Awareness and Knowledge — 2014-04-01

1 h 46 min · 5,017 words · 1 April 2014 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Awareness and Knowledge (Khensur Rinpoche)
Awareness and Knowledge (Khensur Rinpoche)
Awareness and Knowledge — 2014-04-01
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 106-minute seminar, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen conducts a rigorous philosophical analysis of how the five sense consciousnesses—visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile—engage their respective objects. He opens by mapping everyday sensory experience, then examines the classical Buddhist classification of sensory spheres and their subdivisions: color and shape for vision; held and unheld sounds for hearing; natural and artificial odors for smell; six taste categories for taste; and elemental and derivative tactile qualities for touch. Through concrete examples—salt versus sugar, the ocean, recognizing a friend in the distance—Geshe-la demonstrates that mental consciousness, not sensory organs alone, produces recognition and labeling. He explores how the first instant of sense perception qualifies as a valid cognizer, subsequent instants form subsequent consciousness, and perceptions without mental ascertainment remain inattentive minds, illustrated by the famous “gorillas in our midst” experiment. The session includes extensive Q&A exploring whether objects can be shared across sense modes and whether inference operates differently than direct sensory perception.

File metadata (for organising)

File: 2014-04-01 – KR.mp3

UUID: 22702494-c8a0-4bfd-9c93-2841dc26096d

Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen

Collection: Awareness and Knowledge

Date: 2014-04-01

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~5,011

So as usual, we will initially generate the motivation for receiving the teachings. We can see clearly, can’t we, over one day of twenty-four hours that the main activity of the mental consciousness is generating the motivation with respect to phenomena. Whereas the consciousnesses of the five doors, in other words, the five senses, actually engage exterior objects. Most of us eat breakfast in the morning. So when we make whatever breakfast we eat, we engage the color and the shape of that object with the visual consciousness.

Then if we hear the voice of our relatives, we engage it through the auditory consciousness. When we smell the food, we smell it through the olfactory consciousness and taste it through the gustatory consciousness. In this way, all the senses are involved. Generally speaking, these activities are initiated by the visual and the auditory consciousness. This is something we have direct experience of in most cases.

And in the case of the auditory and of the visual consciousness, these consciousnesses engage the object when there is contact between the particles of visual objects on the one side and, for instance, the eye sense organ on the other. So if one thinks about it in this way, this is very helpful. Following this, generally speaking, it is the olfactory and the gustatory sense consciousnesses which engage their object. And in the case of the olfactory or smell sense consciousness, there can only be engagement of its object when the particles of the object in question enter in contact with the particles of the olfactory sense organ. Likewise, for the tactile sense consciousness, there can be no tactile sensation without a preliminary contact between the particles of the tactile object and the tactile sense organ.

And therefore we have five sense consciousnesses—the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile sense consciousnesses—engaging five sensory objects on the outside: forms, sounds, smells, tastes and tactile sensations, by the means of five sense organs. Then it is quite strange to think that these five sense objects, literally the five sensory spheres, are not created by anybody. Then within the threefold division of entities which we referred to previously into matter, consciousness and non-associated compositional phenomena, matter, as you remember, is synonymous with form. And the overwhelming majority of forms are only objects, with the exception of a certain category of sounds known as expressive sounds, which can qualify as subjects. With the exception of that, the other sounds are objects and remaining forms are objects. The second subdivision of entities, consciousness, is exclusively subjects.

Therefore, we have consciousnesses which are subjects engaging the exterior world constituted of objects. And therefore, the five sensory consciousnesses of the five doors engage respectively their corresponding object. Then it is said in Buddhist scriptures that the five sense organs differ in their respective position. The eye sense organ is higher, the auditory sense organ somewhat lower, the olfactory sense organ yet lower again, the gustatory sense organ lower again, and the tactile sense organ overall the lowest of all. This is seen to refer to the distance of engagement of the sense organ with the object.

So you can see for yourself, you know, as soon as I’ve translated—if you take the eye sense consciousness, then it can engage its object at a great distance. Then if you take the auditory sense consciousness, its object sound has to be closer. Let us drop telephones from this discussion; they’re not part of the example. Then after that, the olfactory sense consciousness’s object smells must be closer again, tastes even closer, and for the tactile sense consciousness, they must be in direct contact with the body. Then regarding the definition of—and I will use the English term loci for the ayatanas, traditionally translated as spheres.

