Awareness and Knowledge — 2014-04-08

1 h 32 min · 3,494 words · 8 April 2014 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Awareness and Knowledge (Khensur Rinpoche)
Awareness and Knowledge (Khensur Rinpoche)
Awareness and Knowledge — 2014-04-08
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen delivers a comprehensive 92-minute introduction to the Buddhist philosophical study of mind and awareness, foundational topics in Tibetan Buddhist epistemology. He opens with reflections on the extraordinary conditions needed for teaching — a qualified teacher, skilled translator, and serious students — before turning to the practical value of understanding how our minds follow afflictions like anger and envy. The core of the teaching unfolds methodically: direct valid cognizers (non-conceptual, unmistaken perception) and their subdivision into sensory and mental types; then inferential valid cognizers, which arise necessarily through correct reasoning based on reliable causes. Through vivid examples — the smoke inferring fire, sunlight indicating the sun’s presence, a flushed face revealing anger — Geshe-la demonstrates how we unknowingly rely on these valid cognizers daily, yet rarely examine them. He probes the paradox that practitioners talk extensively about bodhicitta and emptiness, which they do not possess, while overlooking direct and inferential valid cognizers already present in their minds. The session includes extended Q&A where students wrestle with distinctions between sensory and mental perception, hidden versus imputed objects, and how Buddhas perceive all three times. Pitched at serious practitioners engaged in formal study of Buddhist logic and mind.

File metadata (for organising)

File: 2014-04-08 – KR.mp3

UUID: a967b5f1-e2cb-41dc-bdfa-b12b8d43d842

Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen

Collection: Awareness and Knowledge

Date: 2014-04-08

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~3,492

So initially, we shall generate the motivation as usual. It is extremely important to study In my own case, for instance, after studying Lorig, I taught it to others. However, I did not speak English. However, as you can see it is not sufficient to have a well trained teacher. However, clearly these teachings are given in Tibetan.

If they are not communicated to the students, they are of no benefit. Therefore, one needs a perfect translator to translate these teachings and we have one too. However, with both a teacher and a translator, this is still not sufficient. There must be those wishing to attend the teachings. And at TBI, we have a large number of serious students.

And the holy teacher, Khensur Rinpoche, said repeatedly to us, we have extraordinary conditions at TBI. We have an excellent translator with great experience and a large number of serious students. The conditions are remarkable. You should reflect on the fact that these conditions are extraordinary. However, it is not enough to have a setting such as this one or a good teacher if one does not have a good translator or if the translator decides not to stay or if the translator has not studied Lorig in-depth and it is a difficult topic, then oneself will not benefit from the teachings.

So when you think about this, you should generate courage and resolution within yourselves. There is tremendous benefit in reflecting over Lorig mind and awareness over and again. And if we could reflect carefully during one day on the fact that we ourselves, but for that matter all living beings follow their minds, and that our minds in turn follow the affliction such as anger, then we would understand clearly our situation, and this would be of great benefit. Then if when we rose in the morning we could think I am a human being, I am a person, and check for ourselves whether or not we follow our minds, and whether or not our minds in turn follow the afflictions such as anger and so forth, then we would understand quite rapidly. And then we can understand that in as much as the affliction such as anger are mistaken or inverted minds, then in turn their object, they are mistaken with respect to their object, and if they are mistaken with respect to their object, then we will experience mistaken results as a consequence.

Then there are direct valid cognizers, inferential valid cognizers, and the various afflictions within our minds, as well as that of most living beings such as animals and so forth. However, you might want to reflect on the fact that all of us understand clearly whether anger or envy are present or not within our minds and know first hand that they cause hardship for us. But we do not seem to understand whether or not direct valid cognizers or inferential valid cognizers are present or not. Why is this the case? And you might want to reflect carefully on why on the one hand we are easily able to identify anger within our mind stream as an unsuitable and harmful state of mind.

But even though both direct and inferential valid cognizers are present both within our minds and that of animals, we are completely unable to identify them. Then within our minds there are both minds which are valid cognizers and minds which are not valid cognizers. Valid cognizers are subdivided into two, direct valid cognizers and inferential valid cognizers. Direct valid cognizers are mainly subdivided in turn into two, sensory direct valid cognizers and mental direct valid cognizers. This has been covered already.

Now within the context of mind and awareness of Lorig, one talks of direct cognizers, mngon sum in Tibetan. What precisely is a direct cognizer? A direct cognizer is defined as an unmistaken and non conceptual cognizer. So what precisely is such an unmistaken and non conceptual cognizer? It is a cognizer which engages its object not through reasoning but which engages it nakedly as it were.

