TBI Recordings – 01-130331 1321

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About this talk. The speaker explains the Buddhist tenet schools, from Vaibhashika through Sautrantika, Chittamatra and the two Madhyamika schools, by how real each holds phenomena to be, using a chart of eight modes of existence. Examples include a cup of coffee and the Svatantrika and Prasangika views of imputation. The talk also raises modern physics and questions about how imputation is limited, and urges listeners to test the views against their own understanding.

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Then I’ve given the Sanskrit name simply because, frankly, it’s the names everyone uses. Then whether you read sources in English, in French, in German, everyone speaks of the Sautrantikas. Jeffrey started translating these into English, the followers of sūtra, but the problem with that approach is that every single translator has his own translation. So you’re much better off learning a couple Sanskrit terms and not having to to try to figure who are they talking about when they speak of the followers of sūtra. Then the second chart I ask Ishra before handing out because it’s quite a bit more complex.

He said it would be of help to you. You have basically eight different modes of existence which phenomena can have. They’re listed in the column to the far left. Ultimately established establishes its own suchness, correctly established, truly existing, truly established, established by its own characteristics, inherently established, and established from its own side. This refer to varying degrees of reality of phenomena.

A phenomena which has all of these eight features is as real as it can possibly be, let’s say, from a materialist standpoint. Then you see that the Vaibhāṣika school, of which Kesang spoke this morning, asserts that its ultimate phenomena which are the subtle atoms Kesang was talking about have all these eight features of existence. They really exist as little independent blocks of something. That’s what’s the meaning here. Then as you progress upwards in the schools of tenets through the Sautrāntika, following reasoning, the other Sautrantikas are basically identical to the Vaibhāṣikas, then the Chitamatra, then the two Mādhyamika schools, you will see more and more phenomena lack these.

So in the chart, a zero means that that quality is absent. A plus means it’s present. Right? So you see for the Vaibhāṣikas, all of the ultimate phenomena, in other words, of the subtle atoms have all of these eight features. And within conventional phenomena, conventionally have four of these eight features of existence.

When you move up to Prāsaṇgika to the far right, you can see that neither conventional nor ultimate phenomena have any of these features. So the main difference between the Buddhist schools, to put it very simply, is how real they think the world is. That’s the core difference. For the Vaibhāṣikas, really their view is, I’d say, identical to a sort of naive materialism. The true reality are some indivisible particles which we might say nowadays are quarks, let’s say, right, or gluons or whatever.

And everything which is composed of that is less real because it’s composed of parts. Then when you move upwards to the Sautrāntika, the distinction between what is real and what is less real, in other words, ultimate and conventional phenomena since ultimate conventional phenomena are what are real from a Buddhist standpoint, conventional phenomena are unreal, is a difference between impermanent and permanent phenomena. So for the what changes is real. What is impermanent is real simply because it can be a cause, it can be a result, it can do things. So for the Sautrāntika school, everything we see, we hear, we smell, we feel is real.

What is unreal are things such as space which are conceptual constructs. They are therefore called conventional phenomena. Ultimate phenomena are what are truly real. Then the mind only school goes much further in its dismissal of reality as we understand. For the mind only school, everything is of the nature of the mind.

It doesn’t mean that everything is mind, that a chair is not mind. It is of the nature of mind. What that means is that my mind, let’s say my eye consciousness perceiving the chair and the chair are actually not of a different nature. The chair is something which manifests within my eye consciousness perceiving the chair. I can’t posit anything else than that.

It’s quite a an intimidating view for Westerners. I should point out that it is one of the two views which is highly compatible with quantum physics. And the final two views then are the Mādhyamika views, the Svatāntrika and Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika views. You can see the main difference in this chart between these two views is that the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika assert that conventional phenomena are established by their own characteristics, inherently established and established from their own side. What that means is that for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, there is something from the side of phenomena.

When for instance, a Geshe will explain that this afternoon, When, for instance, I perceive a chair with my eye consciousness, clearly, I impute chairness on the basis of imputation, which is a chair. But the Svatantika Mādhyamika say that there are characteristics of the chair which exist really from the chair side, typically the parts of the chair, that which I cannot impute on that chair the name chair. Then chair comes into existence through the meeting of my mental imputation and the features of chair from chair’s own side. It’s a Svatāntrika Mādhyamika viewpoint. The Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika viewpoint is that there is nothing from the object’s side.

