Public Talks — 2011-07-30

Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Public Talks (Khensur Rinpoche)
Public Talks (Khensur Rinpoche)
Public Talks — 2011-07-30
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 91-minute philosophical talk, Ilya Dharmasi explores Buddhist refutations of materialism, arguing that understanding the nature of mind is fundamental to whether Buddhism remains spiritually meaningful. He begins by framing the mind-body problem as the central question haunting Western Buddhists, then contrasts Western epistemology—which defines knowledge as justified true belief and treats it as purely conceptual—with the Buddhist theory of valid cognition, which includes non-conceptual direct perception as its highest form. Dharmasi presents ancient Indian materialist schools, particularly Lokāyata, showing how their nihilistic doctrines resemble contemporary scientific materialism, then marshals Buddhist philosophical counterarguments rooted in Dharmakīrti and Shāntarakshita. He concludes by offering modern evidence against materialism: the spontaneous ethical preferences of pre-verbal infants and the poverty of stimulus problem in language acquisition, both of which suggest an innate, non-material foundation that reincarnation explains more parsimoniously than genetic or evolutionary accounts. Pitched at practitioners and philosophers familiar with Buddhist thought and Western academic discourse.

File metadata (for organising)

File: meditation-2011-07-30-kr

Teacher: Ilia Durovic

Collection: Meditation

Date: 2030-07-11

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~10,967

Welcome back, everybody. Ilya hardly needs any introduction. Once again, I’ll ask you just to read the notice in the foyer for the description of Ilya’s background. Buddhist refutations of materialism from Dharmakīrti to Shāntarakshita and beyond. Without any further ado, it’s my great pleasure to hand over to Ilya Dharmasi.

Thank you. Thank you very much, Chris. I’m delighted that we have been able to organize the second session of the symposium at TBI at Khensur Rinpoche’s request. And there is logic to our madness. Year by year, the topics are addressing core issues for Westerners.

So, last year, if you remember, the crux of the symposium was how can one be a Westerner and a Buddhist? And we try to highlight the difficulties which are often swept under the carpet. In so doing, we found that there were difficulties we had not really been aware of, but which during the course of the symposium came out, and I think this was very beneficial. This year’s symposium goes further in that direction and it addresses, I think, one of the fundamental problems for Westerners who were raised in a twenty first century society, which is how to conciliate the teachings of the great spiritual traditions, in this case the Buddhist tradition, with the dominant materialist message. And I think we cannot elude the reality that the subtext of much of scientific research is materialistic.

So, I felt that with professionals like Sylvia Barber, who is a psychiatrist, or Pamela, is a philosopher of science, I had the possibility to move back into a field which is much more my field, which is that of Buddhist philosophy and Western philosophy. Otherwise, know, when one always talks of topics one is not the master of, one runs the risk of being ridiculous and becomes a jack of all trade and a master of none’s. So today, since Pamela and Sylvia are covering the scientific aspect of the matter, I will articulate my two talks if you want, want in counterpoint. And these two talks are complementary. The first will present a strongly theoretical standpoint on Buddhist refutations of the material nature of the mind.

The second talk is actually going to draw massively on contemporary research on ESP, paranormal phenomena, which I feel provides perhaps the strongest argument within the scientific community against a materialist understanding of mind, what the Tibetans call namshe. Now, these talks are complementary, and one in the first talk I will draw heavily on the Buddhist tradition, since I feel we owe a debt of gratitude to the great masters who came before us, and I don’t think it is appropriate in a Buddhist temple to have a symposium, without talking of our forefathers in the Buddhist teachings figures like Dharmakīrti, Śāntaraksita, Dharmottara and so forth. The second talk will be more contemporary. So, my first talk will focus on Buddhist refutations of materialism and nihilism. And somebody asked me two years ago, and it’s a provocative question, but I think it came from the heart and it’s a very Australian question.

Why bother talking about these figures, these Buddhist philosophers who lived two thousand years ago and what they thought. And the subtext of that question, I think, is one which haunts us in Buddhist centers. All of us Westerners who become Buddhist have to address it at a certain point. Is Buddhism relevant or is it irrelevant? If it is relevant, it’s a worthy pursuit.

If it is irrelevant, then there’s no point in wasting your time and coming here. And the question has to be asked bluntly. In French we say, one has to put the iron in the wound. There’s an old medieval expression, which came from the age where wounds were healed through cauterization with a red hot iron. Therefore, if one really wants to go to the bottom of things, one has to take the red hot iron and put it where it hurts most.

And where it hurts most, I think for us, at present, is a mind brain relationship. So, much of the subtext now in the scientific research on meditation is materialistic, and it is a subtext. It has to be brought to light. There has been remarkable research, by Davidson, but by others before Davidson, Lutz and so forth, on what I would call the neurological correlates of meditation. And what their research has done is to demonstrate that this exists, which is a tremendous step forward, since for decades all Buddhist activities were basically dismissed as fancies.

So, the demonstration that there are neurological correlates of meditation does establish that Buddhist meditation works from a scientific standpoint. In other words, that in the light, as Sylvia Barbara explained to us, of neuroplasticity, Buddhist meditation leads to transformations of the brain structure. This is of no interest whatsoever to a practicing Buddhist. I put it bluntly. Because all Buddhist meditations are designed to transform a non material mind, so that this non material mind can move upwards in the cycle of incarnations from life to life, until it attains a state of liberation from the cycle of incarnations, or the state of full omniscience, which is full enlightenment.

So, the danger for us in the recognition which the Buddhist community has been getting from the scientific milieu is to lose sight of the fact that it is recognition on their own terms. It is just a recognition that our meditative techniques work, which is not terribly surprising. We all know through meditation that our thought processes change over time. So, it’s a personal experience, most of us have. Then, since there obviously is a close correlation between the physical brain and the cortex on the one hand, and the mind on the other hand, if neuroplasticity is a reality, and it seems a word that it is, it is not surprising that brain structure should change.

For instance, as Sylvia mentioned, that the depth of the cortex, which as you know is quite superficial actually, should increase. That one should find activity of the insular, for instance, when one meditates on compassion, since compassion is empathy, empathetic in Greek, to suffer with. So, this type of research is extraordinarily beneficial, I think, for the scientific community. It opens a gateway to contact. It is actually, I think, why His Holiness the Dalai Lama has done so much to foster it.