What is the meaning of unmistaken, ma ‘khrul ba, within the definition of direct cognizers? It means that the direct cognizer apprehends the mode of existence, the state of the entity being considered as it is. So the five sensory consciousnesses from the visual consciousness to the tactile consciousness all have direct cognizers. Therefore, there are five direct sensory cognizers. Then regarding direct mental cognizers, the presentation is a little bit more difficult in this system.

If we take the example of our relatives, our parents, friends and family, when we think about them over and again, we see them mentally in an ever clearer fashion And when we basically see them at their clearest, this probably qualifies as a mental direct cognizer. As was mentioned in the definition of direct cognizers, these are non conceptual minds. One must clarify conceptuality here. Minds are subdivided into non conceptual and conceptual minds. Non conceptual minds are minds which engage the present of their object.

They neither engage the past nor the future of their object. Now what precisely would be an instance of conceptual minds? Within the temple we are in at present, when you look at objects and you think of yesterday’s object to the previous object, that thought thinking yesterday’s object is a conception. Likewise, when we go outside and we see a fruit tree, that initial direct sensory perception of the fruit tree is followed by a mental consciousness which thinks yesterday that fruit tree was there too. That mental consciousness is a conception.

Then when this conception thinks that fruit tree was there yesterday, this conception is actually recollecting the past of the fruit tree. Likewise, at night, just before going to sleep, when we think of what we will have to do on the morrow, then that mind which is thinking for instance of the meal we have to prepare the next day is a conception. Then if you are very hungry before going to sleep and you have a very powerful sense of the type of breakfast you’ll be making the next day, this is a strong conception. Then if you have supper in the evening, it’s easier, isn’t it? His Holiness the Dalai Lama explains the topic as follows, when one perceives phenomena nakedly, this is direct perception.

But when one perceives them through a reflection or through an image, then this is a conception. So this is what I would like to say about conceptions or conceptuality. Now regarding the subdivision of valid cognizers into direct and inferential valid cognizers, inferential valid cognizers are necessarily conceptual. You will enjoy inferential valid cognizers. Do you like it?

Really? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So inferential valid cognizers are loaded topics.

It’s a bit difficult and problem, you know? Then as I mentioned, inferential valid cognizers are necessarily conceptual, and we have them within ourselves. It’s rather odd I think that none of us has in our minds the wisdom realizing emptiness, bodhicitta and so forth, but we talk about them a lot. Then we do have within our minds direct valid cognizers and inferential valid cognizers, but we don’t understand them. It’s odd you see because we do have within our minds direct valid cognizers and inferential valid cognizers and if we were to think about them a little bit, we would understand them.

On the other hand, we do not have bodhicitta or the wisdom realizing emptiness and these are very difficult to understand, yet this is what we focus upon. Well, an inferential valid cognizer is a valid cognizer which arises with certainty in dependence on a reason. Then I will use the example which is given in Pramānavārttika and in Tarkrig, Reasoning and Science. Most of us have certainty regarding the fact that when there is smoke, there must be fire. So the fact that when there is smoke, there must be fire is something we understand through experience.

It’s not merely because fire excuse me, smoke is the result of fire. It is that smoke entertains a particular relationship with fire, an exceptional relationship. And the exceptional relationship which smoke entertains with fire is the reason for which when smoke is observed, fire is deduced. So based on the direct perception perceiving smoke, and it is open to debate which of the sensory direct perceptions perceive smoke. It might be the visual direct perception perceiving the shape and the color of smoke, the olfactory or whatever, we will put the nature of the direct perception aside.

Based on that direct perception, one infers the existence of fire in a place where fire cannot be observed through direct perception. Then, when we infer the existence of a fire on an object which is unobservable at present, such as a house, a fruit tree or a fire behind a hill, and we infer the existence of fire based on the observation of smoke, that inference is a not a direct valid cognizer, it is not direct. The reason for which the mind which realizes the presence of an unobserved fire based on the observation of smoke is an inferential valid cognizer is because such a mind arises in dependence on a correct reason. The correct reason, is the fact that where there is smoke, there is necessarily fire. And the reason for which there is this necessary entailment between the existence of smoke and that of fire is the uncommon relation entertained by smoke and fire.

Then what the uncommon relationship which smokes entertains with fire is something I would like to ask you. It is not good for me to give you all the answers, then you will become slack and not think. Then the fact that smoke is the result of fire, which is which is its cause, is not the rationale for the uncommon relationship which smoke entertains with fire. This is fairly obvious under analyses. For instance, every one of us in this room is the result of our parents.

