3 h 0 min · 4,890 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 180-minute seminar, Ilia S. Durovic uses the Buddha’s Fire Sermon as the anchor for a sweeping comparison between Buddhist and Western philosophical approaches to desire. He opens by reading the sūtra’s radical critique: all sense bases—eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind—are aflame with passion, aversion, and delusion, and thus the instructed disciple grows disenchanted and becomes released. Durovic argues this stands in irreconcilable opposition to Western thought since ancient Greece, which has treated the body and sensory pleasure as legitimate sources of happiness and cultivation. He traces how this tension produces Western ambivalence toward Buddhism: fascination with an alternative model, simultaneous revulsion at its life-denying stance. He examines this friction through Schopenhauer’s early Buddhist sympathies, Nietzsche’s explicit rejection of Buddhism as nihilism, and the Nietzschean echoes in Conan the Barbarian. The talk then broadens to explore how Western culture’s choice to follow Parmenides over Heraclitus—permanence over flux—has embedded itself in aesthetics, sexuality, sport, health, and desire itself. Durovic closes with extended Q&A addressing materialism’s failure to provide meaning, the boundaries of Buddhist identity, Christianity’s political entanglement and celibacy crisis versus Buddhism’s comparative freedom from state capture, and the challenge of transmitting monastic Buddhist practice to a secular Western lay audience. Directed at students and serious practitioners grappling with these philosophical and cultural tensions.
File metadata (for organising)
File: Desire and Modernity 2.mp3
UUID: 93302582-9faf-47aa-93f8-59f572ee862d
Teacher: Ilia S. Durovic
Collection: Ilia Seminars
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~4,888
Who had basically venerated fire in Hinduism. And it is probably the most radical critique of desire which has ever come down to us. And you will see how totally different the perspective is and how desire is from its inception understood in a unified fashion. I was gonna photocopy it, but it’s it’s I have heard that on one occasion, the Blessed One was staying in Gaya, at Gaya. And there he addressed the monks.
Monks, the all is a flame. What all is a flame? The eye is a flame. Forms are a flame. Consciousness at the eye is a flame.
Contact at the eye is aflame. And whatever there is that arises and depends on contact at the eye experiences pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure nor pain, that too is aflame. Aflame with what? A flame with the fire of passion, the fire of aversion, the fire of delusion. A flame, I tell you, with birth, aging, and death, with sorrows, lamentations, pains, distresses, and despairs.
And then the sūtra moves onward to the ear. The ear is a flame. Sounds are a flame. Consciousness that the ear is a flame. That moves onwards to the nose.
The nose is a flame. Aromas are a flame. Consciousness at the no at the nose is a flame, then the tongue, then the body, then the intellect. The intellect is a flame. Ideas are a flame.
Consciousness at the intellect is a flame. Contact at the intellect is a flame. And whatever there is that arises and depends on contact at the intellect experienced as pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure nor pain, that too is a flame. A flame with what? A flame with the fire of passion, the fire of aversion, the fire of delusion.
A flame I say with birth, aging, and death, with sorrows, lamentations, pains, distresses, and despairs. Seeing thus, the instructed noble disciple grows disenchanted with the eye, disenchanted with forms, disenchanted with consciousness at the eye, disenchanted with contact at the eye, and whatever there is that arises in dependence on contact at the eye experienced as pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure nor pain. With that too, he grows disenchanted. And the Sūtra reads on it. He grows disenchanted with the ear, with the nose, with the tongue, with the body.
And I will read the final paragraph. He grows disenchanted with the intellect, disenchanted with ideas, disenchanted with consciousness at the intellect, disenchanted with contact at the intellect. And whatever there is that arises in dependence on contact at the intellect experienced as pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure nor pain, he grows disenchanted with that too. Disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion, he is fully released.
With full release, there is a knowledge fully released. He discerns that birth is depleted, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world. You have here a critique of desire of a radicality and a starkness which is unmatched in western thought. This is 26 centuries old.
