Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
File metadata (for organising)
File: Line in 0240 – KR.mp3
UUID: 178ac13d-cf2a-48ce-9e2e-59847243913c
Teacher: Khensur Rinpoche
Collection: Awareness and Knowledge (Khensur Rinpoche)
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Duration: 1h 3m
Words: 3,048
So, as you know, we will generate the motivation to listen to these teachings. And independence on such such a good motivation, we will then endeavor to practice the dharma. So in this in this context, Geshela would like to say a couple of words about motivation. Motivation is critical in everything we do. A deed which is a good deed in of itself becomes karmically potent only through the power of the motivation impending it.
With a good motivation, deeds give rise in function of the motivation to greater or lesser results, and the supreme of all motivations is obviously bodhicitta. So with this motivation, we should try to listen to loric teachings. So, Luric is very important for our training in the Buddhist path because it is through understanding how the mind functions, how the mind proceeds, that we in turn can train our minds. And this means understanding where the mind comes from in the past and where the light the mind is going to in the future and how we can hope to change the destination of our mind through training. So we are quickly approaching within two sessions, the the crux and the most beneficial aspect of these teachings of Luric, which are the presentation of the 51 mental factors in keeping with Aria Asanga’s Abhidharma Samuchaya.
This is probably what is most helpful for our minds. And within the context of the presentation of Luric in this treatise, this treatise subdivides in the context of its presentation minds into two categories, minds which are valid cognizers, and minds which are non valid cognizers. We have reached the presentation of minds which are non valid cognizers. These in turn are divided into five, which are subsequent cognition, conviction, inattentive minds, doubt and wrong views. And as you remember last time, Geshela presented fully subsequent cognition.
And today, we will start covering minds which are called conviction. And this is on pages 29 onwards of your text, your English translation. And at present, presentation of conviction of what your text calls correct assumption on page 29 is as follows. Secondly, conviction is presented in terms of definitions and divisions regarding the first, in other words, definitions. The definition of a conviction is factually concordant conceptual cognizer, which is controvertible with regards to the cognition of its object.
The meaning of this definition is as follows. It is factually concordant, because such a conviction is actually in harmony or in keeping with the nature of the object it cognizes. It is not mistaken with respect to the nature of the object it cognizes. It’s a conceptual cognizer, because it cognizes its object by means of a meaning generality, and it is controvertible with respect to the object it cognizes, because it has not gained full certainty with respect to that object. It actually has not realized the object it cognizes.
And in turn, conviction is divided into five subdivisions. Reasonless conviction, conviction which is in contradiction with its reason. Contradiction conviction which does not ascertain its reason. Conviction which is not established on its reason. And conviction which even though it does conviction, which even though it does have a reason, not ascertain this reason.
So of this fivefold subdivision of convictions, the first is a groundless or reasonless conviction. It is a simple act of faith. Whereas the following three are convictions which are at odds or in contradiction in one way or the other with their reason. And the last, the fifth category of conviction, convictions which have a reason but which have not ascertained their reasons, are convictions which have a valid reasons but which do not arise in dependence on these. And examples will be given for each of these five subdivisions of conviction.
An instance of the first, which is a reasonless or groundless conviction, is that conviction that sound is impermanence and dependence on the mere statement, sound is impermanent. This is reasonless or groundless, it’s a mere act of faith. An instance of the second, which is a conviction which is contradictory with its reason, would be for instance, the mind which apprehends that sound is impermanent, independence on the reason of its being empty, of being able to perform function. Now obviously, sound is not empty of being unable to perform a function, because sound actually is able to perform a function. Therefore, the reason advanced being empty of being able to perform a function is contradictory with the predicate.
The third reason, or the third example is conviction, which does not ascertain its reason, and an example thereof would be for instance, that mind which apprehends sound as being impermanent, independence on the reason that it is an object of ascertainment. Now, obviously, all existence, all existing phenomena objects of ascertainment. The fact that sound is an object of ascertainment in no means entails that sound is impermanent, since not everything which is an object of ascertainment is impermanent. And the fact that there is no necessary entailment or no necessary pervasion here, is what is meant when we refer to a conviction, which it does not rest on the certitude of its reason. The fourth example which is given, is an example for conviction, whose reason is not established.
And an instance thereof would be a mind which apprehends sound as impermanence, as impermanent, independence on the reason of its being an object of apprehension by visual consciousness. Obviously, sound is not an object of apprehension by visual consciousness. However, everything which is an object of apprehension by visual consciousness, is necessarily impermanent. So in this case, we would say that the subject is not the reason, even though there is necessary entailment. Finally, the fifth category is an example of convictions for whom there are reasons, but which do not ascertain these reasons.
