deep sleep. Then obviously in Chitamatra, the mind basis of all the alia vijnana bridges the gap through deep sleep.
And in Madhyamaka, nothing in particular is said about what happens in the deep sleep. Therefore, we have to postulate a subtle mind. Okay. So therefore, in Chitamatra, the afflicted mind, the kliṣṭamanas views the ālaya vijnana as self established, and it views it as a self of persons. Therefore, it views it as an entity which is which is established as permanent one and independent.
Obviously, the ālaya vijnana is not permanent one and independent, it is impermanent. It changes moment by moment. How precisely does it change moment by moment? So when we say that the alia vajnana is impermanent, we mean that it changes. Is this future or present change?
Then future change obviously is allowable since the ālaya vijnana becomes unusable. But is there present change? At present, let us do the recitations and generate the motivation. Page one. So since the Alaya Vijñāna is impermanent, is it impermanent?
Yes it is, right? Because it is impermanent, because if it was permanent, obviously, then the afflicted mind would not be the grasping at the self. Alright? So as far as the five sensory consciousness is concerned, it’s self evident that they are impermanent, and the mental consciousness, it’s evident that it’s impermanent. Sometimes it is active, sometimes inactive.
So therefore, in your opinion, since the Alaya Vijñāna is impermanent, what is its mode of change, its mode of impermanence? This is your discussion topic. Then if possible by pairs, if that is not possible, maximum of three.
Translation / 翻译 / བསྒྱུར།
These translations were generated using Gemini Pro 2.5 with a curated Buddhist terminology glossary and verified for register, glossary use, and absence of English leakage. The English transcript above remains the authoritative source.
中文翻译 (Chinese Translation)
# 唯识宗 07112017 2.mp3
> **合集:** 录音 —— 唯识宗
> **时长:** 65.6 分钟
> **字数:** 3,269
> **模型:** Deepgram Nova-3
> **校订:** 2处佛教术语修正
> **转录于:** 2026年3月2日 03:37
—
格西拉,我正努力理解一个论点,即阿罗汉在舍弃其蕴时,其心相续会中断。这一点本已困难,而更困难的是,实际上,主张小乘阿罗汉在舍弃其蕴时心相续会中断,是说一切有部、经量部以及所有主张八识聚的唯识宗师所共许的。尤其对唯识宗而言,因为这会蕴含阿赖耶识的中断,所以有其特殊的关联。倘若阿赖耶识在阿罗汉舍弃其粗分蕴时中断,那么他们就必须依赖这些粗分蕴。此处所谓的粗分蕴,指的是六识聚。
换言之,即五种根识及意识。倘若如此,这便会与杰尊·确吉·坚参的《宗义》中所给予阿赖耶识的定义产生问题。所以这是个难点。如格西拉上堂课所言,多数大学者认为阿赖耶识,乃至意识的相续,在阿罗汉舍弃其蕴时即告中断。然后,他又说,少数人主张无漏的部分会持续下去。
然而,当六识聚本身已然断绝,又会是何种无漏的部分得以持续?这意指,除其他外,阿赖耶识能够行善。而很清楚的是,在证得圆满菩提之前,阿赖耶识是不能行善的。那么现在继续往下,仍在第36颂。成立阿赖耶识存在的第三个理据,在9.34.5中是“光明”。
此处的“光明”实际上是对第二个理据的注释。如您所忆,格西拉上堂课解释过,第二个理据的关键在于某些经文段落,根据这些段落,两种心不能在同一心相续中同时并存,这一点已经解释过了。接着格西想举的例子是,譬如眼识在看黄色或蓝色或某种形状时,意识同时思惟着“这是黄色”、“这是蓝色”或“这是一个形状”。因此,这第三个理据是对第二个理据的疏释。如格西拉上堂课所释,倘若阿赖耶识不存在,那么善与不善的业习气便没有熏习的所依,而意识将不得不执行此功能,这在深眠时,或例如在临终时,会造成相当大的问题。
于此,我们必须反思德慧与普拉提亚卡瓦曼对阿赖耶识的定义,即:一个中性、有所覆障的主心,作为善与不善业习气的熏习所依,并具有极稳定的相续。依此定义,阿赖耶识具有极稳定的相续。因此,阿赖耶识认知光明的这个部分是无间断的,不像例如六识聚,它们是偶尔存在的,因为它们依赖于各自的对境。所以,看待此问题的方式是,认为阿赖耶识是无间断的,而另一方面,染污意在轮回中是持续存在的,除了三种情况。第一种是初证阿罗汉果位时。
第二种是证得无学道时。第三种是安住于灭尽等引时。那么,你如何理解“阿赖耶识与染污意在我们的心相续中持续存在”这一说法?我们暂且把地道搁置一旁,因为它基本上与我们无关。我们未证得那些层次。
我们对此的所有了知都来自于佛教典籍。那么就我们自身而言,这对我们有何影响?你对此有何想法?我们需要安立一个能够引导我们经历生生世世的相续,因此在我们的相续中有一个阿赖耶识;我们需要安立一个执着于我的无明,因此在我们的相续中有一个染污意。还有其他的吗?