It is a basis of imputation on which the mind imputes, in this case, chairness. But that basis of imputation internally is itself analyzed under ultimate analysis is found not to exist. Under ultimate analysis, conventionally, it exists. So, Geshe-la, we’ll go into that in much more detail this afternoon. Yes.

That basis then of imputation is made up of a compilation of the the the each component, each part is in itself a compilation of smaller and smaller parts. So then you get down to and that’s where the whole issue of the smallest possible part not existing inherently. That’s where this discussion earlier today about the partless particle comes into it. So that’s where there’s a difference between the Cittamātra and the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika view. The Cittamātra assert that there are no phenomena exterior to the mind at all.

So that’s quite a radical view. It’s what you would call radical idealism in Western philosophy. Then the Prāsaṇgika assert that there are exterior phenomena. The Cittamatras assert therefore that there are no such things as partless ultimate particles. Prāsaṇgika asserts that there are ultimate particles, but that they can have directional parts.

Then I was speaking about that with Geshe-la over lunch. My personal feeling is it’s not a central tenet of Prāsaṇgika. I mean, it’s not really central. It is something which has to be settled more by modern physics than by anything else. You know?

But the Prāsaṇgika viewpoint is a very difficult viewpoint. So therefore, it would just theoretically just keep going? Oh, yeah. I mean, the big problem, Prāsaṇgika, is that there is no base, actually. Right?

So the Prāsaṇgika viewpoint is one we all pay lip service to. But once one analyzes carefully, it is it is quite intimidating. So therefore, from that view, what if the Buddha can conceive both conventional and ultimate, we can only really use those terms from our side, because for a Buddha, conventional and ultimate would have to be a manifestation for where our minds are at. It’s very difficult for us to envision what the Buddha’s omniscient mind experiences. Clearly, omniscience means the Buddha perceives simultaneously everything which exists, both conventionally and ultimately at the same time.

In force, I mean, it’s very difficult to envision what that might be. Could you just repeat the sentence that you were using to ascribe to to describe Chitamantra. The chair is something which manifests you know, didn’t catch the last bit. So let’s take, for instance, my cup of coffee. And we’ll go go through each of the four schools of tenets.

I think that will be quite helpful if you if you want. So what do the Vaibhāṣikas? Let’s say first, what do Western materialists assert? That’s even a better way to go. Western materialists assert this cup of coffee is probably silica.

Silica is a state of carbon if memory serves me well. If you examine this cup with an electron microscope you would see atoms of carbon with their four valences, their four electrons. You would probably see a fuzz. Right? The nucleus and the four electrons in between great gaps of space.

Western physics, Western materialism asserts that this cup is impermanent. It’s a given, taken for granted. You can see that. You can actually, when you examine the cup, see the molecular and atomic decay. Then if we move to the Vaibhāṣika view, the Vaibhāṣika view is primitive but accurate presentation of atoms.

In other words, the cup is constituted of particles or atoms. Then according to the Vaibhāṣikas, yes, these atoms don’t touch themselves, but they are linked by atoms of air, you know, to prevent them from touching themselves. But the key to the Vaibhāṣika view is the atomism. The fact that the cup is composed of particles. Then the question which arises for the Vaibhāṣika is what is ultimate?

The Vaibhāṣika say that what is ultimate is what can’t be destroyed. The cup is not ultimate because I can smash it. So the question is what is unsmashable? The ultimate particles are unsmashable. Therefore they are ultimate for the right?

Now you are really very much within the mindset of modern physics here. I mean, modern physicists at CERN, for instance, in Geneva are trying to find particle the core particles. You you’ve heard of the Higgs boson and whatnot, you know, trying to find particles which actually cannot be destroyed, the ultimate particles. We are very close to the Vaibhāṣika viewpoint in that matter. Then the Sautratika is a development of Vaibhāṣika.

They go one step further. They say, well, just to say that the atoms which cannot be destroyed or the particles which cannot be destroyed are ultimate is too elementary a presentation. Really what is ultimate is what can perform a function. And to perform a function you have to change. Therefore everything which is changeable is ultimate.