We should however not lose sight that at no point in this research do the scientists who engage in this research take any position regarding the non material nature of the mind. And one has to be very direct about these matters and as I said, I will basically put the red hot iron in the wound. If the mind is material, Buddhism as a philosophical and spiritual tradition collapses. At that point, we all as Khensur Rinpoche said, go off to the beach and have fun. Then that does not mean that it is not possible to use Buddhist meditation techniques to calm psychological problems, anguish and so forth.

That is perfectly legitimate and acceptable, but that is not Buddhism. If on the other hand, the mind is non material and therefore there is a mental continuum, and this is the teachings of most of the great religions who disagree on the extent of this mental continuum, but teach that there is a mental continuum, then there is a place for those traditions which wish to transform that mental continuum, and then meditative techniques not only have a place, but have a very specific purpose. The reason this is important is because if we believe that the mind is an epiphenomenon of the brain, it’s a sub product of the brain’s activities, then we close the door to the long-term goal of all meditative practices, and for instance, we will exclude, and we do see this among Western Buddhists, all practices which are unpleasant in this life. Now as Rinpoche has explained very forcefully at TBI, Dharma starts by closing the door to this life, by turning away from this life. So there are a series of meditative practices which are unpleasant and even painful, and which remain unpleasant and painful for the duration of this life.

The practice of confession, the generation of guilt at the thought of non virtues accumulated is neither pleasant nor something we wish to engage in. It is profoundly beneficial, if and only if it enables one to eliminate the impact of non virtue in future lives. If future lives don’t exist, if the mind is a byproduct of the brain, this whole sway of Buddhist practices collapses. So does karma and causality, which have absolutely no relevance, if one restricts Buddhism to a set of psychological techniques for well-being. Hence, in my opinion, the profound discomfort in the Western Buddhist community with teachings on karma and causality.

Hence, the reason for which Khensur Rinpoche hammers the nail home again and again, in every teaching Rinpoche gives. I have heard Rinpoche teach in Australia, I have heard him teach in Singapore, and I have heard him teach in India. Rinpoche’s teachings are completely different. In Australia, I would say Rinpoche is a master of karma. Karma and causality is what Rinpoche teaches.

In Singapore, I have never heard Rinpoche teach anything else but renunciation. In the great monasteries, as in the great monasteries, Rinpoche teaches on the importance of meditation. Belief in karma and causality is there, renunciation is to a degree probably there, studies are there, meditation may be lacking. So this is a subtext I would like to pose before addressing what I feel is the crux of this symposium, which is a mind body problem. The problem which has haunted Western philosophy, it has haunted Asian philosophy.

The answers provided are different. When we want to address the issue of the mind body problem, we have to address the issue of differential epistemology. In other words, differences in the understanding of what it means to know. And to do this, I think we have to understand where we come from as westerners. We carry much more baggage than we suspect.

Bringing this baggage to light is the first way in deciding, first point in deciding whether or not this is baggage we want to have with us. Therefore, have to address Western theories of knowledge. And they span a range of philosophers starting with Plato, who in the Theatetus provides the classical account for knowledge, knowledge as justified true belief, all the way to a contemporary philosopher, an American philosopher, Edmund Gettier, who pointed out the paradoxes in Plato’s understanding of knowledge. The classical Western understanding of knowledge understands knowledge as a development of belief and I think this is fundamental to see the difference between the Western understanding of knowledge and the Indian understanding of Pramāna or valid cognition with which we will deal with later. The pre pre-Gettier consensus, which is in other words Plato’s position regarding knowledge, is that when we think knowledge is justified true belief, this occurs if for a given logical proposition P, let’s say all Aussies love surfing, P is true, in other words, it is true that all Aussies love surfing, the subject who is uttering the proposition believes p is true, in other words, I from my side am profoundly convinced surfing gives meaning to life for most Australians, and the subject is justified in believing p is true.

In other words, the subject has a reason for this. Those of us who have studied Buddhist philosophy are often quite surprised at how simplistic this presentation of knowledge is, because what is striking here is that knowledge is constructed on P’s belief in a proposition and the presence of a reason, actually any reason, This is Gettier’s main criticism of this position. Gettier points out that many reasons can be provided for a true proposition which are invalid reasons and the subject may believe a true proposition on the basis of invalid reasons, this does not qualify as knowledge. And the famous example which is given, is the following. If you imagine a county in the Midwest, in which for reasons unknown to us, a series of Potemkin barns are erected, in other words, facades of barns, and somebody is driving through the countryside, and he sees all these false barns.

They’re not real barns, but among these false barns, there’s the last extant bond in the county, one real bond. He sees that barn and seeing the false and the real barns concludes this county is filled with barns. This is a case of knowledge according to Plato’s account of knowledge. This clearly for Gettier is not an account of knowledge, since basically there is one barn in the county, but all the other barns are Potemkin barns, they’re facades of barns, and therefore a correct account has not been given of knowledge in the Platonic terms, in terms of justified true belief. Now what is striking here is that Gettier’s famous counter argument is very recent.

It dates back to 1963. So it’s only in 1963 that fundamental issues regarding Western theories of knowledge were brought into question. And this leads us, I think, to the core features of western epistemology, western theories of knowledge. The first one is the notion of an externally verifiable true proposition independent of the knower. This is a leitmotif in western logic and epistemology.

The truth value of a propositional proposition, a logical statement, Aussies love surfing, does not depend on the percipient of the statement. It is externally accessible. The second point is that knowledge is rooted in belief. The third point which is very striking is that for Plato and all Western theorists, knowledge can only be conceptual. Plato in the theatetus refutes as the first position of theatetus the idea that knowledge might be perception.

Now this creates major problems from a Buddhist standpoint, where we acknowledge the existence of non conceptual knowledge. Specifically, realization is non conceptual knowledge. It is not just non conceptual knowledge, it is the supreme form of knowledge all Buddhist practitioners strive for. And the fourth feature, which is very striking when one studies Western epistemology from the standpoint of the Buddhist logicians, is that the features of the knowing mind, the mind which knows, are never addressed. It is extraordinary that no attempt is made to identify what characterizes the mind which knows the truth of a phenomenon or a proposition.

So I would like to contrast these features of the western theory of knowledge with ancient Indian epistemologies, and locate Buddhism within ancient Indian epistemologies, show the difference between the Buddhist viewpoint and that of the other Indian schools, and then cover what I would like to cover specifically in this in this talk, which is the ancient Indian school of materialism, the Lokāyata school, which was one of the actually, a dominant school in India around the third and the fourth century, and to show how this school of philosophy is closely related to the modern materialist viewpoint, and how the arguments invoked by the ancient Indian Buddhist philosophers against this school are still relevant today. And then as a conclusion, I will bring up some strong modern arguments against materialism. For ancient Indian epistemologies, we owe much of our knowledge of Indian philosophy to a seminal figure, the great Indian philosopher, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, who wrote his magnificent history of Indian philosophy in two volumes. Those of you who have any interest in Indian philosophy, I would strongly encourage you to read it. It provides the background for Buddhist philosophy, and he covers Buddhist philosophy as well.