Yet, when we are observed in this room, one certainly cannot deduce that our parents are here as well, otherwise the temple would be bursting at the seams. This is called in Tarkrig, Reasoning and Science, in other words, the reason of the effect or the effect reason. So this is one of the subdivisions of correct reasons, correct reasons are subdivided into effect reasons, reasons of nature and a third category. The example of effect reasons has been given regarding nature reasons or reasons of nature. An example might be the following one, when we wake in the morning and we notice sunlight streaming through the window, we infer from the presence of sunlight streaming through the window, generally speaking, the presence of the sun in the sky.

And therefore, to analyze this example further, based on the direct visual perceiver which perceives the color of sunlight streaming through the the window, we infer the existence of the sun. The existence of this sun which is not observed is an inferential valid cognizer. Why is this the case? Because through observing either a part or a feature of the Sun, we deduce the presence of the Sun in the sky. This is a reason of nature.

So this the first example given of a an effect, correct reason, is one which bears careful analyses. If we think, based on the observation of smoke in the distance, I can infer the existence of fire. This alone is really not a very strong reason. We should analyze carefully to see what precisely can be inferred more than this. Then to take another example of effect valid reason, based on somebody’s face being flushed, their speech being coarse and rough, and sometimes their eyes being inflamed, we infer this person is furious.

Sometimes the irises become bulging, don’t they? So one could posit the dawning of a mind, which on the basis of the infuriated appearance of someone’s face, which is flushed, their bulging red eyes, deduces the present of presence of anger within their mind stream as an instance of an inferential valid cognizer. Then the definition of an inferential valid cognizer is an incontrovertible newly arisen predilection which arises in dependence on its basis, a correct reason. Here, the basis, a correct reason, is precisely that observation of the infuriated expression of the other party. Then I would like to ask you a question at present.

Could you please tell me what the difference is between sensory perception and mental perception? For about probably four minutes. Then if you can’t answer, we’ll have to meditate for four minutes. All of you have sensory and mental direct perceptions, don’t you? Okay.

Four minutes of meditation. Perhaps difference is that a sensory direct perception needs an object and you need a sensory sense organ, your sight, your hearing, touch and say if you see a flower you can see it with your eyes, your sense organs that’s direct sensory perception but with your eyes closed you can see a flower with a mental direct cogniser. You have an image of it, you have an understanding of it. Could you summarize? Could you summarize with this?

Well, a sensory direct perception needs an object, needs a sense organ but a mental direct perceiver does not need the object, it does not need a sense organ. It has a conception as its basis. I have a clarification. Was it the difference between sensory and mental perception or was it the difference between direct sensory and direct mental perception? Yes, between sensory perception and mental perception.

I think probably the difference is in the sphere and the consciousness and the object. That’s not clear. What do you mean? That they have the difference is the consciousness. One is mental consciousness and one is a sense consciousness.

Are mutually exclusive. And they’re mutually exclusive in their objects as well. I’m thinking that the mental perception depends on the sensory perception in some way it’s more like a meta perception so it’s because we can see our family directly that it then becomes possible to have a direct mental conception of them for instance where we remember them clearly. If we’d never seen our family I don’t think we could have that so it’s like the mental conception is some sort of meta conception it may not be dependent on a sensory perception it might be dependent on another thought as its object. So from what I understand the mental consciousness is or the perception is recognising the object whereas the sense consciousness is just engaging the shape or the color or the aspect.

The sensory perception can only take place in the present whereas the mental conception can conceive past and future. A mental perception is about thought about asking a question and sensory is about in a sense an object. Is about? An object or a sensation. An idea is a mental perception.

Sorry? An idea is a mental perception? The sensory perception engages external objects whereas the mental perception engenders the motivation and the commentary around the external objects. Engages what the motivation end? In commentary around the external Commentary.

Yeah, around the external object. The sensory direct cognisers just engage an object but the mental direct valid cogniser has to have some familiarity with the object to understand the object. So for example if you see the ocean for the first time you don’t know it’s an ocean necessarily if you have no understanding of ocean. I would say that they have differing uncommon controlling conditions in that for sensory perception, they are able to engage with an object whereas a mental perception is able to determine and apprehend an appearing object. Do you have questions concerning inferential valid cognizers?

