44 min · 1,917 words · 22 August 1991 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 44-minute teaching, Kyabje Rinpoche explores the eight difficult-to-realize objects unique to Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, the Consequentialist school of the Middle Way. He distinguishes between conventional cognizers, which assent to imputed objects like hand without analysis, and ultimate cognizers, which investigate the final mode of abidance—emptiness—through reasoned inquiry. Analysis reveals objects are not truly existent because they arise in dependence, not independently. Rinpoche then systematically presents the eight difficult points that follow from Prāsaṇgika’s core assertion: all phenomena lack natural existence. These are contrasted with views held by the Mind Only school and the Autonomy Middle Way school. Advanced instruction for practitioners with background in Buddhist epistemology.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 1991-08-22 – 21B – KR.mp3
UUID: 806c379f-0aa9-44bf-a457-fa9f4b95d769
Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche
Collection: Entering the Middle Way
Date: 1991-08-22
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~1,919
So it is in dependence upon analyzing as to whether the object is truly existent or not that it finds the final mode of abidance. That’s another way to translate where I said ultimately. You can say the final mode of abidance. Therefore, through this prime cognizer it’s analyzing is an analytic consciousness and what it finds upon its analysis is the final mode of abidance of the object. That’s what it’s searching for and that’s the object that it finds.
And in dependence upon it, so the method for its arising of this ultimate prime cognizer is searching for the final mode of abidance. And upon finding it, it becomes an ultimate consciousness in dependence upon analyzing for the final mode of abidance. Upon finding it, then it becomes an ultimate prime cognizer realizing the final mode of abidance. So it’s showing that it arises through dependence upon searching for the final mode of abidance and in dependence upon finding that object it becomes an ultimate prime cognizer. So here the final mode of abidance refers to emptiness and dependence upon analysis, a type of prime cognizer which arises in dependence upon analysis, arises.
And I’m not sure if the word reasoning consciousness is correct. So I was questioning I would translate as reasoning consciousness, but it is a type of realizer which arises in dependence upon reasons. That’s why I translated reasoning consciousness. So the reasoning consciousness which is analyzing the final mode of abidance. The final mode of abidance refers to emptiness and it is a reasoning consciousness which is analyzing because it is making use of reasoning in its analysis for the final mode of what is the final mode of abidance.
So all phenomena which are not ultimate are conventionalities. And these are objects which are found by a prime cognizer which does not analyze, which does not investigate its object. What it is engaging in, it engages in its object by means of non investigation by not analyzing its object. What it engages in are conventionalities. So what we mean by engaging through non investigation and non analysis would be for example in terms of the hand.
If we were to investigate what is the hand, is this the hand, is this the hand, this the hand, is this the hand, we would not be able to find the hand. But in dependence upon this collection of its parts is imputed a hand and that prime cognizer assents to that appearance of a hand as being a hand, which says, Ah, that’s a hand, which apprehends that imputed object as the hand, that is the prime cognizer arising through non investigation analyzing a conventional prime cognizer. On the other hand, the consciousness realizing emptiness of the hand would arise by way of for example taking the hand as a subject, analyzing that it’s not truly existent because it is not independently arising and because it is dependent arising it’s not naturally existent. That is to say it would engage its object through investigation using various reasons as to whether the object was naturally existent or not naturally existent. And it would come to understand through relying on trying to understand the nature of the object using various reasonings that it would understand that the object is not truly existent and it would be a prime cognizer which would be investigating the final nature or final mode of abidance of its object by means of many reasons.
So it would engage its object in terms of investigation on the basis of reasons. So within the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school there is a category of eight difficult to realize objects which are unique to the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school So there is this category of eight difficult to realize objects uncommon which are unique to the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school and they all follow upon the reason that all phenomena do not naturally exist. This is the uncommon view of the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school, that all phenomena do not naturally exist. And following up on that, there are eight difficult to realize objects which come out of that basic premise. The first of these is due to this reasoning that there is no apperception, there is no consciousness, apperception, self perceiver.
The second is there is no mind basis at all. The third is there are no autonomous signs. The fourth is that there exist external objects. The fifth is that if an individual is a superior, this individual necessarily realizes selflessness of phenomena. The sixth is that the conception of true existence is an obstruction to liberation.
Somewhere the numbering got a little bit confused. I have another one which is a thing, a functional phenomenon. What? Destruction? Yeah, or transit, yeah, destruction, yeah.
And the unique and uncommon presentation of the three times, past, present, and future. Destruction, deterioration, destruction. How many do you have? There’s There’s no no mind basis at all. There’s no autonomous signs.
If an individual is superior, it’s necessary that he be an individual who realizes the selfless is a phenomenon. Conception of true existence is an obstruction to liberation, is an afflictive obstruction. Deterioration or transitoriness is a thing. And an uncommon presentation of the three times. And external objects, the existence of external objects.
That’s nine, isn’t it? Yeah? Difficult to realize objects as presented by the Consequentialist Middle Way, which are unique to the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school. So within the great vehicle there are the two tenet systems of the mind only school and the middle way school. These first two, that is to say mind only school holds the existence of a self knower and mind basis of all.
