1 h 1 min · 7,109 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 61-minute seminar, Ilia S. Durovic traces how Western thought has shaped our understanding of desire, contrasting it sharply with Buddhist critique. He begins by dividing desire into three categories—instinctual, culturally constructed, and legitimated—arguing that Buddhism addresses only the first. Moving through Greek philosophy, he shows how Parmenides’ doctrine of permanence influenced Western aesthetics and the veneration of the human body, ideals inherited through sport and art. Christianity introduced suffering and renunciation into the European psyche, but the Renaissance reinstated the body magnificent, opening the door to modern capitalism’s co-optation of desire. Durovic then examines figures like Rousseau and Stendhal, whose ideas on romantic love and education shaped modernity, before introducing René Girard’s theory of mimetic desire—the idea that we desire what others desire—and its connection to cycles of scapegoating violence. The talk culminates in showing how culturally constructed desire and mimetic violence spiral in modern society, offering tools for understanding twentieth-century atrocities while suggesting paths toward awareness and prevention.
File metadata (for organising)
File: Buddhist Critique of Desire and Modernity – KR.mp3
UUID: 72889612-dc5e-4ba1-9320-36a7fd776feb
Teacher: Ilia S. Durovic
Collection: Ilia Seminars
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~7,107
I would say that one could broadly speaking divide desire into three broad categories. The first I would call instinctual desire. The second, culturally constructed desire. And the third, the legitimation of desire. Now, of these three aspects of desire, only the first is actually addressed by Buddhist philosophy. We can say that the thrust of much of the Buddhist discourse is a critique of instinctual desire.
An analysis first of what instinctual desire is in all its modalities. And then, a devastating critique of this desire. The issue of what we call culturally constructed desire, which is learned desire, and the legitimation of desire are not addressed. So if we were to give examples of these, instinctual desire would be for instance, the desire a cat feels when it sees a mouse. It is unlearned in this life at least.
A cat sees a mouse and its terrible little mind is overwhelmed with the idea of devouring this poor mouse. Now this is instinctual desire. We are awash in it, all of us, humans and animals. However, instinctual desire is a very small part of the actual construct of desire. A second very important part, especially in all societies, is culturally constructed desire.
The desire for a Ferrari is a culturally constructed desire in young men. Young men are not born as children desiring Ferraris. They are taught to desire Ferraris. It’s a long process which makes them useful members of society, wasting their lives, earning a lot of money to buy a Ferrari. This is a classic case of a culturally constructed desire.
Women, for instance, lust, crave after products such as cosmetics or, are all cultural constructs. Women are not born saying to their mothers I would like, you know, a pot of cosmetics because my skin feels a bit rough. They are taught to desire this. It’s culturally constructed desire. Much of Western modernity is a process of co-optation of culturally constructed desire as a means of stimulating and maintaining the economy.
You could see that the modern capitalist economy is a co-optation of culturally constructed desire. The third category is legitimation of desire. This is briefly addressed in the Buddhist texts. What the legitimation of desire is, is all those ad hoc justifications of desire. Now we find them in philosophy.
The laxer, more life-affirming forms of philosophy, such as Bergson’s vitalism tend to be, you know, legitimations of desire. Much of present day popular culture functions as a legitimation of desire. Popular culture, I would say, is one of the richest fields of investigation at present for anyone who is interested in Buddhist thought and its interaction with sociology and philosophy. So having covered this brief presentation, I thought I would very schematically, because these things can only be done schematically in the short time we have, cover the metamorphosis of desire in Western thought. And briefly allude to the differences we see in its development in Eastern thought.
Now, Western thought is basically at its inception Greek or Roman thought. It’s Greek thought. And if we study the modalities of desire in literature especially in early Greek thought, we see a very clear transition between the epic phase which is clearly attested in Homer’s Iliad or Odyssey and later developments in Greek literature from the fifth century BC onwards. The relation to desire in Homer’s Iliad is a naturalistic relation to desire. In other words, desire is legitimate.
It is natural. It is a life-affirming force. The only forms of desire which are banned are those forms of desire which are socially disruptive. And the entire account of the Iliad is the account of destructiveness wrought by one particular instance of socially disruptive desire, which was the desire of Paris for Helen, the wife of Menelaus. In no way can Homer be said to even formulate a critique of desire.