Loci of form. The loci of form is defined as the object of apprehension of the visual consciousness, and it is subdivided into two, and this is probably an exhaustive subdivision. It is subdivided into color and shape. In other words, everything which is a locus of form is necessarily either color or shape. Then regarding the loci of sound, its definition is that which is heard by an auditory consciousness, and it is subdivided into two: sound which is held—literally by a person—and sound which is not held. Sound which is held would include, for instance, human speech; sound which is not held would include, for instance, the sound of a creek.

Then the loci of smell is defined as that which is experienced by the olfactory consciousness; it is subdivided into two: natural and artificial odors. Natural odors are odors which are unfabricated by man, such as, for instance, the perfume of sandalwood, whereas artificial odors are, for instance, perfumes contrived by the human hand. The loci of taste is defined as that which is experienced by the gustatory consciousness. Generally speaking, it is subdivided into six, although there is some debate about this, and these include—and the translations are very tentative—the sweet and sour, the bitter and the astringent, the hot and the spicy.

Finally, the loci of sensation is defined as that which is experienced by the tactile or bodily consciousness and is subdivided into two: tactile objects which are the elements and tactile objects which have arisen from the elements. The first subdivision, tactile objects which are the elements, is subdivided into four: earth, water, fire and air. Whereas the second subdivision, tactile objects which have arisen from the elements, is subdivided into seven: the smooth, the rough, the light, and the heavy, the cold, the sensation of hunger, and the sensation of thirst.

And therefore, we should try to keep in mind the specific objects of each of these five consciousnesses. For instance, the visual consciousness probably cannot engage a tactile object. The way to understand this is as follows. The object of the eye consciousness, as you remember, is defined as that which is experienced by the eye consciousness, and this would include, for instance, earth, water, air, and fire. These are specific objects of—excuse me—of the tactile consciousness. These are specific objects of the tactile consciousness, which cannot be experienced by the visual consciousness. It is therefore important at present to be very clear for yourselves what are the consciousnesses to which specific objects relate. For instance, to which consciousness do earth, water, fire and air relate, and by which consciousnesses are they apprehended?

Likewise, which consciousness apprehends form, which consciousness apprehends shape and color? There’s a lot to say. Then, for instance, water is posited as the object of the tactile consciousness. Color is posited as the object of the visual consciousness. Then the fact that color is the object of the visual consciousness or that, for instance, water is the object of the tactile consciousness is not something which is accepted on authority. It is not something which is accepted based on the reasoning because Buddha said so.

Instead, this is something of which we can gain direct experience, and is something of which you should gain direct experience. Do you understand? Yes. And there are a lot of difficulties with this one, and the difficulties mainly hinge on water, as you know my habit. So on a hot day like today, all of us want to take a dip in the ocean.

Now I hope we agree that the ocean is made of water. Then the question is, can you see the ocean or not? Then, obviously, worldly conventions intimate that one should say that one can see the ocean. If someone asks you, can you see the ocean, you say, yes, I can see the ocean. It’s beautiful and the water seems very fresh, and perhaps as a result of this, we generally believe that water and oceans are objects of the visual consciousness.

Then if the ocean is an object of the visual consciousness, then since water is as well an object of the tactile consciousness, it follows that the ocean is a common locus or an object which is both an object of the visual consciousness and an object of the tactile consciousness. If this is the case, then there is a common object, a common locus for both the visual consciousness and the tactile consciousness. Should this be so, why would we posit five different sense consciousnesses, since it would seem that two of them are conflated? Then when somebody asks us, have you seen the ocean, and you answer point-blank, yes, I have seen the ocean, you may be one of two persons. You may be someone who has had the direct experience of the ocean through swimming in it, in which case your initial experience is a tactile experience. And on the basis of this tactile experience, a mental consciousness, and then a conceptual consciousness, impute the name ocean.

