The Difficult Points of Mind and Basis-of-all Extensively Commented, Tsongkhapa, tr. Ilia Durovic (partial)

Source and licence: Translated by Ilia Durovic. © Ilia Durovic, 2017. Partial translation: the TBI file stops at root verse 37 (Tibetan pp. 629-712).

The Difficult Points of Mind and Basis- of-all extensively commented

by Je Tsong kha pa (1357-1419)

translated by Ilia Durovic

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I prostrate to Buddha Śakyamuni, Lord of Speech.

1. I pay obeisance with my head to the wise among the wise,
Who teach perfectly, un-mistakenly and without admixture,
Through having interiorised, as it is, the worthy Utterance and the worthy Path,
Trail travelled by the Conquerors and the Scions of the Conquerors.

2. I will explain, here, in dependence on the utterances of the Guru,
For the sake of healing my memory and
Teaching clearly mind and basis-of-all,
The extremely difficult topics of the treatises of the Vijñaptimātrins.

Here, should on enquire at just what period the tenets of Cittamātra arise and from what, so as to ascertain both mind and basis-of-all:

3. After Ārya Nāga, prophesied as upholding
The Supreme Vehicle [propounded] by the Holy Speech,
Spread the Supreme Vehicle,
Before Asaṇga, who fulfilled the prophecies, pioneered the track,

After the Muni entered in equipoise in the expanse of phenomena, the Teachings of the Mahāyāna set in Jambudvipa: only the teachings of the Hearers remained and the propounders of Buddhist Tenets were exclusively the Vaibhaṣika and so forth; since the Mahāyāna Sūtras were neither respected nor cared for and had no practitioners, the manifest Dharma, the Hundred Thousand [Verse Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra] and so forth vanished and the profound and vast Sūtras, the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and so forth were reputed to have survived in the abode of the great king of the Nāgas.

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As is said in the “Letter to a Disciple“:

After the great ones with rearing heads, the Nāgas, beseeched respectfully
[The One] akin to a crown jewel,
What the mode of utter purification,
The Teachings, akin to a supreme jewel, beneficial to the worthy, was
[It] illuminated the gloom dwelling within the depths of the earth.

The [stanzas] in the Ārya Laṇkāvatāra Sūtra:

Prithee, after the Lord hath passed beyond torment
Who will the upholder be?
After the Lord hath passed beyond torment,
The upholder of modes,
Will arise after both times have passed,
As Mahāmati will you know him,
In the south, in the land of Veta,
Renowned as the “Glorious Bhikṣu”,
Otherwise quoth Nāga,
He will destroy the biases of existence and non-existence
After supremely explaining my vehicle,
The peerless Mahāyāna to the world,
He will realise the Ground of “Supreme Joy“
And depart to Sukhāvatī.

prophesy that the Great Being, Ārya Nāgārjuna, after being born in the southern land of Veta, will become ordained in the Teachings of the Buddha and, after retrieving the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and so forth from the land of the Nāgas, for the sake of clarifying the Mahāyāna in a signless manner in Jambudvipa, will dispel the bad views of both one’s own and other’s denominations and will compose the treatises of the Mādhyamika Collection of Reasoning and so forth. Thereafter, [the stanzas] in the Mañjuśrī Mūla-tantra:

The Bhikṣu called “Asaṇga”,
Learned in the meaning of the Śastras,
Will distinguish in numerous guises
The definitive and interpretable meaning of the Basket of Sūtras.
That Being, teacher of knowledge to the world,
Will become one who is endowed with the distinction of the Treatises from within.
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The realisation of that knowledge
Is called the “ Messengeress of Sāla”;
By the power of her mantra,
A good mind will be generated.

For the teachings to subsist for a protracted period,
He will summarise the meaning of the Sūtras.
Upon the disintegration of his body, he will betake himself to the Land of the gods,
Living for one hundred and fifty years.

After experiencing lasting bliss
While transmigrating among transmigrators
That Great Being will culminate
By attaining Enlightenment.

prophesy that Master Asaṇga, through realising Ārya Maitreya, will have a vision of him. After betaking himself to Tuṣita, he will listen to the Five Dharmas of Maitreya and returning to Jambudvipa bearing the Dharmas of Maitreya, after composing the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, will initiate and disseminate the Cittamātra view. As is said:

I prostrate to the one called “Asaṇga”
Who, to benefit the world in its totality,
Requested a handful of Teachings,
Flow of nectar induced by the strength of the samādhi of the “Continuum of Dharma”,
Poured from the vase of the mouth of Ārya Maitreya.

Well then, should one enquire, how the Mahāyāna view subsisted before Asaṇga pioneered the track:

3. . . . before . . . Mādhyamika only

since, before Asaṇga, a commentary other than in the mode of the Mādhyamikas on the intent of the utterances of the Tathāgata, dependent origination only, bereft of the extremes of permanence and nihilism, did not exist, the sole clear propounder of the Mahāyāna was Nāgārjuna.

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Therefore, even though the Māhayāna is established as Utterance in the Māhayānasūtrālaṃkāra, the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the Madhyamakahṛdaya and so forth, when Ārya Nāgārjuna extensively disseminated the Māhayāna in Jambudvipa, it was for the sake of dispelling both wrong views of those Pandits of the lower systems of tenets, who, relying on the reasons that:

i. they had not heard the Māhayāna before

ii. [it] was incompatible with whatever type of basket they accepted as a valid cogniser

deprecatingly stated “The Māhayāna bereft of the two extremes is not Utterance”.

The Ācārya, himself, however, in dependence on the lines of reasoning refuting all the elaborations of the eight extremes and so forth as well as on Hinayāna scriptural quotes such as :

The Bhagavān, through knowing the real and the unreal,
Refuted both existence
And non-existence within
The instructions of Kātyāyana.

taught the intent of the Utterances of the emptiness of inherent existence and by stating:

Who, with a mind, would vilify that?

established the Māhayāna as being the Utterance of Buddha. Likewise, after Nāgārjuna, when Asaṇga pioneered the track of the Cittamātra view extensively, the direct disciples of the Ācārya, Bhāvaviveka and so forth, after setting out extensively the assertions of the Vijñaptimātrins, refuted them. Having done so, the following meanings arise: after the Muni had passed beyond torment, the Vaibhaṣika Panditas and so forth, after composing the Seven Collections of Abhidharma, disseminated their own tenets and stained the precious teachings through commenting the meaning of Sūtras differently.

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Likewise:

The Teacher partly closed the mundane eye and
Most powerful beings disappeared and
Those with bad views of their own fabrication who did not behold suchness
Troubled these teachings.

and:

This was said by the Teacher, [they] claim!

[Won cheuk‘s “Extensive Commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra” states];

After the Buddha had passed beyond torment, demonic activities greatly increased, self-proclaimed upholders of the [Scriptural] Collections appeared and since they were mainly Abhidharmikas subscribing to the view of existence, the Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna, having attained Extreme Joy, is said to have composed the Madhyamika treatises and so forth in dependence on the scriptures [propounding] the signless emptiness of the Mahāyāna.

In this way, while the Lower Tenets were extremely disseminated for a long period of time, the Mahāyāna did not exist even in name. Nāgārjuna having disseminated the Mahāyāna pioneered it. After that, since Master Asaṇga extensively pioneered the Cittamātra view, although before Nāgārjuna and Asaṇga, the mere names of Madhyamaka and Vijñaptivāda did exist, the foundation of the texts commenting the intent of the Sūtras differently, in terms of the the two Tenets, was as follows: formerly, only the likes of the Teacher upheld, otherwise, before Nāgārjuna, Asaṇga and so forth, should either a Treatise or Master which commented on the intent of the Utterances pioneered by the Mahāyāna, have been required, they would not have been found.

Likewise, should one enquire at what time those two Masters prophesied by the Tathāgata arose:

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As is said in the [Mañjuśrī] Mūla-tantra, Ārya Nāgārjuna arose :

When four hundred years have elapsed
Since I went beyond torment . . .

while the seventy fifth sheaf of the Great Chinese Commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra states:

Then, when two hundred years had lapsed after Buddha had passed beyond torment, the Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna composed Treatises in dependence on the Sūtra Collection of the Perfection of Wisdom i.e. commentaries on the Perfection of Wisdom, Madhyamaka and so forth. Through abandoning the nature thoroughly analysed in both of these, he taught vigorously the mode of characterlessness. Then, Āryadeva and so forth received these texts correctly, in a lineage from the one to the other and propagated them; when nine hundred years had lapsed after the Buddha had passed beyond torment, the Bodhisattva Maitreya, relying upon the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra and so forth, composed treatises such as the Yogacāryabhūmi, the Madhyāntavibhāga and so forth. Master Asaṇga and Vasubandhu, after receiving these texts correctly, propagated them vigorously. Inasmuch as, at that period, the Buddhadharma was of one taste, there was no contention between the Propounders of Emptiness and those of Existence, therefore according to Master Nye ba’i od :

During the play of a thousand years, the Dharma of the Buddha was of one taste. Thereafter, as recollection and wisdom gradually ceased, the Propounders of Emptiness and those of Existence spread in the world.

Well then, what is the mind-basis-of-all and the afflicted mind which arise from these Cittamātra Tenets?

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Taught concisely:

4. The definitions, proofs and
Refuting the assertions of the nine and the one,
One should know the basis-of-all and the afflicted mind
By the four entities [and] aspects.

Ascertaining the definitions and their proofs and refuting assertions of collections of consciousness as nine and one, one should know the basis-of-all and the afflicted mind by the four entities [and] aspects.

For a more extensive explanation, from within the four:

Regarding the first, definitions, within the two ascertainments of the definitions of basis-of all and afflicted mind, the teaching that basis-of-all has two definitions: supporting basis-of-all of maturation and supported basis-of-all of the seed, I teach [as follows]:

5. I assert that, within the two definitions,
The definition [of] basis-of-all,
Being subdivided into supporting and supported,
Has two aspects.

Should one enquire what the definition of the supporting basis-of-all is, I teach [this] by stating:

6. Regarding that, the supporting basis-of-all has
Entities, sentient beings and imprints
Cognition not cognising,
Neutrality, contact and so forth (the five).

Moreover, [the supporting basis-of-all] should be known through the four: object of observation, aspect, nature and associates.

1. the object of observation, it observes the three:

1.1 the five entities,: form, sound, smell, taste and tactile sensation

1.2 the sentient beings of the five sense-organs: sight, hearing, smell, taste and body

1.3 the imprints of manifest predilection which impute self and phenomena.

2. the aspect, although both the beings and the environment, appear, it does not determine them and later is unable to induce determination as well.

3. the nature is un-obscured and neutral and

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4. [the associates], it is endowed with an entourage of only five mental factors similar to it: sensation, discrimination, intention, contact and attention.

As is also said:

The consciousness to which
Entities and sentient beings appear
Is thoroughly generated.

and in the “Thirty Verses“:

Both appropriations and places
Cognition not cognising
Are always accompanied by
Contact, attention
Knowledge, discrimination and intention.

It has neutral sensation:
It is un-obscured, neutral,
Likewise for contact and so forth.

Should one enquire how the matured and the suchness and other ineffable imprints become observed by the matured?

6. . . .by the power of the seeds

7. I assert both the observed because of the appearance
As place, entity and body.

although, after the seed has appeared, it does not become an object, by its power, that matured basis-of-all is posited as observing because of becoming the appearance of place, the sense bases, body, the sense-organs and entity, the five [sensory] objects. For instance, it is similar to asserting that since, under the power of the object, consciousness bearing that aspect arises, although that object does not appear, it is observed.

Well then, should on enquire, whether the beings and the environment also appear to a Formless mind basis-of-all:

8. As to both apprehended factors of basis-of-all,
Since they are apprehended by the five consciousnesses and
Are imputed terminologically by the sixth,
They are determined in both Realms:

9. Were this not so, a Formless one
Would not have gone beyond the discrimination of form and
It would ensue that it would be on the ground endowed with form
Since, apart from appearing as form to consciousness,
Outside, nothing exists.

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Since, to appear directly as an entity to the mind basis-of-all, [something] is apprehended both by the five sensory consciousnesses and is terminologically imputed on the entity of the mental consciousness, beings and the environment do not appear to a Formless mind basis-of-all: the terminological imputation of form by a Formless mind basis-of-all does not exist. Therefore, the five entities directly appearing to a mind basis-of-all of one base are not hidden from the sensory consciousnesses of that base.

Well then, should one enquire, if one accepts that one apprehended object becomes the factor apprehended by two consciousnesses, inasmuch as whatever appears to a consciousness is of the nature of that [consciousness], two consciousnesses would become of one substance and therefore common apprehended factors would not exist.

There is no fault because, the statement:

Whatever appears to consciousness is either of its nature or
is neither established as one nor as different from it.

is for when analysis occurs and at that time, while common apprehended factors are not accepted, from the standpoint of the un-investigated and un-analysed, common apprehended factors are accepted. However, they are not asserted as of the nature of consciousness, otherwise, it would ensue that the presentation of the five aggregates would disintegrate and strands of hair, the yellow of a conch and dream-objects would be substantially established and that form, sound, etc would be the nature of experience.
If beings and environment appeared to a mind basis-of-all of the Formless Realm, sentient beings of the Formless Realms would not have gone beyond the discrimination of form since beings and environments endowed with form would appear directly to their consciousnesses. This cannot be accepted because it is said:

The discrimination of obstacles ceases
As well as the discrimination of the variegated.

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Moreover, a being of the Formless Realm would have arisen on a ground endowed with form because beings and environments endowed with form would appear directly and genuinely to the mind basis-of-all of the first.
It also does not determine [it] since even in the lower two realms, outside forms are not established apart from the mere appearance as form to consciousness. Therefore, since, under the impetus of a meditative absorption of the Formless [Realm], the seeds existing within the mind basis-of-all of the appearance of being endowed with form, are harmed, while abiding in the Formless [Realm] what is endowed with form cannot appear. For instance, just as under the impetus of a meditative absorption bereft of discrimination, the seeds existing within the mind basis-of-all of the six collections [of consciousness] are harmed, for as long as one has not arisen from that meditative absorption, the six collections [of consciousness] will not arise.

If this is the case, should one enquire: the mind basis-of-all of the Formless [Realm] lacks an [object of] observation because environment and beings endowed with form do not appear and the entity posited as observed [by] the imprints also does not exist. Should this be accepted, one accepts the existence of consciousnesses bereft of an [object of] observation.

There is no fault, because in as is said in [Asaṇga’s] Mahāyānasaṃgraha:

Since the past and so forth, just as dreams
As well the two aspects of reflections
Are bereft of observation,
That is suitable to be observed.

all consciousnesses do not need to rely an existing [object of] observation and in particular since the mind basis-of-all, having been impelled as a basis of pleasant and bad transmigrations by former [respectively] virtuous and non-virtuous karma is not countered for even one instant until one dies, it engages under the force of impelling karma and not under the force of the observed appearance.
Hence, since in the Formless [Realm], entities and sense-organs are non-existent, from within the three [entities of] observation, imprints are observed and in addition, although imprints cannot directly become entities which are observed,

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nonetheless since, under their impetus, places, entities and bodies are suitable to appear, they are observed. For instance, it is just as in [the following example]: since, should a grain in a grain-bin encounter the conditions, it is suitable to generate a sprout, it is called “[that which] acts [as the] condition [of the] sprout”. This is why some prick the assertion that “environment and beings endowed with form appear to the Formless [Realms] minds basis-of-all.“

If this is the case in the Formless [Realm], should one enquire whether in the two Lower Realms, as well, all substances of beings and environments appear to one basis-of-all:

10. In the Lower, as well,
Should all beings and environments
Appear to the basis-of-all of one sentient being,
The hells would appear, as well, to a god of the Form Realm,
The beings and environments of gods
Would appear, as well, to denizens of hell and
Manifold objects of the eons
Would appear, as well, to ordinary beings as well.

If, in the Two Lower Realms as well, all the substances of the beings and environments appeared to one basis-of-all, the appearances of the hells, burning and blazing iron, and so forth, would occur as well to a god of the Form Realm. Should this be accepted, both would have the agony of suffering, because the seeds of the appearance of genuine appearances of the hells awaken on its basis-of-all:

1. [the reason] is not established since these appearances of hell appear directly to the basis-of-all and, in addition, depend on the awakening of the imprints.

2. it is also not indefinite[100], if under the impetus of a seed, both appear directly, they become beneficial or harmful. For instance, it is similar to the appearance of a pleasant or unpleasant object during a dream, being respectively beneficial or harmful.

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One cannot claim that:

Since the environment of migrators of similar type is established from karma which becomes both appearance and conduct, it will become beneficial or harmful, whereas, since, while the environments of [migrators of] discordant types are established from karma which becomes appearance but not from karma which becomes conduct, they will not become beneficial or harmful.
because:

1. some migrators of similar type will see some objects, such as form, sound and so forth as beneficial and some will see them as harmful and

2. since environments apart from the mere appearance as form to inner consciousness are not asserted, the pleasant and the unpleasant become beneficial or harmful through the mere appearance of a self-characterised appearing object and do not depend on action.

For instance, it is similar to fear arising should an illusory Yama appear as a self-characterised Yama, and to desire arising should an illusory youth merely appear as a self-characterised youth.

In addition, does that appearance of hell to the mind basis-of-all of a human being appear or not appear just as it appears to a hell-being ?

1. In the first case, it would follow that, that appearance of hell is not an appearance under the power of the karma of only a denizen of hell. If this were asserted, it would be invalidated by the stanza:

Who made the ground of blazing iron?
What did those balls of flame arise from?
Therefore, the Muni said that all those
Arose from a sinful mind.

and also, one would have to accept that the environment would appear to the basis-of-all of a hell [being] just as it appeared to the basis-of-all of a human being and, in that case:

Since, to pretas, animals, human beings and
Gods, each in keeping with [their] type,
One thing [appears] differently [to the] mind,
I assert that entities are not established.

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the statements of the lines of reasoning of the non-establishment of exterior entities would also be repudiated.

Should one enquire, if just that appeared to the sensory consciousnesse of both those sentient beings would it and the appearance to the basis-of-all be two-fold or one-fold?

Both appearances as the five sense entities to sensory consciousness are the apprehended factor of the basis-of-all: it has been taught by the quote “It arises as the consciousness of the appearance as the five entities” and “[It is] apprehended by the five consciousnesses“.

2. In the second case, although there is not an appearance precisely as it appears to denizens of hell, should one assert a genuine appearance of hell, there would be extreme consequences: all the happiness of the happy transmigrations would appear as well! The four remaining verses, as well, should be understood as being explicated by these lines of reasoning.
Therefore, some Abhidharmikas assert that [all beings] from the Āvici hell to the Fourth Dhyāna appear to one basis-of-all and another asserts that since the Fourth Dhyāna is established from uncommon karma, it does not appear, but nonetheless appears to another.

Others, reflecting on the meaning of a quote from the “Detailed Explanation“:

Its object of observation and aspect cannot be totally severed.

assert the appearance of all the substances of environment and beings, which cannot be altogether severed, however, this is unproven and there are refutations. Should [someone say]: “This is not so, this very quote refutes it.”

The meaning of this quote does not teach that all environments and beings cannot be altogether severed, instead the meaning is that, “such an object of observation has been upheld by such an aspect”, the basis-of-all, itself, is unable to

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sever clearly, and, later, in addition is unable to induce definiteness, otherwise, the previous refutation would occur.

Well then, should one enquire how the environment and beings appear in two Lower Realms?

11. Directly: sense-organs, entities.
Indirectly, whatever can appear
As objects of it’s six collections,
Is also posited as object of the basis-of-all.

Are directly observed the objects which appear to the sense-organs of one’s continuum and are indirectly posited as object of the basis-of-all of its base, whatever can appear as objects of the six collections of it’s base.

Well then, should one say that this is harmed by the statement:

Sentient beings are whatever appears as the five senses within one’s own or another’s continuum.

in the commentary on “sentient beings”.

That teaches the five senses within one’s own or another’s continuum as the sense-organs which appear to the basis-of-all but does not teach the direct appearance of the five senses within one’s own or another’s continuum to one basis-of-all. Such is not the case: if another’s sense-organs appearing directly to one’s basis-of-all were the genuine sense-organs of another’s continuum, migrators would become of one continuum, because:

i. the consciousnesses of the bodies and the embodied occur from imprints of manifest verbalisation and

ii. those imprints, in addition, within one’s basis-of-all cannot be harmed by the consciousness within another’s continuum.

Should someone say:

If all objects of the six collections were objects of the basis-of-all, wouldn’t objects of the mental consciousness such as the Twelve Limbs of Scripture and imputations, such as past and so forth, also become objects of the basis-of-all?

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12. Objects of the six apart from organs and entities
Do not become objects of the basis-of-all
Because the sixth is the imputing subject and
The basis-of-all is devoid of apprehending the variegated.

Objects of the mental consciousness (apart from from the three, organs, entities and imprints) such the Twelve Limbs, past etc. and imputations do not become the objects of the basis-of-all because:

i. both have merely become objects through imputation by the mental consciousness and because

ii. the basis of all, as well, is devoid of discrimination, apprehending the variegated. which imputes terminologically.

Should someone say that the basis-of-all is definitely only neutral and unstained without being posited as virtuous or non-virtuous:

13. Because of being the basis infused with imprints and
Because of engaging manifestly
The virtuous [and] non-virtuous in one continuum
It is established as unstained and neutral.

i. Because the basis-of-all is the basis infused [with] virtuous and non-virtuous imprints and

ii. because [of] engaging simultaneously, in one continuum, manifestly virtuous and non-virtuous minds,

it is established as unstained and neutral because the virtuous and the afflicted are unsuitable to be the basis of imprints.

Should someone say, does the statement the five contact and so forth are definite aver that the associated mental factors are definitely five-fold?

14. Because [it is] neutral and not clear,
Definitely the five, contact and so forth.

The eleven virtuous mental factors, the six root afflictions, the twenty subsidiary afflictions do not occur and because it is not able to sever clearly the particularities of the object, the five object-determining mental factors do not occur. Also, since the four mutable mental factors do not occur [in] the basis of imputation, it is not

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endowed with them at all. It is endowed with the five omnipresent mental factors because contact is the cause of all mental factors and because all minds observe any one of the three aspects experienced and because all minds merely sever the tinge of objects and merely move towards objects and merely focus mentally on their observation.

Should one enquire, which of the three experiences, the sensation associated with the basis-of-all might be?

14. . . . Sensation is intermediate

Sensation is neither of the nature of pleasure nor agony, it is an intermediate experience, of neutrality. Here, regarding [what is] observed [by] sensation, it is totally devoid pleasure and agony.