What is unchangeable is not. Then what is changeable? Matter, this is recognized by physics but consciousness as well. Consciousness is not recognized as an independent entity by physics at least until recently, the last century and so called non associated compositional phenomena which are persons or beings, which have both a body and a mind. So that’s the Sautrāntika viewpoint.

Then Chitamatra goes much further. Chitamatra says it’s actually any presentation of ultimate particles is logically incoherent and Geshela gave the critique of this presentation this morning. Such particles either have directions in which case they have parts or if they don’t touch each other then the whole system collapses. The the the body of the material concerned has no cohesion. Then Chitamatra says this is not just a refutation of ultimate particles.

It’s a refutation of all existence independent of the mind. Nothing exists apart from the mind perceiving phenomena. Then how does this happen? For instance, let us say, if I look at present at my cup, it seems that there are two things in presence. There’s an eye consciousness perceiving the cup, the green color of the cup and there really seems to be a cup from its own side.

That’s my experience of it. The Chitamatra say this is an illusion. Actually, the so called mind basis of all, the Alaya Vijñāna which carries the karmic imprints which we have accumulated since beginning this time simultaneously causes or let’s say the karmic imprint which dwells in the Alaya Vijñāna when it matures, matures simultaneously in two different aspects. One aspect of an eye consciousness perceiving the cup and another aspect of the consciousness which is the cup perceived. And this is due to ignorance.

If we eliminate ignorance regarding specifically the subtle selflessness of phenomena then we understand that there is no difference in nature between my eye consciousness perceiving the cup and that aspect of my consciousness which manifests as the cup. In other words, there are no phenomena exterior to consciousness. Exterior to the eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tactile consciousness, and mental consciousness. The aspect of the eye consciousness manifesting as the cup. They are of one nature.

That doesn’t mean that the cup is consciousness, but it’s a manifestation of the eye consciousness. So the karmic imprint which is present in our mind simultaneously manifests in two different aspects, The illusion of the perceiver and the illusion of the perceived. As the Chitamatra viewpoint and therefore for the Chitamatras, the fundamental reality is consciousness. Consciousness is therefore truly established, inherently established, established by its own side, etcetera. So the cittamatra viewpoint is a very powerful view to counter afflictions.

Whenever an object affliction arises, one just looks at it and thinks, this is just the manifestation of my eye consciousness. It’s a maturation of a karmic imprint. It is not of a different nature than my eye consciousness which perceives it. This is this beautiful music is just not of a different nature from the ear consciousness perceiving it. Very powerful viewpoint.

The problem is there are some logical issues with the cittamatra position. Particularly, it’s very difficult to posit any type of exterior causality. It’s a very powerful viewpoint to explain karmic causality. But if you try to account, let’s say, for just ordinary causality, a cat running after a mouse, the mouse, because of fear of the cat, runs away and you try to do this in the Chitamatra system, it’s quite nightmarish to do. It’s really difficult.

You have your own karmic imprints. The cat has its own karmic imprints. The mouse has its own karmic imprints. Then that experience of seeing the cat running after the mouse, do you have one single karmic imprint in your mind which is maturing in an eye consciousness perceiving both the cat and the mouse from the one side and in an aspect of the eye consciousness of both the cat and the mouse from the other side? Or do you have two karmic imprints manifesting?

One manifesting as a perception of the cat and the perceived cat, the other manifesting as a perception of the mouse and the perceived mouse? Or do you have three karmic imprints manifesting? One with those two animals and another with the one running after the other, etcetera, etcetera. So there are some substantial problems and I think personally a very strong scientific argument against the Chitamatra view is simply the fact that there are phenomena which are perceived of which we cannot say whether they exist at present or not. For instance, if we look at present at the light from Alpha Centauri, the closest star to the earth, it’s approximately four years four light years away.

When we actually see that light, we see the light from four years ago. So we have no way of knowing at present when we see Alpha Centauri if Alpha Centauri is in existence now or not. Yet it is perceived, the light is perceived, then you can make a very fine Chitamatra argument to avoid this problem is difficult. Then the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika view is a view as all the Mādhyamika views of realism. So outer phenomena do exist for Svatāntrika and Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika.

