Source and licence: Translated by Ilia Durovic. © Ilia Durovic, 2017. Partial translation: the TBI file stops at root verse 33.
The inseparable union of the sun and the moon clarifying the difficult points of the root text and the commentary of mind and basis-of-all in the system of the Vijñaptimātrins.
by Ke’u tshang blo bzang ‘jam dbyangs smon lam
translated by Ilia Durovic
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Namo Guru Buddhāya
I perform offerings, prostrate and take Refuge in the Noble Guru, Lord of sapience, empathy and potency. In all times, may I be nurtured inseparably from this fortunate one who is the Enjoyment Body of the heart of the teachings of the Muni.
Through being molded during countless eons by engaging with fiercely blazing sapience and empathy the abode and the mode of abiding of objects of knowledge,
God among the gods, Bhagavān, spontaneously arisen One Gone Thus, within the great funerary shrine of migrators of just that attitude,
Rare and found only once, even by the world ‘s forefather whose beautiful crown diadem is at your feet,
I offer iridescent collections of virtue, well-disposed, inseparably within my heart, dispel the dark epidemic of nescience!
Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva who clarified with precise logic interdependence, the perfected Teachings of the Conquerors,
Buddhapālita, glorious Candrakīrti and Śāntideva whirling within the joy of Union,
Asaṇga and his sibling, Sthiramati, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and so forth who were infused with the essence of Ajita‘s speech,
May those who have realised the prophecies upholding the system of the Great Vehicle Yogācāra be victorious!
Famous Second Conqueror who differentiated the virtuous traditions of lasting, untroubled bliss
Taking the worthy essence of the pith bereft of extremes, the scholarship churning, with the ladle of subtle, wise, intelligence,
The ocean of milk within which the treatises of scholars and practitioners of the Land of the Āryas whirl together,
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I praise respectfully the Guru Mañjuśrī, may the excellent virtue of the Dharma of Scripture and Logic wax!
I pay homage to the bestower of Dharma, the ocean, Maitreya, and so forth,
Whose doctrine Ngawang Nyendrag knew,
Unsated by beholding the good rice of the meaning,
Completely containing the lapis-lazuli of the glorious, supreme Mind.
According to the Vijñaptimātrins, I will explain, here, slightly,
In keeping with the utterances of the Guru,
For the sake of healing my memory and so
forth, all phenomena without exception and
I will clarify the extremely difficult topics of mind and basis-of-all.
Regarding that, in this Land of Snow, the Being who encapsulates the Conquerors of the Three Times, without exception, the only one bearing the famous name, “The Great Tsong kha pa, Dharma King of the Three Realms”, even in these times of degenerescence, after composing in the manner of the sole teacher of the holy speech, for all those striving for Liberation, without exception, the great treatise, “The Essence of Eloquence“, the ultimate system of the Conquerors, which alone comments precisely on the differentiation between the interpretable and the definitive within the Teachings of the Conquerors by all propounders of Mahāyāna tenets. Nowadays, as well, since in less than a paragraph and through the arising of the knowledge of the method of the path to Liberation which is constructed from individual, scattered teachings of scriptural quotes which have a source, without propounding a paltry self-arisen Liberation occuring in a subsidiary fashion to the mundane, he remains the most marvelous and kind from within all the impartial, intelligent ones.
Otherwise, let alone being acquainted with migration within cyclic existence, how could those wishing for Liberation therefrom thoroughly differentiate the meaning?
It would be difficult for even the mere name of such a one to occur within the span of one’s hearing: scholars and practitioners, just through grasping his name, un-impededly behold the mere acreage of the Four Tenets concerning the meaning and, in addition, are conscious of the indications that his mind had not become involved with the age of degeneration upon beholding the style of both these teachings. Specifically, he adorned the root text with an auto-commentary,
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“An Ocean of well-explained, extensive commentary on the Root and the Difficult Points of Mind and Basis-of-all”.
All of us, albeit mired within the darkness of ignorance, have imparted the eye of intelligence which beholds the system of the Vijñaptimātrins and the great balsam of Liberation, yet it seems that the majority have not severed in the slightest the doubts regarding what its intent is. Although a few intelligent seekers, in a couple of ornaments, searched for logical proofs to definitely sever the extremes, bereft of the overarching theme, they made a mere recitation from rote of the words of the great treatises, cardinal.
I, however, generated a mind wishing to help and, while keeping on my crown those who imparted discourses:
1. Specifically, our peerless Conqueror, a real Vajradhāra, the Noble Lobsang yeshe tenpa rabgye pel zang po
2. As far as the meaning is concerned, I will list, for instance:
i. the Lord Protector, Noble in Dharma, Jetsün lobsang tenpe wangchug
ii. Jampel gyatso pel zang po
iii. Ganden Trichen Yongdzin Ngawang Nyendrag and
iv. Yongdzin Trichen Jangchub chöphel and so forth
who clarified the unmistaken path to Liberation for countless trainees through being endowed with un-purloinable wisdom and measureless benevolence. I composed, with as much courage as I could muster, a presentation of the difficult points of the treatise, similar to the explanation in the “Commentary on the Difficult Points . . .” and the commentary on the letters of the root text.
1. the meaning of the introduction
1.1 Proffering homage
1.2 The pledge to explain
2. the meaning of the treatise
3. the meaning of the conclusion
1.1 Proffering homage
Proffering homage occurs in the one stanza:
1. I pay obeisance with my head to the wise among the wise,
Who teach perfectly, un-mistakenly and without admixture,
Through having interiorised, as it is, the worthy Utterance and the worthy Path,
Trail travelled by the Conquerors and the Scions of the Conquerors.
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The meaning:
I, Lobsang dragpa, respectfully pay obeisance with body, speech and mind through bowing the supreme part, my head, to the wise among the wise, endowed with scriptural quotes, the Guru Mañjuśrī, Rendawa zhönu lodrö (1349-1412) and so forth. As is said, just as ” A certainty similar to his own within another . . .”, scholars who teach perfectly, un-mistakenly and without admixture, to the fortunate ones the systems of their own tenets from the exact assertions of the abbots who composed their own root commentaries through having well interiorised, as it is, the individual existences and different modes of progression on the Paths of the Three Vehicles, the great trail which was travelled by Buddha Śakyamuni who utterly conquered the foes of the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience and the Scions of that Conqueror, the Bodhisattvas, the mode of thorough differentiation of the interpretable and the definitive within the Scriptures by the Propounders of Tenets, whatsoever worthy Utterances of the Conquerors which arise as one meaning.
In addition, those who teach the path to others, must themselves sever the extremes regarding that which they teach and after producing certainty should begin to teach, otherwise, in brief, without knowing oneself, to deceive the foolish with purportedly learned speech is to be an executioner wielding the spoon used to gouge out the optical nerve of the teachings. Therefore, this is to be known indirectly from:
Who teach perfectly, un-mistakenly and without admixture,
Through having interiorised, as it is . . .
Whenever one wishes for something different from another expounder
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one definitely needs a wisdom un-mistaken in the mode of differentiating individual tenets, the interpretable and definitive [meaning] of the scriptures of the Conquerors. As Je Tsong kha pa states:
Listen respectfully, you who wish to be peerless exponents,
Through analysis which realises the suchness taught.
This is established by the verses from:
the wise among the wise
through having interiorised, as it is, the worthy Utterance and the worthy Path . . .
1.2 The pledge to explain
1.2.1 Stating the purpose
1.2.2 The actual pledge to explain
1.2.1 Stating the purpose
2. I will explain, here, in dependence on the utterances of the Guru,
For the sake of healing my memory and
Teaching clearly mind and basis-of-all,
The extremely difficult topics of the treatises of the Vijñaptimātrins.
The meaning:
Should it be said, well then, since the non-existence of a purpose for your having composed this would not be the utterance of a rational speaker, it must exist and in addition, it is appropriate to state it.
Statement:
Pay heed to mind and basis-of-all which arise from the system of the treatises of the Cittamātrins, the Vijñaptimātrins, you who have not trained in the path of reasoning! Difficult to realise even for highly seasoned logicians, if one doesn’t realise it, the door of the thorough differentiation of the Cittamātra system is closed and, let alone that, since it would seem that the Tibetan scholars of yore, as well, did not explain through clearly differentiating, I composed for the sake of teaching clearly and for the sake of healing my memory.
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Moreover, this teaches the four Dharmas, the purpose and so forth of composing the treatise:
i. the definiteness of severing the extremes of the Cittamātra system through teaching clearly the presentation of the [afflicted] mind and the basis[-of-all], i.e. the purpose,
ii. the purpose of clearly realising the thusness of the Vijñaptimātrins by means of the four quests and the four complete knowledges;
iii. the topic, viz. establishing the abode of the [afflicted] mind and the mind basis-of-all and so forth
iv. The necessity of the core purpose which is a relation, the relation between the purpose and this treatise.
Moreover, through mind and basis-of-all the topic [is presented] and by conjoining it with and teaching clearly . . . the extremely difficult topics the purpose is taught. Both the core purpose and the relation are taught indirectly.
1.2.2 The actual pledge to explain
Should someone say, when you composed this treatise, was it under your own authority or under that of another?
It is said, I will explain, here, in dependence on the utterances of the Guru since this is taught in dependence on the utterances of the uninterrupted, holy lineage of Gurus and not under one’s own authority.
In addition, in keeping with the meaning of the three perfect causes when the Noble One composed the Great Stages of the Path:
i. being learned in the Five Sciences concerning objects of knowledge;
ii. having had a vision of the Tutelary Deity
iii. having uninterrupted, holy instructions from the Buddha onwards.
having uninterrupted, holy instructions from the Buddha onwards can be understood by in dependence on the utterances of the Guru.
The purpose of the pledge to compose is to complete composing, as is said in the “Letter to a Friend“:
Know the mind to be akin to drawing
On water, earth and a stone.
Therein, the afflicted are the first,
The supreme, those wishing Dharma are last.
and is in keeping with the meaning of:
Do not make many holy promises . . .
2. The meaning of the treatise
2.1 An explanation of the period of occurrence of the chariot- track of the Vijñaptimātrins
2.2 An explanation of the meaning of the actual treatise
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2.1 An explanation of the period of occurence of the chariot-track of the Vijñaptimātrins
Should one wonder, at what time did the great track which presented the Base, Path and Result of the Vijñaptimātra arise and who was the differentiator of this track?
Answer:
He arose
3. After Ārya Nāga, prophesied as upholding
The Supreme Vehicle [propounded] by the Holy Speech,
Spread the Supreme Vehicle,
Before Asaṇga, who fulfilled the prophecies, pioneered the track, . . .
The meaning:
The Muni Buddha Bhagavan, whose Holy Speech, the lion’s roar of the Teacher bereft of the two extremes of dependent origination, induced the Tirthikas whose speech is akin to the hollow waves of [babble] of infants, to vomit down their chins the innards of a drunkard’s club of two, in answer to the enquiry in the Laṇkāvatāra Sūtra:
Prithee, after the Lord hath passed beyond torment
Who will the upholder be?
stated:
After the Lord hath passed beyond torment,
The upholder of modes,
Will arise after times have passed,
As Mahāmati will you know him,
In the south, in the land of Veta,
Renowned as the “Glorious Bhikṣu”,
Otherwise quoth Nāga,
He will destroy the biases of existence and non-existence
After supremely explaining my vehicle,
The peerless Mahāyāna to the world,
He will realise the Ground of “Supreme Joy“
And depart to Sukhāvatī.
After Ārya Nāgārjuna prophesied as the differentiator of the chariot-track of the Great Vehicle had disseminated the Supreme Vehicle, Ārya Asaṇga who fulfilled the prophesy from the Mañjuśrī Mūla-tantra :
The Bhikṣu called “Asaṇga”,
Learned in the meaning of the Śastras,
Will distinguish in numerous guises
The definitive and interpretable meaning of the Basket of Sūtras.
That Being, teacher of knowledge to the world,
Will become one who is endowed with the distinction of the Treatises from within.
The realisation of that knowledge
Is called the “ Messengeress of Sāla”;
(asserted by Dwags po ngag grags to be Red Sarasvati)
By the power of her mantra,
A good mind will be generated.
For the teachings to subsist for a protracted period,
He will summarise the meaning of the Sūtras.
Upon the disintegration of his body, he will betake himself to the Land of the gods,
Living for one hundred and fifty years.
After experiencing lasting bliss
While transmigrating among transmigrators
That Great Being will culminate
By attaining Enlightenment.
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in dependence on the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, having well pioneered the chariot-track of the Vijñaptimātrins, a second mode of thorough differentiation of the Utterances of the Conqueror into interpretable and definitive meaning arose, the Mahāyāna view spread greatly in the Land of the Āryas and even a majority of those of the Hearer school did not deprecate [it] by saying “The Mahāyāna is not an Utterance”.
Well then, should one enquire, how the Mahāyāna view subsisted before Asaṇga pioneered the chariot-track:
Since before that teaches that it subsisted only in the mode of Mādhyamika bereft of the two extremes, as is said:
3. . . . before . . ., . . . Mādhyamika only
In addition, because the Mahāyāna view is definitely [subdivided] into two, the Cittamātra view and the Mādhyamika view, before that [is said], because the chariot-track of Mādhyamika had been differentiated and because Asaṇga differentiated the chariot-track of Cittamātra.
2.2 An explanation of the meaning of the actual treatise
2.2.1 A brief, merely terminological teaching
2.2.2 An extensive, detailed explanation
2.2.1 A brief, merely terminological teaching
4. The definitions, proofs and
Refuting the assertions of the nine and the one,
One should know the basis-of-all and the afflicted mind
By the four entities [and] aspects.
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The meaning:
I have quoted, one should know. What? The basis-of-all and the afflicted mind. How? Definitions, proofs and refuting the assertions of the excessive number of nine collections and refuting the assertions of the one collection, which is insufficient, i.e. by the four entities [and] aspects.
2.2.2 An extensive, detailed explanation
2.2.2.1 Explaining the definitions,
2.2.2.1.1 Explaining the definition of the basis-of-all
2.2.2.1.1.1 The supporting basis-of-all of maturation
2.2.2.1.1.1.1 Teaching briefly by means of subdivisions
2.2.2.1.1.1.2 Explaining extensively by means of the object of observation, the aspect, etc.
2.2.2.1.1.2 The supported basis-of-all of the seed
2.2.2.1.2 Explaining the definition of the afflicted mind
2.2.2.2 Explaining the proofs which establish that,
2.2.2.3 Refuting the assertion of the nine collections of consciousness and
2.2.2.4 Refuting the assertion of the one [collection of consciousness].
2.2.2.1 Explaining the definitions
2.2.2.1.1 Explaining the definition of the basis-of-all
2.2.2.1.1.1 The supporting basis-of-all of maturation
2.2.2.1.1.1.1 Teaching briefly by means of subdivisions
5. I assert that, within the two definitions,
The definition [of] basis-of-all,
Being subdivided into supporting and supported,
Has two aspects.