Should one ask, how?

If sensation were endowed with pleasure, the grounds from the fourth contemplation and beyond would also become grounds of pleasant sensation and pleasant maturations would also exist in hell. If that were endowed with suffering, the maturation of merit and immutable karma would induce suffering and vast [consequences would ensue]: the likes of Formless Beings would also become a ground of agony.

Should one enquire, “Why is the supporting consciousness of maturation called “basis-of-all”?

15. Because it is conjoined
With the Self,
Basis-of-all.

Sentient beings of the five migrations, conjoin it with the Self by means of the afflicted mind, it is called “basis-of-all” because the object which is viewed as the Self by the afflicted mind is a factor of maturation of the basis-of-all.

Should one enquire, “Until what time does one engage and counter such a factor of maturation?”

16. [It] engages the continuum uninterruptedly
Until remainderless and vajra-like.

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It is countered after a remainderless Nirvāṇa of the Lower Vehicle and after a vajra-like samādhi of the Mahāyāna, whereas before it engages uninterruptedly. Moreover, as is said:

Both apprehensions of karmic imprints,
After exhausting the maturation of
Former imprints and so forth,
Generate another maturation.,

That matured mind basis-of-all impelled by previous life virtuous or sinful karma engages in this life until death and since, when the potency of that karma is exhausted, after reverting from that, it engages, again, the dream produced by later karma, it does so uninterruptedly.

Should one enquire why, here, the supporting consciousness alone is called “matured” [and] the eye and so forth, the five organs, are not also matured ?

There is no fault because such a maturation is:

1. unstained and neutral and

2. engages the continuum uninterruptedly for as long as one lives and

3. is the result impelled by former virtue or non-virtue,

it must be something endowed with those three characteristics and, apart from the basis-of-all and its associates, nothing is suitable. Although the unstained and neutral is not incompatible with being the matured of the virtuous and non-virtuous, the virtuous and non-virtuous sequentially are incompatible with the maturation of the non-virtuous and the virtuous because they are mutually discordant and mutual antidotes.

If someone should enquire : since there is no incompatibility between virtue, itself, being the maturation of virtue and non-virtue, itself, being the maturation of non-virtue, maturation is not definitely, only, neutral.

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In that case, the defect of the totally afflicted having no counter would arise: when such a matured [phenomenon] engages the continuum uninterruptedly for as long as one lives, during all lives, if the matured were virtuous, since a virtuous mind would engage the continuum without interruption of the continuum for even an instant, there would be no opportunity for the generation of the totally afflicted and, having no generation, the cessation which precedes it would also be non-existent.
If it is a matured non-virtue, there is no opportunity for the generation of an uninterrupted antidote to non-virtuous minds and, since that does not exist, the totally afflicted will not be countered. Moreover, there are endless [confutations, such as] a person having severed the roots of virtue manifestly having virtuous minds. Therefore, only unstained and neutral are definite.

Thereupon, should someone enquire, why is the maturation of virtuous and non-virtuous phenomena a maturation which is taught to be unstained as well as neutral ?

In this case, unstained as well as neutral is not incompatible with the virtuous and the non-virtuous: the virtuous and the non-virtuous are mutually discordant. If the matured also became virtuous or non-virtuous, the totally afflicted would not be negated. Therefore, matured consciousness is taught to be unstained [and] neutral. Also, since [Asaṇga’s] Mahāyānasaṃgraha states that:

Because, apart from conception, the severance of the continuum of the matured consciousness, has no manifest establishment . . .

i.e. because until the matured is alive, it necessarily engages, it must occur until death however, because the eyes and so forth are also seen to be countered before death,

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they are not fully-characterised maturations. Also, it is said in [Asaṇga’s] Abhidharmasamuccaya, as well:

Should one enquire what the matured is, it is endowed with what is akin to the consciousness basis-of-all and so forth.

therefore, the supporting consciousness alone is matured. These two complete the explanation of the definition of the base.

Should one enquire what the definition of the supported, the basis-of-all of the seed, is?

17. Through infusing the supported,
The seed basis-of-all,
When the basis infused is
Manifestly oriented towards ceasing
A potency has been placed.

When the basis infused by the seven infusing collections is manifestly oriented towards its ceasing, the potency which has been placed, virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral seeds, has disintegrated. Moreover, one third part of the virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral seeds are placed by the six collections, since both have one third part of virtue and so forth. The afflicted mind and its associates infuse only neutral seeds because it dwells permanently in a neutral nature.

Should one enquire how the seven infusing collections and their associates are determined?

Both the engaging consciousnesses and the basis-of-all are mutually, permanently conjoined as resulting things and causal things: likewise, the engaging consciousnesses, through nourishing the old seeds, act as the controlling condition for the factor of the seed basis-of-all and through implanting new seeds, act as the causal condition thereof. As is said:

Both consciousnesses are conditions of each other:
It is said in the Abhidharma Sūtra:

All phenomena are conjoined with consciousness,
Both of these as well, likewise.
Resulting things are mutually, permanently
Conjoined to causal things.

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from the standpoint of simultaneous cause and effect; from the standpoint of non-simultaneous [cause and effect], this explanation posits also a seed which will establish a factor of maturation of the basis-of-all of a future life. Moreover, since that base and infuser arise and cease together, [they] infuse: for instance, just as, when sesame and sumanā are kept together, through arising and ceasing, later, although that flower no longer exists, the sesame is subsequently affected by the perfume of the flower.
Moreover, in that remark, the consciousness engaging it acts as condition with regards to the mind basis-of-all through two aspects:

i. by means of completely nurturing the seed with regards to visible phenomena and

ii. by means of placing the complete apprehension of a seed for the sake of establishing that manifestly in a future life.

Therefore, if the seeds of visible phenomena were completely developed:

However many supported virtues, non-virtues or neutral [states] occur within the consciousness basis-of-all, just so much is there suffusion through arising and ceasing together within one’s base.

Should one enquire, what sort of a basis infused is needed?

. . . The basis infused

18. Is endowed with five characteristics:
Stable, neutral, that which is infused,
Being related to the infuser and
Having become the support of one limit.

Something which is endowed with the five characteristics is posited as the basis infused.

Should one enquire what the five are?

Stable, just as sesame and so forth, needs a continuous continuum, whereas the unstable such as sound and lightning are unsuitable as basis infused: neither of these two are asserted to have imprints and even should they have them, they would go to waste.

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This indicates that the seven collections of consciousness and form are unsuitable as basis infused, because:

1. in keeping with:

Mental consciousness always occurs
(With the exception of the bereft of discrimination,
Both aspects of meditative equipoise and
Mindless sleep and fainting.)

and:

[It] neither exists during a transcendental path
Nor does it exist, either, during meditative equipoise on cessation.

the continuum of both is severed and

2. because even form is non-existent in the Formless.

In that case, should someone say, that the basis-of-all is unsuitable to be a basis infused because its continuum is severed, as is said:

From Arhathood, that is countered.

There is no fault because, for as long as the infusing exists, it is allowed to be uninterrupted. Neutral because, while no seed can infuse the odorous scents of the likes of garlic and sandalwood, since they can [infuse] the odorless scent of the like of sesame, there is no discordance between the neutral which is like an odorless scent and virtuous and non-virtuous minds being extremely clear. This teaches that the virtuous and the afflicted are not suitable as basis infused.
That which is infused: since it is said that “[It] infuses the impermanent, but cannot infuse the permanent, the uncompounded is taught to be unsuitable as infused base. Being related to the infuser: the infuser and the basis infused must have a relationship of arising and ceasing at the same time. This teaches that phenomena which are of different continuums or non-simultaneous are not suitable to be [posited as] infused and infuser. Having become the support of

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one limit: having become the support of one limit, it is not manifold. This dispels contact and so forth, the associates of the basis-of-all, being the base infused, since they rely on the consciousness basis-of-all, a main mind, they have not become the support of one limit.

Well then, should someone say: Do contact and so forth infuse the seeds which they establish in the basis-of-all or not?

In the first case, there would exist infusers other than the seven collections [of consciousness].

In the second case, they would be unchangeable.

Here, “because of becoming causeless, [they] must infuse” and “because [they] are extremely unclear, neutral [phenomena], they do not infuse”.
However, by asserting that since they are the maturation of former karma, they “engage through impelling, until death “, although both are explained, the latter is preferable, otherwise, since the basis-of-all, itself, would also necessarily infuse, the flaw of the base infused being unfindable would arise.

Should one enquire, what the succinct division of such imprints is?

A six-fold division, a three-fold division, two four-fold divisions.

1. The six-fold division

19. Outer, inner and unclear,
Both, conventional and
Ultimate object, all of these
I accept as the six aspects of seeds.

Outer seeds are similar to barley seeds or utpala seeds. Inner seeds are a component of the seeds of the basis-of-all. Unclear, both: unclear is neutral because it has both the thoroughly afflicted and the totally purified unclear or the virtuous and non-virtuous unclear. Both are outer seeds and inner seeds.

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According to the system of one of the commentators of [Asaṇga’s] Mahāyānasaṃgraha, from the standpoint of the statement “both as unclear” if one analyses in terms of the thoroughly afflicted and totally purified or the virtuous and non-virtuous, neither of these is unclear nor neutral, at all.
Alternatively, both, since, inasmuch as the mind basis-of-all, itself, is endowed with seeds of afflicted phenomena, thoroughly afflicted phenomena arise, hence, these two, causality and the seeds of totally purified phenomena abide or having constructed a thing which is a base, both these two and having become cause and effect.
Likewise, in the Pibrīttiguhyārtha :

The statement, ” . . .unclear, both” refers to both virtue and non- virtue or both the thoroughly afflicted and the totally purified being unclear, utterly unclear, i.e. the term “neutral”.
Some read “into both“: if one differentiates seeds into both virtuous and non-virtuous or differentiates into both thoroughly afflicted and totally purified, unclear, means “neutral”.
There, outer seeds are neutral, through that very neutrality, they are unclear. The inner ones, also, are unclear because of not being observed as of the nature of virtue and so forth.

and also the Upanibandhana states:

Unclear is neutral. Both is outer and inner. Alternatively, effect and cause: these two reasons [demonstrate] that the basis-of-all has also both aspects. Regarding that, by means of foundational things which are cause and effect, thoroughly afflicted and totally purified phenomena arise.

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Conventional seeds are exterior seeds, because of being mere objects of a terminological consciousness. Ultimate seeds are inner seeds because, when one analyses, one must also accept this. From the standpoint of the former explanations in the Pibrīttiguhyārtha and the Upanibandhana, the first, third and fifth become merely ancillary whereas, from the standpoint of the second explanation of the Upanibandhana, it is ancillary.
Regarding this, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha also states:

Outer, inner and unclear,
Both, conventional and
Ultimate object, all of these
I accept as the six aspects of seeds
. . .

The supported, which is infused,
Is related to the infuser and
Is not other than the infuser.
That is the characteristic of imprints.

2. A three-fold division

20. Moreover, the three, imprints of manifest verbalisation,
Of the view of the Self and of the limbs of existence.

Moreover, as keeping with the statement:

Should one enquire what the thorough division of this mind basis-of-all is?
In brief, it should be seen as three-fold and four-fold. In this respect, the three particular aspects of the three aspects of imprints are the particular of imprints of manifest verbalisation, the particular of the imprints of the view of the Self and the particular of the imprints of the limbs of existence.

there are three [particular aspects of imprints].

2.1 Imprints of manifest verbalisation

Here, the first imprint is an imprint on the basis-of-all arising in the aspect of the name and marks of phenomena ranging from form to omniscience and in brief, the causal condition of the mental consciousness imputing various designations.

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It is also called “elaborating imprint” because it is a seed elaborating the numerous objects of the mental consciousness. It is also called “imprint of manifest verbalisation” because it is the seed of the mental consciousness having the aspect of verbalising “the eye is the eye” and “form is form”.

In that case, should someone quote the Mahāyānasaṃgraha which states:

Here, because whatever cognition of bodies, embodied ones and ingesters and
Whatever cognition of the thoroughly enjoyed and
Whatever cognition of the thorough enjoyer and
Whatever cognition of time, number, object and designation
Arise from seeds of the imprints of manifest verbalisation.

As I see it, there is no fault because the statement earlier, “seed of the mental consciousness”, is predominantly the case, however, what is taught here is that although other-powered phenomena are cognitions included within incorrect conceptualisation having seeds of the basis-of-all, when cognitions ranging from “body” to “designation” manufacture the three imprints, they arise from imprints of manifest verbalisation because they do not arise from the other two even though those two are manifestly verbalised phenomena of the mental consciousness.
Therefore, from the standpoint of the manifestly verbalised, although its imprints posit it, it is posited only by mental consciousness and its associates and although generated, the terminologically imputed mental consciousness is generated.

2.2 Imprints of the view of the Self

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Seeds which arise as the cognition of the appearance as Self and other posited by the afflicted mind and what is akin to it. As is said:

Because that which is the particular cognition of Self and other arises from the seeds of the imprints of the view of the Self.

These are also called “imprints of the view of the disintegrating composite” because they are the seeds of the view of the disintegrating composite.

2.3 Imprints of the limbs of existence

Seeds which appear as existence, i.e. happy or bad transmigrations, death and birth deposited by virtuous or non-virtuous engaging consciousnesses. As is said:

Because that which is the cognition of happy and bad transmigrations, death and birth arose from the seeds of the limbs of existence.

These are also called “imprints of maturation” because they become of the nature of complete maturation.

Should someone ask whether both organs and objects are referred to here as “cognition” since they have become of the nature of conscious knowledge?

No.

Well then, why?

When one analyses both the appearances of organs and form, sound and so forth as the five objects, although appearances as exterior are totally severed, not asserting, at that time, both of those as of the nature of consciousness is presented in keeping with what is renowned in the world and appears to impure minds.
When one investigates and analyses, such appearances are ineffably different from consciousness and thusness, because they are totally imputed. Therefore, with regards to observing appearances as objects, the ātman, the pradhāna and so forth of the likes of the Tīrthikas and the imputations of subtle

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particles in keeping with our lower systems are not established: both appearances are illogical and, although apprehender and apprehended are logically refuted, since experience is substantially observed, that very interior consciousness appears in that manner and is mentally imputed. Also concerning this, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states:

All realms, migrators and birthplaces subsumed by these cognitions, i.e. other-powered phenomena, are taught to be incorrect conceptuality. Just the mere cognition within these cognitions is not subsumed by incorrect conceptuality. That which is the abode of the appearance of false objects is the other-powered characteristic.

Regarding that, should someone enquire what the imputed characteristic is?

That which has no object, however mere cognition appears as that very object.

Should someone enquire what the thoroughly established characteristic is?

That characteristic of the object which does not exist at all in the other-powered characteristic.

and:

Should one ask , what examples there are for the statement, “Both these cognitions are mere cognitions since they lack an object”?

One should take dreams and so forth as examples. For instance, in a dream, although there is no object, just mere consciousness appears in the aspect of various objects such as forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tactile sensations, dwellings, forests, land, mountains and so forth.
This example [indicates that] everything also is included within mere cognition. By stating “and so forth”, illusions, mirages and cataracts are to be understood as examples.

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3. The first division of the four-fold one

21. The four aspect of seeds:
The common, the uncommon,
Those with sensation and those without. . . .

Moreover, the common seeds are the seeds which establish the world of the receptacle upon the basis-of-all. The uncommon ones are the seeds which establish the world of the essence. These two are also respectively called seeds without sensation and seeds with sensation: since the receptacle is not apprehended by mind, it does not appear as a base of happiness and suffering, whereas for the essence, it is the opposite. As is also said:

Should one enquire what its division by characteristics is: that which itself [has] common characteristics, uncommon characteristics, the characteristics of seeds arising without sensation and the characteristics of seeds arising with sensation. The common is what are the seeds of the world of the receptacle. The uncommon, what are the seed of one’s own locus. What is common are the seeds arising without sensation. What is uncommon, the seeds arising with sensation.

4. The second division of the four-fold one

21. . . . The assumption of bad states,

22. Pliancy, completed behavior and
The uncompleted
Are also said to be the four.

Here, the seeds of the assumption of bad states are the seeds of the root afflictions, desire, hatred and so forth and of the secondary afflictions, wrath, vindictiveness and so forth. The seeds of pliancy are the seeds of virtuous,

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mundane Dharmas. The seeds of completed behavior are virtuous and non-virtuous seeds which are the complete maturation in the nature of maturations of happy and bad transmigrations because, just as cooked food, they will not mature again. The seeds of uncompleted behavior [are called thus] because, since the imprints of manifest verbalisation have been arising beginninglessly, sentient beings, without relying specifically on merely having been born, engage many elaborations of apprehender and apprehended in the continuum. As is also said:

Also, the characteristics of the assumption of bad states and the characteristics of pliancy. The characteristics of the assumption of bad states are whatever is a seed of afflictions or secondary afflictions. The characteristics of pliancy are whatever is a seed of contaminated, virtuous phenomena.

and:

Also, the characteristics of completed and uncompleted behavior. The characteristics of completed behavior is that the maturation of whatever virtuous or non-virtuous seed has completed maturing. The characteristic of the uncompleted, i.e. whatever seed of the imprint of manifest verbalisation, because of being a seed through giving rise to elaborations from time without beginning.

Therefore, someone’s assertion regarding the statement in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha concerning both completed and uncompleted behavior:

Just as, progressively, when the sprout germinates, the germ disappears, there is a two[-fold division]:

i. because the matured imprints of happy and bad transmigrations have completed maturing in the nature of [their] maturation, they are non-existent [and] are not nourished and

ii. since imprints which have not become results are new imprints, they are nourished.

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is not the intent of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.

Should one enquire: are such two imprints are substantially one or different from the consciousness which is their base?

23. From their base, imprints are, moreover,
Neither substantially one nor different.

How? Should one say, [that they are] not one:

24. Since the objects of observations of seeds exist and
The seeds of the five migrations
Would become erroneous and
The realms as well would become erroneous: [they] are not one.

Seeds and the consciousness basis-of-all are not substantially one, otherwise that component [of] the seed basis-of-all would have both object of observation and aspect. Should this be accepted, this would be contradictory with the explanation:

Seeds have neither object of observation nor aspect.

Also, the seeds of the five migrations would become erroneous because one would have to accept that the seeds of the five migrations were substantially one.

Should someone ask, how?

The existence of seeds of the five migrations on one base, simultaneously, would have to exist and both of these, in addition, would have to be accepted as substantially one with one instant of that base’s consciousness basis-of-all and, since that instant has no parts, those five seeds having no substantial parts, would become one, i.e. would be of the nature of one, component-less consciousness.

Should someone ask, how?

The existence of seeds of the five migrations on one base, simultaneously, would have to exist and both of these, in addition, would have to be accepted as substantially one with one instant of that base’s consciousness basis-of-all and, since that instant has no parts, those five seeds having no substantial parts, would become one because two parts of consciousness would be of one nature.

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Should that be accepted, it would ensue that a non-virtuous depositor would deposit that matured seed of happy migrations, because it is a matured seed of bad migrations. Moreover, it would ensue that a virtuous depositor would deposit that matured seed of bad migrations, because it is a matured seed of happy migrations.

Regarding that, if someone who did not strive at vast reasoning engaging intelligently but the dawning of a mere sound generality were to think “The seeds of the five migrations do not have to be mutual: things are different from form.”

Let us analyse this: what thing which is substantially one with form is the substance of form or not. In the first case, your assertion is not established: you accept that thing which is substantially one with form as substantially one as well with sound, smell, taste and the like, however, whatever is the substance of form, does not succeed to those. That whatever is not the substance of form in addition to being substantially one is also substantially different are the words of a lunatic. We do not debate with lunatics!
Sakya Pandita (1182-1251) also states:

Things which are isolated from non-wood:
Whatever is rosewood is not another wood,
Whatever is another wood is not rosewood,
Because its nature is not other.

Is that thing which is isolated from not being wood substantially one or substantially different from rosewood?
In the first case, the instances of wood other than rosewood would not be wood however, in the second case, rosewood would not be wood because it would not negate non-wood.
If one asserted that, apart from rosewood, also [another] substantially one with wood, this is subsequently concordant with the reasoning stating:

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Rosewood is not wood because the substances abide in mutual admixture.

Therefore, as long as one asserts a substantially established generality apart from the instances, one is unable to abandon both defects of investigating [as] substantially one and substantially different. Moreover if, after having accepted [that they are] substantially one, the assertion [that they had] two components was devoid of contradiction, since both the branch and that which is endowed with branches are substantially one, even Buddha would be unable to refute [this].
Also, the realms would become erroneous as well because:

1. in that way, under the impetus of a god of the Form Realm’s meditative equipoise, that infusion in a basis-of-all of [the] Desire [Realm] of a seed which will establish the maturation of a Form Realm god would have to be asserted as substantially one with that consciousness basis-of-all and

2. that seed would only belong to the Ground of Desire because that newly deposited seed would be a consciousness basis-of-all of the Desire Realm.

There are, therefore, countless lines of reasoning like this [countering the assertion that they are] substantially one.

Should one enquire, why [are they] not substantially different?

25. Since on one base, two basis-of-all
There would be, they are not distinct.

If they were substantially different, they would not be form, non-associated or the seven collections at all because they exist even if the substantially established and form do not and arise also when the seven collections of consciousness are non-existent. Therefore, both consciousnesses basis-of-all would necessarily become one and should that be accepted, since two consciousnesses basis-of-all would exist on one base, there would be multiple continuums.

Should someone enquire: this is not definite, it is just like many mental factors arising in association with one mind or, even though the basis-of-all and the seven collections of consciousness engage together, nonetheless they do not become many.

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It is not akin: regarding engagement from the standpoint of one mind, the seven collections obtain, i.e. engage, one basis-of-all and should two basis-of-all exist, neither would depend on the other, because both are independent, stable consciousnesses. The defect remains.

Well then, how do the imprints abide?

26. Therefore, they are ineffably
Neither just that nor other from the base,
Because of abiding as mere imputed existents.

It is because they are not in any wise substantially one or substantially different that, not being established in any wise as one or different from that base consciousness, that consciousness’s potency abides as a mere imputed existent whose nature is latent. As is said:

Should one enquire whether both the consciousness basis-of-all and the seeds of all thoroughly-afflicted phenomena abide distinctly and diffferently or do not abide differently?

