46 min · 3,195 words · 21 March 1989
Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. The talk continues an earlier session on emptiness, explaining the two selflessnesses: selflessness of persons and selflessness of phenomena, and why selflessness of persons is meditated on first as the root of cyclic existence. It sets out the coarse and subtle objects of negation, using the four essentials reasoning to show that a naturally existent self cannot be either the same as or different from the aggregates.
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Duration: 46 min
UUID: c3b9eda5-04fe-4f00-933b-368d146e9b81
Date: 1989-03-21
Words: 3,191
Now that. So we should adjust our motivation such that we’re going to listen to this teaching on the profound great vehicle in order to to put into practice the means whereby to attain complete perfect, Buddhahood for the sake of bringing happiness and peace to all sentient beings equal to space. So Candrakīrti said that the that there are are said to be two selflessnesses. The selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena. And these are spoken of for the purpose of freeing one from cyclic existence.
So in in this verse, Candrakīrti says that that the selflessness are divided there are two types of selflessness, phenomenal selflessness and personal selflessness. And that the by selflessness, we mean emptiness. And that the emptiness is divided by way of their basis, foundation of the emptiness, the basis of the emptiness. And there are two types of bases. There are the bases as persons and the bases as phenomena.
By phenomena, I mean other than persons. Anything other than persons. Okay? Persons and phenomena. So emptiness is qualified by which basis it it is qualifying.
The emptiness is characterized by which basis it is qualifying, whether it’s personal selflessness or phenomenal selflessness. So initially, teachings on on emptiness were spoken of were given by the Buddha. And then these were commented on by various great masters down to Nāgārjuna. And he was commented on by the master Candrakīrti in his text Engaging in the Middle Way. So so when we talk about persons and this where I’m using the word person just in the way of translation.
Actually, all sentient beings are included but just for the sake of ease, I use We use this term persons. This is my translation note I’m making. So, when we say selfless of persons, we’re talking about selflessness of sentient beings. And the What we mean by a sentient being is the I which is imputed to either the four or five aggregates of the being. The I which is imputed to either the four or five aggregates of the being.
And this, by the five aggregates, mean the physic the body aggregate, the form, feeling, compositional factors, and consciousness. Now, generally in the form realm, are five aggregates. We say four or five because in the formless realm, there’s no aggregate of form. Therefore, there is the is imputed to the four aggregates minus the form aggregate. We’re just talking about the general types of sentient beings, all the various types of animals and persons, etcetera.
So then when we talk about phenomenal selflessness or the selfless phenomena, by phenomena, we mean those things other than living beings. Those which have no life force such as the earth, earth, water, trees, rocks, things like this. Those which are not living, those which have no life force are what we’re calling phenomena. So the way we’re using these two terms, those things which have no life, those non living things with no life, we are terming phenomena and their selflessness is selflessness of phenomena and we’re talking about the emptiness of those non living things. When we use the term selflessness of persons or I’m going to use the term selflessness of persons but you should think of it in terms of sentient beings.
We’re talking about those things which have a life force, which are living, which have which are our beings. And therefore, we we term their selflessness, the selflessness of persons or the selflessness of sentient beings. And we’re talking about the emptiness of sentient beings or the emptiness of persons. So when we talk about the emptiness of persons and the emptiness of phenomena, there these emptinesses are the same. They’re both the same they’re the same in their subtlety.
The only difference is by way of they’re just being divided by way of the basis. But the emptiness is the same as far as subtlety. So the the emptiness of phenomena does cannot be applied to the emptiness of persons, and the emptiness of persons cannot be applied to the emptiness of phenomena. So in the in the great text which set forth the meaning of emptiness, such as the the root wisdom by Nāgārjuna and Engaging in the Middle Way by Candrakīrti, that they’re that they’re that in their presentation, first they present phenomena emptiness of phenomena, and then they they put they first they present selflessness of phenomena, and they have a presentation of selflessness of persons. This is the order of their presentation.
So the reason for this order of presentation is that of presenting selflessness of phenomena first is that we can Because we can directly see things like flowers, plants, we can and because we can easily their emptiness is much more readily understood because we’re directly able to perceive them. So this is, you know, as we in accordance with our previous with our last session when we were explaining when we were explaining selflessness, it was much much easier to take the example of a flower and explaining the four essentials, the reasoning you’re making use of the four essentials, that it’s very directly more readily understood because we can directly see it. So those who are striving for liberation must meditate on emptiness. Now, until we are able to realize emptiness, there’s no way that we can be liberated from cyclic existence. The root of cyclic existence is ignorance.
And the only method that we can get rid of ignorance with is the realization of emptiness. So we have to meditate on emptiness. And the order of meditating on emptiness is that first we meditate on the selflessness of person. So why is it that we, in in our meditation practice, take up selflessness of persons first? It’s the the root of cyclic existence, the root of of of all our afflictive emotions, the root of all our our suffering is the conception of the self of person.