Somebody asked me, why should we bother studying the thought of, great ascetics from 26 centuries ago? This is why. And as you can see, it is totally alien to us. Based on the presentation we made of western thought as a thought which in the case of Greek thought considers the here and now and especially the body as the source of pleasure and happiness and the cultivation of the body as a worthwhile pursuit. And in the case of some Greeks and thinkers, the pursuit of all pleasures as legitimate.
In the case of others, the moderate pursuit of the pleasures as legitimate, which is more the case of the Stoics. We have a worldview which is irreconcilable with the world view presented by Buddha in the fire sermon. So this begs the question, why the western fascination for Buddhism? Clearly, there has to be something more than a fascination for the exotic because it is a worldwide phenomenon. There are thousands, maybe tens of thousands of Buddhist centers.
I don’t know of a major city without a Buddhist center. Many have several. And as I indicated in the caption of this conference, the Western fascination with Buddhism is a fascination revulsion. It is ambiguous. It is ambiguous because on the one side, deep down, westerners do feel that the construction of modernity on desire is perhaps one of the most dangerous ventures our civilization has ever chosen to undertake.
And we are fascinated by an alternative model. At the same time, this alternative model is so radical that we find it difficult to endorse it, difficult to accept it. And we see this in the popular culture. If you read the press, it’s always interesting when you study popular culture to look at the explosions of emotion. Whenever there are explosions of popular indignation, there’s always an indication that a very sensitive issue has been broached.
The most sensitive issues in our culture nowadays are those which are connected with the boundaries of desire. We see it in sports. We see it in all the issues where desire, especially sexuality, has to be controlled, Where our culture is at a loss, it understands deep down that it should be controlled. It is unable to formulate a way to control it. This is not something which is anecdotal or incidental.
It is a direct consequence of the very model of our society where desire has been co opted by the forces of production, where the desire is reified, where the enjoyment of the body glorious, the body magnificent is one of the goals, if not perhaps the goal of most. Now when the model, the model we are living with starts breaking apart, the radicality of the Buddhist critique becomes fascinating. That is why we have this ambiguity with respect to the Buddhist teachings on desire. We are fascinated. At the same time, we are repulsed.
A long term Buddhist told to me once that she considered the ordination of westerners or westerners being ordained as a sign of sexual dysfunction. She had been a Buddhist for a long time when she said that. I thought about it many many years. It shows the ambiguity which is present in all of us. It shows that we do not accept the Buddhist teachings completely.
If we did, such a statement is absurd. Because by definition, the monastic lifestyle is a goal of a Buddhist. By definition. Since the Buddha’s first disciples were monks, not lay people. Lay people were allowed by exception to become the Buddhist disciples.
So to reject monasticism is, if one is a Buddhist, to say that there are core aspects of the Buddhist teachings which are problematical for us. And I think they are problematical precisely because desire is such a constitutive force in our society. I was going to, use a technique, I have borrowed from Walter Benjamin, the German philosopher, where you it’s called constellations. You basically take a series of apparently unrelated topics, which nonetheless seem to coincide again and again and try to analyze how they are connected. And I’m just gonna put a couple on the backboard for you, you know, and this is just a suggestion, you know, see whether you think this makes sense.
So number one would be desire two, the body, three, sport, four, health, five, sexuality. All of these are related. These are all the products of the same understanding of desire. Desire as hygienic, desire as healthy, desire as wholesome, the body as a source of pleasure, the body as something which has to be cultivated. At best, the mind as something which is an epiphenomenon, which is secondary.
This is what we bring with us to the teachings. The Buddha’s condemnation of this attitude is radical as you see in the Sūtra. It is not half-hearted, half-baked. And then if we analyze the reactions to the inception of Buddhism in the West, they are very clearly indicative of this mixture of fascination and revulsion. Schopenhauer was one of the greatest German philosophers of the nineteenth century, states in his journal of 1832, at the age of 17 without a university degree, I was overwhelmed by the suffering of life as the Buddha was in his youth when he discovered the existence of disease, aging, suffering, and death.