Abiding on that, they are neither substantially different nor non-different, however the distinctive impetus arising therein, that consciousness basis-of-all, arise thus and is called “all seeds”.

and in its commentary, the Pibrīttiguhyārtha:

Thus, since both positions also seems to have faults, asserting that ” they are neither substantially different . . .” means that “[they] are ineffably neither the that-ness nor the other-ness of the consciousness basis-of-all.”

and also, since, in its commentary, the Upanibandhana:

The statement:

. . . they are neither substantially different nor non-different, however. . .
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states that the abiding of the imprints in the consciousness basis-of-all [occurs] in a manner which authentically transcends being different and not being different because it is the nature of a distinctive potency. As to the distinctive potency of “imprints”, neither the potency nor that which is endowed with potency is said to be either “the that-ness or the other[-ness]” [of the other].
The question: “[Are they] mutually different or non-different with those two” is incorrect, because once the that which is endowed with potency has become a cause, it is imputed.

this Ācāryabecause of asserting that potencies are imputedly existent and that which is endowed with a potency is substantially existent, after commenting that “both imprints and consciousness basis-of-all are not substantially different nor of one isolate” asserts that both are substantially one but of different isolates. Since the Buddhist terminology of other textual traditions is wealthy [in such statements], this is not something he came out with by himself.
Moreover, in the commentarial explanation on the second topic of Abhidharma, it is said that:

The so-called “seeds, potencies and imprints” are synonymous. Seeds are imputededly existent but are not substantially existent.

hence, the intent of both siblings is one and the same.
Therefore, this infused seed, from the standpoint of the aggregate of compositional factors is an attained, non-associated compositional phenomena, because it is a composite phenomenon but is neither mind nor mental factor and because it is said in the Abidharmasammucaya:

Should one enquire, endowed with what? With the characteristics, as previously. Thoroughly divided into three: that which is endowed with seeds, that which is endowed with power and endowed with origin.

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In that case, how can you quote the previously quoted passage [in Asaṇga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha]:

. . . the three particular aspects of the three aspects of imprints

and also in the Pibrīttiguhyārtha:

The consciousness basis-of-all is also differentiated into two, seeds and the particular aspect of maturation.

There is no fault: in general, teaching the seed basis-of-all also using the terminology of consciousness is a type of explanation which does not differentiate between seeds and maturation because, after having differentiated them, when the question of whether seeds and consciousness are substantially one or different arises, it is taught that they are neither.
Such is taught in the Pibrīttiguhyārtha, in particular. If one seeks for its developments, they are to be found in the extensive commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and because

1. both commentaries provide concordant commentaries concerning:

. . . distinctly and differently or . . .

2. and:

Through engaging the continuum of the former seed, [at] the time of the later seed, [it] is a causal condition which is exclusively different. It is not a controlling condition, because it is a manifestly established cause of the same kind. It is also not a similar, immediately preceding condition because it is not in the nature of a mental factor, nor is it an object condition, because seeds have no objects.

occurs in the Pibrīttiguhyārtha

4. and:

Mere imprints are not the consciousness basis-of-all, however . . .

in the Upanibandhana,

through merely reading the letters, [one is] inappropriately perturbed.

Should someone say:

If one accepts that seeds are things without accepting that they are substances, this is a system which never existed before!

As to that also, there is no fault: this Ācārya subdivides things into substances and

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imputed [phenomena], [in keeping] with the siblings because although they accept that non-associated compositional phenomena are composite, they do not accept that they are substances. Hence, also, the Ācārya’s unadulterated subdivision of his own system is that of a forthright and lucid scholar.

Should one enquire, where the three-fold [subdivision] of those imprints into virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral [derives from]?

27. Irrespective of whether the depositor is virtuous and so forth,
The deposited imprint is neutral.

“Unstained” is additional.

Should someone say, this is illogical, because it contradicts both scripture and logic because it is said in the Abhidharmasamuccaya:

Should one enquire what subsequently related virtue is?
That which is the imprint of just those.

and:

Should one enquire what subsequently related non-virtue is?
The imprints of just those.

[this] states that imprints are virtuous or non-virtuous and, should one accept that all infused imprints are neutral, it would follow that:

1. [they] would not operate as matured causes and

2. seeds generated by virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral engaging consciousnesses would not generate causally concordant effects and

3. after obtaining vows, for so long as they were not for repudiated, virtue would not arise continually

because:

1. matured impellings are necessarily either virtuous or non-virtuous,

2. causally concordant effects are necessarily of concordant type with their cause,

3. when the six collections cease, although mind does not exist manifestly, seeds do exist, however, they are accepted as neutral.

That is not so.

Should one enquire, well then, how?

28. The assertion that [they] are fully-characterised virtue
Or non-virtue has no proof.

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Should one enquire, why [in the light of] just the former quotes and lines of reasoning?

The proof of the fully-characterised virtue and non-virtue of imprints is not authentic.

Should one ask, why?

It is taught not to contribute towards a scriptural proof and not to proceed towards a logical proof:

1. Absence of scriptural proof:

Since there are quotes such as ” . . . subsequently related . . .”, if imprints became fully-characterised virtuous or non-virtuous [ones], from that standpoint, in the Formless Realm as well, fully-characterised form would exist, inasmuch as the explanation of being subsequently related as form would exist in a fully-characterised fashion there, because the seeds of form would exist. In the two Lower Realms, fully-characterised non-virtue would also exist.

2. Absence of logical proof:

2.1 Stating:

. . . it would follow that they would not operate as matured causes . . .

i.e. accepting that it would follow that they would not be impelling, matured [causes], because those imprints would have been impelled by virtuous and non-virtuous depositors, since the depositors, themselves, are impelling.
As far as the consequence they would not operate as matured causes is concerned, there is no entailment, otherwise, the previous instant of the consciousness basis-of-all would also [not] become neutral.

2.2 The statement:

. . . it would follow that causally concordant effects would not be suitable . . .

also does not undermine[321] [this] because merely being causally concordant with a depositor satisfies the meaning of being causally concordant.

2.3 Stating:

. . .vows . . . would not arise continually. . .

also does not undermine [this], because for as long as phenomena at odds with the preceptsremain close to our continuum, after generating shame, embarrassment and recollection (if the potency of the vows exists within the continuum of degenerated ethics), previously taken vows can be posited as existent merely through that and, in addition, at that time, are re-engaged.

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Moreover, since unclear is glossed in both commentaries as neutral, it is established as neutral.

Well then, isn’t this non-contradictory with the passages in the Pibrīttiguhyārtha:

Because whatever is produced by inner virtuous or non-virtuous phenomena, is virtuous or non-virtuous.

and:

Because seeds, also, are neutral on the unstained, they only give rise to neutral phenomena on the unstained and it is inappropriate for virtuous or non-virtuous phenomena to arise from the unstained and neutral.

The latter merely sets out the former position but is not definite: otherwise, neutral minds would not operate as immediately preceding conditions of virtuous and non-virtuous minds.
The former scriptural passage is a mere hypothesis explaining unclear, our system is the former hypothesis quoted previously because:

1. the statement in the Pibrīttiguhyārtha concerning the illustration of [dyeing with] the extract of pits:

After imprints have become the cause of the consciousness basis-of-all, because they engage, they are not different and because they observe neither virtue nor non-virtue, they are not variegated.

2. [and] at the time of imprints, the statement:

. . . [they] are not different and not variegated . . .

are accepted both by the [propounder of the] previous position and by our own system; this is how it should be commented.

Should someone enquire: if imprints are not different from the basis-of-all and are different by their own characteristics from [their] effect due to not appearing as virtuous, non-virtuous or variegated, it is unsuitable for them to arise as virtuous, non-virtuous, etc. or variegated, because it is illogical for a different effect [to arise] out of a non-different cause.

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There is no fault. Understand this in keeping with the Mahāyānasaṃgraha:

Should one enquire: how are imprints, which are neither different nor variegated, the cause of different, variegated phenomena?

For instance, even though fabric mordanted by various extracts of pits does not appear variegated, when it is plunged in vats of dyes, the fabric shows numerous, various aspects of different stripes of colors. Likewise, the consciousness basis-of-all infused by various imprints is not variegated at the time of the imprints, however, if it is revealed in vats of dyes revealing the result, measureless, various phenomena are elicited. This is the subtle, supremely profound dependent origination of the Mahāyāna.

Should one enquire: Do these imprints remain primordially on the basis-of-all or is one newly infused ?

29. The mode of deposition of imprints is threefold.
Abiding in thusness, previously ungenerated
I accept both of these.

There are three systems of the Ācāryas of the Yogācāra.

Should one enquire, which ones?

The Pibrīttiguhyārtha after setting out three systems:

1. Those who assert [that they] dwell in Thusness without relying on an infuser

2. Those who assert new, previously non-existent, deposition by infusers and the nourishment of the previously deposed by infusers

3. Those who assert the nourishment of [those] dwelling in Thusness and new, previously non-existent, deposition

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reciprocally criticises them, expands on the abandonment of their contradictions and although it accepts the first system as a suitable position, here the third is upheld.
Moreover, one should analyse from the standpoint of uncontaminated seeds, causally concordant seeds and seeds of maturation:

1. Since the first is the Naturally dwelling Lineage, it dwells in thusness because it is said in the Yogacārybhūmi:

. . .

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. . .

Discarding elaborations, the ordinary explanation:

Should one enquire: “Why is the seed-component of the basis-of-all called “basis-of-all”?

30. Because of being conjoined
To all thoroughly afflicted phenomena,
Causal or resulting things,
Basis-of-all!
This should be explained in accordance with the statement:

Should one enquire, why is it called “consciousness basis-of-all”?

It is consciousness basis-of-all because of being connected to all thoroughly afflicted phenomena endowed with birth, i.e. resulting things or, in addition, because of being connected with both of those causal things. Alternatively, it is consciousness basis-of-all because of connecting sentient beings to their Self.

Regarding that, here, since this statement amounts to deriving one phenomenon from three derivations without distinguishing between seeds and maturations, I will explain the distinction:

1. Moreover, here, in general, it is for the sake of conjoining the meaning present in basis-of-all to all phenomena and, in particular, stating
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basis-of-all with respect to the component of the seed basis-of-all, includes it within the seven collections of consciousness or, since it is the causal condition of the thoroughly afflicted phenomena which are affliction, karma and birth, both are conjoined, here, to its effect or, alternatively, because basis-of-all, itself, is conjoined, here, to the causal things of both of these phenomena, [it is] basis-of-all.

2. The matured component of the basis-of-all is [called] basis-of-all because all sentient beings of the five migrations are conjoined to the Self by the afflicted mind.

Should one enquire at what time such a seed component is countered?

31. Therefore, Those who have attained Dominion and Arhats
Have no basis-of-all
Because neither depositor exists.

Therefore, since, either thoroughly afflicted phenomena are resulting things or that very seed basis-of-all is conjoined to both its causal things and since the afflicted mind connects to the Self, deposing in the basis-of-all, Eighth Ground Bodhisattvas who have attained Dominion and above and Hearer and Solitary Realiser Arhats, in particular, lack the component of the seed basis-of-all and, in general, are bereft of the consciousness basis-of-all because, having abandoned the afflictions without exception, neither depositor in the basis-of-all exists in the slightest.
It is not the case that the reason is not established, it is said in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha:

Learner Hearers and Bodhisattvas are characterised by unilateral teaching. Arhats, Solitary Realisers and Tathagatas are characterised by teaching all
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afflictive obstructions and are conjoined to all types of characteristics of teaching all afflictive obstructions and obstructions to omniscience.

in particular, regarding the time of countering the three imprints, the Pibrīttiguhyārtha states:

The seeds of the imprints of the limbs of existence exist for as long as the matured result has not arisen. The seeds of the view of the disintegrating composite and the seeds of the afflictive, elaborating imprints exist until the antidote arises. The seeds of virtuous and neutral elaborating imprints for Hearers and Solitary Realisers also exist until an utter Nirvāṇa is attained. Those of the Tathāgatas, until the vajra-like [samādhi], [for] mere Stream-Enterers, occur uninterruptedly.

Should one enquire: if Those who have attained Dominion and the Arhats do not have a consciousness basis-of-all, must one accept that all eight collections of consciousness are present within their continuum or not? If one must, the consciousness basis-of-all would exist, otherwise there would exist a consciousness not included within the eight collections. If one must not, engagement until the matured, the vajra-like [samādhi] and the remainderless Nirvāṇa, would degenerate.

There is no fault. Even though the consciousness basis-of-all is necessarily matured, matured consciousnesses are not necessarily basis-of-all: although Those who have attained Dominion and the Arhats necessarily have a matured consciousness, since it is devoid of the meaning of a basis-of-all, the second defect does not occur and when the eight collections are taught, formulating them as eight with the

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consciousness basis-of-all is for the sake of logic and [they] are not mental substances. Otherwise, asserting that there is an intersection between what is neither:

1. an Arhat or an Eighth Ground Bodhisattva and above’s engaging consciousness which has entered a cessation and

2. a basis-of-all

would be illogical. It is also illogical to state:

The basis-of-all has no seed component.

because the component of maturation is deposited on the basis-of-all and also, depositing the matured component in the basis-of-all is said to be the meaning of the afflicted mind being conjoined to the Self. Likewise, it is said in the Pibrīttiguhyārtha:

. . . because regarding the assertion “engaging in the matured consciousness, i.e. . . . ” refers to the consciousness basis-of-all, there is no entailment: likewise, it does not exist in the continuum of a Bodhisattva dwelling on the Eighth Ground and so forth and in the continuum of an Arhat and a Solitary Realiser, however a matured consciousness does exist.

and in the Viniścayasaṃgraha it is also said that there are “four intersections”:

1. The intersection of the consciousness basis-of-all existing and the engaging consciousness not existing, is the Five States;

2. The opposite, No-more-Learning and Non-Returning Bodhisattvas in a state in which mind exists;

3. Both exist, at the time when mind exists during states other than those;

4. Neither exists, [when] No-more-Learning and Non-Returning Bodhisattvas engage in a cessation and a Nirvāṇa without remaining aggregates.

and since it is stated in the “Trimśika”:

From Arhathood, that is countered.
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the boundaries of non-existence of the basis-of-all which I taught previously will be upheld unscathed.
Therefore, since that eighth consciousness in the continuum of Bodhisattvas who have attained Dominion and Arhats has a matured consciousness and inconceivable transference at death, it is not designated the “basis-of-all” of the so-called “appropriating consciousness”.

Should someone enquire: therefore, Those have attained Dominion and Arhats also have no mind, since it is said:

Why should [they] also have a “mind”?

Because the various seeds of the imprints of phenomena are completely accumulated.

This is not akin, its meaning is that while, in Sutra, the statement:

Mind, mentation and consciousness

assert a third constituent, mentation, different from mind and consciousness, that is not posited as something else, apart from the consciousness basis-of-all. The meaning of such mentation, must be explained as accumulation in that context, however the basis-of-all is the accumulation of all imprints and through thinking: “That meaning is not satisfied by mind and consciousness”, even though there does not exist within those two, an accumulation of imprints different from mind and consciousness, there does exist a mentation which satisfies the meaning of:

Regarding that, consciousness sees objects.

because:

1. the meaning of mentation being only the accumulation of imprints is not definite and

2. apart from the three or two depositors in the basis-of-all, others are not taught.

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Likewise, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states:

No third possibility apart from the consciousness basis-of-all is observed, therefore the consciousness basis-of-all is established as mind.

Now, let us examine this:

Some scholars say that both Lower Vehicles assert that the matured component is countered from a Lower Vehicle remainderless [Nirvāṇa] onwards. Which Lower Vehicle Tenet [school], i.e. Vaibhaṣika and Sautrāntika, asserts this or is there ambiguity regarding the differentiation of those dwelling on Lower Vehicle Hearer and Solitary Realiser Paths?

The first is illogical because these two Propounders of Tenets do not accept consciousnesses apart from the six collections of consciousness.
The second is also illogical: both of these would have to teach the presentation of an ascertainment of engaging and countering the basis-of-all and moreover, this is not to be found.

Well then, whose system?

The extensive presentation of its engaging and countering occurs in the treatises of the Yogācāra.

In that case, there exists in the Mahāyāna, one extinguishing abandonment of the obstructions to omniscience by the Hinayāna, because the matured factor is countered from its remainderless [Nirvāṇa] onwards.

There is no fault: at the time of such a remainderless [Nirvāṇa], although there is no abandonment by a Lower Vehicle Path forsaking incrementally and without exception the obscurations to omniscience of a smaller potency, there does exist a countering which severs the continuum of the obscurations to omniscience, because countering the continuum of the five aggregates exists. It is not the case that the reason is not established: although the time of a remainderless [Nirvāṇa] is that of forsaking the compositional phenomena of the Arhat’s life, after his death, as to the occurrence of knowledge after that,

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if he had to take birth, since karma and afflictions have been abandoned without exception, since he has also negated the matured aggregates of birth, there would also be no birth under the power of karma and affliction and the aspect of karma and affliction could also not establish a body, because this is unilateral pacification and because the base is negated. Therefore, here, the thorough pacification of elaborations is only the signless core severing the continuum of engagement of the composite.

In that case, there would be no difference with the signless core of the Mahāyāna?

That is not so: while this is the mere thorough pacification of engagement of the composite, no Body fulfilling the welfare of others rises from the core, because one has not become familiarised with a path for the sake of others.
In addition, since it is said in the Viniścayasaṃgraha that the intersection of neither an engaging consciousness nor a basis-of-all is a remainderless Nirvāṇa, this is also similar to previously. Also, one cannot state :

This is similar to the infusion of a Hearer

because if the basis-of-all exists, it is in the context of ascertainment. Therefore, the Vaibhaṣikas assert that at the time of a remainderless [Nirvāṇa], the analytical cessation of the continuum of composite phenomena exists as a non-composite substantially established phenomenon, whereas the Sautrāntikas assert a non-implicative negation which doesn’t exist at all because they assert being bereft of the aggregates but do not assert non-composite phenomena as substances. The second, however, is thought to be the meaning of the passage from Sūtra:

The body has disintegrated, sensations have been shattered,
Discrimination has ceased, compositional factors are pacified,
Consciousness has set,
Thus is the end of suffering.

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In particular, the Sautrāntikas, in keeping with:

Just like a butter lamp dies out,
His mind is completely liberated.

state that the complete deliverance of the mind of an Arhat is like the dying out of a butter-lamp and this is asserted to be compatible with our tenets. The Yogācāras assert that the thusness which is the thorough pacification of all engagement in matter or cognition:

1. albeit lacking happy sensations, has a happiness which is totally bereft of suffering

2. does not lack a non-implicative negation at all

3. is also not a substantially established existent and

4. is an existent which does not become permanent.

Therefore, until a remainderless [Nirvāṇa], engagement in the Mahāyāna exists, however, thereafter, engagement is not asserted. In the Viniścayasaṃgraha, it is stated:

Why, does a Hearer upon becoming utterly Enlightened dwell within the core of a Nirvāṇa with remainder, the aggregates and did he establish a peerless, complete and utter Enlightenment? Well then, should one say that he dwells within and enact the core of a Nirvāṇa without the remainder of the aggregates?

[In answer:] He dwells within and enacts the core of a Nirvāṇa with the remainder of the aggregates because dwelling thus within the core of a Nirvāṇa without the remainder of the aggregates is bereft of all beginnings and the continuum of all striving is severed.

Apprehending Cittamātra and Madhyamika unilaterally without differentiating between such modes of assertion, some assert that matured consciousnesses are countered within a remainderless [Nirvāṇa] of the Lower Vehicle, some do “not

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counter” since even after a remainderless [Nirvāṇa], one must enter the Mahāyāna, relying on the extreme of fatigue and weariness.
Here, more extensive, similar instructions regarding [Nirvāṇa] with and without aggregates should be known from the presentation of Cittamātra assertions in:

1. the commentary on the vows of the Viniścayasaṃgraha

2. the commentary “Determination and entailment of the object in [Haribhadra’s] Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka“

In this context, although I could elaborate on the modes of assertion of the interpretable and the definitive of the Vijñaptivādins and the Madhyamakas regarding Sūtras asserting three or one [final] Vehicles [as well as] the proofs of both of these, the genesis of the textual traditions, since if there are many words, those of dull acumen will become deranged, I have set this aside, for the time being.
Both of these conclude the explanation of all the difficult points of the matured consciousness and of the basis-of-all of the seed.

What would a definition of the afflicted mind be like?

32. The definition of the afflicted mind is:
A matured component of the basis-of-all and
With the view of the Self, obscured but neutral
With only nine: contact, lust and so forth.

As to that, from within the two, seeds and matured components, the object of observation is the latter, because its object of observation must be akin to the Self and phenomena.
The aspect is the conceit that the object of observation is the Self. Moreover, since the Pibrīttiguhyārtha states:

[By its power], it is through generating the aspect of the Self and not through positing its nature.

although, after the appearance of that very matured substance, it does not become

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the object of the afflicted mind, under the impetus of that matured consciousness, it is posited as object with respect to merely being mistaken as the Self.
The nature is obscured but neutral.

What is the meaning of obscured and unobscured?

Obscured because in addition to being befouled by the afflictions, this mind is also befouled by the four root afflictions. “Unobscured”, i.e. unstained by the afflictions, such as the eleven [virtues] faith and so forth.
Regarding this meaning, someone’s assertions:

1. that meditative equipoise is [either] obscured or unobscured mulling over the fact that the afflicted mind is absent in an Ārya’s meditative equipoise and that the basis-of-all is present and

2. that Liberation is [either] obscured or unobscured mulling over the fact that without abandoning the afflictive obscurations without exception, Liberation is not attained,

amounts to not knowing its obscured and unobscured nature and through positing these two for the basis-of-all and the afflicted mind alone, evinces a narrow perspective. Likewise, although the meaning of these two is whether a phenomenon, itself, is obscured or unobscured, it is not whether it obscures or does not obscure another, otherwise:

1. since the virtuous and neutral minds of Āryas, having become distracting factors, thwart equipoise, they would become obscured and

2. since, without abandoning all origins [of suffering] definitely impelling to another existence, none of the Three Liberations would be attained, it would follow that meritorious and immutable karmas definitely impelling existence would also become obscured.

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One cannot also state:

Since both are thoroughly afflicted karma, they are obscured.

because obscurations are said to be afflictions or the physical and verbal non-virtues motivated by these and because even virtues and the thoroughly afflicted obscurations of [this] life would become obscured. Also, as is said in Abhidharmasamuccaya:

[Why is it investigated as afflicted?] The non-virtuous and obscured but neutral is afflicted. The obscured but neutral is an affliction akin to omnipresent minds and a view of the disintegrating composite arising together with and akin to mental consciousness and is akin to the view apprehending the extremes and to the Form and Formless [Realms].

and:

The virtuous and unobscured but neutral are not afflicted.

and also in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha:

Inasmuch as the mind is afflicted, it is obscured but neutral. It is always akin to the four obscured afflictions. Just as the afflictions engaged in while in the Form and Formless [Realms], this is taught to be obscured but neutral. The mind which engages while in the Form and Formless [Realms] is enfolded by calm abiding, but is always endowed with mind.