That is not to say that it is, is the, that we circle in cyclic existence due to the force of both the conception of the self of persons and the, and the conception of the self of phenomena. But the, the greater force, but it is the conception of the self of persons which is, has a greater force in maintaining, acting as a root of cyclic existence. Therefore, we take this as our as our first object of meditation. So it is dependent upon this reason that the it main it is mainly that the conception of the self of person acts as the root of cyclic existence that this is taken as the primary object of our meditation initially. Though in fact, the selflessness of the conception of the self of phenomena does act to maintain cyclic existence.
But the main root is this is the conception of the self of persons. As Candrakīrti says in his treatise on the middle way that that was mentioned before, it’s seen with their mind that all afflictions and defects arise from the view of the transitory collection. Yogis, upon realizing the self is the object of this, refute self. And here the self that they’re discussing when they say the transitory collection is the self as conceived of by the conception of the self of persons. So one reason that we take the selflessness of person as our object of meditation is that though the selflessness of person and the selflessness of phenomena are of the same nature, the emptiness of person and emptiness of phenomena are the same are the same in nature, that due to the to the subject upon which the emptiness is qualified, that is the person, that it’s easier to realize.
Emptiness is in dependence upon the subject person. It’s easier to realize emptiness upon the person as opposed to phenomena. So if we if we consider it from the point of view of the the basis upon which we are generating the understanding, it is said it’s easier to generate the understanding of emptiness in dependence on a basis of the person rather than phenomena. Now, if we ask, you know, why is this? What is the difference between the ease of realizing the selflessness of the person as opposed to realizing the selflessness of phenomena.
If we say very roughly, if we take as a basis or example of the glass, we want to It’s difficult for the basis of imputation or the basis of designation of the glass to appear to our mind. Now, it’s difficult for the basis of designation of glass to appear to our mind. But if we if we illustrate it on the basis of person, that is what is the basis of imputation of person appears to our mind easily. And what is that basis? It is the I which is imputed in dependence upon either of the five aggregates.
The I which is imputed in dependence upon either of the five aggregates is the basis of the imputation of the person. The I which is dependently imputed, which exists by way of being dependently imputed, easily appears to our mind. The I which exists as a dependent imputation, a dependent designation. The I which relies on designation — its existence relies on designation.
The I which relies for its existence on being designated easily appears to our mind. Whereas, also the I, the non-existence of an I which does not rely upon being imputed for its existence easily appears to our mind. The I which does not exist not relying upon imputation for its existence easily appears to our mind. And we can so we can easily it it can it easily appears that the the non-existence of the appearance of relying on other — the appearance of something which has to rely on other to exist. That the non-existence of that is something which does not rely on other for its own existence, but exists only within itself. This this even this rough idea easily appears to our mind. So the the rough or the coarse object of negation can easily appear to our mind. That is the object of rough the coarse object of negation is something which does not rely on anything outside of itself. It exists from its own side without relying on anything else.
It exists from its own side without relying on anything else. That is the coarse object of negation. And depending upon understanding that, we can approach the subtle object of negation. It is because the coarse object of negation easily appears to us in the case of the selflessness, the conception of self of persons, that we take this and in dependence upon this, be able to realize the subtle object of negation. What is the is the subtle object of negation?
So that is a phenomenon which is established under its own power, not relying on causes and conditions, parts, or name, and designation. So the the the subtle object of negation is a phenomenon which is established by way of its own power. Another word would be independently established by way of its own power and which does not rely on causes and conditions, parts, or name and designation. And the non existence of that is is the subtle emptiness of that phenomena, the non existence of such a way of being established. So when the individual thinks, you know, everyone thinks I, you know, we all have this.
This arises in all our minds. This I. Now this I appears to our awareness, to our consciousness, to our awareness as if it the way it appears to our awareness as if it didn’t rely as if it this I does not rely on causes and conditions. It does not rely on name or designation, but exists from its own side. That’s the way it appears.
And this is the subtle object of negation. Such a type of I. Such a type of I, if it is in fact established in the way it appears to this type of awareness, call truly existent, naturally existent. If the I were established as it appears, then the place where it’s been imputed, that is the aggregates, the place where it’s been designated, that is the aggregates. It would have to be either the same or the different different than those aggregates.
You know, as for example, when we talked about the flower last week, we talked in deciding that and discussing the reasoning of the four essentials, that either the flower must be the same or different than its basis of imputation. There’s no other way. We must come to this decision. When we talked about the four essentials last week, we talked about in terms of the I. The I, it’s the I which is the object of negation, that is the I which is not dependent upon name or causes and conditions, that is to say a naturally existent I.