It is listed in your bibliography under Radhakrishnan, and in addition, if you order the Indian edition of this text, it is very inexpensive. It has all of the qualities. The first key of Indian epistemologies is that they move beyond knowledge, as we understand it in the West. As we said, Western Epistemology attempts to clarify the difference between knowledge and belief. All major Indian schools of philosophy without exception, Pramanas or valid cognizers as the apex of the epistemological pyramid.

Now the crux of the Indian outlook on phenomena, as opposed to the western outlook on phenomena, is that the Western outlook from really Plato and Aristotle onwards views phenomena as externally defined. The Indian outlook defines phenomena in the light of the mind perceiving it. If this mind is a valid cognizer, the phenomenon perceived is indeed a true phenomenon. If it is not, then that phenomenon must have been previously established by a valid cognizer. And the core debates between the schools of Indian philosophy all hinged on what valid cognizers are, and how many there are.

And this leads us to the features of valid cognizers. Indian epistemology addresses, as we said, not only the truth content of the proposition being considered and the justification of the mind, in other words the presence of a reason, but also as we said the cognitive characteristics of the cognitive act. And in the specific case of Buddhist epistemologies, the truth content of propositions depends on the subject to whom the proposition is addressed. This is quite striking. If we move to Dharmakīrti’s understanding of Pramāna, and here I will actually present Pramāna or valid cognizers based on Dharmakīrti’s text and then show the later Indian and Tibetan readings.

Dharmakīrti says, Pramāna is non deceptive consciousness. Actually, a good translation of non deceptive Avisamvadi would be incontrovertible. This is Jeffrey Hopkins’s translation. There are many debates about what is meant by non deceptive consciousness and we will address some of them once we have fleshed out Dharmakīrti’s definition. Dharmakīrti’s definition was not accepted literally by the Indian scholastic tradition and there is an amendment to Dharmakīrti’s definition, which was formulated by Devendrabuddhi and which has basically been integrated in the Tibetan definition of valid cognizers.

Somewhat later in his root text, the Pramanavartika, Dharmakīrti adds, it’s a page later, also it qualifies an object which is not known. And Devendrabuddhi considers that the definition Dharmakīrti gives of Pramāna combines these two verses, and therefore should be a new and non deceptive mind. This is the criterion of truth according to Dharmakīrti. New here means according to the Tibetan exegesis that this refers to the first instant of awareness. In other words, it’s a fresh mind.

Non deceptive is interpreted in several different ways and there are considerable debates about this. It does not merely mean non deceptive, it means a mind which cannot be turned back upon its understanding. A mind which has gained certainty with regards to its object, and the presence or the absence of such minds in ordinary beings is actually a source of tremendous debate within the Tibetan Buddhist tradition. It is the crux of Je Tsongkhapa’s presentation, both of Pramāna and of Mādhyamika, that valid cognizers exist within the continuum of ordinary beings. In other words, that ordinary beings can actually have a degree of knowledge, we would say.

By no means all Tibetan philosophers agree. Daktsang for instance, one of the great Sakya scholars strongly disagrees with Jetsün Tsongkhapa on this topic. Much more recently, a very great Tibetan scholar, albeit very controversial, Geshe Gedun Chopel, gives an example which gives on a sense of how delicate the issue is. If there exists in the mind of an ordinary being a valid cognizer, a consciousness which cannot be turned back on its understanding, which is certain, then the following example would not hold. Geshe Gedun Chopel says, imagine somebody who’s going to the market carrying some chicken to sell, and the first person he meets tells him, why are you taking this black goat to the market to be slaughtered?

And the man says, I’m not taking a black goat to the market to be slaughtered, I just have chicken, and I’m going to sell them for eggs. And the second man he meets tells him the same thing. Why are you taking this black goat to the market to be slaughtered? By the time the third person comes and tells him that, all of us, this man included, would turn back to check whether he is actually taking a black goat to the market. Gedun Chopel says this demonstrates that there are no valid cognizers within the continuum of ordinary beings, in other words non ārya beings.

Then it’s a very, very problematical and dangerous line of reasoning, which to this day elicits a lot of debate in the great monasteries. Because if one thinks about it carefully, one can really see that Gedun Chopel is on to something. But the preservation of the existence of valid cognizers in the continuum of ordinary beings is indispensable, especially in Jetsongkhapa’s presentation of Mādhyamika, to warrant conventional phenomena. And therefore, this enables us to contrast Buddhist and non-Buddhist Indian epistemologies. So as we said, the Indian schools have varying numbers of Pramanas.

I listed the Nyaya school, the school of logicians, which accepts four Pramanas. Two are accepted by the Buddhists, direct valid cognizers. Two are not, comparison and scripture Āgama. Scripture is a source of true knowledge for the Nyaya school, in the same way as for instance to this day, for the Muslims, fundamentalist Muslims, and for the traditional Jews, scripture is a source of valid knowledge. It is said in the Quran is enough to establish that it is true.

Or an orthodox Jew would say, it is said in, let us say, the book of Exodus. Blessed is a man who does not go on the path of iniquity is a revealed statement. Then, for the Indian tradition, a given moment of mind being a valid cognizer must be ascertained by a subsequent moment of mind. There’s a major difference with Buddhist epistemologies, because for the Buddhists, this is post-Dignāgā and Dharmakīrti Buddhists. There are only two Pramanas.

Direct valid cognizers, which are non conceptual consciousnesses, which are valid cognizers. And inferential valid cognizers, which are conceptual consciousnesses which are valid cognizers. Now, direct valid cognizers are subdivided in four, we won’t enter into that here, but they include two which are of importance for us. One are sense consciousnesses, therefore for Dharmakīrti, the first instant of an unmistaken, a non deceptive sense consciousness is a valid cognizer, unlike the presentation of all of the western schools. And the other category of direct valid cognizer is yogic valid cognizers, the existence of which is not acknowledged in any western school of epistemology.