If such is the meaning of obscured, why isn’t neutral alone determining?

Since the afflicted mind is afflicted, it is not virtuous, but it is not non-virtuous because of engaging manifestly and simultaneously in one continuum with virtuous minds. Otherwise, it would not happen for virtuous or non-virtuous minds to be generated manifestly in an ordinary being, because this mind always engages

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manifestly for as long as an Ārya Path has not been generated.
The associates are the five, contact and so forth and desire, ignorance, pride and the view of the Self, because only nine occurs in the Pibrīttiguhyārtha:

Because it has four afflictions and the formerly explained five omnipresent [mental factors], its mental factors are only nine.

and in the Trimśika:

Dwelling [and] arising within that
It has the “mind” [as] object
The mind [as] aspect, with the nature of the mind [apprehending] the I,
Always associated with the four afflictions
Which are obscured but neutral:
View of the Self and benightedness of the Self,
Pride in the Self and lust for the Self:
Wherever it arises, so do the others.
Contact and so forth, also . . .

What sensation is associated with this?

Sensation is exclusively equanimous: if it were pleasant, the mind would have to be pleasant, however, it would follow that in an ordinary being an unhappy mind would never occur at all because, from that standpoint, a pleasant mind would always, manifestly occur and, also, the Fourth Contemplation and above would become the ground of pleasant sensation and even in the Avici [hell] , a happy mind would always engage manifestly. It is not the case that this is not determined: there is no difference in number between its associates in all Three Realms because, since it is a stable consciousness, the main [mind] and the time of engaging and countering are one. One should ascertain the non-occurrence of the sensation of suffering as well by that line of reasoning.
Therefore, the joyful aspect of the afflicted mind is not the joyful aspect of

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sensation but instead the joyful aspect of desire because, in the Trimśika, the five, contact and so forth, associated with the basis-of-all are also explained to be associated with the afflicted mind and sensation has not been treated in particular.
In this vein, also, the Pibrīttiguhyārtha states:

Although having a joyful aspect, it does not have a sensation of delight, because, since it is said:

Wherever it arises, so do the others . . .

just as contact and so forth are timely, alone it is analogous, however, should yet another sensation exist, it would have to be treated specially.

and:

Well then, if it is equanimous, how does it have a joyful aspect?

Because it is akin to desire for the Self.

Why is it definite that its associates are nine-fold? Aren’t there fifteen associates, since these six [additional mental factors] occur:

1. the distraction imputed on thinking “I”,
2. heedlessness imputed on desire and benightedness,
3. agitation imputed on desire,
4. faithlessness imputed on the component of benightedness,
5. laziness and
6. lethargy

Although it is explained that these occur, the nine-fold enumeration is definite: since these six are of the substance of all four afflictions which are its basis of imputation, there are none apart from those four. More extensively, the fact that other mental factors do not arise out of these nine substances should be known from the explanation in the Pibrīttiguhyārtha: out of misgivings that I will be too verbose and since these are not difficult points, I will not write no more.

5. Analysing the Ground

In whomsoever’s continuum this afflicted mind exists, is that support a ground arising there or not? From the first standpoint, since, when an ordinary being of

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the Desire Realm is bereft of lust in the Desire Realm, the afflicted mind is not countered, afflictions of the Desire Realm engage the continuum manifestly. From the second standpoint, since the afflicted mind and its associates, in the basis-of-all of that base, crave the Self, they are biased, therefore afflictions of the Desire Realm do not expand.

Because of the passage:

Wherever it arises, that is its’.

and of the aforementioned defect, the second position is not accepted.

In that case, aren’t defects also stated regarding the first position?

There is no fault, because, since:

An ordinary being of the Desire Realm . . . bereft of lust in the Desire Realm

refers principally to being bereft of the lust for copulation and the absence of the torment of mental unhappiness upon having attained the path of calm abiding and one’s continuum not being tormented by manifest lust for the five objects of desire and exterior focus abandons just some anger and lust but, since this afflicted mind is akin to the innate view of the Self, to counter it under the impetus of its antidote, uncontaminated wisdom must be generated.

What are the times of engaging and countering of such a mind?

33. At the period of equipoise on cessation,
Finally: the Ones having attained Power, the Arhats.

This comprises a contingent, occasional time of countering and a final, durable, time of countering.
The first is the time of entering a cessation for an Eighth Grounder who has not attained a [Path of] No-more-Learning and the time of equipoise for Āryas. The second [is the time from becoming] an Eighth Ground Bodhisattva who has attained Power

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and above and of Hearer and Solitary Realiser Arhats, because such is also said in the Trimśika:

. . . Arhats do not have [it],
It does not exist during meditative equipoise on cessation
Nor does it exist during a transcendental path
This becomes the second.

as well as in the Abhidharmasamuccaya:

What is [the afflicted] mind?

That which has, at all times, the nature of conceit, observes the consciousness basis-of-all and is akin to all four afflictions, the view of the Self, lust for the Self, the pride thinking “I” and ignorance. Also it accompanies all virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral [minds] apart from the manifestation of the Path, entering in equipoise on cessation and the Ground of No-More-Learning and is a consciousness immediately preceding the ceasing of any one of the six consciousnesses.

This being so, the [afflicted] mind is two-fold: a mind thinking “I” and a mind immediately preceding that. These two are respectively called “ultimate mind and conventional mind” because of being a substantial existent capable of autonomy without relying on another consciousness and of not being posited apart from the six consciousnesses.
Regarding these, the first, through operating as an abode for binding the six collections to signs, operates as a contaminated, thoroughly afflicted [phenomenon] whereas the second, through operating as the immediately preceding condition of the six collections, distinguishes the later generation of consciousness by the force of its ceasing. As is said:

Regarding that, [the afflicted] mind is two-fold:

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1. because of having become an abode by operating [as] the immediately preceding condition, the so-called “mind immediately preceding the ceasing of consciousness”, is the abode of the generation of consciousness and

2. the second, the afflicted mind being always akin to all four afflictions (the view of the disintegrating composite, the pride thinking “I”, lust for the Self and ignorance) is the abode of thoroughly afflicted consciousness.

The first, that which is the abode of consciousness, generates whereas the second operates as afflicted: because of cognising objects, it is consciousness; because of being immediately preceding and of thinking “I”, the [afflicted] mind is two-fold.

If the afflicted mind did not exist in Bodhisattvas having attained Power, Arhats and in the meditative equipoise of an Ārya, mental consciousness would also not exist within them, because the controlling condition of mental consciousness, the afflicted mind would not exist. Also, the Ones having attained Power and Arhats would have attained the Wisdom of Equality because, in keeping with:

Since it dwells in the abode of the afflicted mind,
I will call it, Wisdom of Equality.

the afflicted mind is countered.

34. Even were the apprehension of the person,
Which is the afflicted depositor, negated,
Because its mere cognitive clarity exists and
Because the potency to generate the apprehension of phenomena has not been negated,
Both defects, the absence of mental consciousness and attaining Equality,
Are abandoned at a remove.

In answer to this, I will analyse whether the mind exists or not in equipoise and whether that mind is contaminated or not.

1. Does the mind exist or not in equipoise.

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Even at the time of equipoise, the severance of the substantial continuum of mind is not negated, because it is taught in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra that, although the basis-of-all is small, a consciousness engages together with the mind and at the time of equipoise, the object of observation is close to the basis-of-all and the causal condition also arises from the basis-of-all, in addition, experiences such as the ones of six collections of consciousness, the one viewing form, the other listening to sound, not being of discordant types, for as long as cyclic existence exists, [they] will engage as of one type. In this vein, the Pibrīttiguhyārtha also states:

It is also not definite that a mental consciousness on the occasion of being a Learner does not engage in a transcendental equipoise, because at that time, also, there is abiding in mental becoming. Because, in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra:

at times, . . .with one . . .

refers to:

with the mind.

Because:

at times, with two . . .

refers to:

. . . the [afflicted] mind and mental consciousness.

If, also, at that time, in addition to transforming, it also transformed into that which is not mind, this also would transform into that which is not mind.

As was said, when [stating]:

at times, . . .with one . . .

is to be explained also as

. . . with mental consciousness.

Moreover, if it were logical to say:

The collections of consciousness engaging during fainting and so forth depend on an object, because those generations are not close, the stream is severed,

The mind is of one type for as long as cyclic existence exists and is close to [its] object of observation, arising out out of the mind basis-of-all, how could the continuum be severed?

2. Analysing whether that mind is contaminated or not.

Within the systems of the two Ācāryas of the Vijñaptivāda, according to the first

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system, that mind at the time of equipoise is uncontaminated because it does not occur for afflicted and uncontaminated consciousnesses to engage simultaneously in one continuum and the stream of the mind is also not severed and, at that time, the four, the view of the disintegrating composite and so forth, dwell as mere seeds. Moreover, when the meditative equipoise of the mental consciousness sees selflessness directly, just as the basis-of-all, which becomes uncontaminated, occurs out of enduring within its uncontaminated seeds, likewise, at that time, the mind also engages together with the basis-of-all, in an uncontaminated fashion, out of enduring by means of the thusness of uncontaminated seeds. After rising out of that, when the likes of a contaminated, virtuous intention manifests, that mind operates afflictedly after the four root afflictions manifest out of the seeds of the four afflictions. In this vein, the Pibrīttiguhyārtha also states:

That mind, as well, says someone, is therefore on occasion, uncontaminated: whatever is afflicted like that is posited on the occasion of seeds not occurring at all in the stream through engaging in equipoise on an Ārya path.

The uncontaminated occurs with the consciousness basis of all just as the Ārya path having realised selflessness directly out of its own beginingless type.

Hence, according to this system as well, since in equipoise, the four afflictions are non-manifest, it lacks a befouled, stained afflicted mind, however, since that mind is asserted to be uncontaminated, bereft of the four, it is asserted to have a controlling condition.
According to the second system, the mind exists during equipoise and, in addition, it is asserted to exists in a contaminated fashion.

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Well then, do the afflictions’ contamination exist? It does not: otherwise, how [could it] be contaminated?

This seventh mind has:

1. a potency which generates afflictions after beholding the basis of all as owner and

2. a potency which generates obstructions to omniscience apprehending phenomena, after having acted as the innate support of the mental consciousness imputing various designations.

Regarding these, the first is the depositor of afflicted minds and, in addition, for as long as the afflictions, without exception, have not been abandoned, it engages and for the sake of negating [it], when ignorance and views are countered, since Eighth Ground [Bodhisattvas] and above and Arhats abandon root and subsidiary afflictions without exception, the potency to generate the apprehension of persons is negated. Since that is negated, depositing the afflicted also does not exist, hence, the afflicted mind is negated. Nonetheless, that mind’s potency to generate the apprehension of phenomena is not negated and the mere stream of that mind’s cognitive clarity is not severed, therefore, the defect that, since the controlling condition of the mental consciousness does not exist, the mental consciousness would not exist also, is not present and because the Wisdom of Equality is attained through being bereft of all stains, without destroying the apprehension of phenomena, the attainment of wisdom will also not occur.
This is logical because consciousness is asserted to arise cleanly out of definite, individual conditions and even though the seventh consciousness becomes afflicted under the influence of the four afflictions, since it is not so by its nature, when those afflicted associates, i.e. the afflicted obstructions, are abandoned, while its countering is logical, the utter countering of that mind’s nature is illogical. This

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is so because after the transformed object, the adventitious faults, are exhausted under the impetus of the path, its nature is asserted to become clear. As is stated in the Pibrīttiguhyārtha:

If someone says: because the contaminated, likewise, has two potencies.

Again, carefully analysing this latter system yields [the following]: before a past path is generated, at one time, the apprehension of persons and phenomena will have occurred, however, when a past path is generated, if it is that of an Ārya Hearer, at the time of equipoise, that mind lacks the superimposition of persons and engages clearly the selflessness of persons, however, it is not bereft of the superimposition of phenomena and does not engage it clearly.
In addition, although [it is] akin to the four un-afflicted ones (ignorance, the view, pride and desire), since they are also un-afflicted, do not thwart the attainment of the result of a Hearer and are also not virtuous.
If it is that of an Ārya Bodhisattva, both selflessnesses are perceived directly at the time of equipoise, hence, since both the apprehension of persons and of phenomena which thwart perceiving both selflessnesses are non-manifest, it is uncontaminated. Likewise, the Pibrīttiguhyārtha states:

In dependence on that which is the ignorance which thwarts perceiving both selflessness concurrently, just as conception conceptualises forcefully an initial snake on the existing shape of a rope, the view akin to the afflicted mind, concurrently, conceptualises forcefully phenomena and persons.
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If a transcendental path is generated, because Ārya Hearers perceive the selflessness of persons, that mind devoid of the superimposition of persons, is not clear with respect to phenomena and the nature of superimposition is akin to benightedness and the view. Because:

i. those un-afflicted ones do not thwart the attainment of the result of a Hearer and

ii. of being the cause of the result of desire and

iii. of prompting the attainment of Nirvāṇa,

because it is not ultimate, it is not virtuous.

and:

As to not being an afflicted phenomenon, it is also akin to both lust and pride.

and:

[However], if a Bodhisattva has become utterly dedicated to Enlightenment or has become of definite type, on that occasion only the uncontaminated direct perception of both selflessnesses will arise.

Well then, what is the controlling condition of the mental consciousness on the Ground of Buddhahood?

In the Pibrīttiguhyārtha:

Are imprints infused or not in the Mirror-like Wisdom? If they are infused, since earlier Buddhas would have infused imprints for longer, they would be more powerful, whereas since later Buddhas would have done so for a shorter period, they would be less powerful and it would not be definite that the base of infusion of the imprints was only neutral.
If they are not infused, in answer to [the statement]:

The arising of the immeasurable qualities of force, fearlessness and so forth, would be causeless

since, at the time of the Vajra-like samādhi, all uncontaminated seeds would develop their final potency concurrently, without relying on new imprints, in keeping with the statement, “the stream would be severed”, after the end of the stream, since that very uncontaminated
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generation would have reached the nature of [its] final potency, “it follows that [one] enters the severance of the stream” or, alternatively, those wisdoms dwelling in whichever consciousness should be known as mutually conditioning and conditioned.

Proceeding as previously, although the 9th Ground is also said to dwell [in] the mental consciousness, the Four Correct, Individual Knowledges have been obtained, because one has attained power over wisdom and because, with the exception of the smallest of the small abandonments of meditation, while the mere coarse is intended, since the imprints, without exception, of the elaborations dwelling within the mental consciousness, without exception, have been extirpated, the consciousness arising in the aspect of name and sign does not exist, therefore, the obstructions to omniscience are abandoned without exception.
Hence, I have set out the explanation of the uninterrupted arising of non-conceptual wisdom from the 8th Ground onwards and of the spontaneous arising of activities in which striving is pacified.
Although the pacification of predilective, conceptual striving in a person thinking “I will enact the weal of sentient beings” is intended, it is not the case that the mental mobility imputing the various designations of obstructive afflictions, does not exist. In that case, although the Ones having attained Power and the Arhats have that clear, cognitive substance of the mind, it is not called “afflicted mind” and although they have a matured consciousness, it is not called “basis-of-all”: both meanings are complete.
Although there was much to be said about those two, I felt entitled to elaborate. This completes the explanation of the ascertainment of the definition of the afflicted mind. This is the first chapter of “An Ocean of worthy explanations: the Difficult Points of Mind and Basis- of-all extensively commented”

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2. Teaching the proofs of mind and basis-of-all

If one accepts a basis-of-all and a mind different from the six collections of consciousness, from what is it know that both of these exist?

35. The existence of a mind and mind basis-of-all
Different from the six consciousnesses
Should be interiorised
Through credible scripture and logic.

There are both scriptural proofs and logical ones.

2.1 Scriptural proofs

2.1.1 [Scriptural proofs of the mind basis-of-all]

It is said in the Abhidharmamahāyāna Sūtra:

The core of times without beginning
Is the abode of all phenomena.
Since that exists, all migrators and
Nirvāṇa, as well, will be attained.

and:

Since it is the basis-of-all [of] the maturation of
All seeds of all phenomena,
I have explained the mind basis-of-all
To both Holy ones.

and also in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra:

Deep and subtle is the appropriating consciousness,
All seeds flow as in a roiling river,
“To comprehend it as the Self is inappropriate:,
This, I do not teach to children.

and in the Ārya Laṇkāvatāra Sūtra:

[That which] thinks “I” [with respect to]
Mentation, i.e. the mind basis-of-all, is the [afflicted] mind.
Whatever thoroughly cognises the object,
That, I assert to be the engaging consciousness.

numberless [such quotes] occur within the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.

2.1.2 Scriptural [proofs] of the afflicted mind

It is said in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra:

At times, the mind basis-of-all, engages together with one consciousness, the mind, and at times, with two, the mind and the
mental consciousness and, at times, together with all seven engaging consciousnesses.

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and in the tenth sheaf of the Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra:

Through purifying the mind dwelling in the basis-of-all, one attains the Saṃbhogakāya.

in addition, the statements in the Ghanavyūha Sūtra, the Laṇkāvatāra Sūtra and so forth regarding the eight consciousness prove this.

2.2 Logical Proofs

2.2.1 Logical proof of the mind basis-of-all

36. Although countless logical proofs
Are stated in the system of the treatises of the Vijñaptimātrins,
Since they are summarised into eight, that:
Appropriation, the first and clarity
Seeds, karma and physical sensation and
Equipoise and passing away are inappropriate,
I will explain these.

In the Mahāyānasaṃgraha the three inappropriate, thoroughly afflicted, afflictions, karma and birth and the two inappropriate mundane and transcendental thoroughly purified, making five with elaborations [are] extensively [explained] and in the Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa, the four lines of reasoning and in the earlier commentary on the Bhūmi, the seventen scriptural proofs and the logical proofs and in the Pratītyasamutpādā-divibhaṇganirdeśa, some of the lines of reasoning of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and regarding the proofs set out in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, since the statement in the Viniścayasaṃgraha:

Appropriation, the first and clarity,
Seeds, karma and physical sensation and
Mindless meditative equipoise and passing away would become inappropriate.

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summarises most of the eight lines of reasoning set out in the Abhidharmasamuccaya- vyākhyā [508]:

The existence of the mind basis-of-all is to be realised in an eightfold manner because:

1. If such a mind basis-of-all did not exist, the appropriation of the body would not occur

2. Beginningless-ness would not occur

3. Clarity would not occur

4. Seed, themselves, would not occur

5. Karma would not occur

6. Physical experience would not occur

7. Mindless meditative equipoise would not occur

8. Passing away would not occur.

I will, therefore, explain these eight.

The first line of reasoning

If the basis-of-all did not exist, how would the appropriation of the body be inappropriate?

Since, if one does not assert a basis-of-all, the afflicted mind would also not exist, the six collections [of consciousness] would have to appropriate the body, however, it is inappropriate for the body to be appropriated by the five causes. In this vein, inasmuch as the mind basis-of-all is the maturation of karma from a previous life, it engages under the impetus of karma, therefore it exists even at the time of conception, therefore it is appropriate [for it] to appropriate the body.
As to the six collections of consciousness, inasmuch as it is said in Sūtra that they are generated under the sway of attention to the inner organs, outer objects, the view, desire and so forth and inasmuch as, when the body has been established, they arise from its present conditions, they do not exist at conception and since, even if an engaging consciousness, the maturation of former karma and mental consciousness, did exist at conception, one still cannot state that the six collections appropriate the body because whatever is a fully-characterised maturation and a consciousness at conception is a maturation at the initial junction of the place of birth, within it having to be be absolutely neutral, both are beheld as also virtuous and non-virtuous and one also cannot state:

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If, these six [collections of consciousness] have both virtuous and non-virtuous [components and also are unobscured and neutral, there is nonetheless no fault, since they are maturations.

because, if the neutral which has become a component of maturation engages uninterruptedly for as long as one lives, the six collections do not have an uninterrupted engagement for that long and also, if the six consciousnesses appropriated the body, if it were not pervaded by the mental stream appropriating the body, since whatever was not pervaded would not be apprehended by consciousness, it would become like a corpse, therefore, because the six collections are definite in their respective place, in whichever place a consciousness occurs, just that as been apprehended and since the remaining bodies have not been apprehended, they are likewise because engaging consciousnesses do not have the potency to generate the pervasion of all bodies at the same time.

If the place, body and organs of discrimination pervade all bodies, do places apprehend themselves?

This is inappropiate because since they are bereft of consciousness, they do not apprehend and, in addition, if those six [collections of consciousness] appropriated the body, this would also incur the defect of numerous appropriations of the body in one life, because these are occasionally present and occasionally absent. Therefore, if the basis-of-all did not exist, one would have to assert that the six collections appropriated the body, however, these five causes are inappropriate and to observe the appropriation of the body, one should accept the appropriator, the mind basis-of-all. As is also said:

Why is the appropriation of the body inappropriate?

As was stated, the five aspects: likewise, the consciousness totally appropriating arises from the cause of previous compositional factors. The engaging consciousness of the eye and so forth arises from present conditions, as is said, stating extensively:

Consciousnesses arise under the sway of organs, objects and the attention generated by these.

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This is the first argument.
Also, the six collections of consciousness observe the virtuous and the non-virtuous; this is the second argument.
Also, since the six collections of consciousness have a neutral maturation, an un-included aspect is not observed: this is the third argument.
Also, the arising of the six collections of consciousness is definite in their respective places: it is inappropriate for whichever consciousness arising in whatever place apprehending that, not to apprehend the remainder. Apprehending [it] is also inappropriate, because consciousness does not exist. This is the fourth argument.
Over and again the faults of taking a body occur: likewise, at times the visual consciousness occurs and at times not. The same [is true] for the remaining ones. This is the fifth argument.

The second line of reasoning

Should someone say: There is also a defect concerning the assertion of the existence of the basis-of-all: both consciousnesses would likewise occur concurrently because the engaging consciousness also occurs occasionally while the basis-of-all engages continually.

You are someone who apprehends a fault where there is no fault: this is my assertion! If both consciousnesses did not occur concurrently, a given person, after desiring to see the six objects, would desire until consciousness [appeared] when the six non-discriminating attentions directed to their respective objects are unbiased, initially, even a particular consciousness will not arise, because there is no difference in the existence of the causes of body, organ and attention of those two engaging consciousnesses.

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Since the two conceptions desiring to see and desiring to hear do not arise concurrently, even though they are said to be like the six attentions directed to the six objects existing simultaneously, it is appropriate for whatever occurs unbiasedly and undiscriminatedly with respect to its respective object, to be one.