And actually, by the eighteen forties, considered himself a Buddhist. You know, the tremendous influence of the Upanishads and Buddhist thought on Schopenhauer. So this was a clear case of fascination. On the other hand, you have the exact opposite in Nietzsche’s thought. When Nietzsche says in one of his fragments from 1871, tragedy must save us from Buddhism and puts the choice facing the West very bluntly towards Rome or towards India.
Those were the two roads Nietzsche foresaw. Rome, the road of Greek or Roman antiquity, the road of the barbarian self affirmation, the road of the road of what Nietzsche called the overman, Ubermensch, or India. One great French analyst of Nietzsche, Roger-Pol Droit, says, in the eyes of Nietzsche, Buddhism has another face. It is one of the great figures of nihilism, the most powerful attempt with Christianity to negate the world. This is the degree to which Buddhism elicited a revulsion in the West.
And since we’ve been talking a very complex and profound topics, I’m gonna take I hesitated a lot about taking this example. I’m gonna take an example from popular culture, and I hope you won’t be shocked out of your wits. You know? It’s an example of the permeation of Nietzsche’s thought in popular culture. All of you may have seen this fantasy fiction movie, the Barbarian.
Conan the Barbarian is actually one of the most interesting critiques in popular culture of Buddhism, although it’s never formulated explicitly. The author of the novel, which is just one of those pulp novels, Robert E. Howard, was greatly influenced by Nietzsche when young. And if you analyze the movie, you find in the movie the very themes of the fascination revulsion. In this case, more revulsion than fascination with Buddhist teachings. Have on the one hand a hero who is profoundly Nietzschean.
Conan the barbarian is the Nietzschean ideal of a man. He venerates a distant sky god who rejoices in the sound of battle and bloodshed. His cult is a cult of power and force. These are themes which have resonated through western culture in the nine in the twentieth century in the darkest of ways. But he is posited as a life affirming force opposed against the life negating cult of his arch-enemy, who actually is represented as some sort of some sort of Eastern sectarian figure of the time with life denying disciples living in celibacy and venerating some sort of giant totemic deity, a snake deity.
Now this movie represents the ultimate process of trickling down of the Nietzschean critique of Buddhism in popular culture. And we see this when people are first introduced to the Buddhist teachings. We see the impact within their psyches of this relentless bombardment, the relentless affirmation of the prevalence of desire of a life affirming cultures of healthy and wholesome relation to the body and so forth as opposed to the life denying components as you have seen in Buddhism. This is prejudice. It’s very deeply rooted prejudice.
It’s one we should become aware of and then analyze. And if it’s if it’s justified, so be it. But to act on the basis of the such prejudice or to let it dwell within our minds unanalyzed, that I think is quite dangerous. And then I would like to conclude with some questions, which are as all the interesting questions, hypothetical. You know?
But at the beginning of this talk, we pointed out that there was a nexus. There was a turning point in western thought in the sixth century. Western thought had to choose between the models of permanence taught by Parmenides and a flux based model taught by Heraclitus. Western thought opted for the model of permanence. And a great German philosopher Heidegger in his introduction to metaphysics, clearly analyzes this moment.
All of our western culture, western aesthetics, our relation to desire are rooted in this idea of permanence, of the unchangeability of things. We see it in in our lives, in the cut of the unchanging relationship, the unchanging job, the permanent position. This has become part of our being. What would western civilization and culture have been if the West had chosen Heraclitus instead of Parmenides? So one of the things we tried to show during this talk was how the Parmenidean ideals of permanence pervaded western aesthetics and through aesthetics our relation to desire.
What would a Heraclitus aesthetics be? What would an aesthetics based on a theory of flux be? How would we relate to objects of desire if we perceive them as impermanent? We would relate to them in a much more informal fashion. The mind would not be absorbed in the object of desire in the same way.