Inferential valid cognizers are valid cognizers relying on a valid reason. And the other difference with the Indian schools of epistemology is that for Dharmakīrti and the Buddhist philosophers, a mind being a valid cognizer does not have to be ascertained by another mind, it’s not contingent on ascertainment by another mind. And this leads us to the Buddhist epistemological hierarchy, the levels of the knowing mind, if you want, where one progresses upwards from wrong consciousness, which might be a case of wrong views, for instance, believing that the mind is the brain, would be a case of wrong consciousness from a Buddhist standpoint, to doubt. So as progressively one investigates, doubt arises subdivided into three. The first doubt is doubt which suspects that what is still wrong, doubt erring towards a non factual.

The second is equal doubt. One is lost in between the two. The third is doubt erring towards the factual and this doubt eventually when it is cleared leads to conviction. Conviction, as I understand it, corresponds to what Western philosophy knows as knowledge. Conviction, according to the Buddhist teachers and according to meditators, is a very powerful experience.

It actually is an experience which will transform the person. It seems therefore to be at least as strong as our Western term of knowledge. Then I personally suspect that valid cognizers have no equivalent in western philosophy. The notion of prime mind, is glossed either as prime, foremost mind, or as a first instance of a mind. I personally suspect this notion has no correlate.

Therefore, when we compare Western theories of knowledge in Buddhist epistemology, we have to be very aware that they are talking of different things. And that the Western term knowledge in no way overlaps what the Buddhists mean by knowledge. It is conceptual, whereas the Buddhist understanding of Pramāna is that Pramāna can be non conceptual and conceptual, then the foremost form of knowledge in the West is conceptual, whereas the foremost realization from a Buddhist standpoint is non conceptual. The foremost realization is a yogic direct valid cognizer realizing emptiness. This is a non conceptual state of mind, which can only arise in dependence on a conceptual state of mind, an inferential valid cognizer.

But inferential valid cognizer alone does not grant one the state of an higher being. So I feel therefore that the apex of the pyramid Pramanas, especially as they are understood by Dharmakīrti and Dignāgā, is something for which there is no equivalent in western philosophy. And now having covered the nature of the knowing mind, and I should point out that you have a handout on the epistemological hierarchy, which is available at the front desk. Perhaps, a good volunteer might go and get it. I made this for another conference.

It takes the example of, for instance, consciousness is apprehending the body as permanent and the transition to the correct apprehension of the body as impermanent through the various levels of consciousness, wrong consciousness, doubt, conviction and valid cognition. And points out that the only unshakable states of mind are the valid cognizers. So, having covered the features of the mind which knows, we can now ask the core question, I think, of these two talks. Is this mind material or not? Now, what I would like to point out in the second part of this talk is that the viewpoint that the mind is material and is therefore a product of the body is nothing new.

It is an ancient and immemorial view in the West, epitomized by Democritus, in the East by an entire school of philosophy, and we will cover the viewpoints of the teachers of this school. And I think I would like to give you quotes of their teachings, to give you a sense of the full impact their viewpoint has on one’s life. So the ancient Indian school of Lokāyata. There were a series of materialistic and agnostic teachers during the Buddha’s age, which traditionally is set sometime in the sixth century BC. Of these we will cover three Purana Kāśyapa, Ajita Kesakambale and Sanjaya Belatthiputta.

Unfortunately, most of their works are known through Buddhist sources, through the Dighanikaya. I have listed in the bibliography a work of great interest, which is Chattopadhyaya Debiprasad’s Carvaka Lokāyata, an anthology of source materials in some recent studies, which presents the teachings of this materialist school in terms of the fragments which have survived. Those of you who are interested in the connection between Buddhism and Western thought, I would strongly recommend that you study this material, because these positions were the ground of much debate in ancient India, and there are strong counter arguments. Purana Kāśyapa’s amoralism, what we could call moral nihilism, is perhaps one of the most terrifying viewpoints ever taught in ancient India. And it leads directly to consequences which have been clearly demonstrated in recent experiments.

The famous Milgram experiment at Yale University, some of you may have heard of, and Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment. I will cover both these experiments briefly, because I think they are interesting for us. The Milgram experiment was an experiment made in 1963, if memory serves me well, at the time of Adolf Eichmann’s trial in Israel. Milgram, a Stanford psychologist, wanted to see what led ordinary people under Nazi rule to committing atrocities on a very large scale, and he therefore investigated the boundaries in ordinary people to resistance to an amoral or unethical order. So what Milgram did was he recruited a group of volunteers at Yale University, and they were subdivided into three.

A teacher, a student, and the experimenter. Unknown to the teacher, who was one of the subjects, the experiment the the student collaborated with the experimenter. The teacher’s role was to teach the student in laboratory a series of pairs of words, such as dog food, cat eat, mouse rat. The teacher would teach these words and the subject, the teacher thought, was connected to a machine which inflicted electroshocks. The voltage increased by 15 volts each time the answer was wrong.

So each time the student gave a wrong answer to the teacher, he was automatically electrocuted. The teacher thought he was electrocuted in reality. Actually, a tape recorder was programmed to play the sound of the electroshock machine going on, and as the electroshocks increased, the sounds of the screams of the students. Milgram wanted to see how far the subject who were teachers would go taking the instructions from the experimenter to continue the experience, as far as the teacher knew, the student was screaming in pain. To make the experiment more pregnant, all of the students were told to tell the teacher they had a heart condition, and the amplitude of the electroshocks could reach a full 450 volts.

What Milgram found to his astonishment is that the subjects who were teachers kept inflicting electroshocks. 60, a full sixty three percent of the subjects who were teachers inflicted electroshocks to the students until the student who was in a partition, a separate room, stopped answering. In states of ever greater despair and disturbance, the teachers would request for the experiment to be stopped, but the experimenter had instructions to put them under pressure, to give them instructions to continue. This is one of the most disturbing experiments ever made to study the psychology of obedience. It now is impossible to reproduce because it would be considered unethical, even though nobody was actually electrocuted.

Attempts have been made to reproduce it in countries where the standards of experimentation are less. You will not be surprised to learn that when the experiment was done in Germany, it wasn’t 63, but eighty five percent of the subjects who continued electrocution until the end, and when the experiment was done in the Balkans, which are notorious for our disobedience and rebelliousness, the numbers, thank heavens, shrank a bit. The other experiment which was made, and you will see the reason for bringing these two experiments up in the context of nihilism, is Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment, which was an experiment in the same vein Zimbardo was one of Milgram’s students. And Zimbardo recreated in the basement of Stanford University a jail, a metaphor, it’s a real jail, and asked for volunteers to play the role of prisoners and of guards. The prisoners were dehumanized.