Alternatively, you may be someone who has actually never swum in the ocean, but who has received some instruction from someone who has experience in those creatures, and who has been told an ocean is like this, and like this, and like that. And upon seeing in the distance the shape and the color of the ocean, these are perceived by a visual consciousness, followed by a mental consciousness, and very swiftly by an imputation of the name ocean on this entity. There are only these two sorts of people who see oceans: those who have prior experience of them personally, and those who have been told what an ocean is like.

Should somebody who has just arrived from Tibet with no experience whatsoever of the outside world—and as you know, in Tibet there are no oceans—seeing such an entity in the distance, he will see its shape and its color, but will not be able to impute ocean upon this. He will not know that this is an ocean. Then let us take another example. If we see Ilya and Mandy coming in the distance, then assuming that we know Ilya, upon seeing the shape and the color of Ilya in the distance, immediately we will understand and know Ilya is coming. Let us take once again this example, but develop it a bit.

Let us assume Ilya and Mandy are coming from the distance, and instead of one person, there are two people who see them. One knows Ilya, the other has never met him nor seen him. The first, upon seeing the shape and the color of Ilya, instantaneously imputes a recognition of Ilya on this basis. The second also sees the color and the shape of Ilya with his visual consciousness, but is unable to impute on this basis the recognition Ilya. This clearly demonstrates that the visual consciousness alone is unable to engage in such recognition.

Yes. Good. Then since you understand this, the remainder of the analysis should be quite straightforward. When we see Ilya coming from the distance, the visual consciousness only sees Ilya’s shape and color, and most instantaneously after this instant of visual consciousness, there is an instant of mental consciousness which recognizes this is Ilya. Because they occur so close together, we identify them and think that it’s actually the visual consciousness which recognizes Ilya, and we say, I saw Ilya. But we do not see Ilya, we only see Ilya’s shape and Ilya’s color.

Since someone who has never met Ilya and doesn’t know what he looks like will still see the shape and the color of Ilya, but will not see Ilya because they cannot recognize him as such. Alright. Good. These are very elegant analyses. Let us take another very clear example, that of salt and sugar.

Probably all of us naively believe that salt and sugar are visual objects. Yet, if we put them on the table in front of us, both have exactly the same color. They’re both white. Both have exactly the same shape. They are in granular form.

Then with the eye consciousness alone, we have no way of identifying them. Therefore, it is obvious that the visual consciousness does not see salt or sugar, and that salt or sugar are objects of experience of the gustatory consciousness. You have to taste them. Right? Then because we have such frequent experience of salt and sugar, we naively assume that salt and sugar are visual objects, and we might even believe that we can recognize them by their shape and their color, which is obviously not the case.

These are gustatory objects. 100%. Then if we take a square shape from within the five loci—the loci of form, of sound, of smell, of taste and of tactility—what is it? It is clearly the loci of form, the object of the visual consciousness. Then how, or what is the mode of engagement of the sensory consciousnesses of the five doors, of the five senses?

In the case of music, listening to beautiful music, it is the auditory consciousness which engages its object. Whereas perhaps in the case of eating a tasty apple, all five sense consciousnesses are put to contribution. Then specifically, if we are an aesthete and we enjoy eating apples while listening to beautiful music, while our eye consciousness engages the shape and the color of the apple, our ear consciousness listens to music, our olfactory consciousness smells the apple, our gustatory consciousness tastes it, and our tactile consciousness experiences its shape in the palm of our hand. These five consciousnesses engage their object simultaneously. It is, however, difficult to posit examples in which all five sense consciousnesses engage simultaneously aspects of one object.

Generally speaking, the four sensory consciousnesses from the eye consciousness through olfactory, gustatory and tactile sense consciousness can engage one object, whereas the auditory sense consciousness engages another object. The four sense consciousnesses—the visual, olfactory, gustatory and tactile sense consciousness—can engage aspects of one common object, whereas the auditory sense consciousness can engage another object. Doesn’t make sound when he eats apples. Then, obviously, depends on your teeth. Now each of the five sensory consciousnesses in turn can be subdivided into three: valid cognizers, subsequent cognizers, and inattentive minds, or minds to which the phenomenon appears but is not ascertained.