The meaning:
Previously, within the existence of both the explanation of the definition of the basis-of-all and the explanation of the definition of the afflicted mind, the first, the definition of basis-of-all, should also be asserted as having two aspects because that basis-of-all, given as an instance, also has a two-fold division into:
i. the supporting basis-of-all of maturation
ii. the supported basis-of-all of the seed.
2.2.2.1.1.1.2 Explaining extensively by means of the object of observation, the aspect, etc.
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1 Teaching generally
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2 Explaining upon subdividing
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1 Teaching generally
This occurs in the four-and-a-half verses:
6. Regarding that, the supporting basis-of-all has
Entities, sentient beings and imprints
Thorough knowledge, ignorance,
Neutrality, contact and so forth
The five.
The meaning:
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Regarding that, basis-of-all has a two-fold division into supporting and supported, the nature of the supporting basis-of-all of maturation should be known through the four: object of observation, aspect, nature and associates.
Objects of observation are the five entities, form and so forth and “sentient beings” are not sentient beings within “Buddhas and sentient beings” but instead:
i. the intimately appropriated i.e. the eye and so forth, the five organs endowed with mind having a base and
ii. the intimate appropriator, the manifest predilection having the nature of imputing “This and this” to the self and to all phenomena, its objects,
the intimate appropriation observes the imprints of verbalisation and, on the outside, the world of the vessel and on the inside, the interior sense-organ bases and so forth.
Moreover, since the stanza in the “Thirty“:
Both appropriations and places
Cognition not cognising
Are always accompanied by
Contact, attention
Knowledge, discrimination and intention.
It has neutral sensation:
It is un-obscured, neutral,
Likewise for contact and so forth.
is of similar import, if we synthesize, since “both” in “both appropriations and . . .” is a dual marker, both appropriations are:
i. the intimately appropriated, the eye and so forth, the five organs, organ-bases and so forth, i.e. the physical cognition and
ii. the intimate appropriator, the imprints of verbalisation , i.e. the imprint’s cognition,
and since form, etc. (the five entities) and the world of the exterior environment, are the cognition of places and entities, although:
i. the observation of both of these and
ii. the cognition of the aspect, the object of observation viz. both of these, the environment and the beings,
appear directly, they are not cognised by it, i.e. it is not conscious of them and later, as well, it cannot induce certainty.
Regarding severing the extremes, in this context:
Should someone say, “Whatever is the object of observation of the basis-of-all is one of the three: sense-organs, entities or imprints.”
It follows that the subject, the aggregate which is the nominal basis which has become observed by that [mind basis-of-all], is [one of the three: sense-organs, entities or imprints], because it is that [object of observation of the basis-of-all]. If [the opponent states that] the reason [i.e. that it is the object of observation of the basis-of-all] is not established, it follows that it is established because when the meaning of “both appropriations and places”
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is explained, Master Sthiramati states:
Regarding that, the inner, intimate appropriation are the imprints of manifest predilection regarding the imputed nature and the form of the sense-organ of the place and so forth and the name .
Also someone states: “Whatever is a sense-organ which has become the object of observation of the basis-of-all is a sense-organ endowed with mind.” To this another responds: “It follows that the visual organ in the continuum of a Hearer on an Uninterrupted Path of Seeing is that [i.e. a sense-organ endowed with a mind] because of being this [i.e. a sense-organ which has become the object of observation of the basis-of-all]. It follows because it is the object of observation of the mind basis-of-all of that continuum. It follows because it is the object of observation appearing to that. It follows because:
i. albeit established as form, that component established as form, in addition, does not exist as a form established from the outside, apart from the mere appearance as form to the consciousness of that person, and
ii. the six collections of consciousness do not exist in that continuum and
iii. it cannot appear to the seventh mind of that continuum.
Well then, it follows that whatever is a consciousness of that continuum is necessarily either of the two, the [afflicted] mind or the basis-of-all, because the six collections of consciousness do not exist at all within that continuum. If that is asserted, it follows that the subject, the consciousness which has become an uninterrupted path of that one’s continuum is that [i.e. is either of the two, the afflicted mind or the basis-of-all] because of being that [i.e. a consciousness of that continuum].
Our system:
It cannot appear to the seventh mind,
i.e. there is no consciousness which enacts that object in
that continuum
Moreover, one should know the method of repudiation after taking:
i. the five sense-organs at the time of the five non-existences of mind or
ii. the sense-organs of smell and taste of the Form Realm
as subjects.
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Also, someone states: “Whatever is observed as appearing to the mind basis-of-all, is necessarily observed directly by it.” A critic [states]:
It would seem that, upon taking as subject in the continuum of a person who wishes not to abandon the manifest afflictions, the entities of the sense-organs when the six collections of consciousness do not operate at all, one would repudiate . . .
Well then, it follows that the five entities, which have become the objects of the five sense-organs within the continuum of such a person, exist because:
i. this is compatible with your mode of repudiation and
ii. it would be highly incompatible to say that the five entities were not the objects thereof.
This cannot be accepted because, when the eye consciousness does not operate, form does not appear to the sense-organ, since, for instance, although a reflection of a house appears within a crystal and so forth, this is so when one is looking and so forth, however, when one is not looking, thinking “There is radiance”, puts an end to such apprehensions under the power of our manifest predilection for exteriority since times without beginning, while the entity does not exist.
Otherwise, asserting that an establishment of form and so forth is established, previously and is apprehended later by consciousness is a method of asserting verbally both exterior entities but is strongly incompatible with the system of the Vijñaptimātrins.
Our system
Observation by basis-of-all comprises observed appearances and those whose observation is posited without, nonetheless, appearing. The first [i.e. observed appearances] comprises that which is directly observed and that which is indirectly observed.
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1.1 That which is directly observed
Although they are entities of the sense-organs when the six collections of consciousness operate, later, the sensory organs are posited at the time of the five non-existences of mind and, apart from that, at the time when the sensory consciousnesses do not operate. The aspect is as stated previously or, alternatively, “although. . .” both those cognitions of bodies and the embodied “. . . appear,” it does not cognise them, i.e. “does not determine them and later is unable to induce determination as well”. Regarding this teaching, “Cognition not cognising” occurs both in the root text and the “Thirty“.
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Regarding this, someone states that it is unacceptable to state:
Although organs, entities and imprints “. . .appear, it does not determine them and later is unable to induce determination as well”
because the non-appearance of imprints to the basis-of-all will be explained later, clearly, since one should know that it is for the sake of understanding the statement in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha:
Organs, entities and so forth being called by the name of cognition does not entail saying “both of these are consciousness”, instead, something akin, at present, to:
i. the existence of organs and entities on that side, as they appear to us, and
ii. the appearance of the consciousnesses apprehending them on this side, in an aspect similar to someone looking out there
does not exist. Instead, through the appearance of this and that to one’s very apprehending consciousness, phenomena are exhausted as merely of the nature of one’s apprehending consciousness.
that this is said.
The nature is un-obscured
i.e. neither virtuous nor non-virtuous
and neutral and it is endowed with an entourage of only five mental factors similar to it: contact, attention, knowledge
i.e. sensation,
discrimination and intention.
Moreover, sensation within its entourage should be known as equanimous and neither happiness nor suffering, in the slightest.
Also [Je Tsong kha pa’s ” The Root of the Difficult Points of Mind and Basis-of-all] states:
Neutrality, contact and so forth
The five.
while [Vasubandhu’s] “Thirty Verses” adds:
. . . are always accompanied by
Contact, attention
Knowledge, discrimination and intention.
It has neutral sensation:
It is un-obscured, neutral,
Likewise for contact and so forth.
The meaning of this final verse is that “contact” within its entourage “and so forth” i.e. the five as well, are said to be similar to the mind basis-of-all which is taught as neutral and un-obscured.
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2 Explaining upon subdividing
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.1 Explaining the meaning of positing imprints as objects of observation
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2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.2 Severing the doubts which posit sense-organs, entities and so forth as objects of observation.
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.3 Explaining the observation of that which is other than the direct object of observation, also.
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.4 The proofs determining nature.
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.5 The proofs determining associates
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.6 Etymology
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.7 Teachings the times of engaging and countering.
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.1 Explaining the meaning of positing imprints as objects of observation
6. . . . By the power of the seeds,
7. I assert both the observed because of the appearance
As place, entity and body.
Should one wonder how the matured and the suchness of the substantially existent, which are one and other substantial existents, i.e. imprints which are ineffably different become observed by the matured?
Under the power of the imprints, since that matured appears as places, the sense bases, body, the five sense-organs which are sentient beings and entity, the five [sensory] objects, they are asserted as both observed. For instance, it is akin, in dependence on the object, a tree, to positing that as observed as a tree endowed with the aspect of a migrator without being familiar with the aspect. At this point, regarding the statement in the auto-commentary:
Although, after the seed has appeared, it does not become an object, by its power, that matured basis-of-all is [posited as observing because of becoming the] appearance of place, the sense bases . .
and so forth some assert that it is unsuitable to say that by its power, that matured basis-of-all is [posited as observing because of becoming the] appearance of place, the sense bases . . and so forth is imputed because, even though sense-organs, entities, bodies and so forth appear to the basis-of-all, in this context, should one comment the foundation silently, one’s understanding will be extremely great, since this was stated for the sake of fostering an understanding that, both the appearances of the exterior and interior environment and beings, the consciousness of the continuum and, specifically, the basis-of-all, appear as this and that.
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.2 Severing the doubts which posit sense-organs, entities and so forth as objects of observation.
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Should one say: well then, since the basis-of-all, itself, appears as place entity and body and so forth by the power of the seeds, apart from imprints, organs and entities also must be posited as observed, however wouldn’t positing in that way be determined in all Realms and grounds, as well?
Regarding the teaching that they are not determined, it is stated:
8. As to both apprehended factors of basis-of-all,
Since they are apprehended by the five consciousnesses and
Are imputed terminologically by the sixth,
They are determined in both Realms:
The meaning:
Although organs and entities being posited as observed are determined in the two Lower Realms within the Three Realms, neither organ nor entity appears to the basis-of-all of the Formless [Realm] because:
i. both apprehended factors of basis-of-all, organs and entities, are apprehended by the five consciousnesses, viz. the visual consciousness and so forth,
ii. the sixth, the mental consciousness imputes various terms, “This is form”, “This is a good shape” or “A bad shape”
After proving our own position, the refutation of the opposite one is taught:
9. Were this not so, a Formless one
Would not have gone beyond the discrimination of form and
It would ensue that it would be on a ground endowed with form
Since, apart from appearing as form to consciousness,
Outside, nothing exists.
The meaning:
If, organs and entities instead of not appearing to a basis-of-all of the Formless [Realm], did appear, then, it would follow that the subject, the Formless ones, have not gone beyond the discrimination of form since things endowed with form appear clearly to the basis-of-all of their continuum. Moreover, it follows that the subject, a Formless one, is one on a ground endowed with form, because that which is endowed with form genuinely, directly appears to its basis-of-all. It is also not in-determined because:
i. in the two Lower Realms, as well, it would not have gone beyond the discrimination of form and
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ii. the meaning of positing as being one on a ground endowed with form is that nothing, not even one “form”, apart from merely appearing as form to consciousness within its continuum, exists as established from the outside.
Here, if we were to expand on the meaning of the following section of the auto-commentary:
Well then, should one enquire, if one accepts that one apprehended object becomes the factor apprehended by two consciousnesses, inasmuch as whatever appears to a consciousness is of the nature of that [consciousness], two consciousnesses would become of one substance and therefore common apprehended factors would not exist.
There is no fault because, the statement:
Whatever appears to consciousness is either of its nature or
is neither established as one nor as different from it.
is for when analysis occurs and at that time, while common apprehended factors are not accepted, from the standpoint of the un-investigated and un-analysed, common apprehended factors are accepted. However, they are not asserted as of the nature of consciousness, otherwise, it would ensue that the presentation of the five aggregates would disintegrate and strands of hair, the yellow of a conch and dream-objects would be substantially established and that form, sound, etc would be the nature of experience.
there are two subdivisions:
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.1 Welcoming the doubt presented
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.2 Answering it.
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.1 Welcoming the doubt presented
Well then, this is because when both Devadatta and Yajñadatta behold simultaneously something like a blue apprehended object, it becomes the apprehended factor of the two visual consciousness apprehending blue of both of them, and should one assert the like, since whatever appears to consciousness is of the nature of that consciousness, it follows that the two visual consciousnesses of both persons are substantially one, as well. Inasmuch as, should that be asserted, both persons would become of one continuum, the so-called “common apprehended object” would become as non-existent as the horn of an ass !
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.2.2 Answering it.
The defect [suggested by] this doubt does not exist because asserting that whatever appears to consciousness is of its nature and stating that the apprehended object is neither established as one nor as different from it, i.e. is not established as a different substance from it is for when analysis occurs, for instance,
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when the color blue or such, which is the common object beheld by both Devadatta and Yajñadatta, is beheld simultaneously:
i. whatever factor appears to the visual consciousness of Devadatta, does not appear to Yajñadatta and, likewise,
ii. whatever factor appears to Yajñadatta, does not appear to Devadatta
and there is also no other object apprehended apart from these two.
However, at the time of such analysis, a common factor of apprehension of these two persons is not accepted and the meaning of not analysing and not investigating in this way [is that], since such a blue appears to the visual consciousness of both Devadatta and Yajñadatta, it is asserted as the common apprehended object of both, however that sort of common apprehended object is not asserted as of the nature of the visual consciousness of those two persons.
In brief, the meaning thereof is similar to saying that” although a valid cogniser engaging in ultimate analysis does not find a common beheld object, a terminological valid cogniser does find it“.
Otherwise, should one assert that whatever appears to consciousness is of the nature or the suchness of that consciousness, well then, it would ensue that the presentation of the five aggregates form and so forth would disintegrate i.e. would be unsuitable, because there would be no form aggregate apart from the aggregate which is a nominal base and moreover it would follow that the appearance of strands of hair to the visual consciousness to which strands of hair appear to be falling, the yellow of a conch and dream elephants would be established and so forth, i.e. would be substantially established, because:
i. they appear to the consciousness apprehending them and
ii. whatever appears to consciousness is of the nature or the suchness of that consciousness
Moreover there are numerous refutations of the consequence that form, sound, etc would be the nature of experience i.e. of the nature of mind or mind. For a detailed analysis, the statement in “The Rosary of White Lotuses: A Necklace for the Clear-Minded“:
… also, after those two have investigated and analysed in that fashion, upon engagement, whatever dawns to itself dawns as one’s own uncommon apprehended factor without the common apprehended factor dawning and just that is established as the nature of one’s own consciousness and because it is stated in the auto-commentary that [it] “is neither established as one” in nature “nor as different” in nature from the consciousness of the basis-of-all in its continuum.