These are, Geshela says, the foremost or the best convictions, even though they are not valid cognizers, or Parmanas, and an example of such would be the mind which apprehends sound as impermanent. Independence on the non valid cognizer, realizing that sound is a composite phenomenon and that everything which is a composite phenomenon is necessarily impermanent. Such a reason is a valid reason, but the realization of sounds being the reason, in other words, sounds being a composite phenomenon, is not made by a valid cognizer, and the realization of the entailment that all composite phenomena are necessarily impermanent phenomena is not made either by a valid cognizer. Therefore, such a conviction is said to be a conviction which does have a reason, but which does not ascertain its reason. So the mode of presentation of texts on or Buddhist definitions, Buddhist philosophy is one where, as here, first one’s own system is presented.
In other words, the definition of convictions, a five fold subdivision of convictions, an example thereof. And then after that, as here, the positions of scholars which disagree or have reservations about one’s core positions are presented. Here, there are four such scholars. And key points of debate would be presented to show with respect to what the positions of these scholars is unacceptable. So generally speaking, the mode of presentation which is adopted in tech treatises on Buddhist logic, treatises on Pramana such as these, is one where one will present first the broad outlines of some simple debates on the topic, then a core, which is one’s own position, and then a series of debates which are addressed to oneself by other scholars, and which will be refuted in the context of the treatise on logic or epistemology.
This is a procedure which is characteristic of all treatises on logic. And it is one one finds to a degree, even in lamrim treatises like Jetsong Kapas lamrim chenmo, in which there are passages where the objections of others are presented and then refuted. So this is very much the procedure which will be followed here in this text of Lorig. So the first such position is held by a scholar who proposes an alternate definition of conviction, saying, conviction is that conceptual cognizer, which newly ascertains single pointedly its true object, independence either on experience, or on its basis, a valid reason. And I think we are somewhere like the bottom of page 29.
We’re at the bottom of page 29 of your English translation. Now, Geshela says, the position of this scholar is that convictions are conceptual minds, which is a position which is shared with own position. But he asserts that not only this, but that convictions actually single pointedly, in other words, principally, cognize newly their object, and he considers that convictions can arise either from experience, they most obviously are not experienced, but they can arise from them, or that they can arise from a valid reason, is their basis. And the example he would give for this is the syllogism, the subject sound, it follows it is impermanent because it is a composite phenomenon. The mind realizing this, according to him, while, it is not a valid cognizer, would still qualify as being a conviction.
So examples in this context of convictions would be for instance, the mind which apprehends sound as impermanent based on the reason of its being a composite phenomenon during the instance preceding the generation of this as a valid cognizer. Now there would be many such instance where the mind would actually be erring towards the factual and would apprehend sound or would perceive sound as impermanent, without actually having realized the impermanence of sound. Likewise, for instance, we can see in our own continuum, those minds which apprehend phenomena as being selfless, independent on the reason that they depend on other phenomena, are minds which are convictions, which are valid convictions, but which are not valid cognizers. And there is a long stream of subsequent instance of such minds which are factually concordant, but which are still not valid cognizers. So the following debate runs as follows.
Should someone say, in other words, an opposing scholar say, this meaning generality of a vase is one of is actually all four objects which are realized by the mind apprehending vase, then should this be the case, then the subject of the meaning generality of a vase would necessarily be the object conceived by the conception apprehending vase, and this is a case because one’s opponent, the opposing scholar, has asserted that this is necessarily all for objects. Now in this context, Geshela says, what is being referred to, are the four categories of objects of a mind perceiving a phenomenon, which are the appearing object, the conceived object, the object of engagement, and the object of the mode of apprehension. The position of this opposing scholar is that the meaning generality of a vase, in other words, that which appears to a conceptual mind apprehending vase, is actually the object of engagement of the conceptual mind apprehending vase. Should this be the case, that the conceptual mind apprehending vase would have the same appearing object and the same engaging object, and would cease to be a mistaken mind, and would automatically become an unmistaken mind. So there is a fundamental flaw in this position, which hinges on the opponent’s incapacity to formulate clearly the four objects of meaning generalities, or of what is also known as the appearance of sound, which is a synonym of a meaning generality.
And the best way to understand these Geshe la says, would be to take for instance the example of the account of something we hear on television. When we hear on television the account of a far off land, even though we have never been there ourselves, the image of that far off land appears in our mind. This is a sound appearance of this far off land, which in this specific case is also synonymous with the meaning generality of this far off country. Now this understanding of the precise meanings of meaning generality or generic images is in extremely important. Since for instance, the two main objects for which we should gain realization, which are respectively subtle impermanence and selflessness, can only be realized initially through meaning generalities.
So we must understand what the meaning generality of subtle impermanence is before we can gain realization of subtle impermanence. And to gain realization of emptiness, first we must actually understand what the meaning generality of phenomena appearing as self existent or truly existing is. And the third debate is a debate about the precise meaning of the meaning generality of vases, and meaning generalities in general. The debate reads as follows. An opposing scholar says, the conception realizing vase is a mind which apprehends the meaning generality of vase as vase.
