Principles of the Tenets — 2001-10-16

43 min · 3,073 words · 16 October 2001 · Buddha House Adelaide

Principles of the Tenets (Geshe Pema Tsering)
Principles of the Tenets (Geshe Pema Tsering)
Principles of the Tenets — 2001-10-16
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Audio recorded at Buddha House Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. What does it mean to say the “person” is just a collection of aggregates? In this 43-minute session, Geshe Pema Tsering works through two sections of a structured Vaibhāṣika survey. He identifies the school’s account of persons — either the mere collection of the five aggregates or mental consciousness — then maps its full taxonomy of awareness: valid perception versus valid inference, and sense, mental, and yogic subtypes. The sharpest analysis concerns yogic perception’s two grades: a grosser type countering the notion that the self is permanent, single, and self-powered; a subtler type countering the vivid, immediate impression that the self is self-arisen and independently existent. The session ends with Q&A on the Vatsiputriya sub-school’s “indescribable self” — which Geshe Pema dismisses as a dead end best left to the Madhyamaka — and on self-cognition. Suited to students following a systematic course on Buddhist philosophical tenets.

File metadata (for organising)

File: 02 Tenets 2001 10 16.mp3

UUID: f3b31022-8361-4469-9681-20aeecc5aaf8

Teacher: Geshe Pema Tsering

Collection: Principles of the Tenets (Geshe Pema Tsering)

Date: 2001-10-16

Recorded at: Buddha House Adelaide

Duration: 43.5 minutes

Words: ~3,069

And then below that quotation, then it is also stated that they assert that the three times to be substance. And this, then connects back with that previous assertion of why they’re called followers of the great exposition because in fact they assert that three times of the past, present and future to be substance. So therefore, because of that, they assert that a vase exists at a time of the past of the vase and a vase exists at a time of the future of a vase. And that also can be applied to other phenomena as well. So therefore, we finished section number four here, which is the method of asserting objects.

Has everyone understood, the basic presentation there? So in fact here, it’s important to understand this presentation of the objects or how objects are asserted, in different, systems. It’s not easy but it’s necessary to gain a basic understanding of these. In fact, they are different in each of the systems as we move through the different types of tenets that exist. It’s good if we can gain an understanding of this, although it’s difficult.

So now we’re moving on to the fifth part. That is the method of asserting object possessors. So firstly, the first presentation there is that they assert in terms of object possessors, they assert that the mere collection of the five aggregates is the instance of the person or the mental consciousness is the instance of the person. So they give two, two possibilities. So in fact here for the Vaibhāṣika or the proponents of the great exposition, the instance of the person is the mere collection.

Firstly, the mere collection of the five aggregates. Here the five aggregates refer to the form aggregate, feeling aggregate, discrimination, composition and consciousness aggregates. So the collection of those five is regarded as the instance of the person. So therefore, for that reason, the mere collection of the five aggregates then is imputed as the person is therefore labeled the person, designated person. This is the same for a human being or a ghost or any of the other various types of being that exists in the universe.

Then secondly, they assert that the mental consciousness itself is the instance or the example of the person. And in general, it’s the second the second one there that is asserted by the Vaibhāṣika or the great exposition that the mental consciousness itself is the instance of the person. So in fact, initially here we deal with the person and what the person is. So object possessors are of different type and firstly we’re dealing with persons as object possessors. Then secondly, secondly with awareness or discernment, which is also another type of object possessor.

So for discernment, there are two divisions, two types that is, valid awareness and non valid awareness. So the first one there is valid awareness, and that has two types, valid perception and valid inference. So firstly we have valid perception. This is valid perception here is referring to perception and in general what perception, refers to is that type of awareness that doesn’t rely on reasons in order to generate an understanding of its object. So valid awareness, that type of awareness which gains valid understanding without the use of reason, without having to apply reasons is valid perception.