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also calls for careful investigation, in addition, the commentaries on this are extremely difficult to understand.
Therefore, whether my mode of commentary is also the intent of Je Tsong kha pa or not, is debated by scholars, however, as Master Vagiśvarakirtī said:
Since an awareness such as mine
Is not unmistaken regarding difficult topics,
If I am not, let another do so.
I beseech: “Give me a Yajñadatta who has definitely severed the doubt!”
Above, whenever something appears to Devadatta’s visual consciousness, should it appear to Yajñadatta, both consciousnesses would become of one substance and from that standpoint, regarding the statement “it is inacceptable” since they would become of one continuum, the analysis of some scholars regarding whether another’s mind appears clearly or not to a clairvoyance conscious of another’s mind is elementary:
i. non-appearance is inacceptable; inasmuch as it is a direct perceiver, it is inadmissible for it to be other than non-conceptual; this is established by the assertion regarding a consciousness endowed with the clear appearance of its object, unmixed with a meaning generality:
Whatever awareness is endowed with clear appearance
That I assert to have non-conceptuality.
ii. should it appear then, to such a direct perceiver, the mind of another which appears would have to be asserted as substantially one with that direct perceiver because both are substantially established and are empty of being different substances. Should that be accepted, it would follow that those two persons would be of one continuum because both such a direct perceiver and the mind of another, which appears, are substantially one. Therefore, it would follow that both persons would be of one continuum because both the visual consciousnesses of both would be substantially one.
Regarding that, the statement by some that “although those two consciousnesses are of one substance, they do not have to be of one
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continuum” is the nonsense of those who haven’t even seen the letters of the mode of rebuttal of how the Sautrāntikas dispute this in dependence on clairvoyances conscious of another’s mind and how the Lord of Reasoning responds to this.
Well then, should one enquire: “Just how do you formulate an appropriate answer to this ?”
It is formulated because, if one is conscious of the mode of rebuttal by which the Sautrāntikas dispute this and the mode of formulating the response, it will be easy to understand. If one were to explain this, the Sautrāntika’s system of generation of doubts is: since a clairvoyance conscious of another’s mind is a direct valid cogniser, the direct perceiver must apprehend the object, the nature of another’s mind, however if it apprehends in that way, should that which is apprehended, that other mind be established as of one substance with one’s own consciousness, they would become of one continuum and, since this is unsuitable, that which is definitely apprehended becomes another object.
The thought wondering: ” If, the object, the nature of another’s mind, is not apprehended by a direct perceiver, it is not a direct valid cogniser” as stated by the glorious Dharmakirtī:
Should one say, if the very nature of another’s mind became a direct consciousness, its apprehended [object] would be another object. If it did not, how would those be direct consciousnesses. How also would the very nature of the object become un- apprehended by a direct perceiver. Should it not be apprehended, how would it be a valid cogniser?
In response, although a direct perceiver conscious of another’s mind in the continuum of [one who] has not abandoned the conceptions of apprehended and apprehending, does not apprehend directly the nature of another’s mind, inasmuch as it is incontrovertible with respect to the designations of another’s mind (viz. its virtuous or non-virtuous characteristics, the mode of apprehension of the object and so forth), it is a valid cogniser. For instance, regarding teaching in conjunction with an example, “Just as a direct perceiver seeing form related with oneself”, it is said:
Since yogis who do not abide have not abandoned the conceptions of apprehended and apprehending, they are conscious
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of the minds of others and seeing form and so forth incontrovertibly regarding the designation, [they are] valid cognisers.
Should one think, “Since the nature of another’s mind does not appear directly, it does not become directly perceived”, such a manifest consciousness would not apprehend the nature of another’s mind nakedly, moreover, since the aspect, as it is, of the characteristics of that [mind] would appear clearly by the force of yogic meditation, it would not be a non-direct perceiver. For instance, under the impetus of one’s karma, deities and so forth, the good or bad events which will occur appear in dreams and, in addition, their characteristics appear clearly, nonetheless the nature of the event does not appear to direct perception and regarding the teaching “just as being unmistaken regarding that”:
By the force of yoga, the clear appearance of the simily of the particularities of the aspect of another mind’s consciousness will occur to them, just as one beholds truth in a dream by the blessing of karma, deities and so forth.
Should one think, “If that manifest consciousness does not apprehend directly another’s mind, how would it be endowed with the clear aspect thereof?”
That, i.e. the appearance of one’s mind under the force of meditation, is generated in a nature exactly similar to the aspect of another’s mind, however, regarding the teaching, “Since that appears clearly to that, there is no fault”:
Regarding these, they do not become consciousnesses as well, i.e. subjects of another’s mind, instead apart from consciousness being exclusively similar in appearance and aspect to one’s mind, after “consciousness of another’s mind” is definitely apprehended, the term is imputed. Inasmuch as, within direct perception, the simily of the aspect of that appears clearly and is incontrovertible, I assert that it can be called a “valid cogniser”.
The mode of realisation of another’s mind by that manifest consciousness of
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another’s mind is not a realisation through the appearance of the nature of another’s mind, nakedly, instead:
i. under the force of meditation, the appearance of one’s mind is generated in a nature exactly similar to the aspect of another’s mind and
ii. although such an aspect of another’s mind is of one substance with it, nonetheless, since another’s mind is not actual, the shortcoming of becoming of one continuum does not exist.
Well then, should organs and entities not appear to a basis-of-all of the Formless [Realm], inasmuch as there would be no mode of positing the formerly explained meaning of imprints being posited as observed, it would become devoid of observation and, were this accepted, consciousness bereft of observation would exist.
There is no fault because the quote in Mahāyānasaṃgraha:
Since the past and so forth, just as dreams
As well the two aspects of reflections
Are bereft of observation,
That is suitable to be observed.
[teaches that] all consciousnesses do not necessarily rely exclusively on the force of observation and, specifically, the basis-of-all does not engage by the power of observation but instead engages uninterruptedly, by the force of karma, through maturation extending from conception until death.
The meaning of the scriptural passage from the Mahāyānasaṃgraha is not to teach that consciousnesses which apprehend “the past, and so forth” are bereft of observation but the meaning is that “they do not depend on the existence or non-existence of the appearing observation being established as an entity“. However, it is not the case that a Formless [realm] basis-of-all is bereft of observation: since the imprints of verbalisation, of the view of the self of the limb of existence and so forth, are suitable to appear as karma, organs, entities, bodies and so forth, those imprints are posited as observed by that. For instance, it is akin to parched grains of barley and so forth stored in a granary or a silo which, upon encountering, later, [appropriate] conditions will germinate; since they are, at present, suitable to germinate, they are posited as the cause of sprouts.
Well then, should one ask whether in the two Lower Realms, as well, all environments and being appear to one basis-of-all?
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Regarding the teaching were this not so . . ., it is said:
10. In the Lower, as well,
Should all beings and environments
Appear to the basis-of-all of one sentient being,
The hells would appear, as well, to a god of the Form Realm,
The beings and environments of gods
Would appear, as well, to denizens of hell and
Manifold objects of the eons
Would appear to ordinary beings as well.
The meaning:
Let alone the Formless [realm], in the two Lower Realms as well, all beings and environments do not appear to the basis-of-all of one sentient being, and if they appeared, well then, let alone denizens of hell, it would follow that: to the subject, a god of the Form Realm, also, genuine hell [realm] appearances would occur, because all being and environments appear to its basis-of-all.
Should one accept this, it follows that it would have the agony of suffering akin to a denizen of hell, because the seeds of the appearance of genuine appearances of the hells awaken on its basis-of-all. It is not the case that [the reason] is not established, because:
i. that basis-of-all has genuine hell-[realm] appearances and
ii. their occurrence depends on the awakening of imprints.
Here, in both examples in the commentary: is not established explicitates missing letters, it is not indefinite : whatever is the appearance of the awakening of imprints on the basis-of-all becomes beneficial or harmful through merely appearing. For instance, it is similar to the appearance of a pleasant or unpleasant object to the mind during a dream, being respectively beneficial or harmful through merely appearing. Likewise, apart from gods and human beings, it would follow that to hell-beings, as well, genuine beings and environments of gods and men would appear for that reason. Should this be accepted, it would follow that denizens of hell also experience the happiness of gods and men because the seeds which give rise to genuine appearances of the happy realms awaken on their basis-of-all. The mode of establishment of the reason and the entailment are similar to the above.
Moreover, it would follow that (let alone the attainments of previous qualities, the manifest consciousnesses and so forth), to ordinary beings
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as well who had not attained such qualities manifold objects of the eons in location and time would appear because that is accepted. Should this be accepted, there would be numerous consequences.
Someone states that even though the appearance of the hells occurs to gods and the appearances of the happy realms to denizens of hell, they do not necessarily become thereby beneficial or harmful :
i. whereas the appearance of the beings and environments of denizens of hell to the gods is the appearance of the awakening of imprints which appear [to] them
ii. since beings and environments are not the appearance which is the awakening of imprints of karma which will be enjoyed
through the appearance of those two, a agony of suffering does not necessarily exist and the same is to be known, as well, regarding denizens of hell and so forth.
This is unsuitable: well then, it would follow that the subject, the form and statements of the likes of Devadatta, would also be pleasing and heard by the ears of men who are inimical to Devadatta, because those two would be pleasing and heard by the ears of men who are friendly with Devadatta. Moreover, it would follow that the subject, the tactile sensation of coldness, would benefit a man tormented by cold, because it benefits a man tormented by heat. Likewise, countervailing [arguments] are to be formulated.
Therefore, since:
1. some migrators of similar type will see some objects, such as form, sound and so forth as beneficial and some will see them as harmful and
2. since beings and environments apart from the mere appearance of objects to one’s consciousness are not asserted at all, through the mere appearance of genuine pleasant and unpleasant objects benefit or harm occurs and there is no dependency on action.
In addition, does that appearance of the beings and environments of hell to the mind basis-of-all of a human being appear or not appear just as it appears to a hell-being?
If it does not appear, the assertion that these two have genuine hell-appearances is weakened and if it does appear, it would follow that such an
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appearance is not an appearance under the power of the karma of a hell-being.
If this were asserted, it would be invalidated through both scripture and reasoning by the stanza:
Who made the ground of blazing iron?
What did those balls of flame arise from?
Therefore, the Muni said that all those
Arose from a sinful mind.
and also, one would have to accept that the environment would appear to the basis-of-all of a hell [being] just as it appeared to the basis-of-all of a human being and should this be asserted, the statement in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha :
Since, to pretas, animals, human beings and
Gods, each in keeping with [their] type,
One thing [appears] differently [to the] mind,
I assert that entities are not established.
would be invalidated by reasoning.
Someone states: should one enquire, if that appeared to the sensory consciousness of those sentient beings, would it and the appearance of the basis-of-all be two-fold or one-fold?
Just those appearances as the five sense entities to sensory consciousness are the apprehended factor of the basis-of-all: it has been taught previously by the quote “It arises as the consciousness of the appearance as the entities”
and
“[It is] apprehended by the five consciousnesses”.
Here, some versions of the auto-commentary read “just those” and some “both of those“. The former occurrence is similar to “precisely that” in a dialect and is similar to a dialectal [form], whereas I think that the latter might be the authentic version.
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.3 Explaining the observation of that which is other than the direct object of observation, also.
Well then, should one enquire how the environment and beings appear in the Lower Realms?
In answer:
11. Directly: sense-organs, entities.
Indirectly, whatever can appear
As objects of it’s six collections,
Is also posited as object of the basis-of-all.
is stated.
The meaning:
Directly, one’s five sense-organs and their objects, form, sound and so forth, the five entities and the five sensory consciousnesses.
1. At the time when sensory consciousnesses operate. i.e.,
Indirectly, whatever can appear as
all sorts of objects or
the six collections of consciousness of that base is also posited as object of the basis-of-all of that base
The organs, objects, consciousnesses and so forth [are] the directly observed [objects] of the basis-of-all of that base and
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2. at the time when sensory consciousnesses do not operate, the organs and whatever can appear as object of the mental consciousness are also posited as object of the basis-of-all.
In general, regarding dispelling observation:
12. Objects of the six apart from organs and entities
Do not become objects of the basis-of-all
Because the sixth is the imputing subject and
The basis-of-all is devoid of apprehending the variegated.
The meaning:
If all objects of the six collections were posited as objects of the basis-of-all, well then, would the object of the mental consciousness, the meaning of the topic of the Twelve Limbs, the stages of Grounds and Paths, and so forth, be posited as object of the basis-of-all?
The subject, the presentation of the Ten Ground and the Five Paths, objects of the sixth (the mental consciousness), apart from the eye and so forth (the five organs) and form and so forth (the five entities) and the imprint of the view of the self and so forth of a basis-of-all endowed with a continuum and imputations, such as past, future and so forth do not become the objects of the basis-of-all because:
i. both have merely become objects through imputation by the sixth, the mental consciousness, “this is this” and so forth and because
ii. the basis of all is devoid of discrimination, apprehending the variegated, which imputes manifold terminologies
“This is this. This is other” and so forth. Here, the auto-commentary states:
Objects of the mental consciousness . . . such as the Twelve Limbs, past etc. and imputations do not become the objects of the basis-of-all . . .
and commentaries state the like, as well. Nonetheless, whenever one asserts that the Twelve Limbs of Scripture are self-characterised expressive sounds, then, when the Twelve Limbs of Scripture have been uttered by a person whose continuum is endowed with a basis-of-all, one must definitely assert also the Twelve Limbs of Scripture which have become it’s speech and at that time,
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such must be posited as directly observed by its basis-of-all: this is established by directly: sense-organs, entities.
If it were said that “the Twelve Limbs of Scripture which have become the speech of Buddha are intended” that also cannot be averred since, the statement:
objects of the mental consciousness . . . such as the Twelve Limbs
conveys that it is necessarily an entity operating as the object of mental consciousness without being able to operate as the object of sensory consciousness. That is unsuitable and therefore, one must analyse whether the expressed meaning thereof is that:
i. actualising the three refutation, establishment and enactment, various gates of concentration and the wisdom realising selflessness with its object are not . . . objects of the basis-of-all or, alternatively,
ii. that, thereby, something akin to thinking that the nature of scripture being a non- associated compositional phenomenon is being asserted.
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.4 The proofs determining nature.
If someone said why is the the basis-of-all definitely, absolutely neutral and unstained without being posited in the slightest as virtuous or non-virtuous?
It is said:
13. Because of being the basis infused with imprints and
Because of engaging manifestly
The virtuous [and] non-virtuous in one continuum
It is established as unstained and neutral.