Now whether such a thing is actually possible in the West, don’t know. But certainly aesthetics which are based on impermanence, on flux, have this. Much of Chinese aesthetics is based on the profound awareness awareness of the impermanence of phenomena. And we all sense it is very different from us and perhaps closer to reality. So that is basically all I wanted to cover with you today, and I would be very happy for any questions or any doubts you might have.
Yes? I was just I want I wanted to to go back to this model, desire, body, spirit, health, sexuality. I can see I can see how your presentation shows very clearly that these all come from the same source within our society. But there there is also a a
Parallel stream in our society where we value these things, but it is said over and over and over again, in the health literature, also in the psychological literature, that modern people live that the that the busyness of more modern life? How how is that possible? I’ve always felt that much of speech has a compensatory function. And therefore, much of the modern affirmations are precisely so powerfully because we live those things so little. There’s never seldom been an age, for instance, where independence has been affirmed so loudly.
Yet there’s never been an age where we’ve been less independent. Yeah. We have a lot fewer rights than, let’s say, just a mere fifty years ago in many respects. There’s seldom been an age where people have talked about relationships as much. There’s seldom been an age where so many people are single.
You know? So this is speech with its function as compensation. You know? I’m not terribly sure. It’s it’s interesting, you know, the second degree, but I I would say that’s about it.
We can’t take it at the first degree. Are there other other doubts, other questions? Yes. It’s hard to say. I mean, in the case of materialism, I think materialism was a choice which was made by the two dominant economic systems of the mid nineteenth century, nascent Marxism and nascent capitalism, both materialistic, both are very similar.
We just choose different models of analysis of society. Materialism basically is false. And unavoidably, any society built in materialism is going to run into inner contradictions. We’re running into inner inner contradictions. The biggest inner contradiction is the incapacity of materialism to provide a meaningful life.
I mean, an authentic materialist is necessary some necessarily someone like Camus who opts, you know, in the myth of Sisyphus or who should opt for suicide. I mean, if that’s all there is, why bother live? This is our societies are incapable of giving meaning. So this dooms them. This is why people come to Buddhist centers, to Christian centers, to the resurgence of Islam in in the West, actually, among the the newly immigrant communities is due to this.
Our societies are richer than ever before. Our societies are less capable of giving meaning than ever before. And this dooms. This dooms. What we find is that people come to Buddhist centers searching for a meaning.
Actually, any meaning. It doesn’t really matter which one. There is no meaning in their life. It could be a Sufi center. It could be a Hindu center.
It could be a Christian center. All they want is a structure. Our function is to make clear that we don’t offer a structure. We offer a very specific structure, which they may or may not want to take on board. But the mindset of those who come looking for a structure at any cost, whatever it is, is the mindset which leads to great sectarianism.
It’s a very narrow mind because what the person is saying is a person is psychologically destructured. This destructured person needs an exterior structure, whatever it is. And that exterior structure will be taken on board without being understood if need be. And will be defended tooth and nail because its defense is to the sense of the psychological integrity of the person. That is not our goal.
It cannot be our our goal. We can present the teachings of Buddha Śākyamūni, and we can present the Tibetan developments of these teachings. But we have to make it very clear that it is a structure which has to be accepted critically through reasoning, through study, through analysis, and it is a structure which is maybe not a structure for everybody. Our our task is not to structure unstructured psyches. It’s not our function.
Our function is merely to present what we believe is an authentic depiction of reality up to the students to decide. So one of the things historian has been doing very powerfully in the last three, four years is has he has been defining very clearly what Buddhism is. It is very important at present because of the extraordinary extraordinarily unstructured state of the West. The fact that most westerners are completely lost. It’s very important that we be very clear what Buddhism is and what Buddhism is not.
It is not possible to be a Buddhist if one does not believe in reincarnation. It’s not a matter of debate. It’s not possible to be a Buddhist if one has not taken refuge. It’s not possible to be a Buddhist if it believes the mind is matter. And it’s perfectly okay not to be a Buddhist, you say.