If, even when a non-discriminating attention approaches [its] object and organ, it is not definite that “Within the six consciousnesses, this will arise first”, when any one of these has arisen, no other consciousness will arise simultaneously with it, because one attention does not chronologise two concurrent consciousnesses of similar type.

If the attention desiring to behold an object, such as form, must be determined, since both conceptions are not concurrent, you are right, however, since, if the four conditions are assembled, the result, consciousness, arises, two consciousness do occur concurrently because the causal condition, the object and the organ of such six collections [of consciousness] also exists simultaneously and the immediately preceding condition also ceases before [them].

Well then, this is contradictory with the statement: “There is neither a place nor an occasion on which two consciousnesses occur concurrently“?

It is not contradictory: consciousnesses of two similar types are intended. Likewise, also:

Why is engagement from the inception inappropriate?

If some said, as previously:

If the mind basis-of-all existed, then two consciousnesses would occur concurrently.

Regarding that, it was stated formerly: your discrimination of what is faultless as faulty has ceased and both such consciousnesses occur concurrently.

706

Why so?

In this vein, someone after desiring to see concurrently, would desire until consciousness [appeared] however, initially, it would be inappropriate for any consciousness to occur because, likewise, there is no also particularity to the existence of attention, organ and object in that.

The third line of reasoning:

If both consciousnesses do not occur concurrently, the mental consciousness does not engage with clarity. Why is this so?

In this vein, a clear engaging motion, by the subsequently conceiving mental consciousness with respect to the object apprehended by sensory consciousnesses, observes, however, inasmuch as the mental motion recollecting a formerly experienced, past object by sensory consciousnesses is unclear, since one must assert clear, actual motion towards the object of a present sensory consciousness, it is appropriate for both consciousnesses to occur concurrently as well as for mental motion to be clear. If this were not so, it would be inappropriate for those two subsequently conceiving mental consciousnesses to have clarity and non-clarity.

If it is also not simultaneous with sensory consciousness, although the present subject, the mind, has clarity, the likes of the past one would not.

This is inappropriate because when both of those mental consciousnesses engage the object, the objects’ own characteristics do not appear, past does not exist and consciousnesses apprehending simultaneous objects with clarity also not exist. Also, in the same vein:

If consciousnesses occuring concurrently do not exist, why would the visual consciousness and so forth together with the subsequently engaging mental consciousness not be clear?

Likewise, at the time of the subsequent recollection experiencing a past object, the appropriate mental consciousness is unclear however the
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mind moving towards a present object is not, at present, unclear, therefore occurring concurrently and the mental consciousness being clear are also appropriate.

The fourth line of reasoning:

It follows that virtuous, non-virtuous seeds and so forth do not exist because the basis-of-all does not exist. It is not the case that this is not definite because the only the basis-of-all is the basis of accumulation of imprints.

If the six collections are the support of seeds, there is no defect!

This is illogical: if, for seeds to be infused, the generation and cessation of the infuser and the base of infusion must operate simultaneously, both non-virtue would occur after virtue and ending likewise, after a mundane mind a supramundane mind would occur. Moreover, at the time of the severance of the stream of the six collections of consciousness, the support of the imprints would not exist, in addition, from that standpoint, the minds occuring after the severance of the stream, from that viewpoint, would become causeless. Likewise:

Why aren’t the six collections of consciousness each other’s seeds?

Here, non-virtue occuring after virtue, virtue after non-virtue, neutrality after both, intermediate realms after bad realms, good realms after intermediate realms, and likewise bad realms after good realms, the uncontaminated after the contaminated, the contaminated after the uncontaminated, the supramundane after the mundane and the mundane after the supramundane are inappropriate as seeds.
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Even when a long time has passed after the continuum has been severed, since it will arise after that long period has elapsed, it is also inappropriate.

This explains the fifth line of reasoning of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.

The fifth line of reasoning:

If many consciousnesses did not occur concurrently, it would follow that:

1. the cognition of the vessel, such as a mountain trail,

2. the cognition of the place, such as [where] to raise and set one’s foot down,

3. the cognition thinking “I”,

4. the cognition of the object, such as rocks and so forth by the trail,

would not occur simultaneously. If this is asserted, it is said:

When going quickly and so on, through observation, these are clear.

If [summarised] in one aspect:

1. the cognition of the vessel is the appearance of the exterior world, the support.

2. The cognition of the place is the appearance of the mutable world, the substance of sentient beings, the six loci with the base.

3. The cognition thinking “I”, through looking inwards, engages, while always thinking “I”.

4. The cognition of the object is the appearance as form, sound and so forth.

Therefore, since the appearance of the exterior and of the interior, the apprehension of the I and the apprehension as any of the six objects are observed simultaneously, many consciousnesses occur concurrently because such karmas of different nature would be inappropriate for one consciousness.

Why are these four called “karma”?

They manifest as karma under the sway of performance and karma because of appearing as Self and Mine. Likewise, it is illogical to assert that these four are not the basis-of-all, while accepting that they are, is logical.
The cognition to which the exterior and the interior appear i.e. to which objects and sentient beings appear, is the very basis-of-all. The appearance of the Self i.e. the cognition of the Self, is the afflicted mind. As to the appearance of the object, in keeping with:

Thirdly, what objects of observation
Do the six objects have? These two are . . .

it is the six collections. Likewise:

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Why, if two consciousnesses do not occur concurrently, is karma non-existent?

Likewise, in brief, the four aspects of karma i.e. these cognitions (the cognition of the vessel, the cognition of the place, the cognition thinking “I” and the cognition of the object) are observed to occur concurrently, instant by instant: the instant of one consciousness is inappropriate as such a karma of a different nature.

The sixth line of reasoning:

If the basis-of-all did not exist, on the occasion of befitting and unbefitting mentations and so forth, the experience of their pervading the body, totally, would not exist since there would be no support engaging in the generation of that experience in the body by vouchsafing a support, the causal condition would incur the defect of lacking a seed. Likewise:

If the mind basis-of-all did not exist, why would physical experience be inappropriate?

In this vein, some [assert that] although befitting and unbefitting mentations, subsequent ideations, mental equipoise, non-mental equipoise are appropriate, it would nonetheless be inappropriate for
whatever physical experiences occured to be observed with the occurrence of these many variegated aspects and and numerous aspects, therefore the mind basis-of-all exists.

The seventh line of reasoning:

If the basis-of-all did not exist, both equipoises would be inappropriate: likewise, if it did not exist, it would follow that that person engaging in both equipoises, would discard the body with consciousness, because the six collections would have ceased and the basis-of-does not exist. If this were asserted, it would be contradictory with the statement teaching the difference between those two [states] and death:

His consciousness has not gone beyond the body.
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Since, if [it is] accompanied by an unclear mental consciousness, it would not become bereft of consciousness.

This is inappropriate because, if consciousness exists, the sensation subsuming the three [exists] and if that exists, sensation and discrimination exists, therefore a “meditative equipoise in which discrimination and sensation have ceased” is unsuitable. From that standpoint:

Even if the basis-of-all existed, since sensation and discrimination are omnipresent mental factors, at that time, also, it is unsuitable for discrimination and sensation to cease.

That is true, however, since the motion of the discrimination and sensation associated with the six collections of consciousness is not necessarily coarse and since the collected sensations associated with the basis-of-all have an extremely subtle object and aspect, this is not contradictory with an equipoise on cessation, therefore, [they] exist, however, since there is no defect, it is not akin.
Likewise:

If the mind basis-of-all did not exist, why wouldn’t mindless meditative equipoises exist?

Likewise, if it was logical for the very consciousness engaged in a meditative equipoise bereft of discrimination to pass beyond the body, not having passed beyond would, therefore, occur at the time of death. As is said:

Also, the Bhagavan’s consciousness was bereft of a body.

The eighth line of reasoning:

If the basis-of-all did not exist, passing away would be inappropriate: if one asserts a death through the relinquishment of the body by consciousness if, in addition, the basis-of-all did not exist, the mental consciousness would have to relinquish, however, from that standpoint, the gradual withdrawal of physical warmth would be inappropriate because there is no non-occurence of mental consciousness prior to the instant of death.

Well then, since the stream of the basis-of-all is also uninterrupted prior to the cessation of life, [it is] akin [to that].

To explain the distinction, in keeping with:

The consciousness basis-of-all pervades all viscera.
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after the potency of the impelling karma [of] that basis-of-all which abides, while stably pervading all the body, is extinguished, then, since the basis-of-all withdraws from whichever area of the body has become inappropriate for the abiding of that basis-of-all, the sense-organs supported by it cease and warmth fades.
Since the sense organs, without exception, are discarded in these stages and since warmth withdraws from the totality of the body, they are not akin because, upon passing away, there is neither a mental consciousness dwelling in a pervasive fashion in all the body nor is there a withdrawal from the body, area by area.
Therefore, at death, the body is discarded through the gradual withdrawal of the sensation of warmth and it is illogical for something other than consciousness to enact this because the like is not observed in what is bereft of consciousness.
Although they are consciousnesses, the five sensory consciousnesses do not occasionally discard the body: if they did, since they dwell within parts of the body, it would follow that the sensation of warmth would be absent from whichever component of the body they were absent and upon fainting and so forth, death would also occur.
Although the mental consciousness does not dwell within the components of the body, like the basis-of-all which also pervades all the body without dwelling [in the components of the body] however if, by its mere existence, the body is not discarded :

1. inasmuch as from the fact that, until life is finally severed, the sensation of warmth is not withdrawn, before that, as well, the sensation of warmth is withdrawn and

2. inasmuch as the withdrawal of the sensation of warmth is also beheld when the body is discarded,

a relinquisher of the body, the basis-of-all, is accepted. As is also said:

If the mind basis-of-all did not exist, why would passing away also be inappropriate?

Likewise, the consciousness of death causes warmth to fade at the top or the bottom of the body and if relinquished, it is not the case that mental consciousness never occurs, therefore, also:

1. inasmuch as the mind basis-of-all is bereft of an apprehension of the body, and

2. since [it is] bereft of a mental consciousness observing also the fading of bodily warmth and the absence of bodily sensation,

[it] does not [do so], therefore, this is also illogical.

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Having proceeded in this fashion, the five lines of reasoning (i.e. the first, fourth, sixth, seventh and eighth) are actual proofs of existence after formulating the defects of the non-existence of the basis-of-all, whereas the remaining three abandon [adverse] debate.

Apart from the basket of the Mahāyāna Sūtras, doesn’t that mind basis-of-all occur in the discourses of the Hinayāna?

37. That mind basis-of-all
Also [exists] in the discourses of the Hinayāna.
Both the terms, the root consciousness basis-of-all and
Aggregates existing for as long as the limbs of existence
Are taught.

Notes

1. In preparing this tra獮慬楴湯‬⁉慨敶爠汥敩⁤慭湩祬漠桴⁥桺汯攠楤楴湯漠⁦敊吠潳杮欠慨瀠❡⁳潣浭湥慴祲‬湩挠湯番据楴湯眠瑩⁨†桴⁥汢⁡牢湡⁧慢⁲慭攠楤楴湯映牯瘠牡慩瑮爠慥楤杮⁳湡⁤慨敶挠湯畳瑬摥琠敨映汯潬楷杮甠⵮牴湡汳瑡摥挠浯敭瑮牡敩㩳഍ㄉ‮畇杮琠慨杮戠瑳湡瀠❡⁩杳潲敭›夢摩搠湡⁧畫穧楨椧搠慫慢椧朠慮⁳湲浡瀠牡戠桳摡瀠⁡歭慨⁳慰椧ठ樧杵渠潧獧Ⱒ洠⁩楲獧搠数猠牫湵欠慨杮‬敂橩湩Ⱨ㈠〰ളऍ⸲∠楙⁤慤杮欠湵朠桺❩⁩瑲慳戠❡⁩捭慨朧敲≬‬潇慭杮洠湯獡整祲‬畍摮潧Ɽㄠ㜹ഴऍ⸳䈠潬戠慺nslation, I have relied mainly on the zhol edition of Je Tsong kha pa’s commentary, in conjunction with the bla brang bar ma edition for variant readings and have consulted the following un-translated commentaries:
1. Gung thang bstan pa’i sgron me: “Yid dang kun gzhi’i dka’ ba’i gnas rnam par bshad pa mkhas pa’i ‘jug ngogs”, mi rigs dpe skrun khang, Beijing, 2003
2. “Yid dang kun gzhi’i rtsa ba’i mchan ‘grel”, Gomang monastery, Mundgod, 1974
3. Blo bzang ‘jam dpal smon lam: “Rnal ‘byor spyod pa’i lugs kyi yid dang kun gzhi’i rtsa ‘grel gyi dka’ gnas gsal byed nyi zla zung ‘jug”, LTWA, Dharamsala, 1984
4. Blo bzang chos dar: “Yid dang kun gzhi’i dkai ba’i gnas rgya cher ‘grel ba’i dgongs don de nyid gsal ba”, sku ‘bum byams pa gling par khang, Tibet, 199?
I have also relied heavily on recordings of the oral commentary of my teacher, Geshe Yama Rinchen, imparted at Sera Je Monastery.
The page numbers from the zhol edition are on the left-hand for the benefit of Tibetan readers. Variant readings, where important, are indicated in footnotes. Almost all numeration is my own, for the sake of clarity.

2. Geshe Yama Rinchen points out that the homage indicates that the supreme deed of the Buddhas is that of speech.

3. Je Tsong kha pa’s commentary is structured around a series of queries attributed to a hypothetical adversary who acts a a rhetorical foil for Je Tsong kha pa. All these queries have been put in italics.

4. . There are four prophecies of the advent of Ārya Nāgārjuna, three in the Sūtrapitaka and one in the basket of Tantra (in the Kālachakra Tantra). The three prophecies of the advent of Ārya Nāgārjuna in the Sūtrapitaka are:
1. A prophecy in the Laṇkāvatāra Sūtra given shortly in the auto-commentary.
2. A prophecy the Mañjuśrī Mūla-tantra:
Four hundred years after the Buddha’s Nirvāṇa, there will live a monk named Nāga, who will obtain muditabhūmi and will live six hundred years. He will acquire the Mahamayurividya and know the truth of essencelessness. He will ascend to the heaven of Sukhāvatī on his death and in due course will certainly attain Buddhahood.
3. And a prophecy in the Mahāmegha Sūtra:
Ānānda, this Licchavi youth called “Joy-when-seen-by-all beings”, when 400 years after my Parinirvāṇa have elapsed, will be a fully ordained monk named Nāga who will spread widely my teaching. Finally, in the world realm called the “Pure Illumination”, he will become an Arhat, an Utterly Enlightened Being named Jñānākāraprābha.
I refer the readers interested in an analysis of the relation between the Nāgārjuna of faith and the Nāgārjuna of history to my introduction to the “Bodhicittavivaraṇa”, pp. 35-43.

5. . In the Laṇkāvatāra Sūtra, Nāgārjuna is considered to be a 1st Ground Bodhisattva whereas in the Mahāmegha Sūtra, he is asserted to be a 7th Ground Bodhisattva. According to Geshe Yama Rinchen, while Nāgārjuna was, in reality, a 7th Ground Bodhisattva, to ordinary beings he appeared as a 1st Ground Bodhisattva.

6. . The prophecy of the advent of Ārya Asaṇga is to be found in the Mañjuśrī Mūla-tantra and is given shortly as well.

7. Candragomin’s “Letter to a Disciple” translated by Michael Hahn (“Invitation to Enlightenment”, Dharma Publishing, Berkeley (CA),1999

8. Michael Hahn’s reconstruction of this stanza, from a very problematic Sanskrit palm-leaf manuscript version, is at odds with both the Tibetan grammar of the version quoted by Je Tsong kha pa and Je Tsong kha pa’s own intepretation. Specifically, Hahn ignores the ergative usage of the instrumental in the verse, klu mgo’i gdengs ka can chen po rnams kyis treating it as performing a genitival function, which leads him to mistranslate the stanza as follows:
His teaching,
blissful, untainted and immaculate in nature,
clears away the darkness pervading the world,
just as the head ornament of precious gems,
shining, unbroken, immaculate and perfectly round,
worn on the broad hoods of the subterannean Nāgas,
expels the darkness
pervading their subterranean realm.
Candragomin’s “Letter to a Disciple”, op. cit. p. 55
Adversus Hahn, who views this stanza as profering a general statement regarding the benefits of Buddha’s Teachings, a precise translation as well as Je Tsong kha pa’s commentary clearly indicate that it refers to the preservation of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras in the realm of the Nāgas.
Sparham’s translation (“Ocean of Eloquence”, p.45-46) is somewhat better, despite the dubious rendering of Nāga by “dragon” (sic) and a grammatically contrived and inadequate rendering of rnam par dag tshul gang yin as “in its purity”.

9. Sk. Niṛvāna, Tb. mya ngan las ‘das pa. Both terms are very poorly rendered in English.
The Sanskrit term Niṛvāna derives from the root nir-√vā meaning “to blow out”, hence “to extinguish”. The original, etymological meaning of Niṛvāna is an “extinction” akin to that of the flame of a candle, which literally ceases to exist once it is blown out, hence the repeated usages of this metaphor in the Dhammapāda. The Tibetan canonical translation of the term Niṛvāna, mya ngan las ‘das pa, is composed of two components, Tb. mya ngan (Sk. śoka, “burning”,which refers to the most extreme torment known to man, being burned alive) conveyed by the Tibetan mya ngan, “torment”, and ‘das pa “passing beyond”. Hence a good translation of the Tibetan term mya ngan las ‘das pa in English would be “passing beyond torment”, which we have adopted.
It is worth noting the prevalence of the images of fire and burning in both the Sanskrit term Niṛvāna (a fire extinguished by the wind) and the Sanskrit root śoka, translated as mya ngan in Tibetan. This is clearly to be connected to Buddha Śākyamuni’s depiction of cyclic existence as a burning blaze in the famous “Fire Sūtra”.

10. Geshe Yama Rinchen states that these are the extremes of existence and nihilism.

11. i.e. the First Ground.

12. There are some minor differences between this version of the prophecy of the coming of Ārya Nāgārjuna and that transmitted in Je tsün chö kyi gyeltsen’s “First Volume of the Perfections” (Phar phyin skabs dang po)

13. Here, the foremost bad view, according to Geshe Yama Rinchen is the assertion that other-powered phenomena are truly established, one of the central assertions of Cittamātra.

14. Tb. sde pa

15. Nāgārjuna‘s 6 famous treatises are:
i) Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Way (Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā)
ii) Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning (Yuktiṣaṣṭikā-kārikā)
iii) Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness (Śūnyatasaptati-kārikā)
iv) Refutation of Objections (Vigrahavyāvartanī-kārikā)
v) Treatise called “The Finely Woven” (Vaidalyasūtra-nāma)
vi) Precious Garland (Ratnāvalī)

16. This is a very problematic verse, since it is unclear who precisely the “messengeress of Sāla” may have been. Sāla in Sanskrit refers to the Sāl tree (Shorea robusta) which has a strong symbolic link with the genesis of Buddhism in India, since it is under a Sāl tree that Buddha Śākyamuni was born.
Geshe Yama Rinchen points out that, even though some consider the verse refers to an action mūdra, this would probably be unacceptable since the Mañjuśrī Mūla-tantra belongs to the class of Kriyā Tantra in which there is no reliance on action mūdras and suggests, therefore, that the “messengeress of Sāla” refers to Sarasvati in keeping with Ke’u tshang Rinpoche’s commentary: “The inseparable union of the sun and the moon . . .”, transl. I. Durovic, p.11.

17. In the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, according to Geshe Yama Rinchen. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha is Asaṇga’s most compact and at the same time most complete presentation of the doctrine of the Ālayavijñāna. Although partially translated in English by Chikafumi Watanabe, the French translation of Étienne Lamotte ( “La Somme du Grand Véhicule d’ Asaṇga (Mahāyānasaṃgraha)”, Université de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste, Louvain-La-Neuve, 1973) remains authoritative some 70 years later (it was initially penned before and during WWII).

18. Maitreya’s Five Treatises are:
1. The Ornament of Clear Realisation (Abhisamayālaṃkāra)
2. The Ornament of the Māhayāna sūtrās (Māhayānasūtrālaṃkāra)
3. Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes (Madhyāntavibhāga)
4. Distinguishing Dharma and Dharmatā (Dharma-dharmatā-vibhāga)
5. The Sublime Continuum of the Māhayāna (Uttaratantra Śāstra)

19. Cf. footnote 17.

20. Literally, “hearing”. Sparham, in a very elastic interpretation, chooses to translate “drink”.

21. Sk. vāc, Tb. bka’. This technical term, Buddhavācana, refers to those utterance of Buddha which have canonical import.

22. Maitreya’s “Ornament of the Māhayāna Sūtras”

23. Śāntideva’s “Entry in the Behaviour of the Bodhisattvas”

24. Bhāvaviveka’s “Heart of the Middle Way”.

25. i.e. the extremes of eternalism and nihilism which the higher schools of Buddhist Tenets assert that the lower schools have succumbed to.

26. i.e. Ārya Nāgārjuna

27. Sk. bhāva, Tb. dngos

28. Sk. abhāva, Tb. dngos med.

29. This famous stanza from the Kātyāna Sūtra is quoted in Candrakirtī’s Madhyamakāvatara to demonstrate that Hearers and Solitary Realisers also need to rely on the Prāsangika view to attain Liberation.

30. Quoted likewise in Candrakirtī’s Madhyamakāvatara.

31. Nāgārjuna

32. It is noteworthy, here, that Bhāvaviveka (ca. 550 CE) is considered to have been a direct disciple of Nāgārjuna, even though he lived some 4 centuries later. Traditionally, Nāgārjuna is supposed to have lived a short 6 centuries (or even 8 centuries, according to some chronologies) and his life would have spanned much of the high points of Buddhist India.

33. The zhol edition’s version, de ltar byas na ‘di dag gi don ‘di ‘byung ste, is a bit awkward and it is unclear what “the two meanings” in question might be. The bla brang bar ma edition (6b3) reads: de ltar byas na ‘dir ngag gi don ‘di ‘byung ste (“In so doing, here, this verbal meaning arises”).

34. i.e. Ārya beings.

35. This famous stanza is quoted in Guṇaprabha “A thorough Explanation of the manifest statements of the Commentary on the Vinaya Sūtra” (‘Dul ba’i mdo’i ‘grel ba mngon par brjod pa rang gi rnam par bshad pa, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 79) and is the standard stanza indicting devious Abhidharmikas lacking direct realisation of suchness, who composed spurious works attributing them to the Buddha.