The meaning:
The subject, the base, the supporting basis-of-all:
i. does not thwart the attainment of Liberation,
ii. is established as unstained by not being stained by the afflictions and so forth
iii. and is established as neutral which is neither virtuous nor non- virtuous,
because of being the basis infused with all imprints and because [of] engaging simultaneously, in one continuum, manifestly virtuous and non-virtuous minds.
Moreover, whatever is an obstruction and a non-virtue is unsuitable to be the basis infused with imprints of an uncontaminated path abandoning obstructions and of contaminated virtue and when virtuous minds arise
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manifestly, since it is not found, the attainment of Liberation does not exist and
whatever is virtuous is unsuitable to be the basis infused with non-virtuous seeds and when non-virtuous minds are generated manifestly, since it is not found, being reborn in the evil realms, severing the roots of virtue and so forth do not exist, therefore it is established as unstained and neutral.
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.5 Setting out the proofs determining associates
Should someone say:
Above, from what did you aver the reason for [its] definitely having five mental factors, in the statement has . . . the five? Shouldn’t the five object-determining [mental factors] be non-existent?
It is for the sake of teaching the reason of their being definitely five that:
14. Because [it is] neutral and not clear,
Definitely the five, contact and so forth. . . .
is said.
The meaning:
i. If the associates of the subject, the mind basis-of-all, are definitely only the five mental factors contact and so forth, because it is mind and in addition, unstained and neutral, the eleven virtuous mental factors, the six root afflictions, the twenty subsidiary afflictions do not occur and
ii. if, although its object appears clearly, it nonetheless does not determine it and later, because it is not able to sever clearly its object, the five object-determining mental factors and the basis of imputation, benightedness, wisdom and so forth do no exist, the imputed phenomena, the four mutable mental factors, sleep and so forth, also do not occur.
The five omnipresent mental factors exist among the associates of the subject, the basis of all, because contact is the cause of all mental factors and all minds have any one of the three . . . experiences, happiness and so forth and because all minds are seen to . . . sever the tinge of objects and . . . move towards objects and . . . focus mentally on their observation.
Moreover, through merely imputing “discrimination” on the mere unmixed appearance of the aspect of objects, there is no differentiation of the tinge of objects, stating “this is this” and so forth. This is established by the statement above:
The basis-of-all is devoid of apprehending the variegated.
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Well then, should one enquire which of the three experiences, the sensation associated with the basis-of-all might be?
Moreover, sensation which is associated with the subject, the mind basis-of-all, is only an intermediate experience which is neither pleasure not suffering, because regarding [what is] observed [by] the sensation associated with it it is totally devoid of both pleasure and suffering.
Should one enquire, what the contradiction would be, if it were?
In that case, if a pleasant sensation associated with it existed, the grounds from the fourth contemplation and beyond would . . . become grounds of pleasant sensation and pleasant maturations would also exist in hell. If agony existed, , the maturation of merit and immutable karma would induce suffering and the likes of Formless [beings] would become grounded in suffering.
Should he say, “Why should that be so?”
Should one think:
For instance, just as, among the associates of the mental consciousness, at times pleasure occurs and at times, suffering occurs, likewise, why would it be contradictory [to assert that]:
i. when [it] becomes the maturation of meritorious karma, pleasant sensations arise among its associates and
ii. when [it] becomes the maturation of non-meritorious karma, suffering arises among its associates and
iii. when [it] becomes the maturation of immutable karma, neutral sensations arise among its associates?
This would be unsuitable because, after pleasant sensations are generated among the associates of mental consciousness:
i. the occurrence of suffering at its inception and conclusion is not again a process whereby former consciousness becomes later [consciousness] and former pleasant sensation becomes later suffering and
ii. consciousnesses of two different types would become one at the inception and conclusion of one [consciousness] and
iii. sensations of two different types, as well, would become successive and
iv. for as long as the mind basis-of-all abides, it flows uninterruptedly [in] similar type and since sensations
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associated with it are also similar to that,
what is contradictory with that cannot be abandoned.
Should someone think: “Since the mind basis-of-all of the continuum of a denizen of hell is a denizen of hell, it must experience the suffering of hell and, in that case, there suffering sensations associated with it would exist.”
Well then, it follows that the mind basis-of-all within the continuum of a denizen of hell is not extremely unclear [regarding its] object of observation and aspect because of that assertion. If that is asserted, it is contradictory with the quote in the “Thirty“:
Cognition, not cognising . . .
and in [Je Tsong kha pa’s] auto-commentary:
because it is not able to sever clearly the particularities of the object, the five object-determining mental factors do not occur.
Well then, should one say: “It follows that the suffering of that does not appear to the mind basis-of-all of a [denizen of] hell because it does not experience the suffering which is the experience of that”.
No entailment: it’s having the appearance of pleasure and suffering and it’s experiencing both pleasure and suffering are highly dissimilar: if it experiences pleasure or suffering, it is necessarily generated either in the nature of rapture or agony whereas for mere appearance to it, such is not necessary. Moreover, it would follow that the mind basis-of-all in the continuum of a Bhikṣu, is a Bhikṣu, because of that for a denizen of hell. If this is asserted, the mind basis-of-all in the continuum of an Elder Bhikṣu is also that. If that is asserted, asserting that the mind basis-of-all has youth and age, whiskers and a goatee, you are a second, as of yet unknown Abbot, differentiator of the track of the Vijñaptimātrins!
Likewise, it would follow that the subject, the mind basis-of-all of the continuum of someone on an uninterrupted path of a Mahāyāna Path of Seeing, is that because of having asserted [this]. If that is asserted, it follows that it realises emptiness directly because of having asserted this. If that is asserted, setting the Root Text aside, all textual traditions of the Vijñaptimātrins, it’s auto-commentary, [Vasubandhu’s] “Thirty Verses” and so forth become akin to shouldering a corpse; [instead], as instructed, “know them cover to cover and thereafter take good care of these treatises!“
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Therefore, the mind basis-of-all is asserted as the person and regarding it, ordinary beings, Āryas, denizens of hell and so forth should not be asserted: both ordinary beings and Āryas are posited [respectively] in terms of not realising directly and realising directly the meaning of suchness whereas pleasant and bad transmigrations and so forth are posited from their experience of pleasure and suffering.
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.6 Etymology
Well then, should one enquire: “How was the meaning of “basis-of-all” attributed to the mind basis-of-all?”
15. Because it is conjoined
With the Self,
Basis-of-all.
The meaning:
Because all the sentient beings of the five transmigrations are conjoined to the view of the Self by the afflicted mind observing the basis-of-all, here, it is called basis-of-all: because the basis of the view as the Self is this mind basis-of-all.
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.7 Teachings the times of engagement and countering
The difference between engaging and countering:
Should one enquire until when such a consciousness of maturation will engage and counter?
16. [It] engages the continuum uninterruptedly
Until remainderless and vajra-like.
The meaning:
Until a remainderless nirvāṇa of the Lower Vehicle severs the continuum of engagement of compositional phenomena and a vajra-like samādhi of a Great Vehicle Path of Meditation abandons the obscurations to omniscience, the substantial continuum of the mind basis-of-all engages . . . uninterruptedly. The mode by which it engages is taught directly, the mode of countering is implied indirectly. In the addenda to some of our monastic textbooks, something similar to the mind basis-of-all existing in the continuum of an Arhat is mentioned, however, although such is printed in the complete works of Penchen Sönam Dragpa and so forth, whether he thought so, should be analysed.
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Some [say that] even though the basis-of-all exists within the continuum of an Arhat, the non-existence of a mind basis-of-all endowed with both positings is explained to be the meaning of:
Therefore, Arhats having attained power
Do not have a basis-of-all
Because of being bereft of both positings.
however this was not the intent. There is no basis-of-all endowed with both positings in the continuum of such an Arhat:
i. because of being bereft of both positings
ii. because, in that case, if the time of the reason is definite, the predicate also becomes definite.
Also, some say that although there is a mind basis-of-all in the continuum of an Arhat, a mind basis-of-all endowed with both positings does not exist, however, not a single scholar of India or Tibet explained that the mind basis-of-all had both positings and since this does not occur anywhere in the collected works of Je Tsong Kha pa and his Sons , [this is done] by a fox-born one aping Sudamṣṭra and an imbecile gibbering that his innards are his own, just how could you refute and establish [this]?
Therefore, here the explanation teaches until what time the substantial continuum of the consciousness of maturation or the mind basis-of-all engages and the mode of countering and therefore, Arhats having attained power . . . and so forth must distinguish the difference of teaching the mode of engaging and countering of both minds basis-of-all.
In addition, although there is no mind basis-of-all in the continuum of a Bodhisattva dwelling on the Pure Grounds and an Arhat, the consciousness of maturation and the consciousness of appropriation exist and, albeit both are the substantial continuum of the former mind basis-of-all, they are not the mind basis-of-all.
Therefore, within the two modes by which the mind basis-of-all engages, because:
1. the first engages like the continuum of a river, un- interruptedly, a similar type from conception upon the existence at birth until death and
2. the consciousnesses which engage occur adventitiously out of the encounter with their object, just as waves occur out of water
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[Vasubandhu’s] “Thirty Verses” states:
It’s continuum flows like a river.
and the Laṇkāvatāra Sūtra states:
Just as the river of the basis-of-all
Is ruffled by the wind of the various objects,
The waves of various consciousnesses,
Occur like a dance.
The mode by which it engages continually after birth is: after the exhaustion of the potency impelled by previous karma, death [occurs] and after having been conceived in the next existence (after the maturation of former virtuous or non-virtuous karma), [it] engages until death and after death and being conceived in the next existence (after the maturation of former virtuous or non-virtuous karma), [it] engages until death and for as long as death and being conceived in the next existence have not been transformed, for so long, [it] engages while transmigrating in cyclic existence, since the mind basis-of-all whose type is severed is never transformed.
Likewise, [Vasubandhu’s] “Thirty Verses” states:
Both apprehensions of karmic imprints,
After exhausting the maturation of
Former imprints and so forth,
Generate another maturation.
Moreover, although there are four modes by which the mind basis-of-all engages and one mode of countering and so forth, these should be known in detail from [Asaṇga’s] Mahāyānasaṃgraha.
Should one enquire why, i.e. for which reason, here, the supporting consciousness alone is called “matured” [and] the eye and so forth, the five organs, are not also matured ?
. . . such a matured [phenomenon] is:
2. engages the continuum uninterruptedly . . . as long as one lives and
3. is the result impelled by former virtue or non-virtue,
it must be something endowed with those three characteristics and, apart from the mind basis-of-all and its associates, nothing is beheld. Moreover, this is so: if the matured were virtuous, this would be incompatible with the maturation of . . . the virtuous . . . because . . . the virtuous is the antidote of the non-virtuous and the non-virtuous is of a discordant class with it and because causality would become fallacious.
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Likewise, even should the matured be virtuous, this defect would exist. If this defect did not exist, through imputing after thoroughly differentiating the statement:
Upon becoming the maturation of virtuous karma, [it] is virtue and
likewise, upon becoming the maturation of non-virtuous karma, it is non-virtue.
even through stating:
There is no defect of discordant effects occuring from discordant causes and so forth . . .
there is no rejoinder. Well then, it follows that the ceasing of non-virtue on the base of a happy migration does not exist, because the generation thereof on that base does not exist, because one cannot find an occasion for the generation of non-virtue since, in that continuum, virtuous minds are engaged without interruption for even an instant. Likewise, it follows that there is no generation of a virtuous mind on the basis of a bad migration, because that is accepted. If that is accepted, it follows that neither the manifest karma establishing rebirth in a happy transmigration in that continuum, nor rebirth in happy realm, exist.
Moreover, through seeing the endless confutations, [such as] a person having severed the roots of virtue engaging uninterruptedly in virtuous minds and so forth, the matured is established as unstained and neutral.
[It] necessarily engages until [this] life [ends]: if the maturation impelled by impelling karma is countered in between, [one] will definitely take birth before dying or, alternatively, this life will come to an end.
It is said in [Asaṇga’s] Mahāyānasaṃgraha that:
Because, apart from conception, the severance of the continuum of the matured consciousness, has no manifest establishment . . .
Therefore, the eyes and so forth . . . are not fully-characterised maturations . . . also seen to be countered also before death.
Here, someone states that, apart from the basis of all etc., although the eyes and so forth, are not posited as maturations endowed with three characteristics, in general, the eyes and so forth are also ordinary maturations. However, since Je Tsong kha pa himself, in his auto-commentary states that:
Such a maturation is:
1. unstained and neutral and
2. engages the continuum uninterruptedly for as long as one lives and
3. is the result impelled by former virtue or non-virtue,
it must be something endowed with those three characteristics and, apart from the basis-of-all and its associates, nothing is suitable.
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and later, as well, states that:
because the eyes and so forth are also seen to be countered also before death,
they are not fully-characterised maturations
I do not consider that distinguishing between principal and ordinary maturations impelled by impelling karma is suitable.
Here, the commentators state as definition of the mind basis-of-all:
That main consciousness dwelling within the type of engaging:
i. unbrokenly , from [times] without beginning, for as long as cyclic existence abides an extremely unclear aspect and object of observation of the subtle factor of consciousness akin only to its five omnipresent associates and which, moreover, is
ii. a maturation which has become by nature unstained and neutral and exists in such a way that [it] is not abandoned as a base of the view of the Self by the afflicted mind.
If one examines the statements of the Noble One, himself [Je Tsong kha pa], one might think:
After determining the essence of the afore-mentioned object of observation and aspect, since the nature of the mind basis-of-all is mentally illustrated precisely as it is in dependence on that, shouldn’t one nominally impute the definition of the mind basis-of-all on those two?
however, there would be no fault should you proceed in keeping with that explanation.
An Ārya Bodhisattva’s mental body is not asserted to be a matured result, the signs and marks of a Buddha are not maturations and there are numerous statements upon nominally imputing maturation to both.
2.2.2.1.1.2 The explanation of the supported basis-of-all of the seed.
2.2.2.1.1.2.1 Identifying its nature
2.2.2.1.1.2.2 Explaining its characteristics extensively
2.2.2.1.1.2.1 Identifying its nature
Well then, should one enquire: If the supporting matured basis-of-all is like that, how is the supported basis-of-all of the seed?
17. Through infusing the supported,
The seed basis-of-all,
When the basis infused is
Manifestly oriented towards ceasing
A potency has been placed.
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When the mind basis-of-all which is the basis which is infused by the seven infusing collections of consciousness is manifestly oriented towards its, i.e. the infusers, ceasing, the potency which has been placed virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral seeds has disintegrated however, regarding the supported, the seed basis-of-all, in addition the virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral seeds are placed by the six collections and the afflicted mind places only neutral seeds . . .
Should one enquire how the seven infusing collections . . . are determined?