If this naturally existent I must be either the same or different than the aggregates, we come to this decision. Then we understand that there is no other possibility, this was the pervasion, that a phenomenon must be the same or the different. I call this the essential of ascertaining the entailment or in other word ascertaining the pervasion. So last week, you know, we talked about the flower and we this was the selflessness of phenomena. Now we’re talking about beings and we’re talking about the selflessness of person.
So we’re investigating the the the I, the I, which does not rely upon causes and conditions or name or designation. Now, the place where the I is designated, the place where the I is being designated is the aggregates. This is the place of designation. You know, when we talk about persons, the place where we’re talking about the person is at the aggregates. This is the place where the I is existing in terms of the aggregates.
The I exists in terms of the aggregates. Now if this eye naturally exists, it must be either the same or different than the aggregates. We’re investigating whether this eye is whether it’s the same or different than the aggregates. The place where that we see the I is upon the aggregates, so that’s the place we’re investigating. If the eye is the same or different than the aggregates.
If the I is the same as the aggregates, it must be indivisibly the same. It must be in no way different than the aggregates. If something is the same, it is in no way different. So if the I, the natural existing I, if it is the same as aggregates, it is indivisibly the same as aggregates, in no way different than the aggregates. If that were in fact the case, then because there are five aggregates, there would have to be five naturally existing I’s or self.
Because there are five aggregates, there would have to be five selves or five I’s. On the other hand, if the or there would either have to be five I’s or since there was only one I, one self, would only be one aggregate. But we know we know that there are five aggregates, but there are not five selves. We know that there is only one self and there are not five selves. We know that there is one self and there is more than one aggregate.
And we know that there are five aggregates and there are not five selves. So in this way, we negate, we refute the naturally existent I as being the same as the aggregates. So there are many faults which accrue if we if we assert that the that the I is the naturally existing I is the same as the aggregates. If if the eye were the same if the self or the I was the same as the aggregates, then when the aggregates are burnt in a fire, for example, then the and destroyed, then the self or the I would be destroyed. And therefore, there would be nothing which goes on to a future life.
Or if, again, if they were the same, if the, if the naturally existent self and the aggregates were the same, then since the I or the self goes on to a future life, the aggregates would have to go along to a future life. And if that were the case, a person would, in this life, would have to be a person in their future life. A dog in this life would have to be a dog in their future life since the aggregates go along with itself since they’re exactly the same. So there are a number of reasons that we can apply in this situation when the naturally existent self is said to be the same as the aggregates. We can apply many we can find many faults with that type of conception.
That is the the aggregates are the are the appropriated. They are the objects of appropriation. The self is the appropriator, the agent which is doing the appropriating. They cannot be the same. They have to be different.
So we can apply various reasonings in order to refute the that the naturally existent self is the same as the aggregate. Now, if it so it must if the naturally existent self, in fact, exists, it must be it must be different than the aggregate. It must be either the same or different. We refute it the same, so it must be different. So when we say different, it must be completely unrelated, in no way reliant upon one another, because these are truly existent.
They’re independent of one another, and completely no relationship whatsoever with one another. The I and the aggregates completely unrelated to one another, unrelatedly different. So therefore, if such were the case between the aggregates and the self or the I, then when the aggregates were in pain, for example, you know, we hurt our hand, it would not make sense to say I’m hurt because because there’s no relationship between the pain in the hand and the I or the self because they’re unrelatedly different. If I if you if the body if the aggregate has a body the form aggregate has a pain in its head, it doesn’t make any sense to say, I have a headache, because there’s no relationship between the pain in the head and the self or the I. It’s just like a person and a door.
Something completely unrelated in the same way. If somebody has white hair, you know, it would not make any sense to say, I’m getting old, because the body and the self are completely unrelatedly different. There would be no aging of the I in that case. When we say, you know, when aggregate is walking, is going, it makes no sense to say I’m going because the aggregates, the activities of the aggregate and the activities of the I are completely unrelated.
Key terms in this teaching
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- cyclic existence samsara (Skt); khor wa (Tib)
- The six realms of conditioned existence, three lower - hell, hungry ghost and animal - and three upper - human, demigod and god. LYWA
- form realm rupadhatu (Skt); zug kham (Tib)
- The second of samsara’s three realms, with seventeen classes of gods. LYWA
- formless realm arupyadhatu (Skt); zug me kham (Tib)
- The highest of samsara’s three realms, with four classes of gods involved in formless meditations. The four levels are limitless sky, limitless consciousness, nothingness and the tip of samsara. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- object of negation gag cha (Tib)
- An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
- selflessness of person gang zag gi dag me (Tib)
- According to the Prasangika Madhyamaka school, the most subtle view of selflessness of person is the lack of inherent existence of the person or self. LYWA
- selflessness of phenomena chö kyi dag me (Tib)
- The absence of a self in phenomena - all things other than the person. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka view, the most subtle form is their lack of inherent existence: they do not exist from their own side. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.