They wore masks, they were dressed in these, outfits, They had to walk barefoot with no clothes beneath the outfits. The guards on the other hand all had sunglasses and all had weapons as well as symbols of authority. The goal of the experiment, unstated to, either the guards or to the prisoners, was to see how rapidly ethics would collapse in a dehumanizing context. It was found actually the experiment had to be terminated after ten days when, one of Zimbardo’s students pointed that out to they had reached, an untenable point where they might be liable for prosecution. There was massive abuse of the rights of the detainees within a matter of days, and a deresponsibilization of the guardians.

Now these two experiments raise many questions. The core question is what is it within a person which says no. Some of Milgram’s subjects said no. The person, an electrical engineer said no, refused to pursue the experiments and actually walked out. None of Zimbardo’s students did.

What says no within the person is that innate structured sense of ethics. The presence or the absence of that depends, in my personal opinion, on whether or not that ethics can be built on a sound ground. Nihilism prevents the construction of that ground. And it is my personal suspicion that the explosion in human rights violations in highly sophisticated societies is probably due to the collapse of that inner foundation, which prevents of that inner foundation, which enables the creation of an ethics. And in this context, jumping back in time 25 centuries, I would like now to show you the full consequences of a nihilistic standpoint, that of Purana Kāśyapa.

This is Purana Kasappa’s moral nihilism. He was a contemporary of the Buddha. In acting or getting others to act, in mutilating or getting others to mutilate, in torturing or getting others to torture, in inflicting sorrow, in tormenting, in intimidating, in taking life, in taking what is not given, in plundering, in burglary, in ambushing, in adultery, one does no evil. If with a razor edged disc one were to turn all the living beings on this earth to a single heap of flesh, a single pile of flesh, there would be no evil from that cause, no coming of evil. This is the full nihilist doctrine.

This is what the Buddha thought. An attenuated form is taught by Ajita Kesakambali. And this view you will see is very cognate with that of many westerners. It is not a coincidence that the leading propounders of moral nihilism are Australian. Joyce for instance.

There is no such things as alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deed. This is a core nihilist belief. A human being is built up of four elements. When he dies, the earth relapses to the earth, the fluid to water, etc.

The forbearers on the bier as a fifth take his dead body away. It is a doctrine of fools, this talks of gifts, it is an empty lie mere idle talk, when men say there is profit thereby. Fools and wise alike on the dissolution of the body are cut off, annihilated and after death they are not. Now this nihilist doctrine is never formulated this bluntly in our society. As I mentioned in some of my previous talks, ours are societies of soft nihilism.

In other words, the issue is eluded in good society. The actual existence or non existence of the mind before conception, the actual existence or non existence of the mind after conception are not issues civilized persons talk about. And if you are an academic and you want tenure, you had better not raise it up at university. It has a remarkably a remarkable drying up effect on tenure and for that matter on publication, as I will show tomorrow. And then an even more attenuated form of nihilism is Sanjaya Belatthiputta’s skepticism.

And I couldn’t resist putting up a picture of Laurence Olivier playing Hamlet, the ultimate western skeptic. If you ask me if there exists another world after death, if I thought that there existed another world, would I declare that to you? I don’t think so. I don’t think in that way, I don’t think otherwise, I don’t think not, I don’t think not, not. In other words, one doesn’t have a clue what Sanjaya Belatthiputta’s position is.

Now these thinkers were the heralds of a major school of thought in ancient India, and it is a school of thought which was powerfully countered. So the question we have to ask now, having defined knowledge and having presented some ancient Indian accounts of nihilism is who knows? Is it the brain? Who knows? Or, and I was stuck, I had to get a picture for the mind, I took a picture of light.

Mind is non material, one cannot have a picture of the mind. And for this I would like to draw on the great work of Santarakshita, the Tattvasangraha, which is perhaps the major Buddhist philosophical work after Dharmakīrti’s Pramanavartika. It’s a gigantic work of more than 1,000 pages with Kamalaśīla’s commentary, in which Shāntarakshita reviews all of the dominant schools of thought in India at the period and provides counters and rebuttals to each one of them. It is translated in English, I listed it in the bibliography. It’s translated by Ganganatha Jha, the Tattvasangraha of Shāntarakshita.

Those of you who have a real interest in Buddhist philosophy could do no better than to work through those two volumes. Śāntaraksita is remarkable because he presents first the schools in question, and I would like to make it clear today just how relevant some of these schools still are. Shāntarakshita presents specifically the Lokāyata School, the materialist school, and give some of their tenets. The first Lokāyata assertion is that consciousness cannot reside in the fetus. Nothing can be cognized at the fetal state, since there are no sense organs.

Therefore for the Lokayatas consciousness starts at birth. One does encounter to this day many strong materialists who have this stance. Then the Lokāyata assertion is that consciousness proceeds from the four elements, in other words from matter. This is precisely the contemporary assertion by many neurobiologists, that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the brain. I was working through Koch’s Neurobiology of Consciousness a couple of months ago to prepare a talk on meditation in neurobiology.

Koch is one of the leading neurobiologists that he was at Caltech when he wrote the book. And what’s very striking is that he dances around the issue. It’s very clear that for him consciousness is material, but he doesn’t want to take too much position. And there is no life after death. This is the development of the position of Ajita Kesakambali.

The great Tibetan scholar Jamyang Shayba fleshes out these positions. This is a picture of Amdo Tashikhyil Monastery in the East of Tibet, which was founded by Jamyang Shayba. Jamyang Shayba distinguishes two types of materialists. The radical materialists who assert there is neither past nor future lives, and attenuated materialists for whom past and future lives do exist, but neither karma nor causality does. Now these are positions all of you can recognize among friends or colleagues in Buddhist centers.

These Lokayatas are known as hedonists, because they propound being satisfied with what is merely pleasant here, which is a very rational position. If one accepts neither past nor future lives, then as Khensur Rinpoche said so pointedly, what are we doing here? We should be on the beach having fun. Robert J. added, as the Australians.

Because they propound that the continuum of the self is annihilated at death, they are proponents of annihilation. This is the position you find in contemporary philosophers like Camus or Cioran. Because they propound that neither former and later births nor the cause and effects of actions exist, they are proponents of non existence. And finally, and it is a position one hears frequently, nowadays in the twenty first century, the Lokayatas asserted only one valid cognizer, sense cognition, and they refused any validity to inferential valid cognizers and to logic. I have been struck to hear how many contemporary westerners lack any faith in logic, the very logic they use sometimes in daily life, sometimes professionally.

This is a Lokāyata position. And Shāntarakshita has a devastating rejoinder. He says to his Lokāyata opponent, you argue against us with the very tools you deny the existence of. The Buddhist refutations of materialism are powerful and have stretched throughout Buddhist history. And they are constructed around Buddhist proofs of past and future lives, some of which are more cogent for contemporary Westerners, some of which less.