The seven infusing collections, that which is infused (the basis-of-all of the seed) and the basis infused both are mutually, permanently conjoined as . . . causal and . . . resulting things: the engaging consciousnesses, through nourishing the old seeds on the mind basis-of-all, act as the controlling condition for the factor of the seed basis-of-all and through implanting its new seeds, act as the causal condition thereof.
Through engaging the continuum of the engaging consciousnesses, the two basis-of-all, also act as their cause.
Well then, should one wonder: “Do the Cittamātrins assert simultaneous cause and effect?”
This is clearly asserted because [Asaṇga’s] Mahāyānasaṃgraha states:
Should one enquire how both the consciousness basis-of-all and thoroughly afflicted phenomena, while being simultaneous, are beheld as the one becoming being the cause of the other ? It is for instance like the occurrence of the flame of a butter-lamp and the burning wick being mutually simultaneous and like a bundle of spears not collapsing through simultaneously leaning on each other.
and also :
Just as the consciousness basis-of-all is the cause of thoroughly afflicted phenomena, likewise thoroughly afflicted phenomena are also posited as the causal condition of the consciousness basis-of-all: no other causal condition is observed.
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and because Je Tsong kha pa’s auto-commentary also states:
. . . from the standpoint of simultaneous cause and effect; from the standpoint of non-simultaneous [cause and effect], this explanation . . .
The “bundle of spears”, above, refers to the assertion that upon joining the tips of three spears , they will stay erect and remain leaning on each other; should one be missing, they will “collapse”. From the standpoint of non-simultaneous cause and effect, this explanation posits also a seed which will establish a factor of maturation of the basis-of-all of a future life.
Moreover, since both that base and that which infuses arise and cease together, [they] infuse: for instance, just as, when sesame and the sumanā flower i.e. the Jati flower, are collected together, through arising and ceasing, later, although that flower no longer exists, the sesame is subsequently affected by the perfume.
Here, although the Trashi lhünpo manuscript reads snum, since the Drepung manuscript reads sna ma, the former is mistaken.
2.2.2.1.1.2.2 Explaining its characteristics extensively
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.1 Explaining the characteristics of the basis infused
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.2 Explaining the divisions of the imprints infused in that.
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.3 Analysis of whether that is of one substance or a different substance with the supporting
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.4 What virtuous imprints and so forth are
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.5 Explaining the mode of placing imprints
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.6 The etymology of the supported basis-of-all of the seed
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.7 Teaching the times of engaging and countering.
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.1 Explaining the characteristics of the basis infused
Well then, should one enquire, what sort of a basis infused [by] the imprints is needed?
It is said:
. . . The basis infused
18. Is endowed with five characteristics:
Stable, neutral, that which is infused,
Being related to the infuser and
Having become the support of one limit.
The meaning:
From within the five characteristics with which the basis infused [by] the imprints is necessarily endowed: since the stable is devoid of severance of a continuum of similar type, it must be just as sesame . . . whereas the unsupported
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such as sound and lightning are unsuitable as basis infused, because the unsupported is not asserted to have imprints and even if they should have them, they would go to waste. This dispels the seven collections of consciousness and form being the basis infused, because:
1. although the five sensory consciousnesses occur occasionally, they do not always occur,
2. the mental consciousness also in keeping with the statement:
Mental consciousness always occurs
(With the exception of the bereft of discrimination,
Both aspects of meditative equipoise and
Mindless sleep and fainting.
does not engage during the period of the five mental absences and
3. the afflicted mind also:
Neither exists during a transcendental path
Nor does it exist, either, during meditative equipoise on cessation.
i.e. is non-existent during the meditative equipoise of an Ārya and during a meditative equipoise on cessation and
4. because even form is non-existent in the Formless.
Well then, should someone say, how could the basis-of-all also be a basis infused
because it is said:
From Arhathood, that is countered?
Because, for as long as the infusing exists, it is allowed to engage the continuum and because in the continuum of an Arhat, as well, the matured consciousness of the basis-of-all exists.
Moreover, someone’s statement:
It follows that the subject, the consciousness basis-of-all in the continuum of a person of the Desire [Realm], is not suitable as base infused of the imprints, because if form does not exist, it does not exist.
Amounts to releasing an arrow without seeing the target: isn’t it said “[it] must engage a continuum of similar type”?
From your perspective: well then, it follows that the subject, today’s basis-of-all, is unsuitable to be the base infused of the imprints, because tomorrow, it doesn’t exist. Three circles!
Here, within the manuscripts, the occurrences of superscribed “ra” and superscribed “sa“, in the verse :
. . . Stable, neutral, that which is infused
are manifestly wrong.
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It must be either virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral because, just as other scents cannot infuse extremely pleasant and unpleasant scents, any scent can infuse odorless scents like sesame, likewise, the virtuous and the non-virtuous are not suitable as infused base for, respectively, the non-virtuous and the virtuous, however, the neutral, which is like the odorless scent of sesame, is suitable to be the base infused by virtuous and non-virtuous seeds: there is no discordance between the neutral which is like an odorless scent and virtuous and non-virtuous minds being extremely clear. This teaches that the virtuous and the afflicted or non-virtuous are not suitable as basis infused.
Should someone say, doesn’t the verse above:
Because of being the basis infused with imprints and . . .
etc. establish that the consciousness basis-of-all is neutral? Why is it necessary to repeat this here?
While the verse, because of being the basis infused with imprints and . . ., etc., above, proves that the consciousness basis-of-all is by nature unstained and neutral, here stable, neutral, . . . and so forth does not prove that the consciousness which is the base infused by the imprints is neutral but through demonstrating that the base infused by the imprints is necessarily one endowed with five characteristics (the stable which engages the continuum uninterruptedly, which is neutral and so forth), then, from that standpoint, since, apart from the matured basis-of-all, there is none other to be beheld endowed with five characteristics and since that alone is determined to be the base infused by the imprints, there is no fault of redundancy.
That which is infused: since it is said that “[It] can infuse the impermanent, but cannot infuse the uncompounded. This teaches the uncompounded to be unsuitable as infused base because it counters the doubt wondering “Above, through teaching the supported to be a base infused [which is] neutral and neither established as virtuous nor non-virtuous at all, isn’t it necessarily, in that case, an uncompounded phenomenon?”
It is said to be that which is infused because:
i. the infuser, any of the seven collections of consciousness and the basis infused itself necessarily have a relationship of arising and ceasing simultaneously and
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ii. imprints of former non-simultaneous consciousnesses cannot infuse later consciousnesses and
iii. as to simultaneous ones as well, imprints of consciousnesses of other continuums cannot infuse consciousnesses or bases-of-all of other continuums.
This teaches that whatever is impermanent is unsuitable to be a basis infused by the imprints.
Moreover, when it is manifestly oriented towards ceasing by the infuser, the seven collections of consciousness, after both the consciousness directly infusing the imprints and the basis-of-all which is the basis infused have been generated simultaneously, such an infuser or [its] negation must have a relationship of arising and ceasing simultaneously with that basis infused or [its] negation.
It must have become the support of one limit, it is not manifold or under the sway of another: since contact and so forth, the associates of the matured rely on the consciousness basis-of-all, they have not become the support of one limit.
Should someone wonder: Do the associates of the basis-of-all, contact and so forth infuse the seeds which they establish or not?
Within the two approaches:
1. the one saying that “because of becoming causeless, [they] must infuse” and
2. the other “because the object observed and the aspect are extremely unclear, they do not infuse”
I endorse the latter one. Since both of these are effects impelled by virtue and non-virtue, it engages by the force of impelling and not by the force of the seed and in that case, if the basis-of-all, itself, also necessarily infused, it would not engage itself and since there is nothing else apart from it, the base infused would be unfindable.
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.2 Explaining the divisions of the imprints infused in that.
Regarding the explanation of the division of the infused imprints, from within:
A six-fold division, a three-fold division, two four-fold divisions . . .
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.2.1 The six-fold division
Should one enquire, if the base infused by the imprints is like that, is it included within the infused imprints?
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It is said:
19. Outer, inner and unclear,
Both, conventional and
Ultimate object, all of these
I accept as the six aspects of seeds.
The meaning:
If one divides that seed, there are outer seeds similar to barley seeds or utpala seeds and inner ones, the likes of the basis-of-all of the seed, and both outer and inner seeds which are not unclear at all, the thoroughly afflicted and the totally purified or the virtuous and non-virtuous and in brief, all of these, I accept as the six aspects of seeds.
In this context, in some of the textual commentaries on the “The Root [of the Difficult Points of Mind and Basis-of-all]” seeds which are not included within the continuum, such as the seeds of grain, roots, trunks and so forth are outer seeds while those included within the continuum i.e. seeds on the consciousness of all seeds are inner seeds. Moreover, if one posits both outer and inner seeds as well from the standpoint of nature:
i. virtuous, neutral seeds which are unclear and
ii. non-virtuous, neutral seeds which are unclear
the two unclears in the quote ” . . . and the unclear is determined to be two-fold“, would have both outer and inner seeds, would be posited as two having both a virtuous, unclear component and a non-virtuous, unclear, component.
However, while unclear in “. . .unclear, both . . .” refers either to:
i. the thoroughly purified or to
ii. virtuous and non-virtuous
unclear, “both” must be posited as both outer and inner seeds. This is so because, in Je Tsong kha pa’s auto-commentary, after explaining the meaning of “unclear”:
. . . unclear is neutral because it has both the thoroughly afflicted and the totally purified unclear or the virtuous and non-virtuous unclear.
when explaining the meaning of “both”, he states:
Both are outer seeds and inner seeds.
and also because both in the explanation of the Upanibandhana:
Unclear is neutral. Both is outer and inner.
is not said to be:
The virtuous and the non-virtuous being unclear.
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“Alternatively, both,” [because] it is posited as both . . . since:
i. . . . the seeds of all afflictions . . . dwell in the mind basis-of-all . . . all the afflictions and causality would become one and
ii. the seeds of all totally purified phenomena abide, it would become the causality of the totally purified.
It is said in the Upanibandhana:
Alternatively, effect and cause: these two reasons [demonstrate] that the basis-of-all has also both aspects. Regarding that, by means of foundational things which are cause and effect, thoroughly afflicted and totally purified phenomena arise.
Therefore, both unclear and conventional and ultimate seeds are not set aside from outer and inner seeds, however, because one posits:
i. both unclear from the standpoint of nature,
ii. outer, conventional seeds in dependence on a mind which neither investigates nor analyses
iii. inner, ultimate seeds in dependence on a mind which investigates and analyses
the latter two are posited in dependence on mind.
Although barley, roots and so forth are renowned as seeds in terms of the mere criteria of repute and appearance as uninvestigated and unanalysed, in reality, although outer and inner phenomena, such as barley sprouts, utpala and so forth, are manifestly established under the power of the maturation of seeds on the basis-of-all, since sprouts and so forth do no exist as arising from barley, roots and so forth established on the outside without depending on that, if one analyses well, the in the end, the seed of effects encounters a component of the seed of the basis-of-all.
In this Cittamātra system, one must accept that the mind which realises the emptiness of blue and the valid cogniser apprehending it being different substance, establishes blue as of the mere nature of mind and in that case, although there are many who will analyse the method of necessarily accepting emptiness as an implicative negation, know this in detail from Jangkya Rinpoche’s “Tenets” and so forth; contemporary debaters utter a lot of new-fangled blather which doesn’t enter my mind!
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Nonetheless, although simultaneous observations are necessarily empty of being other substances, they are not necessarily of one substance: the conception apprehending vase and the meaning generality of vase are explained to be simultaneous observations in the “Ornament of Reasoning of the Great Treatises on Valid Cognition” and so forth.
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.2.2 An explanation of the three-fold division
20. Moreover, the three, imprints of manifest verbalisation,
Of the view of the Self and of the limbs of existence.
The meaning:
It is said that there is threefold division into manifest verbalisation i.e. the seed of the mental consciousness having the aspect of verbalising “the eye is the eye” and “form is form”, the imprints of the view of the Self and the imprints of the limbs of existence.
Here, the first imprint is deposited only by the mental consciousness from within the six collections of depositors and is the causal condition of the mental consciousness imputing various designations. It is also called “elaborate imprint” because it is a seed elaborating the numerous objects of the mental consciousness. In that case, should someone quote the Mahāyānasaṃgraha:
Here, because whatever cognition of bodies, embodied ones and ingesters and
Whatever cognition of the thoroughly enjoyed and
Whatever cognition of the thorough enjoyer and
Whatever cognition of time, number, object and designation
Arise from seeds of the imprints of manifest verbalisation.
which states that the first nine of the fifteen cognitions arise from imprints of manifest verbalisation, within those nine, aren’t there also sensory consciousnesses? How can it be suitable to speak of “seeds of the mental consciousness”?
There is no fault . . . the statement . . . “seed of the mental consciousness”, is predominantly the case, however, what is taught here . . . are cognitions included within incorrect
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conceptualisation moreover the conceptualising cognitions imputing the designation “This is the body; this, the embodied!” arise from imprints of manifest verbalisation … they do not arise from the other two even though after thinking that those two, the body and the embodied, etc, are objects of that conceptuality, it is said that they arise from imprints of manifest verbalisation.
The imprints of the view of the Self are . . . posited by the afflicted mind and what is akin to it . . . seeds which arise as the cognition of the appearance as Self and other, i.e. “This is the Self. This is another. This is mine. This is another’s. This is not mine.” These are also named “imprints of the view of the disintegrating composite” because the view of the disintegrating composite arises from them.
Imprints of the limbs of existence are seeds which deposit a virtuous or non-virtuous impelling karma, i.e. the arising of the cognition appearing as happy . . . transmigrations etc. and . . . death and birth. These are also referred to as “imprints of maturation” because they arise as maturation from complete maturation.
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.2.3 An explanation of the four-fold division
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.2.3.1 An explanation of the first two-fold division of the four-fold one
21. The four aspect of seeds:
The common, the uncommon,
Those with sensation and those without. . . .
This is stated in two-and-a-half verses.
The meaning:
The common i.e. the seeds which establish the exterior world of the receptacle which has arisen from the accumulation of common karma upon the basis-of-all and the uncommon ones i.e. the seeds which establish sentient which are the inner essence arisen from the accumulation of uncommon karma and those with sensation i.e. the seeds which establish the inner essence apprehended by mind and the seeds without sensation which establish the exterior receptacle. The
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exclusion of the latter two, respectively, is just the enumeration of the former two however, there is nothing apart from the first two.
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.2.3.2 An explanation of the second two-fold division of the four-fold one
21. . . . The assumption of bad states,
22. Pliancy, completed behavior and
The uncompleted
Are also said to be the four.
The meaning:
Apart from the six-fold division of seeds and so forth there are also said to be the four, the seeds of:
1. the assumption of bad states, i.e. [of] the root afflictions, . . . the secondary afflictions and so forth and
2. pliancy the seeds of virtuous, mundane Dharmas, i.e. faith and so forth and
3. the completed i.e. the complete maturation and
4. the uncompleted, i.e. seeds which must mature.