你对此有何看法?这需要你自己去思考。是的,不要笼统地谈论佛教术语,要把它具体到我自己身上。要安立今天的我与昨天的我是同一个人,而其间经历了深眠,我必须安立一个连接这两者的识。因此,一个稳定的相续对于这种连接是必需的。
而对于我烦恼的根源,我的嗔心与贪欲,我需要安立一个作为其根本的识。阿赖耶识,即染污意,符合这个描述。因此,它是必需的。所以根据唯识宗的观点,所有的识都是恒时现行的。那么,当我们说阿赖耶识或染污意是现行的时候,这究竟是什么意思?
格西拉注意到,你们过度依赖教理材料,而没有观察自己内心正在发生什么。如果我们向内审视,我们所看到的是,这种“我”的感觉是现行的。那么,必然有一个思惟“我、我”的心。那就是染污意。而那个心必定有一个对境。
那个对境就是阿赖耶识。明白了吗?你明白了吗?所以你所说的非常教理化。它根植于典籍。
格西拉希望的是一种个人的体验。在唯识宗的思想里有值得深思之处。例如,在我们这些情况中,当我们早上起来时,我们想“我的早餐”等等。或许,我们所想的一切都与“我”混合或连结在一起。因此,这个思惟“我、我”的心,即是染污意,而其所缘即是阿赖耶识。
至于阿赖耶识是否实为补特伽罗,这根据唯识宗的观点需要仔细分析。嗯。你明白吗?所以根据唯识宗的观点,是在分析或观察的时候,“我”才能被安立为阿赖耶识。你不能笼统地说“我”就是阿赖耶识。
那会非常奇怪。所以在一般的经验中,我的经验是我将“我”安立在情绪、思想、我的身体之上。除非我进行分析,否则那就是我的经验。我不会将“我”安立在一个我无法感知的细心之上。在一般经验下,那是我的经验,我将“我”安立在情绪、思想和身体上,而不是阿赖耶识,不是一个细心。
这里有很多可供分析的材料,因为我们必须探究“我的车”、“我的书”、“我的房子”、“我的朋友”所指为何。如前所述,除了在深眠等状态中,现在这是指染污意。所以根据唯识宗的观点,染污意在那些时刻之外是存在的。现在依你之见,当唯识宗说阿赖耶识和染污意总是现行时,你如何解释这一点?非常抱歉。
我翻译错了。所说的是,在深眠中,六识聚,包括意识在内,都已中断。它们是不存在的。但唯识宗主张,染污意和阿赖耶识两者皆恒时现行。那么这是什么意思?
你明白吗?明白了吗?是的,所以这意味着即使我们在无梦状态下没有自我感,执着于我的无明仍然存在。我发现这很难理解。我能理解在梦境状态下仍有我执。
但在无梦的状态下,我无法理解染污意如何能存在,因为我在那种状态下没有自我的经验。显然,梦境是从睡眠中醒来的一个状态,对吧?在深眠中,阿赖耶识是现行的。然而我们没有“我正在睡觉”的感觉。
如格西拉多次说过的,如果有人问你“你究竟是何时睡着的?”,那么没有人能够回答。对吧?所以我们每个人都能回答“你几点上床睡觉?”这个问题。但这个房间里没有人能回答“你究竟是何时睡着的?”这个问题。这清楚地表明,在入睡的那一刻,根识就停止了。
也许借助非常精密的仪器,外部观察者能够确定我们究竟是何时睡着的。我想澄清一下。虽然我在深眠中没有体验到自己正在睡觉,但当我很困并且正在入睡时,会有一种“我正在入睡”的感觉。如果我从深眠中被唤醒,会有一种“我从深眠中被唤醒”的感觉。如果我第二天早上醒来,我可以安立“我睡得不好”或“我睡得很好”。
所以,自我感虽然对意识来说不明显,但似乎仍会贯穿深眠状态而持续存在。那么,这究竟与深眠中“我”的体验有何关联?这是事后推论的。格西拉曾举过一个例子,是关于一位菩萨的。例如,他们在深眠中被安立为菩萨,因为他们在入睡前怀着菩提心的动机而入睡。
那么,似乎如果一个人带着“我正在入睡”的感觉入睡,那种固有的自我感在入睡时存在,那么那种自我感也会以同样的方式贯穿深眠而持续存在。好的。我只能认为阿赖耶识对于深眠中的人并非现行,但对于一位观察者而言,当那个人在睡眠中翻身时,有某种事情正在发生,因此可以推断出那里有这种微细的念头,有意识活动在那里,那个人并没有死。如你所忆,格西拉解释过,当我们入睡时,有一个粗分心消融于愈加微细心的过程,直到我们进入睡眠之心。同样地,当我们醒来时,有一个细心通过梦境逐渐变粗的过程,直到我们从睡眠中醒来。