The fundamental one is that of Dharmakīrti, which is then developed by two later Indian thinkers, Shāntarakshita with his disciple Kamalaśīla and Dharmottara, as well as the great Tibetan disciple of Je Tsongkhapa, Gyaltsab Je. So, Dharmakīrti’s proof of the existence of past and future lives hinges on the presence of instinct, we could say, of automatic activity, specifically the presence of breathing. Dharmakīrti points out that the infant starts breathing naturally at birth, without that process of breathing the infant would not live, yet that breathing is untaught and must come from somewhere. Now this argument is fleshed out later on by Shāntarakshita and Kamalaśīla. We will see if we have time to cover it today and I will perhaps skip Gyaltsab Je’s clarification, to pass directly to Dharmakīrti’s core argument, which unfortunately is an argument which was very powerful in India, but which does not elicit conviction from Westerners nowadays.

Dharmakīrti’s core argument is that mind can only arise from a previous instant of a phenomenon of the same type. In other words, mind can only arise from mind. And I think this argument carries weight only if one fully understands the nature of mind as a cognitive phenomenon and the incapacity of a material epiphenomenon to be cognitive. So perhaps Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen will, flesh this out for us in his two talks. I think if one does not understand the full cognitive component of mind, Dharmakīrti’s argument loses much of its weight.

However, for myself, one of the most powerful arguments was an expansion on Dharmakīrti’s argument by Shāntarakshita and Kamalaśīla, which is the argument from instinct. Shāntarakshita says, how would you account for the idea in the newborn babe, even among animals, of a certain thing being a source of pleasure and another a source of pain. The infant seeks its mother’s breasts, which it regards as a source of pleasure, and it cries out when it does not find it. Certainly during the present life, the baby has never experienced the fact of the breasts being the means to allay hunger. Shāntarakshita’s argument flies directly in the face of a strong Western philosophical tradition, which goes back to John Locke, and which asserts that we are born tabula rasa, the mind is a void at birth.

This is an Anglo Saxon philosophical tradition, which has never convinced anyone in Continental Europe, but it has become part of the Anglo Saxon Weltanschauung. Kant, for instance, fully acknowledged the existence of the a priori of understanding. Then a debate was very active within the Kantian milieu about what these a priori were. Typically, it would have been space and perhaps time. In other words, these are structures the infant brings with him at birth, which enable him to categorize his understanding.

The Lockean view is that there is no such structure. There is a mere mental emptiness, which somehow is not just furnished, but structured from the outside. Shāntarakshita’s argument flies powerfully in the face of this, and the goal of the last part of this talk will be to show you how Shāntarakshita’s argument can be expanded to, our contemporary understanding, both of the genesis of ethics and of language. And therefore we will pass to contemporary arguments against materialism. And it is interesting because these arguments are drawn from, I have drawn from discoveries in cognitive psychology and in linguistics, the full import of the argument is not fleshed out by, those who have made these discoveries and the topic is often profoundly embarrassing.

And it’s quite striking when one reads the articles to see how carefully the authors of these articles hedge their bets. The first is a series of discoveries which have been made in the last two three years, which is the presence of a pre linguistic ethics in infants. And it is all the more striking, because the first such study at the Infant Cognition Center at Yale University by Karen Wynn and Paul Bloom, demonstrated that pre verbal infants aged between six and 10 clearly demonstrated preference for individuals who helped others over individuals who harmed others. And they did this, it’s a very very sweet experiment, by showing puppet plays to these pre verbal infants and filming throughout the reaction of the infant. And the infant was able to manifest very strong feelings of attraction to the kind puppet who would help other puppets roll a ball up a hill, and strong feelings of animosity and irritation to the wicked puppet who kept pulling the ball down the hill.

Now what is striking with this experiment is that far as far as Bloom and Wynn are concerned, the jury is in. And yet, these are cognitive psychologists, who are basically ascertaining the existence of a pre verbal untaught ethics. And the odds of its being untaught increased dramatically in a later study of Wynn and Bloom, which demonstrate that the same bias is present at the age of three months. Now it is very difficult to see how such a bias towards ethical behavior, towards you would say altruistic behavior and against egotistical behavior can be imparted non verbally by the mother in the first three months of life. No mechanism has been proposed.

Sociobiologists would then rejoin that this is an inherited trait, which is to the benefit of the species in as much as it enables us as a species to constitute a society. The problem with sociobiology, as I hope to have demonstrated in the talk here on sociobiology and altruism, is that sociobiology is many things, but it is not scientific. A leading geneticist has said that sociobiology, as far as he’s concerned, amounts to folk narration. No mechanism is provided for the transmission of behavior. For that matter, there has been no clear evidence of the transmission of complex behavior.

To my knowledge, the most complex behavior which was ever transmitted and for which sociobiologists found evidence of was rats grooming their whiskers. So this does not qualify for the type of behavior we are looking at. And therefore in the lack of mechanism and, in the case of sociobiology with a theory which fails or Occam’s razor, it is not a newly complex theory without alternative explanations, I think we can if not discount it, set it aside. So what we can say here is that there is strong evidence of pre verbal ethical behavior and that the source of this ethical behavior is unaccounted for. If we are going to accept, as Kant does, the existence of a prioris and even of an ethical a priori, we can legitimately, as Buddhists ask, this comes from.

And this leads me to the next argument, which I’m afraid is somewhat complex, but is I feel very powerful. It’s an extension of Shāntarakshita’s and Kamalaśīla’s line of reasoning via what is known as a poverty of stimulus argument in linguistics. Most of you or some of you may have heard of the great American linguist Chomsky, the father of the nativist contemporary nativist school of linguistics. Chomsky, I hasten to point out, is a militant atheist, has no religious inclination I know of, and therefore can certainly not be said to have any bias in his research. Yet Chomsky points out that there is a paradox in linguistics, and it’s a paradox we will develop.

But I would like to give some background first. They are broadly speaking two schools of language acquisition. The nativist school and the empiricist school. The nativist school believes that there are some traits, which are inherited by the child, which enable the child to reconstruct language when it is exposed to it. The child is exposed to his mother as main source of language and must construct his first language based on the data input from the mother.

The big question which all of contemporary linguistics struggles with is whether this is possible or not. For the nativist, this happens because there are pre existing structures in the brain, which enable the child as it were to fit the linguistic data into a framework. The framework itself does not have to be created. And Chomsky himself believes that this pre existing framework is hereditary. He gives no account for how it could be hereditary, but that’s the only explanation open to him.