As to the meaning of the completed and uncompleted behavior, although someone states completed maturation is posited as completed because it is unable to be nourished by new imprints and uncompleted maturation is posited as uncompleted because the nourishment by new imprints exists, Je Tsong kha pa himself asserts that is not the intent of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.3 Analysis of whether that is of one substance or a different substance with the supporting
Regarding the explanation of whether it is substantially one or different from the base:
If he states: are such two imprints or seeds substantially one or different from the matured consciousness which is their base?
23. From their base, imprints are, moreover,
Neither substantially one nor different.
The meaning:
After having formulated the thesis:
The supported basis-of-all of the seed or the imprint on the basis-of-all is, in addition, neither substantially one nor substantially different in the slightest with the base, the consciousness basis-of-all.
To counter this, the confutations are taught:
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24.Since the objects of observations of seeds exist and
The seeds of the five migrations
Would become erroneous and
The realms as well would become erroneous: [they] are not one.
The meaning:
Should one enquire what the defect of accepting that the imprint on the basis-of-all and the basis-of-all are one substantial existent might be.
There are three defects, in this case: it would follow that the subject, the supported basis-of-all of the seed, would have object of observation and aspect because of being substantially one with its base, the consciousness basis-of-all. The subject, the seeds which establish the five migrations, the gods and so forth, would become mutually erroneous: it would follow that the seed which establishes the migration of a god would become the seed and so forth establishing migration in hell, because these being un-differentiated [in terms of] instants and substantial parts from their base’s consciousness basis-of-all, would be of one nature.
Well then, are Devadatta’s mental consciousness and Yajñadatta mental consciousness substantially one with or different from mental consciousness?
In the first case, those two would also be substantially one, because those two would be substantially one with mental consciousness.
The second case is unsuitable: since those two are particulars of mental consciousness, they are of one nature with it however, should one think:
For what is of one nature to be of different substances is akin to the child of a barren woman!
This doubts defect does not exist: should whatever is a component of the consciousness basis-of-all which became substantially one with the seed establishing a divine rebirth be substantially one with the seed establishing a human rebirth, both seeds establishing divine and human rebirths would become erroneous and since mental consciousness is differentiated [in terms of] substantial parts:
i. whatever is a component which has become substantially one with Devadatta’s consciousness, is not substantially one with Yajñadatta’s consciousness and in addition,
ii. whatever is a component which has become substantially one with Yajñadatta’s consciousness is not substantially one with Devadatta’s consciousness
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the defect of those two becoming substantially one does not exist. However, the basis-of-all is not alike: should a basis-of-all which has become substantially one with a divine seed exist, a human seed on that basis-of-all would necessarily exist, because it is a matured consciousness apprehending seeds of the five migrations.
If that were accepted, such a basis-of-all and the human seed on it would also become substantially one and if that were accepted, the defect of two such human and divine seeds also becoming substantially one would exist.
Therefore, since Devadatta’s mental consciousness is of the nature of mental consciousness, it is substantially one with mental consciousness, however, since that mental consciousness is not established as of the nature of Devadatta’s mental consciousness, it is not substantially one with it.
Here, within the examples provided by Je Tsong kha pa’s commentary:
The existence of seeds of the five migrations on one base, simultaneously, would have to exist and both of these, in addition, would have to be accepted as substantially one with one instant of that base’s consciousness basis-of-all and, since that instant has no parts, those five seeds having no substantial parts, would become one, i.e. would be of the nature of one, component-less consciousness.
Should someone ask, how?
The existence of seeds of the five migrations on one base, simultaneously, would have to exist and both of these, in addition, would have to be accepted as substantially one with one instant of that base’s consciousness basis-of-all and, since that instant has no parts, those five seeds having no substantial parts, would become one because two parts of consciousness would be of one nature.
apart from component-less consciousness and two parts of consciousness not being alike, everything is alike, the repetition of the second reply is, in my opinion, a better example.
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Should someone say that your explanation is inappropriate because it would be contradictory with statements of Je Tsong kha pa, himself:
Therefore, as long as one asserts a substantially established generality apart from the instances, one is unable to abandon both defects of investigating [as] substantially one and substantially different.
. . . if, after having accepted [that they are] substantially one, the assertion [that they had] two parts was devoid of contradiction, since both the branch and that which is endowed with branches are substantially one, even Buddha would be unable to refute [this].
The meaning of the former passage is as follows: for instance, within the four pillars of a small house, each of the pillars and so forth of the eastern side within what exists [as the] four pillars is a particular of pillar within them and that pillar within them is a generality pervading the eastern pillar and so forth within them nonetheless, according to the assertion of the Tīrthikas, the generality which succeeds to the eastern pillar and so forth within them, is substantially existent and whatever is a component succeeding to the eastern pillar and so forth succeeds to the western pillar and so forth and as long as it is asserted that something exists apart from the four pillars within them:
i. should the pillars within these be substantially one with pillar within these, all pillars would become substantially one however,
ii. should they be substantially different [from the generality, pillar], it would not be possible to abandon the defect of the pillars within these becoming the non-pillar within these.
The meaning of the latter passage is as follows: for instance, having accepted the likes of form as a thing which becomes substantially one with vase, if in addition the assertion [that they had] two components, one component succeeding to pillar and one not succeeding to it was devoid of contradiction, . . . after having accepted [that] that which is endowed with branches i.e. the likes of Devadatta and its branch are things which are substantially one, should one think:
Wouldn’t even Buddha . . . be unable to refute the statement “it has two components”?
Because there are many lines of reasoning confuting this:
The realms would also become erroneous viz. it follows that the subject, the seed which will establish the maturation of the likes of a Form Realm god deposed in a basis-of-all of [the] Desire [Realm] . . . would . . . belong to the Ground of Desire because of being substantially one with its base, that consciousness basis-of-all.
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It is said “not to be substantially one”. To teach that, if [they] were substantially other, such confutations would also exist:
25. Since on one base, two basis-of-all
There would be, they are not distinct.
The meaning:
Such a seed would not be form or non-associated compositional phenomena because . . . if . . . form does not exist, it exists and because it is substantially existent. Also, it is not the seven collections at all . . . because . . . on the occasion when they are non-existent, whilst in the like of an equipoise of cessation, they still engage. Therefore, both consciousnesses basis-of-all would . . . become one and from that standpoint since two consciousnesses basis-of-all would exist simultaneously and distinctly on one base, there would also be multiple continuums on one base. Therefore, different substantial existents are not distinct.
Even should someone think:
This is not definite because one mind . . . has . . . many mental factors arising in association and even though the basis-of-all and the seven collections of consciousness exist concurrently nonetheless they do not become many.
Mental factors engage in dependency on one mind and the seven . . . collections also engage from the standpoint of one basis-of-all and basis-of-all are independent, stable consciousnesses.
Well then, since according to your perspective it is taught that both are confuted, how do both the consciousness basis-of-all and the imprints on it abide?
26. Therefore, they are ineffably
Neither just that nor other from the base,
Because of abiding as mere imputed existents.
Whichever of the two positions one has accepted is confuted by logic, therefore
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imprints are to be understood as abiding . . . ineffably as absolutely neither just that substantially existent nor as a substantially existent other from its base the consciousness basis-of-all, because of abiding as mere imputed existents.
In brief, the meaning of the statement that imprints do not exist as substantially one with or substantially different from their base is that, after reflecting that if they were a single substantial existent with their base, they would definitely become one entity,
[24.] . . . the objects of observations of seeds exist and. . .
and concerning:
[24.] . . . the realms . . . would become erroneous . . .
Je Tsong kha pa’s auto-commentary states: because . . . that newly deposited seed would be a consciousness basis-of-all of the Desire Realm.
Scholars consider that Ācārya Dharmakīrti asserts that whatever is a thing is necessarily substantially established, whereas Asaṇga and his sibling assert that whatever is a thing is either substantially established or not substantially established. Since Je Tsong kha pa, himself, states:
This Ācārya subdivides things into substances and imputed [phenomena, in keeping] with the siblings because although they accept that non-associated compositional phenomena are composite, they not accept that they are substances.
[This Ācārya] asserts that both are substantially one but of different isolates. Since the Buddhist terminology of other textual traditions is wealthy [in such statements], this is not something he came out with by himself.
although it is “known” and if one investigates what is implicit, it is like this, however, Je Tsong kha pa’s intent is extremely difficult [to fathom] and inasmuch as the words of the commentary are also adamantine, resolving them has required a discerning mind up to the present day.
If one divides substantial existence terminologically, there is a three-fold subdivision into:
1. substantial existents able to perform a function,
2. substantial existents able of being autonomous and
3. unstable substantial existents.
The first is synonymous with composite phenomena whereas the second is synonymous with phenomena which are substantially existent.
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.3 Analysis of whether that is of one substance or a different substance with the supporting
Let us posit uncompounded space, the Truth of Cessation and so forth, imputed
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existence is also subdivided into three:
1. imputed existence which is merely imputed conceptually,
2. imputed existence which depends on another basis of imputation,
3. imputed existence necessarily relying on oneself [and] other phenomena being apprehended.
The last and imputed existence are synonymous. Likewise, also, in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha:
In brief, that which is suitable not to rely on another than that and imputes its characteristics without being supported by another than that, is to be known as substantially existent.
That which is suitable to rely on another than that and imputes its characteristics while being supported by another than that, is to be known as imputedly existent.
[the distinction between substantial and imputed existence is] posited in terms of whether that which is apprehended by oneself must rely or not on the apprehension of another phenomenon and moreover, the likes of persons are imputedly existent whereas forms, sounds, smells, tastes and tactile sensations which are the objects of activity of the senses are substantially existent and while it is in keeping with the statement that “all consciousnesses are substantially existent”, form which has become apprehended by the visual consciousness has both substantially [and] imputedly [existent components]: blue and the like is substantially existent and length is imputedly existent (since short is posited by relying on long and long is posited by relying on short, they are imputedly existent).
Concerning tactile sensations, as well, cold and the like and warmth are substantial existents and vase and the like is an imputed existent. Also, regarding consciousness, since Jangkya Rinpoche states that:
All unalterable consciousnesses are substantially existent.
since :
i. wrath, vindictiveness, spitefulness, envy and violence are imputed on anger;
ii. avarice, arrogance, agitation are imputed on desire and
iii. dissimulation, deceitfulness, pretense, sleep, lethargy are imputed on benightedness
consciousness has numerous imputed existents.
Although it is said that all persons, all non-associated compositional phenomena
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and all permanent phenomena are posited as imputed existents, while the own-isolate of persons is an imputed existent, the base-isolate obtains substantial existents because the consciousness basis-of-all is substantially existent.
Should someone doubts such explanations, thinking:
If unalterable consciousnesses are substantially existent, they would become substantial existent able of being autonomous, because, previously, it was stated that:
i. substantial existence and substantial existents able of being autonomous were synonymous and
ii. these are stated, here, to be synonymous.
Should this be accepted, their emptiness of being substantial existents able of being autonomous would not be the meaning of their emptiness of a self of persons and, in addition, another meaning of their emptiness of a self is not found.
Unfindability is not established because these are conscious agents and the emptiness of being substantial existents able of being autonomous of persons endowed with that in their continuum is the meaning of their being empty of a self of persons. For more details, peruse Jangkya rölpe dorje’s “Tenets” with great admiration.
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.4 An analysis of what the nature of imprints is
27. Irrespective of whether the depositor is virtuous and so forth,
The deposited imprint is neutral.
The meaning:
Irrespective of whether the depositor, the imprint, is virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral, its deposited imprints are to be known, similarly, as neutral (and “unstained” is an additional word).
Should someone say, it follows that this is unsuitable because such an assertion contradicts both scripture and logic because:
1. as to what contradicts scripture, it is said in the Abhidharmasamuccaya:
Should one enquire what subsequently related virtue is?
That which is the imprint of just those.
i.e. imprints deposited by a virtuous depositor are subsequently related virtue
and:
Should one enquire what subsequently related non-virtue is?
The imprints of just those.
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i.e. non-virtuous imprints are subsequently related non-virtue.
2. This is also contradictory with logic:
2.1 It follows that the subject, virtuous and non-virtuous imprints, would not operate as matured causes because of being neutral. It is not the case that there is no definiteness because:
Matured causes are only non-virtuous
And contaminated virtuous ones.
2.2 It follows that the subject, virtuous and non-virtuous seeds, would not generate causally concordant effects because a neutral cause would have virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral effects.
2.3 It would follow that after obtaining vows, for so long as they were not for repudiated, virtue would not arise continually because when the six collections cease, although the imprints of vows exist within its continuum, they would not be virtuous.
In answer:
28. The assertion that [they] are fully-characterised virtue
Or non-virtue has no proof.
The meaning:
You taught that this is contradictory with both logic and scripture. This does not invalidate it in the slightest: although the Abhidharmasamuccaya refers to imprints as subsequently related to virtue or non-virtue, it does not refer to fully-characterised virtue or non-virtue and if subsequently related virtue and so forth was fully-characterised , subsequently related form also would be fully-characterised form. In that case, if form did not exist, form would exist, because, subsequently-related form exists there, because, the imprints of form exist there.
If, also upon investigating:
. . . it would follow that they would not operate as matured causes . . .
was to accept that:
they would not be impelling, matured [causes] because those imprints would have been impelled by virtuous and non-virtuous depositors.
If the statement, matured causes would not be generated, is not definite, the previous instant of the consciousness basis-of-all would also not become neutral because it is the cause of the second instant thereof.
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Also the statement:
Matured causes are only non-virtuous
and . . .
does not undermine it because impelling, matured causes are intended.
Also:
. . . it would follow that causally concordant effects
would not be generated does not undermine it because the effects concordant with the cause of that imprint merely being causally concordant with its very depositor satisfies the meaning of being causally concordant.
Also:
. . .vows . . . would not arise continually. . .
does not undermine it because, if the potency of the vows exists within the continuum of degenerated ethics, previously taken vows can be posited as existent merely through that and are engaged even on the occasion of mindlessness,. Therefore:
The assertion that imprints are fully-characterised virtue
Or non-virtue has no scriptural and logical proof.
Here, within the examples of the auto-commentary, it is clear that, in the statement:
. . . otherwise, the previous instant of the consciousness basis-of-all would also become neutral.
a negative particle was elided since it is asserted to be neutral, how could this induce an unwanted consequence, because the other party also accepts that answer.
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.5 Explaining the mode of depositing imprints
Should one enquire: Do these imprints remain primordially on the basis-of-all or is one newly placed by depositors? Regarding this, do both exist?
29. The mode of deposition of imprints is threefold.
Abiding in thusness, previously ungenerated
I accept both of these.
