Emptiness — 2015-08-18

Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Emptiness (Khensur Rinpoche)
Emptiness (Khensur Rinpoche)
Emptiness — 2015-08-18
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

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File: 2015-08-18 – KR.mp3

UUID: 833c3f6d-1750-4b21-bb04-0fd673e08593

Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen

Collection: Emptiness (Khensur Rinpoche)

Date: 2015-08-18

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Duration: 1h 27m

Words: 3,946

So we shall proceed as follows after the class of Buddhist philosophy. This class, Petri, we will do the recitations and generate the motivation and after that we will have a time for question and answers. Je Tsongkhapa quoting Chanda Kearki’s commentary on Arya Deva’s Catuhshataka says regarding the identification of the object of negation, in other words the self of which emptiness is the emptiness of, that nature which is not obtained that is what is bereft of truth. So this passage which is quoted in Je essence of eloquence is extremely clear. When Je Tsongkhapa says refers to what is not obtained.

This unobtained nature is precisely the object of negation. This unobtained nature does not as the passage from the commentary on Aradeva’s Chatuchataka reads does not dwell within its mode of abiding instead it is a mere nominal imputation. This is a very clear explanation of the object of negation. Undeniably the I exists in relation to the aggregates yet as was mentioned it is unfindable within the aggregates. So this passage in Chandrakirti’s commentary on Acharya Vascathosataka as well as development in Geoffrey Gopal’s electioning book make very clear that this I which is related to the aggregates does not exist autonomously within the basis of imputation which is the aggregates.

So I will not develop. This has been explained many times in brief. It is obvious that we have a sense of the existence of an autonomous or an independent I within the aggregates. This independent or autonomous I is the specific object of refutation of Prasangika Madhyamika. It is not the case in the lower schools of tenants, for instance, it is not the case for Svatantika Madhyamika for which this is not an object of refutation.

Now there are numerous graduations of coarseness and subtleness in this concept of an autonomous self. For instance, the non Buddhist outsiders, the Tirthikas, refer to a self which is permanent one and independent when speaking of such autonomy. So there is considerable food for this in as much as clearly such an autonomous self, which would exist within the aggregates, which are its basis of imputation, is the object of refutation of Prasanika Madhyamika. This is, however, not the object of refutation of Svatantrika Madhyamika. Were it the object of refutation of Svatantrika Madhyamika, then such a self, the person, would not be established from its own side and would not be established by its own characteristics, which is a tenet accepted by Satanika Madhyamika.

So if we actually try to understand what the object of refutation of Satanika Madhyamika is, things become very odd. There is obviously an explanation of this object of refutation from the standpoint of satanika but it is an odd explanation from the standpoint of prasanika. So this leads us to the critical point, the distinction or the difference between Prasangika and Svatradhika Madhyamika. Regarding the I, whereas the eye is considered in Svatthakavikamika to be a mere nominal conceptual imputation, this self same I is considered within Svatthakavikamika to be autonomously established inasmuch as otherwise it could not be established by its own characteristics or established from its own side. This is the core difference between Krasangika and Svatantrika.

And this is why Jason Kopas clarifying the intent, Uma Gumpa Rabssel, states the distinction between the two Madhyamika schools is a very major one from the standpoint of the mind. This statement of Omar Grumpur Rabsal clarifying the intent regarding Madameica. In other words, the distinction between the object of refutation of the two Madameica schools is a very great one from the standpoint of the mind is an extremely profound statement indeed. For Prasangika Madhyamika the object of refutation appears to the sensory consciousnesses. For Svatthakamika the object of refutation does not appear to the sense consciousnesses.

So you should reflect about this carefully. It is a critical point to understand that the object of refutation of Prasangika Madhyamika appears to the sensory consciousnesses of the five doors, in other words, the five sensory consciousnesses, whereas the object of refutation according to Svatantrika Madhyamika does not appear to the five senses. This is a critical difference. Why is it so critical for Svatantrika Madhyamika that the I, the self, should be established from its own side. This is critical simply because for Svatantrika Madhyamika the I is findable under analytical investigation.

What is found is the mental consciousness. So check for yourselves this I which we believe exists within the base of imputation, the aggregates can be seen to increase in intensity and when it increases in intensity it seems autonomous. This can be called ignorance. So this I, this I’s mode of appearance to ignorance is an appearance as autonomous, an appearance as independent even though this I in reality is neither autonomous nor independent it is not established from its own side. So it is motivated by such ignorance that both desire and anger arise.