There’s no debate. But their existence is much more tenuous than we think it really is. Svatāntrika Mādhyamika says that things basically come into existence at the meeting point of their characteristics which exist from their own side and the mind which is imputing that object on those characteristics. So Svatāntrika Mādhyamika says that there really is something from the side of the object which is actually a much more intuitive view. Most of the Geshes I know are officially Prāsaṇgika, but when you dig a little bit, they’re quite at ease with the viewpoint.

Because in the viewpoint, there are no characteristics from the side of the object which are ultimately a basis for imputation. The basic problem Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika has is why isn’t everything everything else in its opposite? If phenomena basically are exclusively mental imputations on the base imputation, then how do you posit a difference between a valid and an invalid imputation? So it is done. There are criteria, there three criteria for this, but it’s quite difficult to do well.

Then these difficulties you encounter in quantum physics. So now, I answered your question. I thought it was a helpful way to do it. Yes, Saffron. I was just wondering on that question about I think it was with the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika view, why isn’t everything and its opposite?

It’s probably not possible, but can you use the cup as an example? Is there a way of doing that? The question in a nutshell is if you say that this cup exists as a mere mental imputation on the basis of imputation of the cup, in other words, on the cylinder, the handle, the base, the instance of time of the cup, right, which is the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika viewpoint, Why can’t you impute, let us say, pencil on this base of imputation? Yes. That’s the answer.

But that’s the answer, but it’s an ad hoc answer. Right? It’s like you take the cup, you try using it, the pencil doesn’t work. Well, I’m not I’m not gonna try it. And it’s not working means that the cup is not a suitable base of imputation or the the elements of the cup are not a suitable base of imputation for pencilness.

But it gets quite awkward. I don’t remember exactly. The first is worldly recognition. The second I mean, it’s I’m sorry. It’s a distant memory.

It is not contradictory and valid cognizer. The third, I’m not sure. But it’s actually rather difficult to establish conventional reality in Prāsaṇgika, and yet conventional reality does exist. Ah, yes. The microphone for sofa.

So I was just thinking with that last one, the the the basis of imputation of cup isn’t isn’t valid or perhaps not that’s not the right word, isn’t relevant for an ant climbing into it. It still has a cup. That’s a big question. Right? I mean, clearly, an ant does not impute cuppness on the basis of imputation of cup.

A human being who has used a cup does, but a human being who hasn’t used a cup may or may not. Right? Then because a human let’s say the ant doesn’t impute cuppness on a cup, Cup cannot fulfill the function of a cup for an ant. But for a human being who has already experienced using a cup, cup can fulfill the function of a cup. Right?

The idea of a glass of water from a a a god will see it as nectar of human as water and being as pus. So it’s that’s something about our karma that forces us to see the basis of what that is in a certain way. So, therefore, it follows if we purify our obscurations, then we can impute in a in a more accurate way what is concordant with the way things are. Is that Yes. I mean, you have to analyze really carefully.

These are not easy topics. And there’s sort of a policy not to talk too much about this because people get quite stressed, really. But let’s let’s take an example. Natural laws exist. Right?

You take an apple. You hold it here. You drop it. We put basically at the at sea level. It drops at 9.81 meters per second squared acceleration.

So the first second, it’ll hit the speed of 9.81 square meters meters per second. Excuse me. Now this will happen whether you drop the apple here, you drop it at Central Market, whether the person who drops an apple knows this law or not. So it’s clear that there are universal laws. Everything we do with technology is written to the idea that there are laws.

I mean, we calculate things. We get results. You know? I mean, what actually, we have three basic physics principles in physics in variance of space, time, and experiment. Right?

So who wherever the experiment is made, all of the things being equal, the results must be the same. Whenever it’s made, the results must be the same and whoever makes it, the results must be the same. The moment one of those three invariances stops, physics as we know it ceases to exist. You cannot do experiments anymore. So that means that it’s not possible to impute anything on anything.

Then the question is what are the limitations to imputation? And this is the issue with the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika viewpoint. For prasanika madhyamika but also for Chitamatra, reality as we know it is much much more tenuous than we think it is. But there still is something out there. For Chitamatra, there’s nothing at all.

It’s just the the mind basis of all. For there is something out there, but it is highly contingent imputation. We say imputation. It’s one of the translations for. You can translate it as projection.

In Tibetan, it literally means to put a feather on something. Right? So putting something on something. Right? Then if you have any questions, perhaps we’ll take one more question.