He formulates merely a critique of non-socially sanctioned desire. This is common to all primitive thought. You find exactly the same trend in the Rig Veda, for instance, the foundation of Indian thought. In the Rig Veda, the gods run around seducing women just as Zeus ran around seducing women in various forms. And all of this is nice and fine.
Divine sanction falls, however, on the shoulders of the poor mortal who dares to break the socially sanctified rules. The case of Oedipus is a classic case in point where Oedipus commits involuntarily incest with his mother and just as involuntarily kills his father, not knowing that either of them are his mother or father, and is accursed by the gods for this reason. There is no responsibility, no moral responsibility on Oedipus’ side. Yet the sanction is terrible. This is, I would say, the epic vision of desire and its control.
Suddenly, in Greek thought and almost at the same period in Indian thought for reasons we don’t understand, a complete shift occurs. This is a critical period in human history around or between the sixth and the fifth century BC, where in Greece two great thinkers appear, which will define actually the future of all Western thought. Parmenides and Heraclitus. At the very same period, appear in India four different movements. Of which three at least address head on the issue of desire, no longer from the standpoint of social acceptability, but as an obstacle to liberation.
These four movements: the so-called Upanishadic movement. There is a group of teachers, the Upanishadic movement. The group of teachers whose teachings have been preserved by the Upanishads. The Jain movement initiated by Mahavira. Buddhism, taught by Buddha Śākyamūni.
And one of the more radical forms of materialism taught by Gosala. So I’ll try to speak a bit louder. And Gosala, who was the apostle of stark materialism, and was repeatedly criticized by the Buddha in the Digha Nikāya and so forth. Now this critical juncture in history is a period where civilizations diverge. Greek civilization had to choose between two main orientations.
Parmenides who taught the permanence of phenomena and the permanence of being. And Heraclitus, often called the obscure one, who taught that all is change. The famous Panta Rhei of Heraclitus. Greek thought opted for Parmenides, and I think one can say that all of Western history has been marked by this ever since. The choice for Parmenides, the choice of permanence has had tremendous impact at the metaphysical level, tremendous impact at the psychological level, tremendous impact at the level of aesthetics, and therefore at the level of desire, and the relation to desire.
Indian thought was much more divided. In Indian thought, both currents coexisted for centuries. The Upanishadic current which taught the permanence of being explicitly, that everything which was not permanent was illusory. And the Buddhist movement which taught exactly the opposite. The impermanence of all phenomena and the non-existence of any permanently existing being.
Both currents coexisted. And we find therefore in the West on the one side, an aesthetics which is dominated by the ideas of permanence and the ideas of Parmenides, which passed from Parmenides to Plato. And from Plato basically ruled much of Western first pagan, then Christian philosophy all the way up to Kant. And then on the other hand, we have in Indian thought both currents present and both forms of aesthetics attested. We have the Upanishadic current focusing on the permanence of being, and we have the Buddhist tradition focusing on the impermanence and transience of phenomena.
So, since our main focus at present is the development of the notion of desire in the West, and therefore aesthetics in western thought. We will try to cover some points in Greek thought. Some of which, I must apologize, are a little bit controversial, but you are all adults, so you know, I will bring them up. Because they have a bearing on modernity. And the first aspect I would like to bring up is the Greek understanding of eros.
In other words, the Greek understanding of love, based on the Greek sources we have. And this understanding of love can best be understood in the light of the premise of permanence. Since phenomena are supposed to be permanent, and since in much of Greek thought, the real world is illusory, as a mere reflection of a world of ideas, anything which is infected with the real world, with reality is base. And only the non-utilitarian is noble. Hence, the Greek emphasis on homosexuality as authentic love.
Exactly the opposite of what Christianity came to teach later. And the Greek rejection of heterosexuality as base and utilitarian, therefore, as something which could not be called authentic love. Now this is not a minor current in Greek thought. It’s dominant. It caused tremendous embarrassment to the church fathers when Christianity tried to take over Plato.