Now let us examine the steps which lead from ignorance to either desire or anger. Let’s take the example of a brand new car we have just bought. Then obviously the mind which thinks my car, this is my car, is a mind of ignorance. This is a mind to which the car appears as stable, as unchangeable, basically as exteriorly existent from its own side. This is what appears to the mind.

So if we take this car we have just bought, then even after one year it seems to us still as new even though obviously after one year it is no longer new. And if we see exactly the same brand and color of car bought by someone else from the same dealer at the same time, somewhere and somehow our car will appear more beautiful. And this is true not only for cars but for houses, for watches, for clothing and so forth. Then where does this come from? This is something we should investigate clearly.

Why does our car seem stable and unchanging to us? It is due to an ignorance which induces this grasping at the self of the car. This is what generates this sense of immutability of the car and this in turn gives rise to craving. Then if we analyze the process through which ignorance, in other words this inappropriate mode of apprehension gives rise to anger, we will see that it is similar. Anger is targeted or focused upon a discordant or disharmonious entity with ourselves.

We perceive this entity or this person as stable, as dwelling fixedly and if we analyze clearly we can see that this occurs motivated by anger. Anger here functions as a conception imputing an unwarranted permanence on the object. Therefore, Agadeva Chattoushataka as well as Chandra Kirti and all the great scholars are unanimous in asserting that it is out of ignorance that afflictions such as anger and so forth arise. So here when we refer to this autonomous self, this autonomous self clearly is the object of negation. The I, on the other hand, is intimately related with the basis of imputation, its basis of imputation, the aggregates.

Clearly, as we reduce the intensity of the object of negation, the autonomous I, both anger and desire will dwindle. How precisely can we reduce the intensity of this object of negation? What is the mode of reduction? It is emphasizing terminological existence. So how does this happen?

When we have a sense of our own eye, we have a lingering suspicion that this eye which is indeed related to its object, to its basis of imputation, excuse me, the aggregates also must exist somehow within the aggregates. Now this is endorsed by the lower schools of tenets which assert that it is one of the five aggregates. But this is the specific object of refutation of prasanica madiamica. If this is the case, then how can this I which is purportedly existent within the aggregates be refuted? It can be refuted through the terminological eye.

Then clearly the terminologically existent I does exist. We have direct personal experience of it. I am ill, I have a headache, I have the flu, I will go, I am going. These are actions of the I. Then it is necessary for us to examine where this terminologically existent I exists.

Does it exist within the aggregates? And when we examine going through all five aggregates and starting with the same with the form aggregates and the five subdivisions of our body, in other words, our two arms, our two legs and probably our head, then we ask ourselves does this terminologically existent I exist within my hand? Obviously under analysis it does not. Then how does one proceed to gain some type of experience of this? One should attend teachings, study texts and one should think, reflect then at present in your present condition I think probably it is not possible for you to gain an understanding based just on this explanation.

Then if you have time and you wish not to waste your time, then reflect about this carefully an hour or two hours and then over time a sense will arise. View of the assertion of the self and the two truths is not an easy one. It is rather difficult. Then when we investigate, when we examine the form aggregate to see whether or not the I is within it, we indeed will not find it which is not surprising since all the Buddhist schools of tenets assert that the eye is of the nature of consciousness. But when we examine to try to find it within the four remaining mental aggregates we also will not find it.

And this is why perhaps there is no convincing explanation of the surfaces of phenomena within Svatantrika Madhyamica. Indeed, in Svatantrika Madhyamica, the coarse surfaces of persons is none others than persons being empty of being substantially existent autonomous entities, which is asserted in all of the lower schools of tenets, for instance in Vaibhashika or Sautrantika as the subtle surfaces of persons. But the assertions within Satanika regarding the surfaces of phenomena are unconvincing. The mode of positing of the surfaces of phenomena in Sveta Mica Madhyamica, in other words the mode of positing of emptiness is very, very odd and unconvincing to the mind. If in Prasanika Madhyamika under examination of the basis of imputation of the self, the aggregates, the self should actually be found.

If it were found it would be established from its own side. It is not found under investigation. It’s being not found under investigation does not mean that the eye is not found under investigation. It means that the inherently existent eye, the eye which is established from its own side is not found under investigation. The terminologically existent eye, the nominally existent eye does exist.

If therefore it were found within the aggregates under ultimate analytical investigation, it would necessarily be established from its own side. In other words, the object of refutation of prasanika madhyamika would necessarily exist. It is not found. The non findability of the object of refutation is a non findability of the inherently existent I, the I which is established from its own side. It is not an unfindability of the terminologically existent I which does exist.