And the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school refutes the existence of these two. The mind only school also asserts the existence, asserts the non existence of external phenomena. And the Autonomy Middle Way School asserts the existence of autonomous signs or signs or personal signs and this is refuted. And the Autonomy in Middleways School also asserts that if one is superior it’s not necessary that one realized the selflessness of phenomenon but this is refuted by the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school. The Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school, the Autonomy Middle Way School also asserts that the conception of true existence is a knowledge obstruction but according to the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school it is an afflictive obstruction.
And the Autonomy Middle Way School asserts that transitoryness or what I said destruction is a non functional phenomenon whereas the Consequential Middle Way School asserts it’s a functional phenomenon. And flowing upon the assertion that the transitoriness is a functional phenomenon, they have a unique presentation up to three times. So these are the eight difficult objects to realize as set forth by the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school So we said that all of these eight difficult to realize objects arise in dependence upon the assertion that all phenomena do not naturally exist. If we were to question why does it depend upon this reason that all phenomena do not naturally exist, how this establish the nonexistence of self knower? So definition of a self knower is that it is a consciousness having the aspect of the apprehended.
The That would from its own side having the aspect of the apprehended. So in this definition of self knower it is the independently, from its own side having the aspect of the apprehended. Here they hold that the consciousness and its object come into existence independent of each other. And since the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school refutes that the natural existence of all phenomena then this automatically entails the refutation of the self knower since it cannot exist independent of its object. So according to the mind only school, the object when one searches for the being, for example the person, the object which is found by a conventional prime cognizer upon analysis which is searching for the person, they will find the mind basis of all.
That is to say they are positing the mind basis of all as being the being or more specifically that which is illustrative of the being. So when this conventional prime cognizer searches for the person, what it finds is the mind basis of all. When they search, they say, Is the arm the person? No. Is the head the person?
No. What they do find as the person is the mind basis of all. On the other hand, when the Consequentialist Middle Way school searches for that which is the person, the person is never found, and in dependence upon that, nothing naturally exists. Because the Consequentialist, the mind only school, when they search for the person, they find the person and that person is the mind basis of all. Therefore the mind basis of all must naturally exist as the naturally existent person.
But since the Consequentialist Middle Way school say nothing naturally exists then they refute the existence of the mind basis of all. Within the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school, they assert that whenever upon searching for the imputed object, it is never found and therefore nothing naturally exists. You have any questions? I hope I didn’t confuse you very much by my translation. So the reasoning consciousness, I’m not very comfortable with reasoning consciousness.
I don’t think it has the sense of a prime cognizer, but carries, it conveys, but it also conveys the sense that it is an analytic consciousness which is investigating and making use of reason. So it realizes its object on the basis of reason and that which is a realizer is a prime cognizer. It has the sense of a prime cognizer, but it also has the other sense that it is an investigative consciousness and dependence upon reason. So when it says reason is not so good, it is a realizing consciousness, in dependence upon reason. But it realizes, therefore it’s upon cognizing.
So, I think that rather than reason consciousness and knowing consciousness, rather than reasoning consciousness and knowing consciousness in all of these tenet systems beneath the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school with respect to them, they all would hold that the definition of a prime cognizer is that which is new and incontrovertible knower. A new and incontrovertible knower is the definition of a prime cognizer. But the definition of prime cognizer according to of the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school is incontrovertible with respect to its main object. And here incontrovertible means that it realizes its object. So here in the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school, a prime cognizer realizes its main object.
But when we use the word knowing consciousness, I’d have to investigate how this is translated. The word knowing consciousness — so we say the prime cognizer is that which realizes its main object. But here, the word knowing consciousness or reasoning consciousness is a realizer but it gives the connotation of something more than that. The connotation is that it realizes its object but it realizes it through engaging its object through reasoned analysis. That’s the way it has a sense of it engages its object.
Object. It comes to realize by means of engaging its object through analytic reasoning. Analytic reasoning. So it has a broader connotation, sense about it. So all prime cognizers are conventionalities or conventional phenomena conventional truths.
The omniscience which realizes all phenomena whatsoever, that is to say the consciousness within the continuum of the Buddha, is a conventional truth. Though it is a conventional truth, it’s able to
Key terms in this teaching
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- conventional truth samvriti satya (Skt); kun dzob den pa (Tib)
- As opposed to ultimate truth, which is the understanding of the ultimate nature of reality (emptiness), conventional truth is what is true to the valid conventional consciousness. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- Mahayana teg chen (Tib)
- Literally, Great Vehicle. It is one of the two general divisions of Buddhism. LYWA
- mind basis of all alayavijana (Skt); kun zhi nam shä (Tib)
- A main consciousness posited by the Cittamatra school, the consciousness they say is needed to carry karmic imprints. LYWA
- Prasangika Madhyamaka u ma thäl gyur pa (Tib)
- The Middle Way Consequence school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Consequence school accepts mere consequences known to others and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
- selflessness of phenomena chö kyi dag me (Tib)
- The absence of a self in phenomena - all things other than the person. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka view, the most subtle form is their lack of inherent existence: they do not exist from their own side. LYWA
- true existence den par yö pa (Tib)
- The concrete, real existence from its own side that everything appears to possess; in fact, both self and phenomena are empty of true existence. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.