The meaning:
Three systems of the Ācāryas of the Yogācāra arose. From within the three systems of assertion:
1. Ācārya Dharmapāla and the Abbot of the Pibrīttiguhyārtha assert that imprints dwell in Thusness without relying on an infuser and engaging consciousnesses only nourish the old ones;
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2. Ācārya Candraprabha and so forth assert only new deposition by infusers without dwelling in Thusness and
3. the other Ācāryas assert both imprints dwelling in Thusness and new . . . deposition
here, the last one will be upheld. Regarding that, uncontaminated seeds are ones dwelling primordially in the basis-of-all without being deposited newly by a depositor: this is called the Natural Lineage. When uncontaminated seeds have been sown by hearing, both their enhancement and the Natural Lineage are asserted.
Why is it called “imprint of hearing”?
Because of being the abode of hearing the Twelve Limbs of Scripture and so forth upon encountering Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.
Why is it called “Naturally dwelling Lineage”?
Because of dwelling from the inception in Thusness without being deposited by a depositor.
Why is it called the characteristic of the Six Sources?
Because the Six Sources of whichever continuum is endowed with it is characterised with regards to the Six Sources of another one. Since both causally concordant seeds (or seeds of concordant type) and seeds of maturation are deposited by virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral depositors, they are not attained through Thusness.
If one subdividides this into newly deposited or not by depositors, attained through Thusness, under the sway of being deposited newly and having a beginning or not, although Lineage is beginningless, it is the causally concordant, incremental infuser [of] both seeds of maturation and seeds of concordant type, in addition, [it] has arisen from causally concordant seeds and such a former causally concordant seed is its infuser, moreover, inasmuch as it has arisen from its previous causally concordant seed, although the beginning of a seed of concordant type, whose beginning is
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unfindable, does not exist, the beginning of a seed of concordant type, newly deposited by virtuous, non-virtuous or neutral depositors, does exist. Likewise, if seeds of maturation had a beginning, cyclic existence would have a beginning however, if there were no beginning, in particular [cases], impelling karma would not deposit seeds of maturation. Therefore, although, in general, both seeds of concordant type and seeds of maturation have no beginning, in particular [cases], they do. For instance, even though, in general, cyclic existence is beginningless, in particular, the like of Devadatta’s aggregates which are a substantial cause are cyclic existence and have a beginning.
2.2.2.1.1.2.2.6 The etymology of the supported basis-of-all of the seed
Why is the supported seed basis-of-all called “basis-of-all”?
30. Because of being conjoined
To all thoroughly afflicted phenomena,
Causal or resulting things,
Basis-of-all!
The meaning:
In general, basis-of-all is stated, for the sake of conjoining . . . to all phenomena and, in particular, there is a reason for stating basis-of-all with respect to the component of the seed basis-of-all: that component of the seed basis-of-all, i.e. thoroughly afflicted afflictions, thoroughly afflicted karma and thoroughly afflicted birth, are conjoined here to causal things of all thoroughly afflicted phenomena or, alternatively, . . . because . . . both are conjoined to . . . resulting things, it is called basis-of-all. In addition, that supported basis-of-all of the seed is the causal condition of all thoroughly afflicted phenomena because, since the seeds of both of those phenomena exist within it, both their results arise from it.
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2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2.7 Teachings the times of engaging and countering
For how long do the supporting, matured basis-of-all and the supported, seed basis-of-all engage and from when on are they countered?
31. Therefore, Those who have attained Dominion and Arhats
Have no basis-of-all
Because neither depositor exists.
The meaning:
It is because of:
1. the immediately preceding explanation, regarding the seed basis-of-all, that the meaning of being deposited in the basis-of-all occurred through the reasons that either all thoroughly afflicted phenomena were its resulting things or that it was conjoined with both its causal things and
2. the explanation, formerly, in the context of:
15. Because it is conjoined
With the Self,
Basis-of-all.
that the meaning of the matured basis-of-all of being deposited in the basis-of-all occurred through the reason that all migrators, here, were conjoined to the Self by the afflicted mind
that Mahāyāna Āryas on the Eight Ground and above who have attained Dominion over non-conceptual wisdom and Hearer and Solitary Realiser Arhats have neither the matured, supporting basis-of-all nor the supported, seed basis-of-all because they utterly lack the depositors in the basis-of-all formerly explained.
Therefore, one should know that after attaining the Eight Ground, the afflictive obstructions, without exception, have been abandoned. Je Tsong kha pa states:
Eighth Ground Bodhisattvas who have attained Dominion and above and Hearer and Solitary Realiser Arhats, in particular, lack the component of the seed basis-of-all and, in general, are bereft of the consciousness basis-of-all because, having abandoned the afflictions without exception, neither depositor in the basis-of-all exists in the slightest.
and also, in the system of the Abidharmasamuccaya: After attaining the Eight Ground, it follows that it is asserted that afflictions are abandoned, because the like is asserted by the Viniścayasaṃgraha and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.
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This cannot be asserted because it is stated in the Abidharmasamuccaya:
When their Enlightenment is attained, afflictive obstructions and obstructions to omniscience are abandoned concurrently.
Therefore, since in the system of the Abidharmasamuccaya, the mode of countering of the basis-of-all and of the afflicted mind is discordant with that in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and so forth, it must be modified. The mode of countering the three imprints is as follows:
1. the imprints of the limbs of existence engage until the matured effect arises, its arising and countering [are simultaneous] however
2. the imprints of the view of the Self and the afflictive, elaborating imprints engage until the direct antidote [is applied], and are countered thereafter. From the standpoint of the Hinayāna, virtuous and neutral elaborating imprints, engage until a remainderless nirvaṇa and are countered thereafter whereas, from that of the Mahāyāna, [they] engage until Buddhahood and are countered thereafter.
Well then, if the basis-of-all and the afflicted mind do not exist within the continuum of Bodhisattvas who have attained Dominion and lower Arhats, the eight collections of consciousness would not exist within both of their continuums.
There is no fault since the seven minds and the matured consciousness exist within both of their continuums. Therefore, one should know that just that matured consciousness is posited as the consciousness basis-of-all until the afflictions are abandoned and, when the afflictions are abandoned, is posited as the matured consciousness. Therefore:
1. The intersection of the consciousness basis-of-all existing and the engaging consciousness not existing, is the Five States;
2. The intersection of the engaging consciousness existing and the basis-of-all not existing is on the occasion of Bodhisattvas who have attained Dominion and Arhats;
3. Both exist, at the time when . . . a . . . mind . . . other than those exist;
4. Neither exists, at the time a person who has abandoned the afflictions engages in a cessation.
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In this vein, since the nature of the supported, seed, basis-of-all definitely change in function of the distinctions of the support and so forth, one should know the nominal imputations of the characteristics of the seed basis-of-all on both of these.
2.2.2.1.2 Explaining the definition of the afflicted mind
2.2.2.1.2.1 Explaining object of observation and aspect
2.2.2.1.2.2 Determining its nature
2.2.2.1.2.3 Determining its associates
2.2.2.1.2.4 Teaching the times of engaging and countering
2.2.2.1.2.1 Explaining object of observation and aspect
Well then, what would the definition of the afflicted mind be like?
32. The definition of the afflicted mind is:
A matured component of the basis-of-all and
With the view of the Self . . .
The meaning:
From within the four-fold explanation of the afflicted mind (object of observation, aspect, nature and associates), as to the object of observation, after observing only the matured component of the basis-of-all, the view of the Self of that aspect is the conceit of the Self.
. . . Although, after the appearance of that . . . matured consciousness, it does not perform as object . . . , since, in dependence on that, it is generated as a mistaken . . . Self for the afflicted mind, it is posited as object.
2.2.2.1.2.2 Explaining its nature
Well then, is that afflicted mind virtuous and so forth or neutral?
32. . . . obscured but neutral . . .
The meaning:
That afflicted mind should be known as obscured because this mind is . . . befouled by the four root afflictions, its associates and as neutral through seeing that asserting it as virtuous or non-virtuous is undermined.
Regarding the meaning of obscured and unobscured, someone’s statement:
The consciousness basis-of-all is unobscured and the afflicted mind is obscured.
is meaningful because the first does not obscure an Ārya’s meditative equipoise and the latter is obscured and mulling over the fact that without abandoning the afflictive obscurations . . . Liberation is not attained, since Liberation is obscured, it is called obscured.
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Well then, it follows that the subject, the virtuous and neutral minds of Āryas, having become distracting factors . . . would become obscured because they obscure an Ārya’s equipoise. You accepted the entailment.
It follows that the subject, meritorious and immutable karmas, are obscured because of obscuring Liberation, because without abandoning both of these, Liberation is not attained. Therefore, although the meaning of obscured and unobscured, in this context, is our own Dharma, [what] others [make of] our own side’s obscured and unobscured is not the meaning of obscured and unobscured for others.
Well then, what undermines the assertion that that is virtuous or non-virtuous?
Likewise, if this was virtuous or non-virtuous, it would follow that virtuous and non-virtuous minds which arise manifestly in ordinary beings, would not exist because this would engage continually until an Ārya Path was attained.
2.2.2.1.2.3 Determining its associates
Well then, as to the associates of the afflicted mind, where are they?
With only nine: contact, lust and so forth.
The meaning:
As to the associates of the afflicted mind, there are definitely only nine because only the nine (the five omnipresent [mental factors], contact etc. and lust and so forth. i.e. the four, desire, ignorance, pride and the view of the Self) akin to it engage. Sensation associated with it is equanimous sensation, because, if this were not the case, in an ordinary being happy or unhappy minds would always occur and . . . the Fourth Contemplation and above would become [the grounds of] someone on the ground of pleasant sensation and even in the Avici [hell] , a happy mind would always engage un-interruptedly. [It’s] being happy or suffering is illogical. The reference to it’s “joyful aspect” . . . is the joyful aspect of desire . . . not the joyful aspect of sensation.
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Someone says, It is not definite that its associates are nine-fold: by adding these six distraction . . . , heedlessness. . . , agitation. . . , faithlessness. . . , laziness. . . and lethargy. . . associated with it . . ., aren’t there fifteen associates?
Such does occur, however since distraction is imputed on pride associated with it, heedlessness is imputed on desire and benightedness, agitation is imputed on desire, faithlessness, laziness and lethargy are imputed on benightedness, inasmuch as these lack a substance apart from their basis of imputation, there is no fault. In addition:
Isn’t reference made to “un-afflicted desire and so forth” associated with it?
Although that seventh mind in the continuum of a Hinayāna Learner in equipoise is not an afflicted mind, four akin from the standpoint of nomenclature with the desire and so forth associated with it, do arise and inasmuch as they are not included within one I’s mental factors, they are not counted.
Does this afflicted mind belong or not to the ground on the support of which it is generated?
This is similar in meaning to the verse of the Trimśika:
Wherever it arises, that is its’.
Well then, on a support of the Desire Realm, being bereft of lust in the Desire Realm does not exist through a path having the aspect of coarse pacification and Non-Returners having a support of the Desire Realm would not have abandoned the desire of the Desire Realm?
There is no fault: [An] ordinary being of the Desire Realm . . . bereft of lust in the Desire Realm refers principally to being bereft of the lust for copulation . . . and having abandoned lust for the five objects of desire however, the statement:
Non-Returners have abandoned the afflictions of the Desire Realm
applies to the ninth [abandonment of meditation of] desire and that arises among the associates of the sixth whereas such designations are unsuitable for the associates of the seventh mind.
2.2.2.1.2.4 Teaching the times of engaging and countering
What are the times of engaging . . . of such an afflicted mind?
33. At the period of equipoise on cessation,
Finally: the Ones having attained Power, the Arhats.
The meaning:
Notes
1. I have relied for this translation on:
1. the excellent Lhasa edition of Ke’u tshang Rinpoche’s commentary in his “Collected Works” (Ke’u tshang blo bzang ‘jam dbyangs smon lam gyi gsung ‘bum, vol. 1, Lhasa, 2010, pp. 170-253, which has been the Uhrschrift (henceforth “L”)
and
2.the Dharamsala edition of Ke’u tshang Rinpoche’s commentary in his “Collected Works” ( Blo bzang ‘jam dpal smon lam, LTWA, Dharamsala, 1984, vol. 1, pp. 181-254), henceforth “D”
The page numbers of the Lhasa edition are put in the left margin of the translation in bold characters.
As multiple layers of text, both root text and commentary intersect, I have adopted the following conventions:
i. Ke’u tshang Rinpoche’s commentary is in plain text.
ii. All doubts explicitly evoked by Ke’u tshang Rinpoche are in italics.
iii. Je Tsong kha pa’s root text is in bold characters.
iv. Je Tsong kha pa’s auto-commentary is in small characters and
v. all other quotes are merely indented.
When reference is made to a passage or a term in the body of Ke’u tshang Rinpoche’s commentary, it is put in the corresponding characters, if a term is quoted from any text of category v, it is merely put in quotation marks.
2. Ke’u tshang blo bzang ‘jam dbyangs smon lam (ca. 18th cent.) was a famous Gelug teacher, disciple of the illustrious 2nd Reting Rinpoche, Blo bzang ye shes bstan pa rab rgyas (1759-1815). Apart from Je Tsong kha pa’s auto-commentary, his commentary is one of the two standard commentaries on the “Root of the Difficult Points of Mind and basis-of-all” (the other commentary is Gung thang bstan pa’i sgron me’s)
3. Tb. mkhyen rtse nus pa. The three characteristics of an appropriate object of Refuge
4. i.e. Je Tsong kha pa.
5. The prologue of Ke’u tshang’s commentary is a tour de force of Classical Tibetan poetry:
i. the f i. the first four verses of praise of Buddha Śākyamuni have 21 feet each
ii. they are followed by four 17 feet verses praising the lineage masters and culminating in praise of Je Tsong kha pa, presented as Second Conqueror
iii. these are followed by four verses of 15 feet each, praising Je Tsong kha pa as the emanation of Mañjuśrī who synthesised the corpus of teachings received from Ancient India
iv. the prologue concludes with 8 verses of 9 feet each which paraphrase the motivation Je Tsong kha pa formulates at the beginning of his “Root of the Difficult Points of Mind and Basis- of-All”.
I have indented the various sections relative to each other to give a sense of the dramatic buildup Khe’u tshang Rinpoche is able to evoke.
6. i.e. the great monument erected to all departed proponents of the Cittamātra view.
7. The following verses have 17 feet.
8. The three main later proponenets of the Prāsaṇgika view.
9. The usage of the verb “to whirl” here is reminiscent of Yeats’ fascination with whorls.
10. Vasubandhu
11. Author of a famous commentary on Vasubandhu’s Trimśika (“The Thirty”).
12. Sthiramati, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti were all considered proponents of Cittamātra.
13. “The Unconquered”, an epithet of Maitreya.
14. Implicit in this verse is the existence of a Lower Vehicle Yogācāra, not by view, but by method, since there are Yogācāra Hearers and Solitary Realisers.