You know? Given what Chris just said about linking that nectar offering as blood and pus, those different imputations, Geshe-la said really clearly this morning, it’s highly inappropriate to impute enemy on one’s mother on the basis of compassion and Bodhichitta. That’s correct. So that’s what makes it’s very clear. Something about that is very clear.

I mean, there’s a lot of empirical data which goes in this direction. His Holiness has had some talks with a psychologist, an experimental psychologist, and I I forget the name of the the experimenter. He was doing a lot of work on the process of genesis of emotions. And his wife always quoted this. This experimenter said to him that approximately 90% of the qualities and attributes which are seen in an object, which are the basis for attachment, come from the side of the observer.

You know? That’s huge. Right? Then that means that we are highly delusional. Right?

Of the person who feels those emotions. So 90% of projections are imputations, which is an awful lot. Then if you have the possibility what I would suggest as a way to enter into this an understanding of tenets is perhaps to pick up a good book like Cutting Through Appearances is not too long. If you have the courage, you can try Meditation on Emptiness by Jeffrey Hopkins. But those are more difficult books and the thing is not just to read it but to ask yourself, is this true or not?

Does this fit with what we know of modern physics? And look a little bit into modern physics as much as you can. I mean, if you can’t, you can’t. But our goal is not just to present an Asian system of thought. Our goal is to try to get a sense of how things actually are.

Otherwise, just an Asian system of thought, there are many. There’s no particular reason to waste time. You know? Because if things truly exist like the Cittamātra say or like the Mādhyamika or even the Chitamatra say, then it’s got very far reaching consequences for our lives. And then we want to meditate on that and change the way we perceive people and things.

You know? It’s clear that once you start perceiving people as mere conceptual and nominal imputations, then you don’t relate to them at the same way. So you want to be quite sure that that is a correct way to perceive them. Not just what you’ve been told and okay, this is what we say here at the center, this is we do. I mean you have to really, really check and there’s a lot of data in quantum physics.

I mentioned this last year mainly in Wigner’s famous example of Wigner’s friend and in some of the examples of the orthodoxy of quantum physics which really corroborate this. Then there are simplified books in quantum physics, not very mathematical. If you feel like reading them, it might be helpful. Might be helpful. If there are no characteristics from the side of the object, how do they account for the fact of the way the object functions that that cup holds water?

Water. So it’s precisely because the object has no characteristics that it functions from the Prāsaṇgika viewpoint. And it’s precisely because of mental imputation that the object can function. If from the Prāsaṇgika viewpoint, if the object had was established by its own characteristics or was inherently established, it actually could not function. So the viewpoint is an extremely fluid viewpoint.

So it looks this conventionally. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

But think about it. I mean, your doubts are good because it’s these are the key doubts. Right? I mean, if you read Śāntideva’s ninth the ninth chapter in Śāntideva’s bodhisattva, are the doubts which are addressed with the Prāsaṇgika by the Cittamatras. They say if as you say nothing is inherently established, then nothing can do anything or everything can do everything, which is neither of which is the case.

Right? Then karma collapses. For those who are non Buddhist, we would say physical laws collapse. You know? I mean, your your car works.

It works because of the fundamental laws of mechanics. You know? Didn’t I think we have to stop? It’s too sharp. It wasn’t Oh.

For which language? Well, I have the Oxford Compact Dictionary at home. Then I use a Webster thesaurus. So you see I divide myself equally between the two great powers in England and America. And I spell recognize with a z.

I have yet to adapt to the old fashioned way of doing it and those who don’t accept change. Thank you very much. You’re welcome.

Key terms in this teaching

basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
bodhisattva jang chub sem pa (Tib)
One who possesses bodhicitta. LYWA
Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
mind basis of all alayavijana (Skt); kun zhi nam shä (Tib)
A main consciousness posited by the Cittamatra school, the consciousness they say is needed to carry karmic imprints. LYWA
Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
selflessness of phenomena chö kyi dag me (Tib)
The absence of a self in phenomena - all things other than the person. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka view, the most subtle form is their lack of inherent existence: they do not exist from their own side. LYWA
Vaibhashika jedrag mawa (Tib)
The Great Exposition school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Great Exposition school asserts truly established external objects but does not assert self-knowers. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

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