We find in much of Plato clear attestations of this in the Charmides, for instance, a famous dialogue. Socrates, you know, praises young men. The Symposium which gave rise to the idea all of you are vastly familiar with, the notion of the soul mate, which is probably the most popular notion in Western thought at present, actually refers really to authentic love as the love between two people of the same gender. I was a bit curious about this idea of soul mate, so I entered it on the Internet. And Google gives me 25,300,000 different references.
So that’s a clear indication that Plato’s Symposium has had quite a posterity. And then, obviously, there is a moderating influence on the extreme sensuality of Greek culture, which dawns with stoic philosophy. And with the greatest, one of the greatest Roman exponents of Stoicism, Marcus Aurelius. I remember when I was a young man reading Marcus Aurelius, and finding his teachings on self-restraint and discipline very inspiring. Until I came to a passage in his introduction which threw me completely, and I realized just how far we had come since then.
In which Marcus Aurelius congratulates himself on not having seduced his nephew or his niece. They were very young and terribly attractive. And said that this was really a case of great self-restraint on his side. Now this was the wisest Roman emperor of his age. Held up by the Christian fathers as a model of a Christian before his time.
And this leads me to, I would perhaps give a little brief parenthesis, but this will lead me to the Christian revolution. We tend to devaluate greatly Christianity because we’re the product of a Christian society. Much is taken for granted. But when we look at what antiquity was, and how barbaric the mores were, Christianity comes through really shining. Now, regarding art, I was going to bring some slides, it hasn’t worked out.
The one thing I think which if we look at Greek art, especially plastic art, such as sculpture, is very striking, is the idealization of the human form. Now this is something which has passed very powerfully into Western culture. And for that reason, is very interesting for us. You in Australia live in a society which as far as I can understand, is ruled by the preoccupation with sports. I think there seems to be nothing else which matters, or nothing of great importance.
You do not realize the degree to which your society is a modern avatar of Greek society. In Greek society, sports were a religious event. The Olympic games were a religious celebration held on Mount Olympus in the honor of Zeus. And in the honor of Zeus, young men competed. The perfection of the human body attained through athletic practice was a tribute to the gods.
Now this has passed into western thought. Sports, especially with the resurrection of the Olympic movement by Coubertin, have become de facto religious without it ever being officially acknowledged. They have all the criteria of religion. It’s a mass movement, elicit powerful emotions, provide meaning to the life of people, and interestingly enough lead to the glorification of the human body. Which is one of the biggest obstacles Buddhism has time and again faced in its introduction to the West.
Because this cult of the human body which we have inherited from the Greeks, which went underground during the period when Christianity was dominant, and resurrected at the Renaissance, goes hand in hand with a cult of desire. Desire is a legitimate expression of the body magnificent. If desire is a legitimate expression of the body magnificent, there is no place for a teaching for which desire is the root of human suffering. These two are poles apart. What we find time and over again with western Buddhists is that these implicit assumptions, which are some 25 centuries old, are present in our minds.
And they systematically block this critical perception of Buddhist thinking. Now this is why I have entered into perhaps more details about these topics than otherwise would be warranted. And I would heartily encourage you to try to find some examples of Greek statues, especially the statues of Praxiteles, the great Greek sculptor. Some of his works are in the Louvre, some in the Vatican Museum. All elicit the same fascination with the perfection of the human form.
But a perfection of the human form which is completely disembodied. It is very striking when you look at the great works of Greek sculpture. That perhaps never in history has the human form been so well described, so well depicted. Yet, never in history perhaps has it been so characterless and so soulless. It’s very striking.
It’s actually with the Romans. If you go to the Pinacoteca of the Vatican, it’s with the Romans that suddenly character appears in the sculpture. You see with the famous Roman busts of the emperors, there is a personality. There’s no longer this ideal of human perfection, the perfection of the body, but a personality which is represented. Now, this Greek ideal of human perfection, of perfection of the human body, is one which we have adopted uncritically.
And in our cult of athleticism, in our cult of body building, in our cult of health, we are worthy inheritors of the Greeks. But we have taken this heritage in a non-critical fashion. Much in it we can keep, but there is perhaps some we have to reassess. A turning point occurs then at the beginning of our era, with the eruption of Christianity. And it is a turning point which cannot be over-assessed.