Therefore, under ultimate analytical investigation, the object of refutation is not found within the aggregates. Nonetheless, the terminologically existent I is asserted as existent. Should the terminologically existent I not exist then Krasanika Madhyamika would be wide open to the attacks formulated by the lower schools of tenets and quoted in Mulamadyamaka Karika, in which it is said addressing Nagarjuna, from your standpoint, there is neither a rise nor disintegration nor for that matter do the four truths, the four truths of an aria being exist. Indeed if the terminologically existent I does not exist there is no generation or horizon of this I nor is there any disintegration of this I nor is it possible to formulate the two first truths, the truth of suffering and of the origin of suffering nor is it possible to formulate the two last truths, the truth of cessation and of the path. At this point indeed Prasanika Madiamica is wide open to the accusation of the lower schools of tenets that causality disintegrates.

So this is the critic which the lower schools of tenets would address to Prasanika Madiamika. Here when we say the lower schools of tenets, it would first and foremost be Vaibhashika and Sautrandika which would address this critique but as a matter of fact both Chitamatra and Sautrandika assert that phenomena are established from their own side and established by their own characteristics Whether such a critique would be addressed by Svatantrika Madhyamika to Prasanika Madhyamika is an open question. In either case, this is a critique which would be addressed. So you do understand therefore that when after investigating, investigating, investigating this I is not found within the basis of imputation which are the aggregates, then that inherently existent I, the object of refutation would have been found to be non existent. So the eye which exists from its own side, the inherently existing eye has not been found within the basis of imputation of the aggregates.

Since it has not been found, it is non existent. Does this imply that the I or the I does not exist? No. The terminologically existent I does exist. What precisely is its mode of existence?

This is something which has to be examined. So on the basis of the I or the self, we have the I, we have posited ultimate truth. Now we have to posit conventional truth on the basis of the I. And this is not the sort of fantasized understanding of conventional truth. We in Kadir people say conventional truth is this table etc.

It is a subtle form of conventional truth. So we have posited ultimate truth on the basis of the eye. Now when the time comes to posit conventional truth on the basis of the eye, please be aware that this is nothing which appears to your sensory consciousnesses. By definition that is mistaken. So having been unable to find this inherently existent eye, this eye which is established from its own side within the basis of imputation of the eye which is its foundation, we conclude that it is non existent.

However, as we said the terminologically existent eye does exist. What precisely is its mode of existence? Its mode of existence is one of mere conceptual imputation out there on the basis of imputation. What therefore is this terminological mode of existence of the eye? This ultimately existent eye which is not found within the aggregates leads us to an awareness of the non inherent existence, the non existence from its own side of the eye.

The terminologically existent eye however is merely imputed on the basis of designation which are the aggregates. It is said to be a existent as a mere nominal and conceptual imputation. So what precisely is therefore this mode of existence of the eye? It is a terminological existence where the eye is a mere conceptual imputation out there on the basis of designation. Then some of you asked last time what precisely was meant by conception here?

This is a very good question which is answered in Jean Gerald Pedori’s great treatise on tenets in which he says conception here is to be understood as that discrimination within our mind stream to which we have been accustomed since beginningless time and which when we see the color blue for instance says this is blue, when we see the color yellow says this is yellow, when we see a shape say this is a shape. So what exactly therefore is meant by conception, the conception present within our mind stream in this context? It is precisely that state of mind which we experience when we say I have had a good meal, I will be having a good meal this evening, I’m going for a walk, I will be going for a walk. Obviously if you have money the best of meals are Momo’s. Then I will be having Momo and drinking some soup.

In every single case when this state of mind appears we can see a very powerful sense of I is present as well with Then what exactly is this innate conception within our mind stream which induces in turn a sense of I. We can clearly see that it is present when we say things like I eat, but to eat we need both hand and mouth as well as something to be eaten and it is through the conflation of these three that eating occurs. On the other hand, you can clearly see that when you say I am eating, I am meditating and so forth, in every single case that which is eating, that which is meditating is none other than the terminologically existent I. This is the way in which the two truths are posited on the basis of the I. Therefore when we try to posit the ultimate truth on the basis of the eye and investigate to see whether an inherently existent eye, an eye which is established from its own side is present within the aggregates, we can see that from the side of the imputer, in other words conception, and from the side of the basis of imputation there is actually no such inherently existing eye.

The terminologically existing eye arises independence on imputre and basis of imputation. Now from our own side, we need a decrease in the intensity of this sense of an inherently existent eye to cause a decrease in the afflictions. So in the context of generating the motivation what could be superior than to reflect on this mode of positing the two truths, the ultimate truth and the conventional truth on the basis of the I. The ultimate truth being the unfindability of an inherently existent I within the basis of designation which are the aggregates and the conventional truth being the terminological existence of this eye. Then we shall generate the motivation and then do the recitations.