36. Attributed to Vasubandhu by Geshe Yama Rinchen.

37. This whole passage is quoted from the work of the great Sino-Korean scholar Won cheuk (西明法師, Tb. Wen tsheg), “The Extensive Commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra” (‘Phags pa dgongs pa zab mo nges par ‘grel pa’i mdo rgya cher ‘grel pa; bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 68). Won cheuk (613-696) was one of the main disciples of the great Tang dynasty Cittamātra scholar, Xuánzàng (玄奘) (602-664) who travelled to India and studied with Śīlabhadra (529–645), the foremost Cittamātra scholar of his age at Nālandā monastery. Won cheuk’s commentary is the mainstay of Je Tsong ka pa’s analysis of the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra both in his “Essence of Eloquence” (Legs bshad snying po) and in the present “The Difficult Points of Mind and Basis-of-all extensively commented” (Yid dang kun gzhi’i dka’ ba’i gnas rgya cher ‘grel ba).
One of the major weaknesses of Gareth Sparham’s translation is that is at times unaware of the extensive quotes from Won cheuk ‘s treatise embedded in Je Tsong kha pa’s text, unless they are explicitly identified, and treats them as Je Tsong kha pa’s own speech.

38. Tb. mngon par zhen pa

39. The 1st Ground.

40. Cittāmatra

41. Tb. bam po

42. Won cheuk, op. cit.

43. Je Tsong kha pa does not address the discrepancy between these two chronologies, which is all the more striking in the light of his reliance on Won cheuk ‘s commentary. Broadly speaking, the dates proposed by the Mañjuśrī Mūla-tantra and the Mahāmegha Sūtra are closer to those generally accepted by Western scholarship than those adduced by Won cheuk . Contemporary scholarship, in keeping with Subramanian and Venkata Raman’s archeological and epigraphical data from Andhra Pradesh, tends to place Nāgārjuna around 50-120 C.E (viz. Subramanian, K. R: “Buddhist remains in Andhra and the History of Andhra between 225 and 610 AD”, Asian Educational Services, Delhi, 1989)

44. Tb. rab

45. Tb. spel ba

46. Geshe Yama Rinchen indicates that “at that period” refers to the period between the composition of the “Five Treatises of Maitreya” by the Bodhisattva Maitreya and the moment Asaṇga pioneered the Cittamātra view.

47. According to Geshe Yama Rinchen, proponents of Madhyamaka.

48. According to Geshe Yama Rinchen, proponents of Cittamātra.

49. An unknown scholar quoted by Won cheuk , purportedly a disciple of Dharmapāla, Śīlabhadra’s teacher.

50. The various subdivisions of consciousness are taught in detail in Gung thang bstan pa’i sgron me’s “The Gateway into the Explanation of the Difficult Points of Mind and Basis-of-All” (Yid dang kun gzhi’i dka’ ba’i gnas rnam par bshad pa mkhas pa’i ‘jug ngogs), pp. 192 ss.

51. Tb. grogs

52. i.e. the supporting mind basis-of-all.

53. In other words, the basis-of-all observes objects, sentient beings and imprints.

54. Tb. mngon par zhen pa, i.e. manifest conceptuality.

55. Geshe Yama Rinchen points out that this refers to imputing “this is that” on phenomena which are the object of the self.

56. Generally speaking, in keeping with Madhyāntavibhāga, whatever is the object of observation of the mind basis-of-all is necessarily an object, a sentient being or an imprint. There are however some problematic debates with this position.

57. Literally, “the essence and the container” (Tb. snod bcud)

58. i.e. the mind-basis-of-all

59. Tb. nges pa

60. In other words, the supporting mind basis-of-all is an inattentive mind (snang la ma nges pa’i blo) and is not a valid cogniser.

61. Madhyāntavibhāga 1:3

62. Anacker (“Seven Works of Vasubandhu, op. cit. p. 212 ss) translates Sk. ārtha, Tb. don as “meaning” instead of “object”. While both are possible translations of the Sk. ārtha, “meaning” is very much at odds both with Je Tsong kha pa’s reading of this verse and with the general import of the Cittamātra doctrine.

63. Geshe Yama Rinchen elucidates that the consciousness to which objects and sentient beings appear, is the mind basis-of-all, whereas the consciousness to which the Self appears is the afflicted consciousness.

64. Vasubandhu’s “Thirty Verses” (Triṃśikā), stanza 3.

65. “Appropriation” (Tb. len pa) refers both to the sense-organs and to imprints as per Geshe Yama Rinchen.

66. Geshe Yama Rinchen indicates that “places” (Tb. gnas) refers to the five sense objects, form and so on.

67. Geshe Yama Rinchen glosses this passage by pointing out that, inasmuch as the “abodes”, i.e. objects, appear to the basis-of-all, it is said to be consciousness.

68. Tb. mi rig pa

69. The quote from Vasubandhu’s “Thirty Verses” (Triṃśikā) in the zhol edition of “The Difficult Points of Mind and Basis-of-All extensively commented” is corrupt. The zhol edition reads rigs (“type”) instead of rig (“knowledge”) as per the bla brang ma edition of “The Difficult Points . . .”, a reading which is corroborated both by the reading rig in the Tengyur dpe bsdur ma edition of the “Thirty Verses” (vol. 77, p.3) and by the Sanskrit edition of Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā (as per Anacker, op. cit., p. 422), which reads Sk. vid and not gotra.
Geshe Yama Rinchen comments that “knowledge”, here, refers to sensation.

70. Just as the mind basis-of-all is un-obscured and neutral, likewise the five omnipresent mental factors necessarily associated with it, viz. contact, attention, sensation (cf. end of footnote 67), discrimination and intention also are necessarily un-obscured and neutral.

71. i.e. the supporting mind basis-of-all

72. In other words, does the mind basis-of-all observe itself, how does it observe suchness, etc. The mind basis-of-all appears to itself but it does not perceive itself, since it is an inattentive mind.
There are numerous debates surrounding the notion that the mind basis-of-all is an inattentive mind such as:
It follows that there are inattentive minds in the mental continuum of an Ārya Bodhisattva, since the mind basis-of all exists within that continuum.

73. Geshe Yama Rinchen states: “Under the power of the imprints, the supporting mind basis-of-all itself appears as form, the five sense objects, etc. The imprint itself does not appear to the supporting mind basis-of-all.”

74. Major, particularly difficult debates arise in this context, for instance, in the Cittamātra system, is the statement:
The subject, vase, is the observed condition of an uninterrupted path of a Path of Seeing directly realising the selflessness of vase.
a valid statement or not? If not, is there no observed condition for an uninterrupted path of a Path of Seeing directly realising selflessness?

75. Geshe Jampa Gyeltsen indicates that both apprehended factors refers here to both the objects of sensory consciousness and the sense organs.

76. i.e. given category of transmigration.

77. Obviously, in Cittamātra and Cittamātra alone.

78. This extremely difficult debate hinges on the thought experiment:
As is said in the preceding paragraph:
the five objects directly appearing to a mind basis-of-all of one base are not hidden from the sensory consciousnesses of that base
therefore, when a karmic imprint in the mind basis-of-all by awakening, gives rise simultaneously to a visual consciousness and to the form perceived by that visual consciousness, these two consciousnesses both have apprehended factors of that form and as a result, both the mind basis of all for which that form is an apprehended factor and the visual consciousness for which it is an apprehended factor would have to be of one nature. This poses major problems.

79. In general, they are of the nature of consciousness, what is being said here is that they are not of the nature of that being’s individual consciousness.

80. These are all examples of non-existence:
i. the strands of hair refers to the appearance of hair falling in front of the eyes of someone afflicted with cataract;
ii. conch-shells are white and therefore the yellow color of a conch-shell does not exist;
iii. dream objects are self-evidently non-existent.

81. i.e. would actually exist. Sparham (op. cit. p. 53) seriously misunderstands the meaning of this passage stating that ” form . . . and sound . . . etc have an emotional [sic] dimension”

82. i.e. forms which are obstructive.

83. The “variegated” (Tb. sna tshogs pa) refers to variegated objects, such as colors, shapes, etc.

84. Tb. mtshan nyid pa

85. Geshe Yama Rinchen indicates that Tibetan texts of both the zhol and bla brang ma editions are corrupt and read “higher” (Tb. gong ma) when they should read lower (Tb. ‘og ma). This passage refers, therefore, to the Desire Realm and the Form Realm.

86. Tb. mthu

87. Emending zhol (638.3): de lta na gzugs med kyi gzugs kun gzhi la dmigs pa med par to de lta na gzugs med kyi kun gzhi la dmigs pa med par in keeping with bla brang ma (9b5)

88. i.e. the reflections of reflections and reflections which arise from a non-conceptual samādhi (Geshe Yama Rinchen).

89. As Geshe Yama Rinchen points out, a very fine line must be tread here: while dreams and so forth have no object of observation, they necessarily have an object, an appearing object, and this appearing object, according to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha is suitable to be observed. It is impossible to posit a consciousness without an object: even a dream consciousness has an object.
The reason for which passages of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha may seem ambiguous is because the intent of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha is the refutation of exterior objects, not establishing that every consciousness necessarily has an appearing object.

90. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha propose four lines of reasoning to counter the existence of exterior objects, this is the second (Geshe Yama Rinchen). The crux of this stanza is that, since there are consciousnesses in ordinary experience, such as recollections of past events or dreams whose object does no exist at present or never existed at all, one cannot extrapolate from the existence of a consciousness to that of its object of observation and therefore, it is perfectly possible for exterior objects to be non-existent, even though we perceive them.
As Sthiramati puts its in his “Commentary on the Thirty Verses” (Bstan ‘gyru dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p. 397) : ” It is unsuitable to assert the existence of a consciousness bereft of object of observation and of aspect.” while Ācarya Vinayadeva adds in his commentary: “I do no assert a mind basis-of-all bereft of [object of] observation and aspect, in the slightest” (tentatively, in his “Commentary on the Twenty Verses”, Bstan ‘gyru dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, pp. ?)

91. i.e. objects, sentient beings (or sense-organs) and imprints, viz. p. 10 of Je Tsong kha pa’s auto-commentary.

92. Only in the Formless Realm, obviously.

93. Once one has left the meditative equipoise of the Formless Realms and been reborn in the Realm of Desire, for instance.

94. Unidentified quote. Je Tsong kha pa’s general position is that neither material objects nor sense-organs can appear to a Formless mind basis-of-all as is clearly stated on page 14 of the auto-commentary:
Therefore, since, under the impetus of a meditative absorption of the Formless [Realm], the seeds existing within the mind basis-of-all of the appearance of being endowed with form, are harmed, while abiding in the Formless [Realm] what is endowed with form cannot appear.
Here, by stating that only some prick this assertion, Je Tsong kha pa qualifies the statement on page 14, since it would seem that there are other, substantial scholars who assert that “environment and beings endowed with form appear to the Formless [Realms] minds basis-of-all”.
The fact that, while their position is identified and a passage actually quoted, they are not criticised by name indicates in traditional Tibetan scholarly usage that:
1. the proponents of such a stance were well known to all scholars of Je Tsong kha pa’s time
2. this was a stance for which one could have some sympathy (even though one disagreed with it).
It can also frequently indicate that this is the position of one of one’s own teachers with whom one would not wish to disagree openly, in writing.

95. The two lower Realms, the Desire Realm and the Form Realm.

96. Tb. yang. Absent in the root text but attested by both zhol 639:4 and bla brang ma 10a:6.

97. i.e. the mind basis-of-all of beings of both Realms.

98. Tb. sad pa

99. i.e. one cannot deny that ” the seeds of the appearance of genuine appearances of the hells awaken[100] on its basis-of-all ” since:
1. the appearances of hell appear directly to the basis-of-all and, in addition,
2. they depend on the awakening of the imprints

101. i.e. one cannot deny the necessary entailment of the consequence Je Tsong kha pa is mooting in his commentary on the root text:
It follows that they would have the agony of suffering because the seeds of the appearance of genuine appearances of the hells awaken on its basis-of-all
In other words, one cannot deny that: if the seeds of the appearance of genuine appearances of the hells awaken on its basis-of-all, then it necessarily would have the agony of suffering.

102. Geshe Yama Rinchen clarifies this passage by pointing out that: if under the impetus of a seed in the mind basis-of-all of a being, human appearances appear, they are beneficial to the being concerned and if hell appearances appear, they are harmful to the being concerned.

103. As the Latin maxim puts it so aptly, “De gustibus et coloribus non est disputandum”, “One should not argue about tastes and colors”.

104. In other words, as Geshe Yama Rinchen points out, according to Cittamātra, the exterior environment of both the happy and bad transmigrations is the appearance of the exhaustion of karmic imprints implanted in one’s mind basis of all.

105. Tb. spyod ‘gyur. This is the crux of the Cittamātra position: all causality exterior to the manifestation of the exhaustion of karmic imprints implanted in the mind basis-of-all is a mere illusion.

106. Tb. rang mtshan par which simply means “real” as per Geshe Yama Rinchen.

107. This clearly demonstrates, as Geshe Yama Rinchen points out, that mere appearance is sufficient to generate both fear and desire: an exterior object is unnecessary.

108. This section of the auto-commentary is an extended commentary on the qualm mooted by the root verses:
In the Lower, as well,
Should all beings and environments
Appear to the basis-of-all of one sentient being,
The hells would appear, as well, to a god of the Form Realm,
The beings and environments of gods
Would appear, as well, to denizens of hell and
Manifold objects of the eons
Would appear to ordinary beings.

109. i.e. if the appearances of hell to the mind basis-of-all of a human being is precisely like that to a denizen of hell. This position will be refuted down to the middle of the next page.

110. Tb. me. This is the dominant reading attested by Lam Rim chen mo and all the recensions of Je Tsong kha pa’s “Commentary on the Difficult points . . .” which I have consulted. Geshe Yama Rinchen addresses however, cogently the issue of the repetition of the theme of blazing fire in the two first verses and the redundancy of the second verse by relying on an ancient variant reading of this verse found in the works of the great founder of the Drikung Kagyü tradition, ‘Jig rten mgon po (1143-1217), which carries mo tshogs de dag gang nas byung. The verse would then read:
What did those groups of maidens arise from?
While the first reading does not include the appearance of beings as the result of non-virtue, the second reading does, hence its importance. The difference between the two readings must be extremely ancient since it can be traced back to at least the 12th century (Gampopa (1079-1153) in his “Jewel Ornament of Liberation” quotes the dominant reading).

111. This famous stanza is as yet untraced.

112. Mahāyānasaṃgraha

113. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha presents four different lines of reasoning to disprove the existence of exterior objects (cf. footnotes 86 and 87)

114. i.e. human beings and denizens of hell.

115. The crux of this debate, as elicited by Geshe Yama Rinchen, is that some scholars assert that what appears to the visual consciousness does not appear to the basis-of-all and therefore there would be two appearances. This position is not accepted by Je Tsong kha pa.

116. The term “both” is a source of major debates. Geshe Yama Rinchen indicates that Khedrub pänchen asserts that the five objects appearing to sensory consciousnesses and the five objects appearing to the mind basis-of-all are both apprehended factors of the mind basis-of-all.

117. Emending zhol 641.2, khung to bla brang ma 11.6, lung.

118. Untraced quote.

119. Cf. “The Root of the Difficult Points of Mind and Basis-of-all”, p.3.

120. i.e. if the appearances of hell to the mind basis-of-all of a human being is not precisely like that to a denizen of hell.

121. i.e. Geshe Yama Rinchen points out that since the pleasure of the happy transmigrations would appear to the bad ones and the suffering of the bad transmigrations would appear to the pleasant ones, the realm structure of cyclic existence would collapse.

122. i.e. the following verses from Je Tsong kha pa’s root text:
The beings and environments of gods
Would appear, as well, to denizens of hell and
Manifold objects of the eons
Would appear to ordinary beings.

123. Tb. dpags

124. The Fourth Dhyāna itself does not, according to those who propound this position.

125. Identified by Geshe Yama Rinchen as a passage of the bye brag bshad mdzod chen mo, the Mahāvibhāṣa, the main doctrinal text of the Vaibhāṣika school.

126. Tb. tshad kyis

127. A Vaibhāṣika.

128. i.e., the quote from the Mahāvibhāṣa:
Its object of observation and aspect cannot be totally severed.
refutes this position. This is a particularly strong argument from the standpoint of Vaibhāṣika., since that school considers the Mahāvibhāṣa to be of definitive meaning and asserts, in addition, that all scriptures of definitive meaning are literal.

129. The mind basis-of-all is an inattentive mind (Tb. snang la ma nges pa’i blo) and is therefore, eo ipso, unable to induce any definiteness regarding its object.

130. The base, here, refers to the sentient being whose mind basis-of-all is being discussed.

131. As Geshe Yama Rinchen indicates, the term can is critical here: the object can appear to the mind basis-of-all but does not necessarily do so. It is posited as object of the mind basis-of-all.
For instance, according to Asaṇga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the sense consciousnesses are interrupted during deep sleep and meditative equipoise. During such a state, the object, the exhaustion of the karmic imprint of which would cause its appearance to a sensory consciousness does not appear, but it can appear just as we can say that the five sensory objects are suitable to appear to the mind basis-of-all of a being in the Formless Real, even though they do not appear (since that being is precisely in a meditative equipoise of the Formless Realm).

132. In other words, according to Geshe Yama Rinchen:
1. whatever appears to the sensory consciousness of a person is necessarily both the direct object of observation and the apprehended factor of its mind basis-of-all, however
2. whatever appears to a person’s mind basis-of-all without appearing to their sensory consciousness is the indirect object of observation of their mind basis-of-all.

133. It is worth remembering here that the objects of observation of the mind basis-of-all are subdivided as follows:
1. appearing objects of the mind basis-of-all
1.1 directly appearing objects of the mind basis-of-all
1.2 indirectly appearing objects of the mind basis of all.
and
2. objects of observation which, although not appearing, are nonetheless posited under its power.

134. This quote is drawn from Vasubandhu’s Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya according to Geshe Yama Rinchen, whereas Gungthang Rinpoche traces it back to an unknown commentary on Vasubandhu’s “The Thirty” (Trimśika).

135. This is one of the main debates countering solipsism, the view that there is only one mind, my own.

136. Tb. mngon brjod kyi bag chags

137. Tb. bkra ba

138. i.e. the two examples: the Twelve Limbs and the past.

139. Emending kun gzhi’i yang to kun gzhi yang adversus zhol 643.2 and bla brang ma 12.2.

140. While the mind basis-of-all is accompanied by the five omnipresent mental factors, which include discrimination, this discrimination is non-manifest i.e. does not discriminate.

141. In other words, “always”.

142. Tb. bsgo gzhi

143. Tb. spu ris

144. Tb. gdung ba

145. Sk. Dhyāna, Tb. bsam gtan

146. In Vasubandhu’s “Thirty Verses”

147. According to Sthiramati:
“Both apprehensions” are the apprehension of the apprehended and the apprehension of the apprehension.
Sum cu pa’i bshad pa (“Commentary on “The Thirty””), Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p. 435.14)
i.e. the apprehension, by the mind basis-of-all, of subject and object arisen from one given karmic imprint.

148. Reading ‘dzin gnyis kyis with Je Tsong kha pa adversus ‘dzin gnyis kyi in Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p. 435.9

149. Reading gzhan with Je Tsong kha pa adversus kyang in Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p. 435.9

150. While in terms of both the grammar of the Sanskrit original and that of the Tibetan translation, Stefan Anacker’s translation of this stanza (“Seven Works of Vasubandhu”, op. cit., p. 188):
The residual impression of actions along with the residual Impressions of a dual apprehension,
Cause another maturation (of seeds) to occur,
Where the former maturation has been exhausted.
while possible, is completely at at odds with the consensus of interpretations of this difficult stanza initiated by Sthiramati’s commentary on “The Thirty” (cf. following footnote), which prevailed in China and is fleshed out in Ke-u tshang Rinpoche’s commentary in which “both apprehensions” alone cause first the exhaustion of previous karmic imprints and later the generation of the maturation of new ones. It is unclear which commentary, if any, Anacker relied upon for this translation.

151. Sthiramati comments this passage as follows:
At present, for the sake of teaching how the mere mind basis-of-all after being stopped in the present time is conjoined in the future, the following was stated:
Both apprehensions of karmic imprints,
After exhausting the maturation of
Former imprints and so forth,
Generate another maturation.
Meritorious, non-meritorious and immutable intentions, i.e. karma, is that which generates the potency within the mind basis-of-all to actualise a future body by that karma. These are the karmic imprints.
“Both apprehensions” are the apprehension of the apprehended and the apprehension of the apprehension.
Sthiramati, op.cit., p. 435.7-14

152. i.e. the mind basis-of-all.

153. Je Tsong kha pa’s root text, stanza 12

154. Je Tsong kha pa’s root text, stanza 15

155. Tb. kun nas nyon mongs ba i.e. the two first Noble Truths, the Noble Truth of Suffering and the Origin of Suffering.

156. Tb. ldog pa

157. Meaning clarified by Ke’u tshang Rinpoche’s commentary, p. 43 (Lhasa 202.10)

158. Powerful anger can sever the roots of virtue, however a person who had generated powerful anger towards their parents or their Spiritual Teacher, might still have virtuous states of mind after, despite having severed all their roots of virtue.

159. Tb. la

160. Tb. log pa

161. i.e. the time of conception.

162. We have translated this important line in keeping with Je Tsong kha pa’s rendition in the ” The Root of the Difficult Points of Mind and Basis-of-all” which is in keeping with what became later the textual tradition of the Beijing and Narthang Tengyur.
Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 26.8, in keeping with the Derge edition has a substantially different reading:
Because, after the severance of the continuum of the matured consciousness,
apart from conception, it does not occur.

163. Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 26.8-9.

164. In other words, one can go blind, deaf and so forth before one’s death and therefore, the eye, ear and so forth are not fully- characterised maturations.

165. Tb. mtshungs pa

166. i.e. that the mind basis-of-all is unstained and neutral.

167. Tb. sgo byed

168. Emending zhol 647. 3 kyi to bla brang ma 14b.4 kyis.

169. Tb. sgo byed tshogs bdun. These are the five sensory consciousnesses, the mental consciousness and the afflicted mind which infuse the karmic imprints within the mind basis-of-all.

170. viz. the five sensory consciousness and the mental consciousness.

171. i.e. potency and seed.

172. These are the same as the infusing consciousnesses.

173. Tb. sbyor ba

174. Emending Tb. dngos attested by zhol 647.5 and la brang ma 15a.1 to Tb. dngos po in keeping with the passage from Abhidharma Sūtra quoted by Mahāyānasaṃgraha below.