Now let us take the eye consciousness perceiving the shape or the color of the apple. What would we posit as an instance of valid cognizer within this eye consciousness? It would be the first instant of the eye consciousness perceiving either the color or the shape of the apple. Then what would we posit as a second subdivision of visual consciousness? Subsequent cognizers. The subsequent cognizer perceiving the color or the shape of the apple would be all the instants from the second instant onwards—the second, third, fourth instant of perception.

Then what is the third subdivision of the visual consciousness? Inattentive consciousnesses, or consciousnesses to which the phenomenon appears but is not ascertained, would be an instant of a visual consciousness to which the shape or the color of the apple appears, but which does not recognize or which is not followed by an instant of mental consciousness recognizing this is this or that is that. Then a very good example for this is watching a soccer game.

When you watch a soccer game, you will generally focus on the most famous or your favorite player, and you see how he is playing, how he is passing the ball, how he’s blocking the ball, how he is trying to score a goal. But because you are focusing on him, even though the other players appear to the eye consciousness, their shapes and colors are not ascertained. Then we can see this very clearly if we look at the account people give of a soccer game after having watched it. After having watched the game, they remember every detail of the behavior of the star player or their favorite player. However, if you ask them what the other players did, they will typically answer whatever, I’m not quite sure.

In other words, even though the other players did appear to the visual consciousness, a mental consciousness identifying them did not arise because of the intense focus on the star player. Then I will give an example for some of you in this temple who are listening inattentively to the teaching and the translation by the translator. Then the sound of my voice is apprehended by an inattentive auditory consciousness, or your mind is someplace else. It’s an inattentive mind.

Then this is something we should check in the light of our own personal experience. For instance, if we have been hearing the teachings, but our mind has been scattered elsewhere, thinking of work tomorrow, going back home, or even breakfast tomorrow morning, then in a couple of minutes when we go out of the temple and gather for tea, those people will have a blank expression on their face if one asks them, what exactly was taught this evening in the temple? Their ear consciousness would have been an inattentive ear consciousness to which things appear but are not ascertained. Do you understand? Yes.

Really? Then if you listen to my speech carefully, or since I speak Tibetan and that’s a bit difficult, to the translator’s version of my speech, translation of my speech, then later on when we go outside for tea, you will be able to report point by point, subdivision by subdivision to someone asking you exactly what was said in the temple. If you are able to do that, then your ear consciousness during the teachings was either a valid cognizer or a subsequent cognizer. Valid cognizer first. Subsequent cognizer, second. Inattentive, third. Just joking.

Here, stop. I just mentioned something on the idea of inattentive mind. There is now a quite famous videotape, I think, of which you are aware, called Gorillas in Our Midst, where—I think Ilya will like the example because it involves basketball. There are two teams passing a ball around, basketball, and you’re asked to count how many times the ball was passed from person to person wearing a particular color of jersey. And at the end, you’re asked how many times the ball was passed. But what most people don’t see is a man in a gorilla suit walking into the middle of the players, waving his arms and walking off, because everybody is so focused on counting the number of passes of the basketball, they don’t see the most obvious thing.

Jade, please. There was one section I didn’t quite understand when Geshe-la was talking about the apple, and you perceive the color and the shape, which is then followed by something and then followed by mental consciousness. If we try to understand how sensation arises in dependence on the five sensory consciousnesses of the five doors, we will do it through the following example. Since it is difficult for all five of them to arise with respect to one object, one must do it with respect to two objects, which is an apple which is being eaten and music which is being listened to. When we are eating an apple, with our eye consciousness we perceive the apple’s color and the apple’s shape. Simultaneously, with our ear consciousness, we listen to the sound of music. When we bite into the apple, we can clearly smell—we have direct experience of this—the smell of the apple, and with our gustatory consciousness, we taste whatever the taste of the apple is, while our tactile consciousness experiences the smoothness or the roughness of the apple.

Do you understand? Who? I did, but I understood that Geshe-la said that before, but it was further down that he said that the consciousnesses are divided into three. Then after these sensory consciousnesses, various types of mental consciousnesses may arise. For instance, in the case of the experience of the sound of music, the mental consciousness which thinks this is a beautiful song may arise. In the case of eating the apple, the mental consciousness which thinks it smells good or the mental consciousness which thinks it tastes good may also arise.