So I remember a couple of weeks ago, I get to translate a very difficult letter for Rinpoche of someone who did not want to come here anymore. And who said he did not want to come because he did not believe in selflessness. Said offhand, he said, such students we do not need. In other words, there are boundaries. And at this point in time, precisely because the demand from the side of the westerners is so great, we have to set the boundaries.
And it’s not popular. It’s not popular at all because people want structure and they want to belong. And they are ready to be very very flexible in terms of intellectual honesty, to find structure and to belong. We don’t offer free structure, and it’s not a social club. It’s not our goal.
You know? And then the moment one starts putting this in these terms, it’s difficult. You know? But I think it’s a matter of honesty, of intellectual honesty. Does that make sense?
Yes. I don’t know much about the history, but how did it relate between the Yes. Yes. That’s a very, very good point. That has been the curse of Christianity and the blessing of Buddhism.
The curse of Christianity has been really from its inception, the idea of the city of God and the apocalypse, which was then taken on by Augustine to create this idea of a Christian state. And this temptation, the Augustinian temptation, which a couple decades earlier was put into shape by the first emperor, Roman emperor, who Christianized the empire, Constantine, I think it was in 03/21, actually led to the or implanted the seeds of decay in Christianity. Christianity became a state religion. The Christian marriage became the state marriage, which was not before. Christian baptism became the inscription of people in the roles of the state.
You know? And many of the tragic abuses in the history of Christianity are connected with issues of power and the abuse of power. Whether it is the inquisition, which was an attempt to root out those with different beliefs because the heretic he who had different beliefs threatened the structure of the state or the witch hunts, which it seems now were largely materialistically motivated. There’s been a study of the famous Bamberg witch hunts in the sixteen thirties, which found that the vast majority of the poor witches who were arrested, these 40,000 women, were widows who were landed, who had land, and that the land was accruing to the church if they were found guilty of witchcraft. So the bishop of Bamberg made a fortune in the process.
This was the bane of Christianity. Buddhism has escaped this to a large degree with the unfortunate exception of Tibet where I think after the rule of the fifth Dalai Lama, Buddhism was really a a state religion, But the Dalai Lama’s were very enlightened in their ways of handling this. But fundamentally, what is very striking is precisely because Buddhism never wished to develop a a political thought or play a major role in society. For this reason, Buddhism has never had this degree of intolerance which came to characterize all those religions which saw themselves as having as a role to constitute a religious state. This Christianity and Islam.
And perhaps nowadays, Judaism. Perhaps. Bloody civil war. Hopefully, the end of bloody civil war in Sri Lanka in which one side was a Buddhist state. Yes.
But there have been many exceptions. But they’ve always been exceptions against the spirit of Buddhism. I mean, we’ve never had a Buddhist monk or priest call his disciples to holy war. That has never happened. And had it happened, it would have been totally at odds with the very spirit of Buddhism.
We have had from 1098 to 1250 pope after pope who was promising the complete remission of sins to the knighthood of Europe if they went to reconquer the holy land. So there there is a difference. Human nature is the same everywhere. Yes. But because precisely because the Buddhist teachings are teachings for the betterment of the person.
And through the betterment of the person, indirectly others are helped. The community is helped. There’s not at all a Buddhist political thought, an organic Buddhist political thought. And Buddhism has broadly speaking escaped the temptations which faced Christianity in Islam. Mean, there were exceptions.
I mean, there were persecutions of the in Tibet, but persecution of the meant what? It meant that, you know, their books were not published in Central Tibet. Well, it’s not exactly the same thing as burning people at the stake. You know? It’s a massive big difference.
I don’t think so. I mean, as I’ve said, human nature is the same everywhere. So an old friend of a friend of mine, Marie Madeline Davy, a great medieval scholar, made a very particular point. He said, wherever there is man, there is nonsense. This is true.
Man as in the general. As in the, you know, male and female. The problem I think with Christianity in this respect has been the imposition of celibacy on the one side, both to the monks where it’s legitimate and to the priests where it is a historical development. The Roman Catholic priests were not celibate before the Gregorian reformation. Imposition of celibacy and the total absence of antidotes to desire being taught in the tradition.