175. In Asaṇga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 17.13-14

176. i.e. the engaging consciousness and the mind basis-of-all.

177. Tb. gcig gi rkyen gcig

178. Vasubandhu’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya comments on this passage as follows:
The scriptural passage for both these consciousnesses being conditions of each other is the verse in the Abhidharma Sūtra: ” All phenomena are conjoined with consciousness”. Regarding the statement, “Things which are mutual causes”, it is because both of these arise out of the root consciousness, that they are causes. As to stating “resulting things are . . . permanently conjoined” when the consciousness basis-of-all is a cause, at that time, that is a result and when that is a cause, the consciousness basis-of-all is a result. Both of these arise dependently [in] three aspects.
Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 345.1-7

179. Tb. dus mnyam

180. Tb. lhan cig tu

181. Reading sna ma with bla brang ma 15.4 and Ke-tshang 205.8 adversus snu ma in zhol 648.2. Identified as a variety of flowers, probably jasmine.

182. Je Tsong kha pa’s version of this passage of Asaṇga’s Yogācāryabhūmi seems truncated and ambiguous. The recension of the Yogācāryabhūmi in dpe bsdur ma, which is much clearer, reads as follows:
However much the consciousness engaging the supported within the consciousness basis-of- all becomes virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral, just so much are imprints suffused within that base through arising and ceasing together with that base.
Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 74, p. 11.13-16

183. Reading Tb. bsgo gzhi with bla brang ma 15b.1 against Tb. sgo gzhi in zhol 648.5 throughout this section.

184. Reading brten with bla brang ma 15b.1 and the comments of Ke’u tshang 206.21-207.1

185. Tb. bsgo bya ba

186. Tb. bsgo bar byed

187. Tb. mtha’

188. Vasubandhu : “Trimśika”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p.4.20-21; 5.1

189. Sthiramati in his Trimśikabhāṣyam, the famous commentary on Vasubandhu’s Trimśika, comments on this stanza as follows:
Mental consciousness always occurs,
With the exception of the bereft of discrimination,
Both aspects of meditative equipoise and
Mindless sleep and fainting.
“Always”, i.e. at all times, has a final particle which [means either ] “simultaneously with the visual, etc consciousness or not. In general, this is composed to dispel the object of observation thereof. In:
. . .
With the exception of the bereft of discrimination,
Both aspects of meditative equipoise and
Mindless sleep and fainting.
Those “bereft of discrimination” are sentient beings bereft of discrimination, whose phenomena of the minds and mental factors of those reborn within the gods have ceased. ” Both aspects of meditative equipoise” are the meditative equipoise bereft of discrimination and the meditative equipoise of cessation. . .
. . . Dwelling in “mindless sleep”, because of having been overcome by deep sleep; since during that sole period, the mental consciousness does not arise, it is called “mindless”.
Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p. 431.2-423.4

190. . The sequence of the verses given by Je Tsong kha pa here, in all editions is the inverse of that in the versions of Vasubandhu’s text we possess which read:
It does not exist during meditative equipoise on cessation
Nor does it exist, either, during a transcendental path
Vasubandhu : “Trimśika”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p.4.4-5
When the same passage is quoted, later on in the auto-commentary, the text reverts to the standard order of the verses (viz. p.65).

191. According to Ke’u Tshang Rinpoche’s commentary (p.48 ss), “both” here refers to the mental consciousness and the afflicted mind. The mental consciousness does not exist during the five mindlessnesses and the afflicted mind does not exist, among others, during a meditative equipoise on cessation.

192. Vasubandhu : “Trimśika”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p.3.10 reads:
Upon Arhathood, that is countered.
In other words, upon attaining the state of an Arhat (as well as, for the Mahāyāna Vehicle, from the 1st instant of the 8th Ground), the mind basis-of-all ceases to exist and transforms into a matured consciousness. In the case of an Arhat, that matured consciousness is extinguished upon relinquishing his aggregates, at the end of that life, and his continuum is severed, whereas in the case of the Mahāyāna Vehicle, the matured consciousness transforms into the Mirror-like Wisdom at the 1st instant of a Mahāyāna Path of No-More Learning.

193. Tb. dri mi mnyam pa

194. Emending Tb. bsgod to bsgos

195. Tb. rnam grangs

196. Untraced quote.

197. This stanza is a direct quote from Asaṇga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 16.15-16):
Outer, inner and unclear,
Both, conventional and
Ultimate object, all of these
I accept as the six aspects of seeds

198. This is the anonymous author of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha upanibandhanam translated under the aegis of Pandit Jinamitra by Ye shes sde.

199. The five verses, Outer, inner and unclear . . . and so forth indicate this while differentiating thoroughly. The outer seed is barley and so forth. The inner seed is the mind basis-of-all. Unclear is neutral. Both, is outer and inner. Alternatively, effect and cause: these two reasons [demonstrate] that the mind basis-of-all is also both. From that, by means of cause and foundational things, thoroughly afflicted and totally purified phenomena arise.
In the reading, “both those two”, those two is explained as “the two, cause and effect”. Conventional is exterior barley and so forth, because it has become the mind basis-of-all. As to ultimate object, the ultimate seed is the mind basis-of-all because it is the condition of all seeds and the limb of their nature. These two seeds, because of being different phenomena, are subdivided into six aspects.
Mahāyānasaṃgraha upanibandhana, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 538.18-539.9

200. Tb. rten gyi dngos po

201. Pibrīttiguhyārtha piṇḍavyākhyā, Tb. don gsang ba rnam par phye ba bsdus te bshad pa (“A concise explanation thoroughly differentiating the secret meaning”). The Pibrīttiguhyārthapiṇḍavyākhyā is another text of unknown authorship. Even though a purported Sanskrit title is listed at the beginning of the text, no translator is mentioned and it is therefore possible that the text was a native Tibetan composition.

202. Tb. tha tshig

203. This is an important variant reading of the stanza of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.

204. Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 878.14-879.1.

205. Mahāyānasaṃgraha Upanibandhana, Tb. Theg pa chen po bsdus pa’i bshad sbyar (“Ancillary explanations to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha”), Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 538.21-539.3

206. Emending zhol 651.6 kun gzhi rnam pa yang gnyis so to kun gzhi rnam par shes pa yang gnyis so in keeping with bla brang ma 17.4 and dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 539.1-2.

207. Tb. gzhi’i dngos po

208. i.e. outer, unclear and conventional seeds.

209. zhol 652.3 and bla brang ma 17b.1 Tb. dang vs. dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 16.9 la.

210. Asaṇga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 27.13-18)

211. Sk. prapañca vāsanā, Tb. spros pa’i bag chags. The usage of the term “elaborating imprint” is frequent in the Indian commentarial literature on Cittamātra, whether it be Vasubandhu’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya or Sthiramati’s Trimśikabhāṣyam.

212. Tb. lus can

213. Tb. za ba po

214. Asaṇga: Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 31.1-6)

215. Je Tsong kha pa anticipates the critique of a potential opponent who adduces this quote from the Mahāyānasaṃgraha to demonstrate that imprints of manifest verbalisation cannot be defined as ” causal conditions of the mental consciousness” or as ” seeds of the mental consciousness” because they are also “cognitions of bodies”, i.e. have a sensory component.

216. Tb. gtso bo’i dbang du byas

217. Tb. byed pa

218. i.e mental consciousness and its associated mental factors

219. i.e. the afflicted mind’s mental factors.

220. Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 31.8 reads byung “arose”.

221. Asaṇga: Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 31.6-8)

222. Asaṇga: Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 31.8-10)

223. Bla brang ma 18.3, in a divergent and probably less accurate reading has ‘di yongs su smin pa rnam smin gyi ngo bor gyur pa yin pa’i phyir ro (“. . . because its complete maturation becomes of the nature of maturation.”)

224. Tb. shes rig

225. i.e. sense-organs and forms, etc.

226. Tb. kun btags pa

227. The Self in the Non-Buddhist Upaniṣads and latter Indian philosophy, which is the object of refutation of both the coarse and the subtle selflessness of persons of the Lower Schools of Buddhist philosophy.

228. Tb. gtso bo. Literally, “the principal”, pradhāna is a technical term in Saṃkhya philosophy which refers to the primordial state of matter in which the three guṇas or qualities of matter, sattva, rajas and tamas co-exist in harmony.

229. Both the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools are realistic schools of philosophy and assert that matter is composed of indivisible particles, to the difference of the Cittamātra school.

230. Tb. mi rigs

231. Reading yid kyis sgro btags pa, with zhol 655.1, adversus bla brang ma, 19.a1, yid kyis sgo btags pa

232. Asaṇga: Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 31.10-18)

233. Tb. sdud pa. Vasubandhu’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya states:
“Subsumed” is of that nature.
Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 371.18

234. Tb. kun tu rtog pa

235. Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 31.11-12 reads . . . yang dag ma ma yin pa kun tu rtog pa both here and in footnote 235, Vasubandhu’s bhāṣya confirms that the genitive ma yin pa’i is to be understood implicitly by stating yang dag pa ma yin pa’i kun tu rtog pa yin no (Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 371.19-20)

236. Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 31.13 reads also yang dag ma ma yin pa

237. Tb. nor ba’i don

238. Asaṇga: Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 32. 3-11)

239. Tb. snod. The physical world (without sentient beings).

240. Tb. bcud. The sentient beings inside the world.

241. Asaṇga: Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p.28.6-12)

242. Zhol 656.4 and bla brang ma 19b.4 both read do, adversus dpe bsdur ma vol.76, p. 28.9, de. Je Tsong kha pa’s reading is far preferable.

243. Tb. so so. Translating here in accordance with the gloss of the Upanibandhana, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 571.15-17.

244. Tb. skye mched , Sk. āyatana. Cf. my note in “Appendix 1: Terminological issues”, in “The Bodhicittavivaraṇa by Nāgārjuna”, transl. by Ilia Durovic, Jamgon Publications, 2014, p. 384

245. Tb. khro ba

246. Tb. ‘khon ‘dzin. Napper’s translation as “resentment” in “Mind in Tibetan Buddhism” (Snow Lion, 1986) while capturing the general meaning of the term, understates both the depth of the anger it conveys and the resolve to gain revenge.

247. Tb. ched du ma ltos par, attested in the both zhol 657.2 and bla brang ma 20a.3, is very possibly due to the conflation of two original recensions, one bearing ched du and the other ma ltos par.

248. Asaṇga: Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 29.1-5)

249. Asaṇga: Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 29.6-10)

250. There is an important difference in the readings between the manuscript traditions of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha:
1. The mss. of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha Je Tsong kha pa relied upon, in accordance with the later Beijing and Narthang Tengyur, reads ‘byung bas. Vasubandhu’s bhāṣya confirms this difficult reading thog ma med pa’i dus nas spros pa ‘gyung bas sa bon yin pa’i phyir ro zhes bya ba (Dpe bsdur ma vol. 76, p.369.18-19) and comments:
Regarding the statement “. . . because of being a seed through giving rise to elaborations from times without beginning”, should “The mind basis-of-all which has become the cause of correct designations from times without beginning” not be stated, the new arising of imprints of manifest verbalisation would also be unacceptable. Since the old ones are absent, therefore, present imprints of manifest verbalisation, also would not exist.
Dpe bsdur ma vol. 76, p.369.19- p.370.2
2. Dpe bsdur ma vol. 76, p. 29.10 in keeping with the Derge edition adopts the reading byung ba’i, which changes totally the meaning of this line:
. . .The characteristic of the uncompleted, i.e. the seeds of the imprints of manifest verbalisation, because they are seeds which give rise to elaborations from times without beginning.
Lectio difficilior and the gloss of Vasubandhu’s bhāṣya corroborate Je Tsong kha pa’s difficult reading.

251. Untraced passage which is not present in the major commentaries on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha in the Tengyur and might be a presentation of the viewpoint of an eminent predecessor or contemporary of Je Tsong kha pa.

252. Tb. sa bon gyi snying po. As a seed, say of wheat or barley germinates, the germ of wheat consumes the endosperm to develop.

253. Tb. ‘chol ba (non-differentiative form)

254. Tb. cha

255. Tb. cha shas

256. These two paragraphs are completely identical, apart from the usage at the end of the first one of “component-less consciousness” and at the end of the second of “two parts of consciousness”. As a result Ke’u tshang Rinpoche considers the second paragraph, understood as an example, as preferable and representing Je Tsong kha pa’s final thought on the topic, since it is given later (cf. Ke’u tshang Rinpoche p. 59).

257. i.e. the entire structure of interior or karmic causality would collapse.

258. Tb. phan tshun

259. Tb. rjes su ‘gro ba

260. In Sakya Pandita’s “Root text of the Treasury of Valid Cognition and Logic” (Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter rtsa ba). In Chos rje sa pan gsung rab dpe bsdur ma, vol. 3, p. 12.4-5, Krung go’i bod rig pa dpe skrun khang, Beijing 2007

261. Tb. ldog pa

262. Tb. sha pa. Indian rosewood, also known as sheesham or agaru.

263. Sk. vyakti, Tb. gsal ba

264. Tb. log pa

265. Sakya Pandita’s states in his auto-commentary on “The Treasury of Valid Cognition and Logic”:
Regarding this, a majority of Tibetans assert the isolate of thing to be a thing. A majority of the imbecilic dialecticians of the Land of Snows assert that “although the isolate of non-thing is a non-thing, the isolate of thing is a thing because of being inseparable in nature with thing”. Should this be so, the formulation of the general defect [of this position] is difficult to express. Should one enquire, just how it is difficult:
Things which are isolated from non-wood:
Whatever is rosewood is not another wood,
Whatever is another wood is not rosewood,
Because its nature is not other.
If the isolate of non-wood is a thing, is the wood which is isolated one or different with rosewood? If it were one, since the nature of rosewood would succeed to another, sandalwood and so forth would not be another wood; however if it were not one, rosewood would not be wood because of being different from the isolate of non-wood, just like a chunk of stone.
Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter rang ‘grel, op. cit. p. 123.10-124.1

266. Conjectural emendation of dgos attested by zhol 660.3 and bla brang ma 21b.5, reading instead bsgo.

267. Emending zhol 660.4 gtegs pa to gtogs pa with bla brang ma 21b.5

268. i.e. non-associated compositional phenomena.

269. i.e. the seven collections of consciousness.

270. Emending zhol 660.5 de na to des na with bla brang ma 21b.6

271. Reading gnyis po with zhol 660.6 against bla brang ma 22a.2, gnyis pa.

272. Tb. mi mtshungs

273. Sk. anuśaya, Tb. bag la nyal

274. Asaṇga: Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 14.3-8.

275. Reading dang with zhol 661.4 versus la in Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 14.3.

276. Reading thams cad with zhol 661.4 and bla brang ma 22a.6 versus Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 14.4

277. Tb. khyad par can

278. Pibrīttiguhyārtha piṇḍavyākhyā, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 867.9-12

279. Reading with zhol 661.5 and la brang ma 22.b2 against Bstan ‘gyur dpe sdur ma, vo. 76, p. 867.8 gnyis.

280. In the passage of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha quoted above.

281. Tb. de nyid refers here to the conventional nature of the consciousness basis-of-all.

282. Mahāyānasaṃgraha Upanibandhana, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 434.21-435.7

283. In the passage of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha quoted above.

284. Reading yin pa’i pyir with zhol 662.1 against gyi phyir in Upanibandhana, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 435.4.

285. Tb. nus pa can

286. The author of the Upanibandhana is unknown, but the colophon in the Tengyur, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 763 clearly implies that the text must have been written in Sanskrit, probably by an Indian scholar, since Jinamitra was the Pandit under the supervision of whom the translation was made.

287. This is a paraphrase of the statement in Upanibandhana:
The statement:
. . . they are neither substantially different nor non-different, however. . .
asserts that the abiding of the imprints in the consciousness basis-of-all [occurs] in a manner which authentically transcends being different and not being different . . .
whose author does not use the logical concept of “isolate” used to differentiate two phenomena of the same nature.

288. This is by far the most logical position regarding the relation the supported and supporting basis-of-all can entertain in what is, after all, a strong idealistic system.

289. Tb. ‘grel bshad

290. Untraced quote.

291. Asaṇga and Vasubandhu were half-brothers: born from the same mother, the father of the first was of the military, kṣatriya, caste and that of the other of the priestly, brahmin, caste.

292. Tb. ldan min ‘du byed kyi thob pa, one of the 14 subdivisions of non-associated compositional phenomena, according to Vaibhaṣika.

293. Asaṇga: “Abidharmasamuccaya”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 184.14-16

294. It is worth noting that while Je Tsong kha pa does quote the passage from Asaṇga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha earlier in the text, he does not quote the passage from the Pibrīttiguhyārtha.

295. . . . the three particular aspects of the three aspects of imprints are the particular of imprints of manifest verbalisation, the particular of the imprints of the view of the Self and the particular of the imprints of the limbs of existence.
Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 27.13-18
in which the three-fold subdivision of imprints is explained (p. 33 of the present translation). This passage is invoked by Je Tsong kha pa to provide scriptural authority for the three-fold subdivision of imprints.

296. op. cit., Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 787.19-20

297. Tb. ‘phros pa

298. Vasubandhu’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya.

299. i.e. the Pibrīttiguhyārtha and Vasubandhu’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya. The importance Je Tsong kha pa attaches to the Pibrīttiguhyārtha is noteworthy: it is after all a later, anonymous commentary, which is nonetheless put on the same footing as that of Vasubandhu, Asaṇga’s half-brother. This leads one to wonder whether oral traditions were extant at Je Tsong kha pa’s time concerning the authorship of the Pibrīttiguhyārtha.

300. In the passage of Asaṇga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha quoted on p. 43.

301. Pibrīttiguhyārtha, vol. 76, p. 871.13 reads : “Since the former seed engages the continuum, [at] the time of the later seed, it is a causal condition which is exclusively different.” We feel this reading is definitely preferable, but it is not the one Je Tsong kha pa had.

302. The crux of the debate in the Pibrīttiguhyārtha hinges on demonstrating that a seed and its engaging consciousness can both be, simultaneously, causal conditions.

303. Tb. skal mnyam

304. Pibrīttiguhyārtha, vol. 76, p. 871.16-17 reads: ” because it is neither in the nature of a mind or a mental factor . . . “

305. Op. cit., Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 871.13-18

306. Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 516.3

307. i.e. Asaṇga and Vasubandhu.

308. Tb. ma ‘dres pa

309. Tb. mdzangs pa

310. Tb. yid gzhungs pa

311. Tb. rjes su ‘brel ba’i dge ba. This is one of the 13 ways of viewing virtue taught in Asaṇga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya.

312. Asaṇga: “Abhidharmasamuccaya”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe sdur ma vol. 76, p. 157.14-15

313. Tb. rjes su ‘brel ba’i mi dge ba. This is one of the 12 ways of viewing non-virtue taught in the Abhidharmasamuccaya.

314. Asaṇga: “Abhidharmasamuccaya”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe sdur ma vol. 76, p. 159.14-15

315. The length and detailed critique this query addresses to Je Tsong kha pa’s own presentation illustrates just how important and sensitive the issue of the neutrality of imprints was in Cittamātra. The crux of the debate hinges on the fact that Asaṇga’s position in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, according to which imprints are neutral, seems to contradict his position in Abhidharmasamuccaya, in which he agrees with the traditional Sautrantika view, according to which imprints can either be virtuous or non-virtuous.

316. The two quotes from Abhidharmasamuccaya mentioned above.

317. Explanations are sound and sound is matter. If the explanation of being subsequently related as form existed in the Formless Realm, matter would exist in the Formless Realm and since form is synonymous with matter, so would form.

318. i.e. the Desire and Form Realm.

319. AC 48, zhol. 664.4

320. The mistaken reading omitting the negation is found in both zhol 665.5 and bla brang ma 24b.5. As Ke’u tshang Rinpoche points out in his commentary (Lhasa 222.9-12):
. . . it is clear that in the statement:
. . . otherwise, the previous instant of the consciousness basis-of-all would also become neutral.[321]
a negative particle was elided: since it is asserted to be neutral, how could this induce an unwanted consequence, because the other party also accepts that answer.

322. Somewhat of a paraphrase of AC 48, zhol. 664.4

323. Tb. gnod pa

324. AC 48, zhol. 664.5

325. Tb. bslab bya

326. In the stanza of Asaṇga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 16.15-16):
Outer, inner and unclear,
Both, conventional and
Ultimate object, all of these
I accept as the six aspects of seeds
quoted by Je Tsong kha pa as stanza 19.

327. i.e. the Upanibandhana and the Pibrīttiguhyārtha (viz. fns. 200 and 204)

328. Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 879.2-3

329. The usage in the Pibrīttiguhyārtha suggests that the “unstained” refers to the consciousness basis-of-all.

330. Reading chos with dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 867.7 against chos nyid in zhol 666.2 and bla brang ma 25.a3

331. With dpe bsdur ma vol. 76, p. 867.8 against zhol 666.2 and bla brang ma 25.a3.

332. Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 867.9 reads “illogical” (Tb. mi rigs pa).

333. Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 867.6-9

334. Tb. na yams / na yam

335. The example Asaṇga gives in the section of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha translated in the following footnote, hinges on the dyeing techniques used in Ancient India. Fabrics and silks would be treated with a mordant made from the extracts of nuts and stone fruit pits which would leave invisible patterns, such as stripes, stars and so forth on the fabric, it was only when the fabric was then plunged in the vats of dye that these patterns would be revealed in all their richness.

336. This examples is given in Asaṇga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha and is quoted a couple lines down.

337. Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 876.1-4

338. Reading bag chags ni with dpe bsdur ma p. 876.1-2 against bag chags kyi attested by both zhol 666.5 and bla brang ma 25a.5-6

339. This is a fragment of one of the doubts Asaṇga raises in his Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 14.16).

340. Conjectural emendation: rang gi mtshan nyid tha dad pa instead of rang gi mtshan nyid tha dad pa dang attested in zhol 667.1 and bla brang ma 25b.2.

341. Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p.14.16-15.2

342. Reading gi with zhol 667.2 and bla brang ma 25b.3 against dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p 14.17.

343. Tb. mngon du phyogs pa

344. As Etienne Lamotte in “La Somme du Grand Véhicule d’ Asaṇga (Mahāyānasaṃgraha)”, vol. 1, p.36, fn. 18 suggests quite cogently : “Dans notre civilisation, l’ exemple de la photographie serait mieux approprié encore.” and indeed, Asaṇga’s metaphor could very successfully be transposed to the development of negatives or slides.