It is, in my opinion, what has allowed the transmission of Buddhism to the West. Had it not been for the Christian heritage, there would not be enough grounds of commonality to bridge the Buddhist teachings with our pagan heritage. I don’t think so. And here, I will, I hope I’m allowed to do this, read some passages from the Bible in a Buddhist temple. I hope there’s no major objections.
Well, do you see the foundation stones outside? Yes. Well I think this has been done before. The one I would like to read is a famous seventh chapter of Corinthians, dealing with marriage. One Corinthians seven.
Which is very striking because it is the eruption of a totally new ethos. A new relation to the body and to desire. In a world in which, as we explained previously, the body was king. Now there are endless debates I don’t want to enter into here, on whether these were the authentic teachings of Jesus, or they were specific to Paul. My personal opinion is that they were specific to Paul, but there is no evidence either way.
So, First Corinthians seven, verse one reads as follows. Keep in mind the context we just presented before. It is good for a man not to touch a woman. Nevertheless, because of sexual immorality, let each man have his own wife and let each woman have her own husband. Let the husband render to his wife the affection due to her and likewise also the wife to her husband.
Now, I skip a little bit. I say this as a concession, not as a commandment. For I wish that all men were even as myself. But each one has his own gift from God, one in this manner, one in another. But I say to the unmarried and to the widows, it is good for them if they remain even as I am.
Paul was celibate, never married. But if they cannot exercise self-control, let them marry. For it is better to marry than to burn with passion. This is a radical shift in the relation to desire, in the context of western thought. We pass from unabashed endorsement and glorification of desire in Greek or Roman culture, to a rejection of, in this case specifically sexual desire, but it can be extended to the other forms of desire.
And at best, you know, an allowance as a concession. This has actually ruled western civilization for fifteen centuries. This one passage of Saint Paul, defining man’s relation to woman, which is a core form of desire, became the guiding line of Christianity until the Renaissance. Desire is not completely condemned, since after all the world is created. Inasmuch as it is created, it is good, albeit fallen, but desire must be controlled.
The more the control, the better. Now this heritage actually gave rise to the great monastic movements in early Christianity, the desert fathers as they were called, who engaged in practices extraordinarily similar in some respects to Buddhist practices in the Desert of Judea and Palestine, as well as the Egyptian Desert. In a period extending from the second to the seventh century, and then led to the great patristic works, like the works of Augustine, in which the dogmatic foundations for an actual critique of desire are laid. Saint Augustine’s Confessions. So we have here a tremendous change in orientation of western civilization, which was largely possible because after the Christianization of the Roman Empire, then the fall of Rome, much of the Greek works were lost.
And therefore the Greek heritage became subterranean. It abided, you know, really it survived largely in Byzantium. Now what we see in artistic representations is a radical switch. That is of great interest to us. There are almost no representations of suffering in Greek art.
The only ones we have are those on vases and terracotta. In other words, popular cheap art. All of the major sculptural representations are celebrations of the divinity of the human form, or of religious import. This is very striking. In societies in which 90% of the population lived in slavery.
Only 10% of the population were citizens with some rights. And of the percentage who were citizens, women had very few if any rights. More in Rome than in Greece, but still. In other words, in societies where suffering was rampant, it’s not described. It is not depicted.
With Christian art, a radical shift occurs. The very depiction of the crucifixion is a depiction of suffering. Suffering has entered the western psyche. And the depiction of the crucifixion was a dominant form of art, or the dominant depiction in art, in western art, all the way up to the fourteenth century. Another item which is very interesting for us, is that we pass from art which is a celebration of the body, the glorification of the body.
To an art which attempts to describe non-material features of the person. And this can best be understood in the art of the icon, in Eastern Orthodox art. Where an attempt is made to describe the soul, through describing the face or through painting the face and the eyes. It’s very striking if we contrast Greek or Roman art and Christian art that in Christian art, the body disappears. With the exceptional descriptions of the crucifixion where the body is represented as a support for suffering.
The suffering of the passion. The body disappears and what is privileged is the face, and within the face the eye, and within the eye that intimation of the non-material, the soul. So this again is a radical shift. It’s a process of interiorization in Western art, which perhaps reached its pinnacle with the great social crises heralded by the great plague. Those of you who have studied art history know that artistic depictions shift dramatically during and after the great plague of thirteen forty-eight.