Then we have valid inference, and valid inference is the opposite of valid perception in the sense that it relies directly on reasons, in order to comprehend its object. For instance, if there was a person and we didn’t know who they were and someone said that they’re the president of the United States, then if they were to offer valid reasons for asserting that and we could establish they were valid and so forth, we would develop a valid inference that that person was the president. So in brief, valid awareness which relies on reasons, in order to comprehend its object, is valid inference. And awareness which comprehends its objects without relying on reasons is perception. That’s a very brief or simplified way of looking at the difference between these two.

So valid perception then has three types according to the school. Valid or sense perception, mental perception, and yogic perception. So the first one, sense perception here, is therefore dealing with our ordinary sense perception such as eye perception, ear perception, nose perception, tongue perception, body perception. These sense awarenesses that we normally have. Then we have mental perception.

Mental perception is a type of perception that exists on a non sensory level, on a mental level, so therefore being mental perception. Then we have yogic perception that exists in the continuum of ārya beings, and that type of perception is the path itself and it comprehends the subtle objects that are required in developing the path. So in fact, here we dealing with, then yogic perception and yogic perception, is developed initially by a valid inference comprehending its objects such as impermanence. First we have a conceptual understanding generated of something like impermanence, and through meditating, then developing meditation or wisdom developed, wisdom dependent on meditation, comprehending impermanence and meditating on that over a long period, it’s possible to develop yogic perception comprehending impermanence and so forth. So here these are types of awareness that exist within the continuum of an ārya perceptually comprehending their object such as impermanence or selflessness.

So then the assertion of this particular school is that sense perception itself is not necessarily awareness. So if it is valid sense perception, it doesn’t have to be awareness because the eye sense power itself is valid perception. That means the subtle form, which is the eye sense power, is held by the school to be, sense perception itself, even though it’s not awareness. So then we have a division of yogic perception perception into two types. Firstly, Yogic perception perceptually comprehending selflessness of the person Yogic perception perceptually comprehending subtle impermanence.

And then the first type there, this Yogic perception, perceptually comprehending selflessness of the person, is again divided into two types, into a grosser and a subtler type. And the first one there, the grosser type of, yogic perception is yogic perception perceptually comprehending a person to be empty of being permanent, single, and self powered. And the subtler type of yogic perception is this yogic perception perceptually comprehending a person to be empty of being self and substantially existent. So here we’re dealing with two different types of yogic perception. So the first one is a gross type of Yogic perception and the second is a subtle type.

And they comprehend the gross selflessness or a subtle selflessness of a person. So the gross selflessness of a person there is a person being empty of being permanent, single and self powered. So in fact, there’s three features, there that are being denied, that a person is permanent firstly, then single, then self powered. And the absence of that in a person is gross selflessness. Then on a subtler level, a person being empty of being self arisen and also being substantially existent, those two qualities, is a subtler level of selflessness, and that is comprehended by the subtler yogic perception.

So in fact, these types of yogic perception are both the antidotes to different types of self grasping. So the first one, a gross yogic perception, is the antidote to grasping a gross type of self, and the subtle yogic perception is the antidote to a subtle, self grasping. So the first one there, is the gross gross grasping of self grasps the self at being permanent, single and self powered. Here permanent refers to the fact that the self is fixed and it, doesn’t change moment to moment. Then grasping self to be single, there refers to grasping the self as not dependent on its parts.

And then grasping the self to be self powered is to grasp the self or the person to be not dependent on causes and conditions. So these are overcome by this type of Yogic perception. So therefore this yogic perception, this first one that’s developed there, acts as the antidote or eliminates these different types of conception of the person, the person being permanent, meaning that they’re fixed and unchanging, not momentary, that a person is single and not dependent on their parts and self powered therefore not dependent on causes and conditions. So this yogic perception eliminates those misconceptions about the nature of a person, and that a person in fact is empty of those states. So in fact, initially here, this understanding or this grasping of the person to be permanent is overcome by understanding a person to be actually impermanent, and momentary.