I’ve heard this, the fire and smoke, the fire and smoke energy, example, before and if I see like in the hills particularly fog drifting across the sometimes that can appear as though it’s smoke and not fog. It seems that that doesn’t come from fire and therefore it doesn’t seem that that’s valid and inferential valid cognition of fire from that fog, but I perceive it as smoke. I’m just not sure how to understand that. What you say is exact. The inference is not valid simply because your direct sense perception is mistaken in confusing fog with fire.

It’s not a valid reason. And this is a case because even though you might wonder, is there smoke or not, in reality there is not smoke. And since in reality there is not smoke, the inference where there is smoke there is fire does not apply. I’m not sure if I’ve got the terminology correct, but my question is about the difference between hidden objects and I have this definition of a hidden object being whose initial realization by a valid cognizer depends on correct logic so the difference between a hidden object and an imputed object because it seems to me the way that I view things is I impute them incorrectly and when I think about the difference between hidden objects and imputed objects my mind just spins especially in relation to emptiness. I was wondering if Geshe-la could clarify this a bit.

There is an important difference between hidden object, kögyu in Tibetan, and imputed objects. Whatever is an imputed object is not necessarily a hidden object. For instance, we ourselves are persons. Persons are imputed objects on the basis of the aggregates. However, persons are not hidden objects.

Because a hidden object is an object which can be understood in terms of a valid reason. Geshe-la, I think you said that an inferential valid cogniser arises with 100% certainty on a reason. So my question is, does that mean that inferential valid cognisers are always learned? Or could we know something instinctively? It depends what is meant by learned experience.

If we take the example of the syllogism, on the smoky pass it follows that there is a fire because there is smoke. The experience which is indispensable for such the mind realizing the syllogism to be an inferential valid cognizer is the experience that wherever there is smoke there is fire. That experience, that preliminary experience is indispensable. Thank you, that’s what I was asking. Okay, so if the senses aren’t able to directly perceive subtle impermanence or emptiness, how can they be perceived directly without inference?

How can they be perceived directly? Directly without inference, without mental inference or cognition. Well, sensory direct perceptions cannot perceive subtle impermanence. The realization of subtle impermanence is contingent on initial habituation through an inferential valid cognizer. And another another question.

Ilya, could you just go back to the section where you were talking about direct mental cognisers and you’re using the example, Geshe-la was using the example of a family where we know those people so well and we have so many experiences with them over and over and over again, that this is how one gains a clearer perception of them over time. But within those clear perceptions, we still have a lot of misconceptions about the individual members of our family. So although we’re developing direct mental cognition, there’s also other rubbish mixed in there as well. Initially, when one thinks of one’s family or one’s relatives, it is clearly a conception, a conceptual mind. Then as one thinks about them on and on, the power of the conceptuality decreases and the component of direct perception increases within this perception.

Chris, behind you. Yes. Behind. Geshe-la, what type of cognizer would a Buddha have in cognizing all three times, past, present, and future? Did you say Gogunas?

What what is my Me? To cognize impermanence. To realize impermanence. Then omniscience, in other words, the mind of the Buddha is a valid cognizer. It is a direct valid cognizer within valid cognizers.

Within And direct valid cognizers it is a yogic direct valid cognizer. Geshe-la spoke of correct reasons having three aspects, effect reason, nature reason and I missed the third. He didn’t say I just mentioned that. Yes. So there is what Geshe-la would like to emphasize the fact that the definition of an inferentially valid cognizer hinges on its arising in dependence on a correct reason.

Then the correct reasons are indeed subdivided into three, effect reasons, nature reasons and what is known as reasons of non observation. But we would not enter into reasons of non observation here because they are difficult to understand, it is better to focus on the two first which are easier to understand. Special announcement, Tenzin will be returning next Tuesday. And we’re happy for your registrations for the three day Easter weekend with Geshe-la, which will be a wonderful experience. And please enjoy some chai and a biscuit.

Thank you.

Key terms in this teaching

bodhicitta jang chub sem (Tib)
A principal consciousness that combines the two factors of wishing to free all beings from suffering and of wishing to attain enlightenment in order to achieve that; the spontaneous altruistic mind of enlightenment can be either aspirational or engaging. LYWA
lorig
Awareness and knowledge, the study of mind and mental factors, in order to understand and control the delusions. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

Questions answered in this teaching

What are the three types of correct reasons, given that effect reasons and nature reasons are two of them?

Correct reasons are subdivided into three: effect reasons, nature reasons and reasons of non observation. This matters because an inferentially valid cognizer is defined by its arising in dependence on a correct reason. Reasons of non observation are not explored here because they are difficult to understand. It is better to focus on the first two, effect reasons and nature reasons, which are easier to understand.

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