An estimated twenty-five percent of Europe’s population may have died. In certain areas in Germany, it was closer to seventy-five percent. And death enters the European psyche as perhaps never before. We see the depictions of what are called the Danse Macabre. The dancing skeletons, dancing through the streets of the European cities.
Death is omnipresent. Perhaps, never has a depiction of suffering in European art reached such a proportion. And perhaps as a reaction against this, a mere century and a half later, the Renaissance, which represents the reintroduction, or the re-appropriation of Greek and Roman culture by the Christian West, occurs. And with the Renaissance, it is the return of the body magnificent. The body magnificent, legitimated by an appeal to antiquity.
It’s very striking to see Julius the Second, for instance, you know, sponsoring countless profoundly pagan depictions of the human body. And this was only possible because one could invoke antiquity. There were depictions of Apollo, of Poseidon, imitations of, you know. All this was legitimate. So we have a reappropriation of the body which goes hand in hand inherently once again with a progressive exteriorization.
And this trend has been at work since the Renaissance in our societies. So I will cover perhaps a couple of post-Renaissance developments. Relying mainly on literature and some philosophical material to show how since the Renaissance, which means the last five centuries, our relation to desire has evolved. And then, in the second part, we will try to address what I would like to call the Gangetic Critique of Desire. The critique which is shared by the Buddhists, the Jains, and what we could loosely call Hindu tradition, the Vedanta tradition, which is rooted in the Upanishads.
So what we see then after this return of the body magnificent, after this reappropriation of Greek texts with the reintroduction, for instance, of Plato in Italy in 1418. The translation of Plato into Latin by Ficino, by Bracciolini, you know. Then the translation of the entire Greek corpus which had survived in Byzantium. We see a re-emergence of antiquity, but an antiquity which is always in a relation of tension with Christianity. And this relation of tension continues until the eighteenth century, where a series of pivotal figures will define our relationship to desire in general, to emotions even more largely, and to our physical substrate, to our body.
The first such figure who is greatly underrated in my opinion, certainly in Anglo-Saxon thought, is Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau’s influence, even though he was not a philosopher, but more of a writer, was dramatic. If one actually reads much nineteenth century material, whether it be Russian or German. Constant references are made to the tension between Rousseau and Voltaire, as being a dominant source of tension in the psyche of the nineteenth century educated bourgeoisie or nobility. One had to choose between Rousseau and Voltaire.
Between Rousseau who believed that man was naturally good, who believed that society was, when all is said and done, the root of evil, and that the social contract was entered into under the force of circumstances, but that one could only aspire to return to this primordial state of goodness on the one side, and Voltaire on the other side, the skeptic and the cynic. If you read Tolstoy’s Childhood, Boyhood and Youth, it’s very striking to see that, you know, his father had both Rousseau and Voltaire in his library. Voltaire was well hidden because Voltaire was considered to be a corruptor of the minds of the youth, you know. And Tolstoy read Voltaire, and almost became an atheist in the process, you know. Now, what does Rousseau bring?
In a series of works, Rousseau defines our modern sensitivity. In his perhaps most controversial work, his Confessions, which are an intentional allusion to Augustine’s Confessions. He redefines man’s relation to his own intimacy. Rousseau’s goal in his Confessions is to depict his life as it happened, and his emotions as they occurred, without any sense of shame or compunction. When one reads the Confessions, it is very obvious that they are a massively self-serving document.
Nonetheless, because Rousseau for the first time, talks of what were then considered the baser aspects of life. He talks of his physiological needs. He talks of his sexual awakening. He talks of things which were never talked about before. He redefines the notion of intimacy, and redefines the relation between the private and the public spheres.
Rousseau heralds the beginning of the publicization of the private sphere, which has come to mark much of modern popular culture. It’s always very striking if you go on the Internet. You learn more about famous non-entities than you ever wanted to know. And it’s not terribly clear why you should know anything about this. But this is a direct heritage of Rousseau.
The idea that baring it all is a good thing, which is very much something completely alien to the antique world. The second aspect of Rousseau’s thought which is formative of modernity, are Rousseau’s views on education in Émile, which are a direct conclusion of his understanding of the constitution of society, and of the social contract. For Rousseau, since man in a state of nature is fundamentally good, and naturally gravitates towards good. Education should be limited to encouraging the child to rediscovering what deep down he already knows. So from Rousseau to Françoise Dolto, the great French educationalist, there is a continuum.