And in fact that they arise due to a collection of different states, and so the person actually is impermanent. So initially this first type of Yogic perception, is the type of Yogic perception which is comprehending subtle impermanence. Because it comprehends subtle impermanence, it’s overcoming the grasping of the self to be single and self powered. But that type of Yogic perception is too gross to comprehend, the selflessness of a person. So that is established by the second type of perception which perceptually comprehends a person to be empty of being self arisen and substantially existent.

So in fact, the second type of Yogic perception acts as the antidote to grasping the self to be self arisen and substantially existent. So, here the first part is a person being empty of being self arisen. So, here self arisen is this holding the self to actually be able to establish its own existence itself. It’s a type of independent, as an independent being in a sense. And in fact, we have this impression because when we think about the self, the idea of I or another being, when we think of them, it’s almost there already.

It’s a process which is in a sense instantly manifest. When we think of ourselves, this impression we have of ourselves is already fully manifest for us. It’s as if it gives the impression that the person is in a sense generated from their own side independently of any other objects that they would depend on. So in fact, we therefore have this impression of the self as being self arisen, self generated or independent. So we have this impression that the self, the I, is self arisen.

But when we investigate, we find that it actually isn’t self arisen. It’s not independent. It cannot exist independently because it, exists in dependence on things like karma, like the fact of having to get up and walk from one place to another. In fact, it exists in dependence on various causes and conditions and so on. So in fact, it’s not self arisen.

So in fact, this understanding that a being is empty of being self arisen or the person or the self, the I, is empty of being self arisen is understanding them to be empty of true existence. And also this the self, the person, the I, is not substantially existent. So in fact, in other words, the I of the person doesn’t exist in a way that it’s held by the I-grasping. So in brief that covers firstly those two types of yogic perception that exist. Then also we have the sixth division here is the method of asserting selflessness.

Initially the subtle selflessness of phenomena and subtle selflessness of the person are asserted to be equivalent. Here the subtle selflessness of the person is equivalent to a person being empty of being self arisen and substantially existent entity. So then selflessness of dharmas is not asserted. This particular school doesn’t assert dharmas or existent entities also to be selfless.

And that is because the advocates of the great exposition accept that established bases or all existent entities are necessarily the self of a dharma. So then on page number six, then we have from among the advocates of the great exposition. So within the great exposition schools, there are many different sub schools. So from among those, there are said to be eighteen or nineteen, there is a group called the Vatsiputriyas.

The followers of Vatsiputra accept selflessness of the person empty of a permanent single self powered self, but not selflessness of a person empty of a self arisen, substantially existent self because they accept a self which is indescribable as being either permanent or impermanent or one in nature with or distinct from the aggregates. So that’s a particular view within the great exposition. So even though they assert a gross selflessness which is asserted by the other, great exposition systems, they don’t accept subtle selflessness that we mentioned before. So in fact, they don’t accept this subtle selflessness because they assert that there is a self, an indescribable self, which cannot be described as being permanent or impermanent or one in nature with or distinct in nature from the aggregates. In fact, is subtle level of self that does exist and they assert that subtle type of self to exist.

Does anyone have any questions? Actually, we’ve we’ve just probably have a little time just to deal with any questions that may come up. So if there’s any questions also, people can think about them and then put them down on paper and they can be dealt with say in the next session. So in fact, at any time it’s possible we should just write down any points or questions that come up and they can be dealt with in later sessions. So that’s very good to do.

We need to deal with these issues. And in fact also within the, the BSP program then tests are also held. So, it’s good to deal with any, doubts and so forth that arise when they do arise, especially so we can answer the questions in the tests. In fact, from the point of view of the Vaibhāṣikas or the Great Exposition School, they do assert this, the vase substantially exists in the three times. But it doesn’t necessarily mean that a vase would become permanent because of that assertion.

But even if it did mean for the Vaibhāṣika that it would become permanent, it’s not a problem for the Vaibhāṣika or for the Great Exposition School because they assert that permanent things anyway are functioning. So there’s not, wouldn’t necessarily be a problem for this particular school in the vase being permanent. Is that okay? For someone like the Sthaviravada or the Theravāda, they are not really represented in this particular text. Here when it talks about Vaibhāṣika, it’s a general term given, to the eighteen different types of Vaibhashikha or Great Exposition school.