The empiricist, on the other hand, considers that there is no pre existing structure. The child is somehow able to construct the language he learns, in our case English, not just the vocabulary, but the meta rules, the grammatical rules, the syntax exclusively on the basis of the data provided by the mother. And this is where the poverty of stimuli argument kicks in, because when the data provided by the mother is analyzed, it can be shown quite clearly that there is insufficient data provided to the child to allow the child to construct the rules of his own first language, by analogy induction or deduction. And even more fundamentally, insufficient data is provided to enable the child to establish a difference between meaningful sounds and non meaningful sounds. Put yourself in the feet of a little baby held by his mother.

The baby is staring at his mother’s mouth. If we take the empiricist position, there’s no framework, the baby is just receiving data. The baby sees the mother’s mouth move, and the baby hears sounds arise. A legitimate inference could be that the sounds arise from the movement of the mouth. But how does the baby establish what sounds have meaning and what sounds don’t have meaning?

How does the baby know the difference between a cough and a sneeze on the one hand, and a word expressing irritation on the other hand? The baby must be able to make this distinction. Then according to the empiricist, by staring at the mother’s face and listening to sounds, the baby is able to acquire vocabulary, and then to acquire what is much more problematical, grammar. To string these words in a meaningful sentence. Now there’s been a lot of research on this topic and Stromswold is a key researcher in the field, investigated the usage of auxiliaries in English and it is quite striking.

Take auxiliaries such as I have, I do, I am and so forth. There are actually 10 power 22 possible combinations of auxiliaries in English. Of these 10 power 22, 99 are only grammatically possible, and yet Stromswold found that examining 66,000 auxiliary containing utterances in 14 children studied, there was not a single telling error that the children confused auxiliary verbs and principal verbs of the sentence. It is very difficult to account for this on empiricist basis. It’s very difficult to see how such a profound knowledge of grammar and syntax can arise without a pre existing framework in the infant who learns the language.

And Stromswold gives a series of instances, I won’t enter into them here since most people are not fascinated by linguistics, but you can see the range of mistakes here, which could be made. The she could go, he didn’t a few things, he can go, these are all mistakes and yet the infants, verbal infants obviously, were not making them. So linguists have had to propose a solution to the poverty of stimuli syndrome and the solution proposed is Chomsky’s universal grammar. This is the dominant viewpoint among all those who accept the poverty of stimuli line of reasoning, which is that there is a universal underlying grammar present as a subtext if you want of all languages, which enables the child to construct a language based on stimuli. And I included here an interview with Chomsky.

So you can see when the question asks do we genetically inherit this knowledge, Chomsky just has to acknowledge that we do. In fact, by universal grammar, I mean just that system of principles and structures that are the prerequisites for acquisition of language and to which every language necessarily conforms. The basic problem is that when asked to formulate the principles of universal grammar, all the Chomskyans can do is come out with tautological principles, basically meaningless or quasi meaningless statements, and the moment they come up with restrictive grammatical statements, these actually are not verified by certain extant languages. And I included this chart to show you the wide variety of differences between fundamental linguistic syntax. This is a chart showing the proportion of languages which follow the subject object verb structure in the language, the case of Tibetan for instance.

The subject verb object structure, which is a case of English, the verb subject object structure, which is a case of Irish, no particular dominant order, which is actually the case of Russian in many respects, and various minority orders. Now what you find is that every single syntactic order is attested. There is little more fundamental than the sequence of subject, verb and object in a sentence. So if there is that much variation and something that fundamental, it seems difficult that anything like a universal grammar can be proposed. And this leads us to our conclusion.

As you know, Mañjuśrī is the lord of language, so this is not inappropriate. I feel there are a series of arguments which rebut the materialistic theses. The first is a personal experience of consciousness. It is an argument which has only personal weight, it’s a private argument. It is however for most of us the most powerful argument.

The second, which I have not covered in detail today, but which I covered in the sociobiology conference, is the prevalence of altruism. Altruism is public while consciousness is private, and to a degree altruism is verifiable. Now one of the big stumbling blocks of the Darwinian account of biology has been from day one, from the origin of species onwards, an explanation of the prevalence of altruism. Darwin was aware of this and much of sociobiology arises as an attempt to explain altruism through multiple theories, one of which perhaps dominant one nowadays is kin selection. I have not entered into it in this conference, because there simply wasn’t time.

And I have explained the sociobiology conference why I feel these arguments are weak. I would allude to them briefly here today again. And the third argument against the materialist thesis is the acquisition of language. And more fundamentally, because language is just a development of complex forms of behavior which are accumulated, the acquisition of any highly complex form of behavior of which there are many among human beings, which cannot be explained easily. So if one were to apply Occam’s razor, I feel reincarnation is a simpler, a more synthetic and a less contrived explanation of the prevalence of altruism, of empathy, of an innate sense of fairness and I might add of ease of acquisition of language as well as innate behavior in infants than either group selection or kin selection.

And therefore, we can see the explanatory value of reincarnation. It provides a simple rationale for altruistic behavior and it provides a clear mechanism for the transmission of the meta structure of language, thought and behavior. It is not enough as Chomsky does to say that the transmission of universal grammar is genetic. A mechanism must be provided and propositions must be formulated. Chomsky and the Chomskyans can do neither.

There is no mechanism for the transmission of universal grammar. It is not known at present whether genetics can account for this and universal grammar has no propositions. In English, a grammatical proposition would be that the verb necessarily follows the subject of a sentence. What are the propositions of universal grammar? And this leads us to the dawn of certainty.

So we have, I hope, progressed upwards on the epistemological pyramid, and at least some of us I hope are close to conviction. Some of you may already have valid cognizers, in which case I defer to your prostrations. And this is the rejoinder of the Buddha to King Ajatashatru. Ajatashatru was the son of King Bimbisāra, one of Buddha’s main sponsors, who took power by killing his own father. He imprisoned King Bimbisāra in a jail and so as not to sully his hands with his blood, starved him to death.

Then Ajatashatru came to see the Buddha and without alluding to this, asked the Buddha on his opinion on the meaning of religious life and its relevance. And the Buddha answered, household life is confining a dusty path. That’s how we see monastic life, isn’t it? The life gone forth is like the open air. It is not easy living at home to practice a holy life totally perfect, totally pure, like a polished shell.