Our modern system of education is profoundly marked by Rousseau. By this man who married illegitimately a washer woman, begot four children, and then even though he was quite well off for his age, placed all four of his children in a public orphanage in Paris. Most of them died. This is what Rousseau did. Rousseau was an appalling human being.
Rousseau, in my opinion, epitomizes the contradictions of modernity. High and lofty ideals, and appalling behavior. This man who wrote the treatises on education which have marked modernity abandoned all four of his children. He couldn’t be bothered. And if you can imagine what the conditions in French orphanages in the eighteenth century were, you have a sense of the fate he sentenced them to.
Then the third work of Rousseau, which is the one which is the most interesting for us here, is a work nobody reads anymore, but which was perhaps the most widely read work in the nineteenth century. It was The New Héloïse. An account of romantic love on the shores of the Swiss Lake where I was raised, Lake Geneva. This defined the new standard of love. A love which provided absolute meaning to life.
On a scale which I would say has never been reached before in history. No civilization has ever thought that human love could provide meaning to life. Thanks to Rousseau, who in many respects inherited and developed this concept from twelfth and thirteenth century authors, such as the authors of Tristan and Iseult, the Roman de la Rose. Thanks to Rousseau, this has become part of our culture. It’s not a minor part as my search for soulmate on Google showed.
It’s a dominant part. It is a source of tremendous suffering because obviously, it is a complete fantasy. From a man who himself was never able to relate in a wholesome and respectful way with a woman, whose wife was basically a servant, whom he treated as a servant. This is a man whose ideas on education and whose ideas on relationships imbue modernity. So many ruptures.
All of this may seem very far removed from Buddhism. But I think as we start moving through this history of western thought, we will start to get a sense of what we are bringing to the temple when we come here. What we are bringing to the teachings are unfulfilled expectations. And perhaps just how unrealistic these expectations might be. That’s a little bit the goal of this talk, and I must apologize if I make a bit of a caricature, but, you know, it’s difficult to enter into great detail in a mere two hours.
And then, obviously, these developments which Rousseau initiated were called the romantic movement in the early nineteenth century, which is a movement which spans literature, as well as music, as well as philosophy. And perhaps, in contradistinction to Rousseau, there is one figure at the beginning of the nineteenth century for whom I have always had a particular fondness, and he’s actually a very good human being, in addition to being an extraordinary writer. And he has left us the most cynical and precious analysis of love any western writer has ever left. And that is Stendhal. Stendhal, the great French novelist, wrote a small treatise, a treatise on love, in which he analyzes the process of falling in love.
And his analysis is fascinating because it is extraordinarily Buddhist, and yet he had no contact whatsoever of any type with the Buddhist teachings. Stendhal, the background of this story is that Stendhal was visiting the salt mines of Salzburg with an Italian traveling companion, Madame Gherardi, who was very plain. She was pockmarked and rather sallow as many Italians were supposed to be at the period. And a Bavarian officer joined them. And this Bavarian officer started to become infatuated with Madame Gherardi.
And Stendhal, who, as Somerset Maugham said, all writers have a shard of ice in their heart. Stendhal certainly did have a shard of ice in his heart. Stendhal observed this process of infatuation and gave a detailed account of it. Madame Gherardi asking her all along to play along with this Bavarian officer. And the process Stendhal described is what he calls crystallization.
He had been very struck to see in the salt mines that ugly brown twigs could get covered in salt crystals, and eventually become resplendent. And he felt this was a metaphor for the process of falling in love. Where the loved object was progressively imbued with all of the qualities in a quasi-hypnotic process, whereby the lover convinced himself progressively ever more of the existence of what were completely non-existent qualities in the loved object. And it struck him in particular, when the Bavarian officer in question described to him Madame Gherardi’s hand, which was brownish and pockmarked by smallpox, as the most exquisite hand he had ever seen. Now this is a beautiful description of the process of imputation without the term ever being used.