There’s absolutely no way to counteract desire except struggle. Now some of the early Christian desert fathers did indeed have something akin to meditation. It’s very primitive. But there’s nothing otherwise. There’s no meditation on the physical human body.
There’s no meditation on death and impermanence. There’s no meditation on the skin. This does not exist. You know? Then, obviously, it’s very difficult.
And the risk in those cases is in perverted manifestation of these impulses. I think that’s what’s happened. I know of one case which was reported by his holiness. The monk was expelled. I normal I don’t know of other cases.
I think it would be very difficult. The monasteries are very public places, number one. Number two, Christianity is a religion which probably is in agony. Most Christians have mixed feelings and mixed beliefs with respect to their own religion. And when you have mixed beliefs and you lack faith and there are strong external strictures, this is the recipe for trouble.
And then there’s no way around the fact that there was an institutionalization of of hypocrisy. In the Roman Catholic church, I think we have to acknowledge that that was the case. The absence of the antidotes, think, a very powerful see, Buddhist monks meditate, and they meditate every day. So the process of change is initiated. Rinpoche said was very clearly through prayer alone there is no transformation.
That is the only tool the Christian has. It’s a tragic situation. He prays for help. You see, what happened is because of the Christian and monotheistic wish for a religious state, especially in Roman Catholicism, lay orders, in the court, lay orders were created whose function was to bridge the gap between the monastic world and the community. They ordered like the Franciscans or the Dominicans.
Then more recently, orders like the Christian brothers, which have been associated with most of the scandal, the sisters of mercy. Now these are orders where people are either ordained as monks or nuns or have vows of celibacy, and yet at the same time they have to be active in society in a curative function. This is a contradiction in terms, and I think this is what has come to haunt the Roman Catholic church. You cannot mix the contemplative and the active vocations. What we end up with is a couple exceptional people like mother Teresa.
And then we have many cases where the person is held to an inner discipline in a society which has moved totally away from that. And this creates tremendous tension and the person yet is expected to be active in society. So these are problems I think the Catholic church itself has to address to say, I don’t feel they concern us personally. You know? Does it go towards answering your question?
How can you practice as a as a noncelebrate person? Well, there are many many teachings in the certainly in the Buddhist tradition, many. And I think most religions don’t enjoy celibacy for spiritual perfection. Having said that, you know, the thing we find time and over again in centers is that when people start practicing seriously at a certain point, they realize that they’re going to have to choose. And it’s a refusal of choice.
Because at a certain point, different practices seriously, it’s not possible to have at home. You can’t have the job, the money, the family, the good life, and the great practice. It doesn’t work like that. Something has to give. You know?
And the the of celibacy in the monastic ordination was precisely to release the total focus of the person on spiritual practice. It’s not for everybody. One has to really want to go that route. You know, but for somebody who wants to go that route, that’s the way to progress. That’s why when the Buddha started teaching, he taught they were not called monks in those days.
They were called bhikkhus. Renouncers.
They were those who had given everything up for their practice. Then, obviously, the availability, the disposability, the power of the person is tremendous. The person accomplishes whatever it is possible for that person to accomplish within their limitations. You know? One of the big problems with the transmission of Tibetan Buddhism to the West has been that a magnificent monastic and ascetic tradition is trying to find its place in a very secular and lay world.
Now the premise of I remember I was translating for a lama in Estonia who casually said, well, obviously, any decent lay Buddhist would be doing one month solitary retreat per year. That’s a minimum. And I saw the people in my Estonian audience just going white. You know, like, one month solitary retreat a year. So your vacation, you spend alone, locked up, you know.
And this is just the standard, you know. Obviously, the reality is that we’re to have to bring the standard down. That’s what a lot of my western friends find difficult to accept. Can’t do it wrong. So it’s four or five.
We’ve tried to sort of keep stick to the schedule. Thank you very, very much.