But of course we don’t have time here to go into the various different assertions of the eighteen schools. Someone like the Sthaviravada are not necessarily represented in the views here, although the general presentation should cover all eighteen. But when you get into specific assertions by the different schools, then they are far too many and intricate to be represented in the broad definitions that are given, to be fully represented. And in fact, generally the presentation here is given from the point of view of what is called the Sarvastivada or the all exists school from within the Vaibhāṣika. So in fact, the general presentation here should actually pervade all eighteen schools of the Vaibhāṣika or the Great Exposition.

It’s a very general presentation. But even so we can see that there are some exceptions like the Vatsiputriya, one school that does have slightly different presentation. So in general here, the presentation is from a very broad perspective of, the great exposition. So it should hold with all of the the eighteen schools. Yeah.

The Theravāda are one of the eighteen. Oh, it means it’s indescribable. You can’t describe it as being permanent or describe it as being impermanent. It’s indescribable. Yep.

Here, this particular school doesn’t assert self cognition or self perception. It’s just something that they disagree with. They don’t assert that it’s necessary, to assert a type of self cognition in explaining how, a being functions. The other schools, like the Sūtra School who do assert self cognition assert it because they are seeking to explain how we remember past experience. And for them, if there isn’t, an initial awareness itself aware of our inner experience of states of awareness, we can’t remember them later on.

So self cognition is, fundamentally asserted in order to explain memory. And this is in other systems that it’s therefore asserted. But this particular school doesn’t assert it. They assert or they establish memory in other ways. So it’s really in order to explain memory that, self perception or self cognition is asserted.

And here the Vaibhāṣika or the Great Exposition simply don’t, they themselves don’t need to, assert such a state, such a type of awareness in order to establish memory. But other particular schools do. In general, this type of assertion, this assertion of an indescribable self, that’s made by the Vatsiputriya, this particular sect, is an invalid or it’s an incorrect assertion. We don’t have to be too concerned about, discovering exactly what they’re referring to there, but they do assert a type of self. They don’t assert subtle selflessness.

And this particular assertion that there is an indescribable self, subtle self, is a false assertion. And so it’s not that useful to actually pursue or there’s nothing valid to be detected in such an inquiry. It’s a wrong assertion at the beginning. Here in fact, in order to determine the nature of the self, the best or the highest description occurs in the fourth system, in the system of the middle way. And within that then there is an extensive reasoning set forth to establish the nature of the self.

And there they’re able to do that very skillfully and accurately. Here, this assertion of an indescribable self at this level of the great exposition is not a very skillful or well defined assertion at all. So trying to discover actually what they mean by that is not of much use. It’s probably better to wait and examine it in more detail on a level of the middle way school. Did you understand?

Oh, yeah. Is he going home?

Key terms in this teaching

Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
self-grasping dag dzin (Tib)
The mind that apprehends the self as inherently existent. This refers to both the self of persons and the self of phenomena. LYWA
selflessness of phenomena chö kyi dag me (Tib)
The absence of a self in phenomena - all things other than the person. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka view, the most subtle form is their lack of inherent existence: they do not exist from their own side. LYWA
Theravada Sthaviravada (Skt); nätenpa (Tib)
A tradition of Buddhism that upholds the Pali Canon and the noble eightfold path, which leads practitioners to liberation (nirvana), a state free from the suffering of conditioned existence. LYWA
true existence den par yö pa (Tib)
The concrete, real existence from its own side that everything appears to possess; in fact, both self and phenomena are empty of true existence. LYWA
Vaibhashika jedrag mawa (Tib)
The Great Exposition school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Great Exposition school asserts truly established external objects but does not assert self-knowers. LYWA
valid awareness pramana (Skt); tshema (Tib)
A new non-deceptive cognition. There are two types: valid perception, such as the eye consciousness seeing a flower, and valid inference, such as inferring fire from seeing smoke. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

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