What if I were to shave off my hair and beard, put on the ochre robes and go forth from the household life into homelessness? So after some time he abandoned his massive wealth, large or small, leaves his circle of relatives, shaves off his hair and beard, puts on the ochre robes and goes forth from the household life into homelessness. When he has thus gone forth, he lives restrained by the rules of the monastic code, seeing danger in the slightest thoughts. Consummate in his virtue, he guards the doors of his senses, is possessed of mindfulness and alertness and is content. This life can only have meaning, if one has escaped from the jail of nihilism.

And the effort the Buddha put into it is epitomized by this magnificent statue, which I am told is His Holiness’s favorite statue of the Buddha. It is the Buddha in ascetic travail. It is one of the famous instances of Gandhara art. And this is a quote which is a beautiful, probably autobiographical quote of Buddha Śākyamūni himself. Thus far did I go in my penance, I went without clothes, I licked my food from my hands, I lived on the roots and fruits of the forest, I wore grave clothes, dusty rags, a dress made of bark, I always stood refusing to sit down, I lay upon a bed of thorns.

This is the level of effort which the Buddha went through before engaging in what amounted to a meditation to the death under the Bodhi tree, at the end of which he attained full enlightenment. And this is the amount of effort which our teachers, of which a noble Khensur Rinpoche calls us to. Thank you very much. I’m afraid I have gone far beyond time, but we have ten minutes for questions. Yes, please.

So with regard to the things that the baby can pick up, for instance language and so forth, There was an experiment done with wild wolves. They were taken and put in cages and I think that the experiment was to see whether DNA can produce emotions, and in a sense tame a wild animal and over I think it was 50 generations they only bred the wolves that were receptive to humans with other wolves that were receptive to humans. And after 50 generations and many years they had two sets wolves that still hated humans and wolves that didn’t. My question is, given the theory of, like, the the reincarnation, how does it happen that some traits seem to be genetically passed on? I think the jury is out, to be honest with you.

I think the jury is out. I think you have twin streams of causality. You have a genetic stream of causality, you have a karmic stream of causality. Now what is the part of the one and the other? I think that is very difficult to know.

I am convinced that there is and I think it’s established, there is a genetic and neurobiological basis for emotion and behavior. I think the genetic and the neurobiological base does not account for everything and the data is pretty much in on that. Now the ratio between the two, that is very difficult. I I couldn’t answer. Yes?

I’m I’m a I’m a Buddhist, so therefore, I believe in karma. I believe in karma and rebirth. However, I don’t feel the language problem proves it because unless I was born consistently as an Englishman over the last thousand years, Language has developed. You know, if I was born at the time of, say, the thirteen hundreds, the English language was totally different from what it is now. So if I was an Englishman back then and then spent time as an animal or as a Tibetan or even a Frenchman Mhmm.

Mhmm. I would have a totally different kind of grammar. And therefore, it wouldn’t explain how I learned modern English. Totally different. Language vocabulary changes a lot.

But for instance, the core grammatical structures of a language change very little. For instance, English has been a subject verb object language for more than one thousand years. You have to go back to very archaic forms of English where actually there was a usage of English as an SOV language. Then we’re not talking of the transmission of knowledge. We’re talking of an edge in being able to make sense of the data.

The empiricist approach as far as language acquisition is concerned says there is nothing. Language, the child basically is able to construct meaning from a stream of data with very, very little telling him what is meaning and what’s not. The nativist approach says that there are some inherent structures and these can be very general. They can be something as simple as the fact that there are verbs. It’s not self evident that there are words in a language which function as verbs.

The sequence subject object verb, for that matter, similarity of terms. If you spoke German, in a past life, you would have a definite edge in learning English. When I learned German, I had a big edge because I was an English native speaker. A lot of words are similar, milch for instance. Then my experience teaching Tibetan is that it’s a nightmare for most Western students.

There are no cognate words. There’s not a single Tibetan word which has a cognate in a Western language. It’s possible that you learned English very slowly. We would have to ask your parents. For Buddhist standpoint matter is defined as that which is composed of particles.

Then I think nowadays we can adopt the approach which is formulated in Schrödinger’s wave equation, which is that a given phenomenon can behave at the quantum level either as a particle or as a wave. If it shows wave behavior, then wave behavior would be diffraction, then it is said to be non particulate. If it shows particle behavior, then it is non undulatory. Now, is consciousness of an undulatory nature or not? I think not.

So when we say that consciousness is non material in a contemporary sense, what we should say is as consciousness is neither particle constructed nor undulatory. And I will cover tomorrow some of the data from ESP, specifically Vasiliev’s research, which rather cogently demonstrates that that telepathy does exist. It definitely cannot be accounted for by the four fields of energy, the two he was able to test, which is electromagnetic and gravitational. Then if we go down to the quantum level, you’d have to bring a physicist in because basically quantum mechanics assumes that the strong dualistic boundary between observer and observed phenomenon dissolves at the quantum level and that according to some physicists at least, this is the meaning of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. All physicists nowadays acknowledge Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, not all consider that it means that the mere fact of observation by a conscious entity affects the observed phenomenon.

Many consider that it is actually a law which refers to interference of the observer in the observed phenomenon. So when I was studying physics that was the more comfortable viewpoint. I’m not competent. You know, I mean, I think one is ridiculous when one talks of fields one is not specialized in. Then I did some years of physics thirty years ago, which as far as physics is concerned is a stone age.

So I I fully acknowledge my incompetence in the field. But I would like to show, however, what I would like to show in this talk is that there aren’t gigantic gaps in the materialist subtext, which is present throughout scientific investigation, and that these gaps are so great in some cases, and tomorrow I think the talk on ESP will show it, they call into question core presentations of the scientific viewpoint. But tomorrow, if we have time at lunch, I would like to show a video which will be dedicated to the research of Robert Jahn at the Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research Lab at Princeton, which unfortunately just closed two years ago. Yeah. It’s closed.

They they managed to at last. And it includes a series of interviews regarding Jahn’s work, who is dean of plasma physics research in The United States and became one of the foremost researchers on PK in The United States. It includes a series of interviews with leading physicists regarding Jahn’s work, which is an eye opener, in terms of the levels of prejudice encountered. I think it’ll be interesting for all of us. By my clock, I think we’ve we’ve reached midday.

So perhaps any questions that you have, just, jot them down for the panel discussion and we shall now feed the body aggregates. And just join with me again to thank Ilya for a stimulating presentation. It is one hundred fifteen.

Key terms in this teaching

Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
prostrations chag tsel (Tib)
The act of showing respect to the objects of refuge, the Guru and the Buddha, Dharma and Sangha; the first of the seven-limb practice and one of the preliminary practices. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

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