Can I ask a question about the ocean? Preface it by talking about salt and sugar and the engagement of the visual consciousness in the first place in relation to the salt and the sugar and the inability of the mental consciousness to be able to label either the salt or the sugar as such until the engagement of the gustatory consciousness, then the mental consciousness is able to label. Turning to the issue of the ocean then, are we really talking about water here in saying that whilst the visual consciousness is engaged by the color and the shape of the water, it is not until the tactile consciousness is engaged that you know that it’s liquid? And by virtue of the tactile consciousness, you are then able to mentally label, the mental consciousness is then able to ascribe, say, ocean to it because it is established that it is liquid rather than something else?

Until the tactile consciousness has been engaged, is it a case of saying, well, you don’t know that it’s water? The visual consciousness—on the basis of the visual consciousness, it is impossible for the visual consciousness which perceives the color and the shape of the ocean alone to give rise to the recognition this is the ocean. It’s based on repeated previous experience of the ocean by other consciousnesses that it is possible on the basis of the eye consciousness, the visual consciousness which perceives the shape and the color in the distance, for a mental consciousness which immediately follows it to recognize this is the ocean. Then because these two events are so close together and it is a repeated phenomenon, we assimilate the mental consciousness and the visual consciousness, albeit they are separate.

Right. I thought that it required the engagement of the tactile consciousness. Yes. And the reason that it requires the engagement of the tactile consciousness is because until such time as the tactile consciousness is engaged, you can’t be sure that it is liquid, water. Is that right? No. What you say is incorrect, because let us take the example of President Obama. None of us has ever met, we assume, President Obama. Yet, if President Obama were to come in this temple, we would look at him and immediately say, this is President Obama, even though we have never met President Obama before. However, we are familiar with representations of President Obama, pictures of President Obama, because he is famous. On this basis, without ever having experienced him with a visual consciousness or any other consciousness, we are nonetheless able to recognize him.

Without ever having experienced water. Without seeing it. Just as based on the visual consciousness perceiving the shape and the color of water in the distance, the mind thinking this is water can arise. Likewise, in dependence on the olfactory consciousness, smelling the scent of water, whatever this might be, the mental consciousness thinking there is water here would also arise. For the mental consciousness to arise, that would require an auditory consciousness, somebody saying this tactile experience is water, to give it a name. For the mental consciousness to ascribe a name to the experience, that would have had to have been preceded by a description of some kind from a parent or a teacher. Probably. Yes. Probably.

Just going back to the apple, I have obviously very different teeth to Geshe-la because I definitely get a crunch, a sound from the apple, so why can’t the five consciousnesses, sense consciousnesses, be involved in the eating of an apple? Yes. It is true that when you eat an apple, there is the sound of a crunch, but this is not literally an expressive sound or a meaningful sound. So if it’s not meaningful—so understand there’s held and not held. So in the category of sound, auditory, there’s held, which, for example, is human speech, and not held, which the example was creek. So where does crunch fall in those two categories?

Which is not held, yes. So the five consciousnesses can be involved in eating an apple? You can posit it if you want. Yes. I mean, the sound of the crunch can be posited. But it is an inexpressive sound. It is not a sound which conveys anything in particular.

If I’m correct, Geshe-la mentioned the mental consciousness can be divided into a valid cognizer, subsequent cognizer or inattentive minds. You have to speak up because I can barely—I heard that bit. Does that mean at any point our mental consciousness is divided into one of those three? Sorry. Could you repeat? Does that mean at any point our mental consciousness—if any mental consciousness is what you’re saying.

Not at any point. Any mental consciousness. Mental consciousness at any point is divided into a valid cognizer, subsequent cognizer or an inattentive mind. No. Everything which is consciousness, generally speaking, can be divided into consciousnesses which are valid cognizers and those which are not valid cognizers. Then consciousnesses which are not valid cognizers include not only subsequent cognizers and inattentive minds, but other categories of minds such as conceptual cognizers, wrong views, and so forth. Within the so-called sevenfold division of awarenesses and knowledges, at present we are focusing only on valid cognizers.