This is a position which we cannot accept, because should this be the case, it follows that the subject, the conception apprehending vase is necessarily a wrong consciousness, because the meaning generality of vase is apprehended by that mind as vase. This is the reason which the opposing party has accepted. Should he accept this position, then we assert that subject, it follows it is not a wrong consciousness because it’s a factually concordant mind. It is a factually concordant mind, because it’s a conceptually factually concordant mind. This is the case because it is a conviction.
The position here, Geshela says, is that of someone who considers that the conceptual mind which apprehends vase, actually apprehends the meaning generality of vase as well. In other words, the meaning generality of vase does not merely appear to a conceptual mind, but is apprehended by this. And that such a mind in addition apprehends the meaning generality of vase as vase. Now the meaning generality of vase and vase are fundamentally different. The meaning generality of vase is a permanent phenomenon, whereas vase itself is an impermanent phenomenon.
So such a mind would be apprehending a permanent phenomenon as an impermanent phenomenon, and would necessarily be factually discordant mind. Such doubts arose not so much in Buddhist schools, such as the Sautrantika or the Chittamatra, but in certain non Buddhist schools. There are quite a few Hindu schools, Geshela says, which actually considered that the meaning generality of a vase was the cause of a vase. This is obviously impossible if we consider that the meaning generality of a vase is permanent, as is the case in a Buddhist context. So the reason which is given for this in the Pramana Varttikam is a very humorous reason, which is that if it were the case that the meaning generality for instance of a tree, in a tree were one and the same, then whenever we recollected or whenever we thought about trees, there would be trees in the room and for that matter trees within our bodies.
And then Dharma Kirti says, in that case, there would be no place without trees. So, the fourth debate, Geshela would like to point out that these are four different positions of four different scholars, runs as follows. The conceptual mind apprehending vase is not a conviction because there exists a wrong view becoming it, or a wrong view which becomes it. This is the case, always in the position of the scholar, because the conceptual mind which apprehends vase on the basis of the subject, the basis of negation of vys. Basis of negation here refers to that place where there is no vase.
Therefore, the subject would read in more vernacular English, the conception apprehending vase on the basis of the subject, the place where there is no vase, is a conceptual mind apprehending vase. To this, we say the reason is not established. The reason is not established here means that while there is indeed a mind which apprehends vase in a place where there is no vase, such a mind actually is not a mind, a conceptual mind which realizes vase, because such a mind is a wrong conception. And if this is the case in addition, one addresses the rebuttal to one’s opponent, what about the place in which there is a vase? Would you be asserting that the mind which apprehends the non existence of vase in the place where there is a vase, is also, such a valid mind.
To this he has no answer. So we have finished the presentation of conviction and now approaching the presentation of the third categories of minds which are not valid cognitions, which are inattentive minds. These are presented with only one major debate. And Geshela would suggest that we group our questions on convictions and inattentive minds in one single group of questions. So inattentive minds are presented from page 31 of your English translation, and they are not very difficult to understand.
Geshela says, these are basically minds to which phenomena, in this case specifically functioning things appear, but which do not apprehend or engage their appearing object. All inattentive minds are necessarily direct perceivers, There are no conceptual inattentive minds. Therefore, all inattentive minds are necessarily unmistaken minds. So Geshe lahm will not cover in greater detail in attentive minds, he would suggest that you read the sections on this in mind and Tibetan Buddhism, and he will cover briefly the debate in this text at the end of the section in attentive mind, reads as follows: The subject, a direct valid cognizer, is the Definiendum, because it is the definition. So the Definiendum here refers to an inattentive mind, the definition to the definition of an attentive mind, therefore what is being said is that a direct valid cognizer is an inattentive mind.
This is a case because a direct cognizer cannot induce ascertainment with respect to its object, and this is a case because it is not a consciousness which ascertains. This is the position of the opposing scholar, which will be refuted. To this we assert no necessary entailment. In other words, whatever is a consciousness, whatever is not an ascertaining consciousness is not necessarily a consciousness which cannot induce ascertainment with respect to its object. And this is the case because a direct valid cognizer ascertains its object.
So we will have half an hour of discussion.
Key terms in this teaching
- bodhicitta jang chub sem (Tib)
- A principal consciousness that combines the two factors of wishing to free all beings from suffering and of wishing to attain enlightenment in order to achieve that; the spontaneous altruistic mind of enlightenment can be either aspirational or engaging. LYWA
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- lamrim
- The graduated path. A presentation of Shakyamuni Buddha’s teachings in a form suitable for the step-by-step training of a disciple. LYWA
- lorig
- Awareness and knowledge, the study of mind and mental factors, in order to understand and control the delusions. LYWA
- mental factors chaita (Skt); sem jung (Tib)
- Literally arising from the mind, a mental factor is a cognition that apprehends an attribute of its object and accompanies any principal consciousness that is concordant with it. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.