So would you please ask your questions if you have questions? I have a doubt with that last point that was made in the teaching tonight that the ultimate truth is the unfindability of the inherent existence of I on the basis of imputation and the conventional truth is the existence of the nominal I. It would seem to me that it should be the other way around because the first thing that we find is the unfindability of the inherently existing I and through that we then understand that there’s the inherently the nominal I that exists. So the first one that comes is understanding the lack of inherent existence of the ‘I’. So that would seem to me to be the conventional truth, not the ultimate truth.

It’s too long for me to answer it. Summarise Okay. So because the first thing that we find with the eye is that it is unfindable, it would seem to me that that would be the conventional truth because then on that basis we then understand that the nominal eye is the only I that exists. No that is impossible because what one finds at the time of searching for the eye and not finding it is a non implicative negation. A non implicative negation could not be conventional truth so this is why it is posited as the ultimate truth.

Another Thank you, Kesla and India. So my question is about the object of refutation appearing to the sense consciousnesses, which is asserted by Prasangika Majumika. It’s my understanding that the aggregate discrimination is involved in all of the sense consciousnesses. So the sense consciousness, the tactile sense discriminates, you know, smooth from rough. That was my understanding of what the aggregate of discrimination does in relation to one sense consciousness.

So the first part I need to know is if that is correct. If that is correct, then it seems that the prasangikas are just calling the aggregate of discrimination and perhaps the aggregate of feeling conceptuality. I was wondering if Geshela could clarify on that. In this context you could definitely say that these conceptions would be included within the aggregate of discrimination. This would definitely not be something you could say for all conceptions.

I don’t really understand the distinction between established by its own characteristics and established from its own side. So being established from its own side and being established by its own characteristics are exactly identical. There is no difference. When things such as the house, the temple, a book seem to you to exist from their own side, this is an indication that they seem to be established from their own side. My second question is, under analysis I can agree that it’s possible that phenomena are mere conceptual imputations out there.

My question is about the term out there because when I analyse the eye, it never appears over there. It always appears here for me. So here, if we did not have the sense of the eye being imputed out there, in other words, independently of the imputing mind, then we would be akhaas, which we are not. So clearly, we have that sense. Then what out there means is something to investigate.

And Ralph, have you a question? It’s a difficult one, the object of refutation of Svatandrika Madhyamika. Basically, the object of refutation is the belief in an object which is not established through ascertainment by a mind, and this refers to ascertainment by a valid cognizer, but which dwells within its own uncommon mode of abiding. Now this is precisely the mode of assertion of phenomena of the lower schools of tenants, for which phenomena dwell within their uncommon mode of abiding and are established by their own characteristics. Okay.

I lied. I do have a question. It’s a terminological question. In response to Natalie, I guess, should have pointed out that the absence of an inherent I is a nonimplicative negation. But can you not argue that it’s also an implicative negation?

Because if you say, for example, table or I without inherent existence, then you are by default implying table and I just without the inherent existence, which is a nonexistent to begin with. So no, but yours is a very good doubt because when one refutes the inherent existence of table, indeed if this refutation implied the existence of table, that would imply an affirming phenomenon and the refutation of the inherent existence of table would no longer be a non implicative negation but would become an implicative negation. However, the refutation of the inherent existence of table implies nothing and definitely not the existence of table even though indeed, even though table is not inherently established, nonetheless table does indeed exist. Yours is an excellent doubt in which we will enter in greater depth later. There are two issues to be addressed.

The first is, is it the mind which refutes the existence inherent existence of table which would understand table nuts or not? If that was the case, then this would become an implicative negation. And secondly, does this occur at the same time or not? It seems difficult for it to occur at the same time. These are topics we will look into later, but this presentation of the tutus is a very important one.

Key terms in this teaching

basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
conventional truth samvriti satya (Skt); kun dzob den pa (Tib)
As opposed to ultimate truth, which is the understanding of the ultimate nature of reality (emptiness), conventional truth is what is true to the valid conventional consciousness. LYWA
Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
object of negation gag cha (Tib)
An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
two truths den pa nyi (Tib)
The two ways of relating to phenomena, as conventional or all-obscuring truth, the truth to a worldly mind, and ultimate truth, the truth to a mind engaged in ultimate analysis. LYWA
Vaibhashika jedrag mawa (Tib)
The Great Exposition school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Great Exposition school asserts truly established external objects but does not assert self-knowers. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

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