I think—okay so, sorry, I’ve got about five questions going on in my head so I’ll just start with one. Just going back to the taste and the sweet, sour, bitter, astringent, hot and spicy, what’s the nature of the debate that is questioning whether there are six subdivisions there? Generally speaking, it is said that there are these six subdivisions of taste into sweet and sour, bitter and astringent, hot and spicy. But one has to check for oneself whether or not it is an exhaustive division. Probably not.

If I heard correctly, Geshe-la said, why posit five sense consciousnesses if they do not have unique objects? Is that correct? Did you just ask? Yes. If there was an object which was shared or common to both the eye consciousness and the tactile consciousness, what would be the reason for positing different distinctions? That response seems to me like, what would be the reason seems to me a logical issue, not an empirical one. It’s an issue of logic rather than how are things in the world necessarily.

For example, we now know that the olfactory sense—that the tactile—the gustatory sense does not function without the olfactory sense or very, very, very badly. They have many common objects, and yet they are two different senses. So I think that basically the rejection of—you know, the statement of why posit five sense consciousnesses if they don’t have five unique objects is a logical consideration, not an empirical. You follow? Which of the two doesn’t work?

If you prevent taste, you cannot smell is what you’re saying. No. If you cannot smell, you cannot taste. Okay. Well, clearly, the five sense organs are connected to the brain. Any damage to the brain might affect them, couldn’t it? It could, but it also means that if you cannot smell, that your sense consciousness is highly impaired, which suggests that they have common objects.

I don’t—I’m afraid I can’t agree with that. There is no shared or no common object between the olfactory consciousness and the gustatory consciousness. The olfactory consciousness has its own experiences, whereas the gustatory consciousness experiences sour, bitter, and so forth. Snake and ant. You know? Yes. Snake. Many examples of one sense functioning without the other. For instance, I gather snakes have a bad sense of hearing, but a good sense of smell, whereas it is said that ants have no eyes, but a good sense of hearing.

Do snakes have ears or not? So this clearly shows the presence or the absence of these senses, clearly shows the respective objects of engagement of the senses. Then in our own case, we have five different sense organs, which have five different objects. Other animals obviously do not. Alright. Yeah. I know if you taste things like essential oils and perfumes, they taste disgusting, but when you smell them, they smell beautiful. There’s no question then, is there? Jasmine.

Is Geshe-la—are we—we’re still yet to look at inferential valid cognizers, that it was mentioned, I think, last week or the week before that there’s another category, the— You have to speak up. I can’t hear at all, my apologies. Sorry. Geshe-la, I imagine, is getting to the inferential valid cognizers. At the moment, this is just under the category of direct valid cognizers. I just want to clarify that we’re getting to what an inferential valid cognizer is.

Yes. I will explain inferential valid cognizers later. Future. In the future. Not now.

Yes, is a small announcement. Tenzin spoke with His Holiness’s private office to see what—we’ve got a few copies left of the Daniel Perdue, Debate in Tibetan Buddhism, and a lot of what, some of what Geshe-la was talking about tonight is in here. So $64. There’s also the Seven Point Mind Training, three days, Friday, Saturday, Sunday over Easter with Geshe-la, and there’s some flyers and also on the website. So you can register now. Thank you. And there’s also some chai if you would like to have a quick cuppa.

Key terms in this teaching

thought transformation lojong (Tib)
Also known as “mind training” or “mind transformation”. A powerful approach to the development of bodhicitta, in which the mind is trained to use all situations, both happy and unhappy, as a means to destroy self-cherishing and self-grasping. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

Questions answered in this teaching

Before the tactile consciousness is engaged, can we really recognize that what we see in the distance is the ocean or water?

The visual consciousness, which perceives only the color and shape of the ocean, cannot by itself give rise to the recognition "this is the ocean." That recognition is possible because of repeated previous experience of the ocean through other consciousnesses. On the basis of that experience, a mental consciousness that immediately follows the visual consciousness, which perceives the color and shape in the distance, can recognize "this is the ocean." Because the two events occur so close together and happen repeatedly, we merge the mental consciousness and the visual consciousness, even though they are separate.

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