这与死亡过程相似。在死亡过程中,我们有一个粗分心逐渐消失、消融的过程,最终当死亡的细心在那个时刻显现时,也唯有在那个时刻,一个人才能被称为死亡。因此,如你所忆,格西拉解释过,修习睡眠状态是为死亡状态做准备的初步训练。我们的处境很困难,因为如果我们在入睡时不停止分别思维,我们就无法入睡。一旦我们停止分别思维,我们就会陷入睡眠。
那么,我们究竟该如何为死亡状态进行修习?当一个人证得完全具相的止,换言之,完全证得止时,显然,根识会变得不现行。否则,就没有专注于其对境的止。然后,显然还有比止高得多的境界。所以,一般来说,仍然认为在梦境中,没有根识。
那么,在你看来,在梦中,我们所见的与我们醒着时所见的是否一样?此刻。所以现在,例如,如果格西拉(他没有在做梦)闭上眼睛,他什么也看不见。那么在梦中,情况是否一样?如果你在梦中闭上眼睛,你能看见东西吗?
在一次讨论小组中,这个问题确实被提出来了。在梦中,你仍然能感知到形色,仍然能听到声音,仍然能闻到气味,所以它们似乎不依赖于感官器官,或者说通常所说的不共增上缘。哦,显然,在梦境中,如果有人发出很大的声响,那确实会进入梦中,不是吗?法称论师说,在梦中,唯有意识。换言之,没有根识。
那么,我们来看现在的情况。如果你闭上眼睛,你能读东西吗?一样的道理。在梦中,我的意识中有显现,而在梦中,如果我看到什么,我并不知道我是在做梦,它显现得就好像我真的在感知什么东西一样。你在梦境中无法辨识出梦是梦。通常是这样,是的。
那么,让我们想象在梦境中,我们非常清晰地看到了字母。换句话说,就是文字。那么,那些文字是色法。在五种根境中,也就是视境、声境、嗅境、味境和触境中。
这五者中,它们属于哪一种?我们已经确定它们是色法。如果是色法,那么它就是视觉的。那声音呢?它会被感知为……声音不是色法。
声波。波。声音是物质,对吧?在物理学中,声音是物质,是的。压力差。
在梦境中有时候,我们也会念诵我们所背记的内容。那么,那究竟是什么?你发生过这种事吗?这些是业习气,对吧?有人提到,视觉皮层可以被视为视觉的不共增上缘的一部分。正如你所知,通常当我们观想某物时,大脑被测量,视觉皮层的活动方式与你实际物理感知它或仅仅在心中观想它时相同。
这似乎意味着,视觉识的不共增上缘不一定……它不是……是的,它不必然依赖于一个形色或一个视觉对象。这是我们需要详细分析的事情。教法中说,视觉识的不共增上缘是物质性的眼根,很可能是视网膜。所以今天,我们采取一种非常……今天,我们采取一种非常非结构化的方式来谈论这些事情。格西拉想提出死亡状态的心和初生之初的心的问题。
上次你问了这个问题,或者有人问了,死亡状态的心究竟是什么?根据唯识宗,只有八识聚。它必须是这八者之一。对吧?是哪一个?
我们已经讲过十二缘起了。我没来听十二缘起,但我会认为死亡状态的心应该是……死亡状态的心。你能思考一下吗?在身体和感官的消融过程中,它从粗分状态进入越来越微细的状态,最终随着死亡光明的显现,它是一个极微细心。那么这是否意味着它变成了……目前,我们只谈论唯识宗。
对吧?所以我们说,当我们入睡时,对吧?我们入睡,我们入睡,我们入睡。在唯识宗里,深眠是什么?它是一个心。
你说是“Sleeper”(睡眠者),这样更好吗?所以在睡眠状态中,有两个心存在,阿赖耶识和染污意。其他的识聚,六识聚,都在睡眠中。所以在深眠中,在深眠中,睡眠已经停止了。
对吧?睡眠之心已经停止了。对吧?所以在深眠中,染污意是……所以在深眠中,睡眠已经停止了,因为睡眠是一个心所,对吧?中性的。
中性的。你如何定义睡眠和梦的区别?梦是一个心所还是它……它是无意识?所以睡眠是梦识的一个心所吗?你知道吗?