And this is perhaps the main rejoinder there was in the early nineteenth century to Rousseau’s vision of love. That from Stendhal’s standpoint, love is merely a process of projection, of mental imputation. Hence, all the sufferings which derive therefrom. So I will try to finish this section before a small tea break. This, I think, may be a bit heavy going.
So we have a tea break and then resume. Hand in hand with this, the demise of Christianity which was initiated by the Renaissance, which was a long and drawn out process. With first an implicit critique through the reappropriation of Greek and Roman values and an explicit critique in the context of the philosophers of the enlightenment. Figures such as Diderot, but also Voltaire, d’Alembert, etcetera. Eventually, the role of Christianity as an ideologically constituting factor of the West dwindled to such a point that it became possible to co-opt desire in all its manifold forms as the motor of the up and rising industrial revolution.
This is the heritage we at present live upon. This was fought tooth and nail by the representatives of traditional Christianity. There was papal encyclical after papal encyclical condemning in the eighteen seventies and the eighteen eighties, the rising capitalist economy. Encyclicals which are prophetic with hindsight, which were seen as completely passéiste and reactionary at the period, but which are prophetic because they understood the enslavement of man to the economic machine by an appeal to his basest desires. And this was only made possible as we were saying by the collapse of Christianity and its teachings on the restraint of desires as a structuring force of society.
One of the greatest critiques of the rising industrial revolution, and the destructive effect of desire and greed specifically, can be found in Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment. Where the young student, Raskolnikov, who for Dostoyevsky epitomizes Russian youth in general. Fascinated and hypnotized by pernicious western ideas. And in dire financial straits uses this new ideology to justify his projected murder of his landlady. And eventually falls into the abyss, which he had been warned against.
These critiques of the co-optation of desire by the industrial machine, by incipient capitalist society, were not just critiques formulated by Russian writers, but by great French writers like Zola, by British writers like Dickens, who portray time and over again the horrific misery which arises as a result of this new world view. I was gonna talk briefly, but I think we’re gonna pass because it is a bit complex and not terribly germane of a specific rereading of Marxist thought by what is called the Frankfurt School. Where Marxist thought is used as a tool for cultural criticism. To criticize the up and rising consumer society and the alienation it produces in consumers as a result of the constant cultivation of desire. But much of this critique has entered popular culture, and I have listed some of the authors in the bibliography if you’re interested.
Adorno’s Minima Moralia is a masterpiece. You have also Dialectic of Enlightenment, is also to be consulted. And I personally have a very soft spot for Walter Benjamin, the great Jewish critic and specialist of literary criticism. But the one author I would like to cover before the break is a French anthropologist and sociologist who has provided, I think, one of the most pertinent analyses of the middle category of the three divisions of desire, in other words, culturally constructed desire. And he is not very well known in Anglo-Saxon countries.
He’s been translated, but he’s not well known. We will dwell somewhat on him. This is René Girard. Some of you may have heard of René Girard. He was born in France, but spent much of his professional career in The United States.
And was fascinated by the process of Genesis of desire. Now, to the difference of Buddhist thinkers and thinkers in general, Girard does not seem to consider that there is any such thing as instinctual desire. Girard considers that all desire is necessarily culturally constructed. But his analysis of culturally constructed desire is very interesting for us precisely because it is not a component of desire to which much care or much attention is dedicated in Buddhist thought. Largely because culturally constructed desire is socially constructed.
And Buddhism and Buddhist teachings have little time for society. They are interested in the individual and the individual’s path to liberation and full enlightenment as a means to change society eventually. So an analysis of socially constructed or culturally constructed desire is particularly interesting for us. This is something that we have to endorse. Girard’s presentation is quite fascinating.
For Girard, desire by definition is mimetic. What he means by mimetic desire is that desire is imitative. In other words, we desire something because others desire it. If they did not desire it, we would not desire it. Now this obviously applies to culturally constructed desire, which as I said earlier, is for Girard the only form of desire he acknowledges.
This mimetic desire is present in man from the dawn of society, and is clearly co-opted now by the advertising industry. The goal of the advertising industry is to convince you that others desire something, therefore you should desire it. So advertising relies on mimetism. But where Girard’s analysis is fascinating is that Girard connects mimetic desire with the genesis of violence in society. And in this respect, I would put it to you that Girard is profoundly Buddhist in the context of his analysis of culturally constructed desire.