345. Reading kyi with zhol 667.5 against bla brang ma 25b.6 kyis.

346. Tb. gso ba

347. Tb. ‘thad phyogs

348. Tb. rang bzhin gnas rigs

349. This section of Je Tsong kha pa’s commentary treating with the Buddha Lineage according to Cittamātra, will be presented separately, in 2018.

350. Tb. sbyor ba

351. Asaṇga: “Mahāyānasaṃgraha”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 7.6-10.

352. i.e. the supporting and supported basis-of-all.

353. Op. cit. vol. 76, p. 7.10 reads bdag nyid, “self-ness”.

354. Tb. nges tshig

355. Whereas the Mahāyānasaṃgraha’s derivation focuses on the consciousness basis-of-all, Je Tsong kha pa, in his commentary, expands it to include the seed basis-of-all.

356. i.e. the supporting and supported basis-of-all.

357. Asaṇga: “Mahāyānasaṃgraha”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p.29.19-30.2

358. Tb. phyogs gcig

359. Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p.29.20 reads bton pa.

360. op.cit., p.30.1, ibid.

361. op.cit., p.30.2, ibid.

362. i.e. the imprints of manifest verbalisation, those of the limbs of existence and those of the view of the Self.

363. Pibrīttiguhyārtha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 879.20-880.5

364. i.e. a remainderless Nirvāṇa.

365. Tb. rigs la sems

366. Tb. mu.

367. There are four intersections between:
1. having an engaging consciousness and
2. having a basis-of-all
as given in Ke’u tshang Rinpoche’s commentary.

368. Pibrīttiguhyārtha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 937.3-7

369. This debate arises in the context of the discussion concerning the base of infusion of imprints arisen from hearing in Asaṇga ‘s “Mahāyānasaṃgraha” (Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 24.18-19).

370. i.e. an instance of the consciousness basis-of-all not existing while the engaging consciousness exists.

371. Vasubandhu: “Trimśika”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p.3.10.

372. Op.cit reads na which would translate as: “Upon Arhathood, that is countered”.

373. Tb. brjod

374. Asaṇga: “Mahāyānasaṃgraha”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p.10.1-2

375. Reading bsags with zhol 682.3 and bla brang ma 34.a1 against bstsags, op.cit. vol. 76, p. 10.2.

376. Reading ro with op.cit. vol. 76, p. 10.2 against rol with zhol 682.3 and bla brang ma 34.a1.

377. Tb. sems

378. Maitreya: “Madhyāntavibhāga”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 70, p. 903.7.

379. Asaṇga: “Mahāyānasaṃgraha”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 9.19-21

380. Tb. grang (archaic)

381. It is worth noting that while engaging and countering the basis-of-all are not taught in Lower Vehicle Tenet systems, Asaṇga quite pointedly teaches in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha that a mind basis-of-all is taught in the Abhidharmasūtra in the verses:
Expanse since times without beginning,
Abode of all phenomena:
Because it exists, all migrations
And Nirvāṇa are attained.
Asaṇga: “Mahāyānasaṃgraha”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 7.1-3
these teachings were simply not understood by the Propounders of Hinayāna tenets.

382. Tb. zad par spangs pa

383. The time of a remainderless Nirvāṇa is the moment, at death, at which an Arhat relinquishes his aggregates. Those schools asserting the severance of the continuum state that, at this point, the mental continuum of the Arhat is severed.

384. Tb. tshe has the twin meanings of “time” and “lifespan”.

385. Tb. dbyings

386. Tb. gtan la ‘bebs pa

387. Tb. cang

388. For Sautrāntika, all non-composite phenomena are necessarily permanent and cannot be substances.

389. Udānavarga, Bka ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 72, p. 658.14-16

390. Tb. bsil ba (√gsil ba)

391. Purnamukhavadanasataka, Bka ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 75, p.674.4

392. Bka ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 75, p.674.4 reads h. thugs.

393. An Arhat who has not yet entered a remainderless Nirvāṇa can still generate Bodhicitta and enter the Mahāyāna, but as Rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan states in his treatise on Tenets:
From the standpoint of the True Aspectarians, when Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Arhats attain a remainderless Nirvāṇa, it is asserted that their mental continuum is severed, however it is asserted that it is impossible for the mental continuum of Ārya Buddhas to be severed, because it is asserted that Bodhisattvas manifest as a Sambhogakāya in the Pure Land of Akaniṣta and that the Sambhogakāya performs uninterruptedly, in various types of aspects, the welfare of others through various emanations appropriate to the good fortune of the individual trainees, for as long as cyclic existence is not emptied.
“A Presentation of Tenets composed by Je tsün jam pel yang chö kyi gyeltsen”
2nd. ed. (translated by I. Durovic), p. 23, Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide, 2016

394. Asaṇga: Viniścayasaṃgraha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 74, p. 1041.16-1042.2

395. Reading phung po lhag ma with zhol 685.4 and bla brang ma 35b. 3 against phung po’i lhag ma op. cit. p. 1041.17.

396. Tb. byed pa

397. The doubt being addressed by the Viniścayasaṃgraha is the following one: let us assume a Hearer Arhat, who has attained a Nirvāṇa with remainder, enters the Mahāyāna and eventually attains Full and Utter Enlightenment. At that point, upon relinquishing his aggregates at death, would he enter a remainderless Nirvāṇa or not?

398. This had become quite common in latter Indian commentaries, such as Kambala’s Ālokamālā which fuses elements of Madhyamika in what is an otherwise Cittamātra commentary. Viz. Christian Lindtner’s excellent translation: “A Garland of Light. Kambala’s Ālokamālā”, Asian Humanities Press, Fremont, California, 2003.

399. The “extreme of weariness and fatigue” is frequently referred to in treatises on Vinaya as an extreme to be abandoned by monastics, but it is happily accepted by the trainees of the Mahāyāna.

400. Tb. ngal

401. Tb. dub pa

402. For a good translation of Maitreya’s Abhisamayālaṃkāra with Vimuktisena’s Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti and Haribhadra’s Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka, it is worth consulting Gareth Sparham translation: “Abhisamayālaṃkāra with Vṛtti and Ālokā”, vols. 1-4, Jain Publishing Company, Fremont, California, 2008

403. Tb. chags pa

404. And, indeed, the object of observation of the afflicted mind is the basis-of-all and the supporting basis-of-all is akin to the Self, whereas the supported basis-of-all is akin to phenomena.

405. Tb. rlom sems

406. Pibrīttiguhyārtha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 821.19-20

407. Tb. rnyog rnyog byed

408. i.e. the obscured and unobscured natures.

409. Tb. gegs byed

410. i.e. the Path of No-more-Learning of a Hearer, a Solitary Realiser and a Bodhisattva (which is Full and Utter Enlightenment)

411. Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 155.8-13

412. Tb. kun tu ‘gro ba

413. op. cit., p.155.17-18

414. Asaṇga: “Mahāyānasaṃgraha”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p.9.14-19

415. This refers to the afflicted mind.

416. The four afflictions which are always associated with the afflicted mind: desire, ignorance, pride and the view of the Self.

417. Tb. ‘khyud pa

418. i.e. the afflicted mind.

419. The five omnipresent mental factors: sensation, discrimination, intention, mental application and contact.

420. Pibrīttiguhyārtha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 831.9-10

421. Vasubandhu: “Trimśika”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p. 3.10-4.3

422. The afflicted mind dwells and arises within the basis-of-all since the consciousness basis-of-all is the repository of its imprints, in keeping with Jinamitra’s commentary on this verse (Trimśikabhaṣya, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p. 404.13-16)

423. i.e. the consciousness basis-of-all.

424. The instance given for the I, in Cittamātra, is the consciousness basis-of-all.

425. In other words, in addition to the five omnipresent mental afflictions, which necessarily accompany every main mind, the afflicted mind is accompanied by the above-mentioned four additional mental factors, which makes a total of nine.

426. Tb. bdag rgyal. Literally “Self-King”.

427. i.e. the afflicted mind.

428. The lines of reasoning used to demonstrate that sensation associated with the afflicted mind is equanimous are the same as those used to demonstrate that sensation associated with the consciousness basis-of-all is equanimous.

429. Sk. dhyāna, Tb. bsam gtan

430. Conjectural emendation to nyon yid. Both zhol 690.1 and bla brang ma 38a.4 read nyid yid.

431. Pibrīttiguhyārtha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 833.11-15

432. Tb. sims pa

433. Vasubandhu: “Trimśika”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p. 4.3

434. Tb. sgre pa

435. Pibrīttiguhyārtha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 833. 19-20

436. Tb. grangs

437. i.e. desire, ignorance, pride and the view of the Self.

438. Tb. ris su bcas pa

439. Cf. footnote 433, Ke’u tshang Rinpoche. Je Tsong kha pa relies in this section on the variant reading from the Dhargye Tengyur. Vasubandhu: “Trimśika”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p.4.3

440. From the previously mentioned doubt.

441. Tb. kha phyir lta. This expression is somewhat mysterious, since calm abiding is not normally considered to be an exterior focus of the mind but an interior one, until one remembers that Cittamātra teaches that the self of phenomena is precisely phenomena being exterior to the mind apprehending them. From such a perspective, calm abiding can be said to have “an exterior focus”. Obviously, without relying on the wisdom of the non-duality of perceiver and percipient, it is impossible to obtain more than a temporary surcease in the afflictions.

442. The use of the term “abandon” here is non-technical: it is not possible to abandon any affliction through calm abiding, alone.

443. i.e. the afflicted mind.

444. Vasubandhu : “Trimśika”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p.4.3-5

445. Asaṇga: “Abhidharmasamuccaya”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 137.9-16

446. Tb. ‘gags

447. It is one of the most delicate points of the Cittamātra view that, while Cittamātra unambiguously affirms a subtle selflessness of persons, i.e. persons being empty of being substantial existents capable of autonomy, the afflicted mind is, nonetheless, taught to be a substantial existent capable of autonomy. Lcang skya rol p’i rdo rje (1717-1786) devotes some of the finest pages of his great treatise on tenets to elucidating the distinction between substantial and imputed existence in Cittamātra and, specifically, between these two forms of substantial existence. (“Grub mtha’ thub bstan lhun po’i mdzes rgyan”, Ser byas dpe mdzod khang, Bylakuppe (Karnataka), 2006, p.124-133)

448. Asaṇga: “Mahāyānasaṃgraha”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 8.2-10

449. Reading with op.cit. vol. 76, p. 8.2 rnam pa gnyis against zhol 692.6 and bla brang ma 39b.5, gnyis.

450. Abhayākaragupta: Munimatālaṃkāra, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 63, p. 1567.12-13

451. Pibrīttiguhyārtha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 841.20-842.10

452. In this context, “mind” refers to the “afflicted mind” throughout.

453. Reading with op.cit., p, 842.3 yid dang yid kyi rnam par shes pa dang against zhol 694.4 and bla brang ma 40b.3, yid kyi rnam par shes pa dang.

454. Reading with op.cit., p. 842.5 ‘di yang against zhol 694.4 and bla brang ma 40b.4 ‘di la yang.

455. Reading with zhol 694.5 and bla brang ma 40b.5, rgyun chad against op.cit. p.842.8 rgyun ‘chang

456. Tb. rgyun

457. i.e. the four supplementary mental factors associated with the afflicted mind: desire, pride, ignorance and the view of the disintegrating composite.

458. Tb. gnas pa

459. Pibrīttiguhyārtha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 842.10-15

460. Tb. gnas skabs

461. Reading with op. cit. vol. 76, p. 842.13 rgyun kun du mi ‘byung bas against zhol 695.4 and bla brang ma 41a.5 rgyun du mi ‘byung ba’i

462. Reading with op. cit. vol. 76, p. 842.14 las against zhol 695.5 and bla brang ma 41a.5 la.

463. Tb. nga bdag. The basis-of-all is beheld as owner of the aggregates.

464. Tb. lhan cig skyes pa

465. Tb. zhags pa

466. Tb. gsal rig

467. Tb. gzhan stobs

468. In other words, once the four afflictions associated with the afflicted mind (viz. desire, pride, ignorance and the afflicted view) are abandoned, for instance for an Ārya Bodhisattva, upon the attainment of the 8th Ground, the clear and cognitive nature of that afflicted mind subsists and eventually becomes, on the Path of No-more-Learning, the Wisdom of Equality.

469. Tb. gnas gyur

470. Pibrīttiguhyārtha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 842.20-843.1

471. Tb. sgro ‘dogs pa

472. i.e. the selflessness of phenomena.

473. i.e. the afflicted mind.

474. What seems to be implied here is that, just as the nature of the afflicted mind subsists, after its propensity for the superimposition of persons and phenomena have been eliminated, likewise, the nature of its associated four afflictions subsists, but becomes un-afflicted. Hence, it cannot interfere with the attainment of the result of a Hearer, the Liberation of a Hearer.

475. Pibrīttiguhyārtha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p.843.2-843.11

476. Reading gegs with zhol 697.4, 5 & bla brang ma 42.b1, 2 against op. cit. p. 843.1 gags.

477. Tb. gcig car du

478. Tb. sngon du ‘gro ba can

479. The view of the disintegrating composite.

480. Pibrīttiguhyārtha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p.843.16-17

481. Pibrīttiguhyārtha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p.843.19-21

482. This passage is not to be found in the Pibrīttiguhyārtha. It must have been attested in earlier recensions to which Je Tsong kha pa had access. The non-standard spelling of bsgo mentionned in footnotes 474-476 suggests a manuscript copy.

483. Emending zhol 698.4 and bla brang ma 43a.2 ss, sgod to bsgo.

484. Idem.

485. Idem.

486. Tb. rkyen

487. Tb. rkyen can

488. Reading na sa with bla brang ma 43a.6 instead of nas with zhol 699.2

489. Tb. so so yang dag par rig pa bzhi

490. Reading rags pa with bla brang ma 43b.1 against zhol 699. 2, rigs pa.

491. Tb. drung ‘byung ba

492. Tb. mnyam par bzhag pa

493. Tb. ‘bad rtsol

494. Tb. zhen pa’i rtog pa’i ‘bad rtsol

495. Tb. ‘gyu ba

496. Asaṇga: “Mahāyānasaṃgraha”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 7.1-3. This famous passage of Sūtra is one of the main scriptural quotes substantiating the Cittamātra view. It is attested in the works of Vasubandhu, etc. however it does not appear to have survived in this form in the Kangyur.

497. Asaṇga: “Mahāyānasaṃgraha”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 7.4-5

498. Reading pa’i with dpe bsdur ma, op. cit., against zhol 700.4 pa

499. Lamotte (“La Somme du Grand Véhicule d’ Asaṇga”, Vol. II, p. 13) mistranslates this dual as a plural. “Both” probably refers here to Buddha’s foremost disciples, Śāripūtra and Kāśyapa.

500. Bka’ ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 49, p. 31.17-20

501. Bka’ ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 49, p. 400.2-4. The recension of the last two verses preserved by the Derge Tengyur, on which the dpe bsdur ma edition mainly relies diverges substantially from the version Je Tsong kha pa had access to:
Whatever apprehends objects,
That is called “consciousness”.

502. In this quote of the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, “mind” refers to the “afflicted mind”.

503. i.e. the five sensory consciousness, the mental consciousness and the afflicted mind.

504. Sk. kalāpa, Tb. bam po.

505. Bka’ ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 89, p. 495.17-18

506. The three and-a-half previous verses are a direct quote from Asaṇga’s Viniścayasaṃgraha (Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 74, p. 4.5-7).

507. The issue Je Tsong kha pa has to address is the absence of an explicit proof of the ālayavijñāna in Asaṇga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya (by its very nature, the Abhidharmasamuccaya is a summary of Cittamātra tenets and proofs would be somehwat out of place).
Jinamītra, however, in his second commentary on the Abhidharmasamuccaya, the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā, fleshes out the eight objections to the non-existence of an ālayavijñāna formulated in the stanza of the Viniścayasaṃgraha:
Appropriation, the first and clarity,
Seeds, karma and physical sensation and
Mindless meditative equipoise and passing away[508] would become inappropriate.
and, since Jinamītra’s commentary is an authoritative commentary on the Abhidharmasamuccaya, Je Tsong kha pa considers that the eightfold proof is implicitly stated in the Abhidharmasamuccaya.

509. Asaṇga: Viniścayasaṃgraha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 74, p. 4.5-7

510. Tb. ‘chi ‘pho

511. Jinamītra: Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 1306.1-7

512. Tb. yid byed

513. It is self-evident that the five sensory consciousnesses do not exist at the moment of conception for any of the Buddhist schools of Tenets. While for Cittamātra, the mental consciousness does not either, and only the mind basis-of-all and the afflicted mind exist at conception, most other schools of tenets would have to assert the existence of the mental consciousness at the time of conception.

514. Tb. dang por mtshams sbyor

515. This issue is addressed in stanza 13 of the root text:
13. Because of being the basis infused with imprints and
Because of engaging manifestly
The virtuous [and] non-virtuous in one continuum
It is established as unstained and neutral.
as well as in Je Tsong kha pa’s auto-commentary (AC p. 21 zhol 643.3 ss)

516. i.e. both fully-characterised maturations and consciousnesses at conception.

517. The “neutral which has become a component of maturation” is the mind basis-of-all.

518. For instance, all six collections of consciousness are interrupted every night in deep sleep, according to Cittamātra.

519. i.e. their respective object, viz. footnote 6.

520. i.e. they are also like corpses.

521. Jinamītra: Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 1306.7-1307.3

522. In other words, the appropriating consciousness arises out of the 2nd of the Twelve Limbs.

523. Both zhol 703.6 and bla brang ma 46a.2 read rkyen against dpe sdur ma 1306.10 rkyen gyi rgyu

524. Tb. gtan tshig

525. Tb. ris su ma chad pa

526. Tb. nye ring med

527. Reading rtog pa with bla brang ma 46b.4 against rtogs pa in zhol 705.1

528. Tb. skabs ‘byed pa

529. Untraced quote

530. Pibrīttiguhyārtha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 978.2-10

531. Tb. gzod ma

532. op. cit. ‘byung bar mi ‘gyur p. 978.3

533. Tb. ‘jug pa la rgyu ba

534. Reading with zhol 706.3 rgyu ba la against bla brang ma 47b.1, rgyu ba.

535. Tb. rjes su rtog pa’i yi shes

536. This debate hinges on the difference in clarity between a mental consciousness cognising a sense object immediately after sensory perception and one recollecting the object of sensory perception. It is evident, based on experience, that the conceptual, mental consciousness thinking, “This is a very tasty!”, just after tasting a new dish at an Indian restaurant has far more clarity with respect to the taste of that food than the conceptual consciousness recollecting the taste of the self-same food several days later, even though both are conceptual, mental, consciousnesses cognising their object through a meaning generality.
Sensory consciousnesses are, naturally, clear with respect to their object of observation, which is always a present one (for the sensory consciousnesses of ordinary beings).
The opponent in this debate wonders why, if two consciousnesses cannot occur concurrently, mental consciousness could never engage with clarity. The answer given is that the only instance of a clear, conceptual mental consciousness, for an ordinary being, is one immediately following a stream of sensory consciousnesses which induce it and which, typically, are still present when it arises.

537. Both Jinamītra’s Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya and the vyākhyā include this query (Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 978.11-16 & p. 1307.14-20)

538. Tb. rjes su ‘jug pa’ yid shes

539. This is the position of most of the Buddhist schools of Tenets which do not accept the existence of the mind basis-of-all, such as the Sautrantika-Svātantrika Mādhyamika school.

540. Tb. bzlog pa

541. Jinamītra: Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 978.16- 979.5

542. Tb. snod

543. The physical world.

544. Sentient beings.

545. Vasubandhu: “Trimśika”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p. 4.5-6

546. Jinamītra: Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 979. 5-11

547. Reading with zhol 709.1 and bla brang ma 49a.2 rnam par shes pa gnyis against dpe bsdur ma 979.5 rnam par shes pa

548. Tb. tshul bzhin

549. i.e. the basis-of-all.

550. Tb. rten sbyin pa

551. Jinamītra: Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 979. 11-16

552. Tb. rjes su rnam par rtog pa

553. Reading lus kyis myong ba gang dag ‘byung ba with op.cit. p. 979.14-15 against zhol 709.5 and bla brang ma 49b.1 which both lack the passage.

554. Both equipoises refer to the equipoise bereft of discrimination and the equipoise on cessation.

555. Tb. ‘bor ba

556. Untraced quote.

557. The Cittamātrin’s opponent tries to preserve the possibility of having equipoise without a mind basis-of-all by asserting that while this equipoise would not be accompanied by a clear mental consciousness, it would nonetheless be accompanied by an unclear one (i.e. a metal consciousness purportedly bereft of several of the omnipresent mental factors, specifically, sensation and discrimination). This would preclude having to postulate a mind basis-of-all to explain equipoise.

558. i.e. during equipoise.

559. Jinamītra: Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 979.16-21

560. Reading with zhol 710.3 and bla brang ma 49b.6 ce na against op. cit. p. 979.18, dang.

561. Reading with zhol 710.4 and bla brang ma 50a.1 med pa’i snyoms par zhugs against op.cit. 979.17 med pa la snyom par zhugs

562. Apart from deep sleep, etc.

563. Tb. bye ba

564. Sthiramati: “Pañcaskandha-prakaraṇa-vaibhāśya”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p. 629.1-2

565. Tb. ‘khog pa

566. Tb. phyogs

567. This whole section hinges on an archaic understanding of human physiology and the death process in which the warmth suffusing the body is equated with the presence of consciousness (and not the circulation of blood) and its progressive withdrawal at death (due to the progressive decline of circulation to the periphery of the body) is understood as the withdrawal of consciousness inwards. If we consider coarse consciousness and nervous influx as manifestations of the same underlying reality, a contemporary presentation of the eighth line of reasoning could easily be undertaken in terms of the decline in sensitivity of the extremities.

568. Tb. phyogs phyogs

569. i.e. the progressive withdrawal of warmth is not observed in inanimate objects, therefore it would have to be a manifestation of consciousness.

570. The sense consciousnesses dwell within their respective sense organ.

571. Since upon fainting, or in a coma, none of the sense consciousnesses operate, the body would have been completely discarded, in which case death would have occurred.

572. Unlike sensory consciousness, mental consciousness does not dwell within a physical sense organ. The mental organ does exist, but it is the previous moment of that mental consciousness.

573. Tb. srog. “Vitality” refers to the life supporting forces in the body.

574. Jinamītra: Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 980.1-6

575. i.e. the mental consciousness.

576. In other words, the proofs by:
1. appropriation
4. seeds
7. equipoise and
8. passing away
are main lines of reasoning, whereas those relying on:
2. concurrent consciousnesses
3. the distinction between clear and unclear mental consciousnesses
5. karma
are subsidiary ones, clarifying issues in the four major proofs.

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