梦是觉醒过程的一部分。梦感觉像是持续很长时间的事情,但实际上,它非常短暂。我们正在醒来。我们正在从睡眠中醒来。那么,梦是一个主心,而睡眠是它的心所吗?
这两者之间的关系会是这样吗?你说的是梦还是梦识?我不知道区别,但是……梦识。所以梦是从睡眠中醒来的过程。然后,睡眠又细分为两种。
你有粗分睡眠和细分睡眠。细分睡眠就是深眠。好的。所以格西拉问你们,在你们看来,深眠的心是什么?然后你们中有一位说,是阿赖耶识,这样说有很好的理由。
显然,它不是染污意,并且在深眠中,所有六识聚都已经停止了。同样地,格西拉问你们,死亡状态的心是什么?同样,在唯识宗中,有很好的理由说它是阿赖耶识,这也是为什么当一个人去世时,其他人会为他行善,试图将阿赖耶识转化为一个善的心态的理据。所以,在唯识宗中,死亡的细心是阿赖耶识。那么,在说一切有部和经量部中,让我们以经量部为例,在深眠中,识已经停止了。
所以他们不承认阿赖耶识,他们认为在深眠中,六识聚已经停止了。因此,说一切有部和经量部都主张在深眠中根本没有识。那么,当一个人从深眠中醒来时,识如何可能重新出现?他们主张,入睡前识的最后一刹那是深眠后识的第一刹那的亲因缘。那么显然,在唯识宗中,阿赖耶识通过深眠架起了桥梁。
而在中观宗,对于深眠中发生了什么并没有特别说明。因此,我们必须假定一个细心。好的。因此,在唯识宗中,染污意,即末那识,视阿赖耶识为自性成立,并视其为补特伽罗之我。因此,它视其为一个建构为常、一、自在的实体。
显然,阿赖耶识不是常、一、自在的,它是无常的。它刹那刹那地变化。它究竟是如何刹那刹那地变化的?所以,当我们说阿赖耶识是无常的时候,我们的意思是它在变化。这是未来的变化还是当下的变化?
那么未来的变化显然是允许的,因为阿赖耶识会变得不可用。但是否有当下的变化?现在,让我们来念诵并发起动机。第一页。所以,既然阿赖耶识是无常的,它是无常的吗?
是的,它是,对吧?因为它是无常的,因为如果它是常的,那么显然,染污意就不会是我执了。对吧?至于五种根识,它们是无常的这一点不言自明,而意识,它很明显是无常的。有时它活跃,有时不活跃。
因此,在你看来,既然阿赖耶识是无常的,它的变化方式,它的无常的模式是什么?这是你们的讨论题目。如果可能的话,两人一组,如果不可能,最多三人一组。
Key terms in this teaching
- arhat dra chom pa (Tib)
- The Tibetan translates as "foe destroyer." A person who has destroyed their inner enemy, the delusions, and attained liberation from cyclic existence. LYWA
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- grounds and paths sa lam (Tib)
- Various advanced mental states that are achieved through meditation and practice. LYWA
- mind basis of all alayavijana (Skt); kun zhi nam shä (Tib)
- A main consciousness posited by the Cittamatra school, the consciousness they say is needed to carry karmic imprints. LYWA
- path of no more learning ashaiksa-marga (Skt); mi lob pä lam (Tib)
- The fifth of the five paths, the culmination of practice: for the Mahayana, buddhahood; for hearers and solitary realizers, the liberation of an arhat. LYWA
- principal consciousness vijnana (Skt); nam shë (Tib)
- The main cognition posited by means of apprehending the entity of its object. Synonymous with main mind, it is one of the two divisions of mind, the other being mental factors. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- shamatha zhi nä (Tib)
- Calm abiding; a state of concentration in which the mind is able to abide steadily, without effort and for as long as desired, on an object of meditation. There are nine stages in its development. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.
Questions answered in this teaching
Why is the continuum of a Hinayana Arhat said to be severed when they relinquish their aggregates?
This is a difficult point. The assertion that a Hīnayāna Arhat's continuum is severed when they relinquish their aggregates is shared by the Vaibhāṣika, the Sautrāntika, and all Chittamatrins who teach eight collections of consciousness. For the Chittamatrins there is a particular connection, since it would entail severing the Alāyavijñāna. If the Alāyavijñāna were severed when the coarse aggregates are relinquished, it would depend on those aggregates, meaning the six collections of consciousness (five sensory consciousnesses and mental consciousness). This would cause problems with the definition of the Alāyavijñāna given in Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen's tenets.