Because from a Buddhist standpoint, desire and aversion are two sides of the same coin. Where there is the one, the potentiality for the other is present. Aversion or hatred arises from unsatisfied desire. Now, Girard’s analysis is the following. If all desire is mimetic, then in a society where all are imitating each other in their desire for a finite number of objects of desire, it is unavoidable that conflict should arise.
Conflict and violence then become mimetic as well. In other words, the violence of the one imitates the violence of the other. Now this is something we can see in many of the conflicts now in the world. Where the violence of one side legitimates the violence of the other, which in turn legitimates. And what we have is a spiraling explosion of violence on scales, which beggar the imagination.
So this analysis of Girard, I personally found absolutely fascinating, and it seems to me to go a long way to explain the explosion of violence in the twentieth century, which has made the twentieth century the most violent century on record. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former national security advisor of Carter, in Out of Control, Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century, evaluates lives deliberately extinguished by politically motivated killing in the twentieth century at approximately one hundred seventy-five million deaths in one century. The deeds of man to man, we’re not talking of catastrophes and all that. Politically motivated killing. Probably a greater number of deaths than throughout the rest of history.
Probably. In conflict, not total number of deaths. And then, I would like to quote a passage from Mark Mazower in the American Historical Review. Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century. It’s a recent article, seven years old.
The twentieth century is increasingly characterized by scholars in terms of its historically unprecedented level of bloodshed. More human beings have been killed or allowed to die by human decision than ever before in human history, Eric Hobsbawm has written. For Isaiah Berlin, the twentieth century was the worst century there has ever been. Genocide, ethnic cleansing, the killing of unprecedented numbers of civilians both in wartime and through acts of massive political oppression have all contributed to what Charles Maier has described as an epoch of moral atrocity. It is difficult for us to understand the specific and horrific violence which has come to characterize the twentieth century and unfortunately which seems to be continuing in this century, without appealing to models like the model that René Girard proposes.
Girard offers very little hope to escape the spiral of violence. His analysis of societies where the spiral of mimetic violence is initiated, shows that time and again the only way out of the spiral of mimetic violence is scapegoating. The selection of a scapegoat, which will bear the totality of the mimetic violence, which the community then catalyzes on the scapegoat. And you all know what the scapegoats were in the Old Testament. They were animals which were selected for ritual purification of the community.
You have this in the book of Leviticus. And they were then expelled ritually from the community in the process of what is called anathema. Modern day excommunication in the Roman Catholic church is the same. It’s expelling from the community and sacrificed. Now what is very striking in the violence of the twentieth century is the scale of scapegoating.
We have scapegoating of the Armenians by the Turks at the end of World War One, the Armenian Genocide. Scapegoating of the Jews by the Germans in World War Two. The Jewish genocide. Scapegoating of huge swathes of the Tibetan population by the Chinese. His Holiness has spoken of a cultural genocide for the Tibetans.
Scapegoating of a large proportion of the Cambodian population by the Khmer Rouge. One can speak of a genocide. Scapegoating by Stalin of huge swathes of the Ukrainian population, the Kulaks. 20,000,000 died. Again and again, this process where mimetic violence explodes leads unavoidably to the only road of appeasement of mimetic violence, which is a scapegoating of large swathes of the population.
We are caught in exactly the same process nowadays. A mutual process of scapegoating with the Islamic world. Where the Islamic world has scapegoated the West, and Islamic radicals come close to performing ritual sacrifices of Western prisoners they capture. And the West has scapegoated the Islamic world. To the point where, you know, many Sikhs in The United States, you know, were terrorized after the terrorist attacks of September 11th merely because they resembled Muslims.
Now, this I think really, or here lies the strength of René Girard’s analysis. It provides us with the tool for understanding the arising of culturally constructed violence, and of culturally constructed desire. And perhaps through self-awareness, it provides us also with the tools to prevent them from spiraling out of control, and to resist the temptation of scapegoating. So this has been terribly non-Buddhist, but I hope there have been some things here which have been of interest or of relevance. I think you can feel that we are perhaps moving in the general direction.
We’re gonna take a nice tea break and come back in ten minutes time.