15. The following verses have 15 feet.
16. Je Tsong kha pa.
17. All Buddhist schools of Tenets claim to dwell in a middle bereft of the extremes of eternalism and nihilism. They, however, disagree on what these extremes are.
18. The following verse have 9 feet.
19. i.e. Maitreya’s Five Treatises:
1. The Ornament of Clear Realisation (Abhisamayālaṃkāra)
2. The Ornament of the Māhayāna sūtrās (Māhayānasūtrālaṃkāra)
3. Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes (Madhyāntavibhāga)
4. Distinguishing Dharma and Dharmatā (Dharma-dharmatā-vibhāga)
5. The Sublime Continuum of the Māhayāna (Uttaratantra Śāstra)
20. Dga’ ldan khri chen yongs ‘dzin ngag dbang snyan grags, referred to in the praise on the following page
21. Ke’u tshang Rinpoche is paraphrasing the first stanza of Je Tsong kha pa’s “Root Verses”:
I will explain, here, in dependence on the utterances of the Guru,
For the sake of healing my memory and
Teaching clearly mind and basis-of-all,
The extremely difficult topics of the treatises of the Vijñaptimātrins.
22. Tb. Drang nges legs bshad snying po. Interestingly, Ke-utshang Rinpoche presents “The Essence of Eloquence” as Je Tsong kha pa’s main achievement.
23. Je Tsong kha pa is presented as a systematiser who constructed a major synthesis from multiple sources.
24. This was one of the main critiques addressed by Je Tsong kha pa’s successors to many of the schools which had become prevalent in Tibet at his time: excessive relianc on purported oral instructions which had no connection with the great Indian sources. In this respect, Je Tsong kha pa’s reformation can be seen as similar in spirit with that of Martin Luther.
25. i.e. a Liberation calling for no particular effort and which one can achieve without abandoning wordly pursuits.
26. i.e. the Truth of Suffering and of the Origin of Suffering.
27. i.e. emptiness. The final part of the sentence alludes to the Truths of Cessation and of the Path.
28. The blessings of the name of Je Tsong kha pa are encapsulated in the migtsema, recited to this date by all Gelug practitioners,
29. Tb. rkang grangs the basic fiscal unit of land in ancient Tibet measured in rkang, broadly corresponding to the English unit of the “square foot”. The metaphor of a unit of surface is used to refer to the scope of the object of negation according to the various schools of tenets: the lower schools, such as Vaibhāṣika or Sautrantika have a lower footage, i.e. they negate less, whereas the higher schools of tenets, viz. Cittamātra and the Mādhyamika schools, have a much higher footage inasmuch as they negate far more.
30. The meaning, here, refers to selflessness according to the various schools of tenets.
31. In other words, although physically part of the age of degeneration, Je Tsong kha pa’s teachings were unstained by it.
32. Tb. spyod yul
33. Tb. spyod tshul
34. i.e. “The Essence of Eloquence” and both the root text and the commentary of “ The Root and the Difficult Points of Mind and Basis-of-all”. Both texts address the Cittamātra view: the first presents Buddhist hermeneutics relying mainly on the Samdhinirmocana Sūtra, while the second is a sui generis presentation of Cittamātra doctrine.
35. In other words, although mired in ignorance, we have taught others without severing our own doubts.
36. Tb. gsos sman
37. i.e. commentaries.
38. Tb. gtsor ‘don
39. Emending L. 172.10 sbyor to D., 184.1 skyor
40. Sk. vacana, Tb. bka’. This is a term specifically used for texts or teachings whose “canonical” authority is the same as actual utterances of the Buddha. To apply it to the utterances of one’s teachers amounts to equating them with Fully Enlightened Beings.
41. The 2nd Reting Rinpoche (1759-1815), the main teacher of Ke-u tshang Rinpoche.
42. Such as the word by word commentary published by Gomang monastery, “Yid dang kun gzhi’i rtsa ba’i mchan ‘grel” (Gomang monastery, Mundgod, 1974).
43. Je Tsong kha pa’s root teacher.
44. One who wishes to generate
A certainty similar to his own within another,
Will have stated the presence of the subject in the reason, the relation,
The thesis and abandons the rest.
Dignaga : “Pramaṇasamucchaya”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 97, p. 65
In this famous stanza, perhaps the founding stanza of Buddhist logic, the “relation” refers to the forward entailment of the reason by the predicate.
45. It is a characteristic of Bodhisattvas that they teach whatever is of greatest benefit to other beings, hence they will teach systems of tenets which are not their own, but which are beneficial for the other party. The subtext of these lines is that, even though the Cittamātra view was not Je Tsong kha pa’s final view, nor hat of many of its propounders, they taught it for the benefit of their trainees.
46. It is insufficient to understand the mode of progression on the paths of the Three Vehicles, one must first be convinced that they actually exist.
47. While the utterances of the Conquerors are manifold, the intent is one.
48. A traditional punishment meted out to criminals in Tibet abolished by the XIIIth Dalai Lama in a major judiciary reform in 1913 which abolished capital punishment and severe punishment (typically, the amputation of limbs).
49. In Je Tsong kha pa’s ” The Root of the Difficult Points of Mind and Basis-of-all”
50. Tb. ‘chad po
51. In the prologue to his “Essence of Eloquence” (Drang nges legs bshad snying po)
52. Because of fundamental syntactic differences between Tibetan and English (Tibetan is an SOV language whereas English is an SVO language), the verse order when translating verse from Tibetan to English or reciprocally will be frequently affected.
53. This clarifies the purpose of Ke’u tshang’s commentary: to enable those who had not studied in the Great Seats of Sera, Ganden and Drepung to gain access to an understanding of the difficult points of the Cittamātra system.
54. Tb. ‘tshol ba
55. Tb. yongs su shes pa
56. Tb. rang stobs kyis
57. These are the three perfect causes for the composition of a treatise.
58. i.e. Je Tsong kha pa
59. viz. the sciences of arts and crafts, medicine, grammar, logic, and Buddhist philosophy.
60. cf. “Myam med tsong kha pa mdzad pa’i byang chub lam rim che ba”, p. 10, The Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, Taiwan, 2000
61. Nāgārjuna’s “Suhṛllekha”, vs. 17.
62. This famous stanza from the Nitiśastraprajñadanda attributed to Nāgārjuna reads:
Do not make many holy promises
If you have made pledges,
May they be akin to an engraving on stone,
Which you will not change, even at the price of your life.
63. Tb. shing rta’i srol
64. Tb. srol. The Tibetan term srol has two meanings, the first ‘system” and the second “track” or “path”. Hence, the term shing rta’i srol has both a literal and a metaphorical usage:
1. literally, shing rta’i srol is a “chariot-track” whereas
2. metaphorically, it is the “system of a chariot”
Western usage systematically privileges the abstract over the concrete and as a result the richness of the Tibetan texts and its earthy flavor is often lost. I have therefore opted for the literal rendering of shing rta’i srol but encourage the reader to keep the meaning of the metaphor in mind.
65. Tb. srol ‘byed pa po
66. Geshe Yama Rinchen states that these are the extremes of existence and nihilism.
67. i.e. the First Ground.
68. Dwags po ngag dbang grags pa, the 15th century Abbot of Dwags po monastery (who, although bearing the same name as Je Tsong kha pa’s disciple, Tsago ngag dbang grags pa (late 14th cent.), author of a remarkable commentary on the Bodhicittavivaraṇa, is completely unrelated).
69. Ancient India.
70. Tb. nyan thos sde pa
71. Which is an interesting, albeit probably over-optimistic view of the relation between Hinayāna and Mahāyāna in Ancient India as there is substantial evidence of strong disagreement on precisely this point. Perhaps, what Ke’u tshang Rinpoche is attempting to say is that many Hearers were Cittamātra or even Mādhyamika by view and therefore would have accepted the Mahāyāna Sūtras as teachings of the Buddha.
72. Source unknown.
73. In other words: 1. definitions
2. proofs
3. refuting the nine collections of consciousness
4. refuting the one collection of consciousness.
74. Quite a bit of awkwardness is introduced in Ke-tshang Rinpoche’s outline by the fact that he mentions subdivisions 2.2.2.1.1.1 and 2.2.2.1.1.2 as an after-thought, after giving the general subdivision of 2.2.2.1.
75. Tb. nye bar len bya
76. Tb. nye bar len pa po
77. Tb. mngon par zhen pa i.e. the manifest conception.
78. Tb. nye bar len byed
79. Tb. mngon brjod kyi bag chags
80. Vasubandhu’s “Thirty Verses” (Triṃśikā), stanza 3.
81. As quoted in Vasubandhu’s “Thirty Verses”.
82. Sanskrit, just as modern Arabic, in addition to the singular and plural numbers, has specific endings for those items coming in pairs, known as the dual number.
83. Tb. rnam rig
84. i.e. places and entities
85. i.e. the mind basis-of-all
86. In other words, the mind basis-of-all is an inattentive mind, a mind to which phenomena appear, but which cannot ascertain them.
87. Tb. thal
88. Sthiramati: “Commentary on “The Thirty””, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p. 398
89. The context of this important passage is as follows (the section quoted by Ke’u tshang Rinpoche is in italics):
It is unsuitable to assert the existence of a consciousness bereft of object of observation and of aspect. Although I do not assert it [i.e. the mind basis-of-all] to be bereft of object of observation and aspect, nonetheless, the object of observation and aspect are utterly unexplained.
Should one enquire why: in this way, the mind basis-of-all arises in two aspects, a consciousness which is the inner, intimate appropriator and an unexplained exterior aspect, a consciousness of the environment and the aspect. Regarding that, the inner, intimate appropriation are the imprints of manifest predilection regarding the imputed nature and the form of the sense-organ of the place and so forth and the name because their object is extremely subtle.
Sthiramati: “Commentary on “The Thirty””, “Sum cu ba’i bshad pa”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p. 397-398
90. Tb. khyab pa (literally, “to cover” or “to pervade”). Generally speaking, Boolean logic and set theory are isomorphous: any statement in Boolean logic has a correlate in set theory and reciprocally (for that matter, statements in Boolean logic are often advantageously presented in terms of Venn diagrams). While Western formal logic from Aristotle onwards has privileged deduction, eventually formalised in Boolean logic as a way to present the process of logical deduction, Buddhist logic, especially in the form developped by Phya pa chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169) in his commentary on the Seven Treatise of Prāmaṇa, privileges a formalisation based on set theory. Since this is quite counter-intuitive for a western audience (khyab pa
would have to be translated as “includes” in the sense of A ⊂ B), I have deemed it preferable to convert these consequences to deductive terminology. They actually read as follows
If A= {a/ a verify the property of the subject}
B = {b/ b verifies the property of the reason}
C= {c/ c verifies the property of the predicate}
then:
a ∈ C ∧ C ⊂B ⇒ a ∈ B
or
A ⊂C ∧ C ⊂B ⇒ A ⊂ B
91. Statement iii. above.
92. In keeping with Butön Rinpoche’s (1290-1364) commentary on Asaṇga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya, “The Sunlight explaining the Commentary on Abhidharmasamuccaya” (Chos mngo pa kun las btus lyi tik rnam bshad nyi ma’i od zer):
Since, for so long as one has not attained Liberation, the so-called “followers” still rely on the mind basis-of-all: although the continuum of form is interrupted in the Formless [Realm] and at the time of the five non-existences of mind, the mental continuum has been severed, the continuum of those seeds in the mind basis-of-all has not been severed.
in other words, when the continuum of the sensory consciousnesses has been severed (as for instance during a rebirth in the Formless Realm, the seeds which give rise to the sensory organs, which are their uncommon dominant condition, and the seeds which give rise to the sensory consciousness are present.
93. The issue in all of these debates is the phenomenological status of the entities of sensory consciousness when sensory consciousness does not operate as this is directly related to the existence or non-existence of entities exterior to consciousness.
94. Dharamsala 6.5-6 de ‘khrul ba sogs kyi tshe na yin gyi has a very different reading, “this is a time of being mistaken and so forth”. These two variant readings usher dramatically different interpretations of this passage. The Lhasa reading ” this is so when one is looking and so forth” is more in keeping with the argument and has been preferred, while the Dharamsala reading seems to misunderstand the crux of the argument.
95. This is the standard presentation of “realistic”schools such as Sautrāntika for which the object of observation necessarily precedes the sensory consciousness which observes it, they are in a causal relationship. The first instant of the visual consciousness observing the first instant of the blue color of a vase is simultaneous with the second instant of the blue color of that vase and not with the first instant of the blue color of that vase.
96. The position of the dual particle dag here is grammatically rather odd, but probably refers to both entities and sense organs.
97. Tb. rgyu ba
98. Tb. rnam par rig pa
99. Tb. lus can
100. This passage is quoted from “The Difficult Points of Mind and Basis- of-all extensively commented”, cf. my translation, p. 10 (zhol 635:6)
101. This is a particularly problematic statement which is carefully interpreted.
102. In stanza 3 of Vasubandhu’s “Thirty Verses” (Triṃśikā):
Both appropriations and places
Cognition not cognising
Are always accompanied by
Contact, attention
Knowledge, discrimination and intention.
It has neutral sensation:
It is un-obscured, neutral,
Likewise for contact and so forth.
103. Je Tsong kha pa: “The Difficult Points of Mind and Basis- of-all extensively commented”, cf. my translation, p. 10 (zhol 635:6), henceforth “AC”
104. AC, p. 10-11 (zhol 635:6-636.1). The sequence in which the five omnipresent mental factors is given by Ke’u tshang Rinpoche is different than that in Je Tsong kha pa’s auto-commentary and Je Tsong kha pa mentions “sensation” and does not mention “knowledge”. “Knowledge” is used as a synonym of “sensation” in stanza 3 of Vasubandhu’s “Thirty Verses” (Triṃśikā).
105. Ke’u tshang Rinpoche includes this complement in the quote from Je Tsong kha pa’s auto-commentary.
106. i.e. the five omnipresent mental factors.
107. Tb. ‘jug ‘dog gi dus
108. This whole section interweaves the doubt formulated in Je Tsong Kha pa’s auto-commentary (AC, p. 11ss ; zhol, 636.2-3) which is indented with Ke’u tshang Rinpoche’s commentary which is not. At times it is an exact quote and at times a paraphrase of Je Tsong kha pa’s clarification of this doubt.
109. AC, p. 12; zhol, 636.3-4
110. Tb. gnas gzhi
111. This does not refer to the 1st to 10th Ground of any of the Three Vehicles.
112. The following stanza of the root text, by explicitly teaching that these are determined in both Realms (the Desire and Form Realms), implicitly teaches that they are not determined in the Formless Realm.
113. Both the doubt evoked by Je Tsong kha pa in his autocommentary and his rejoinder are quoted as this is one of the most difficult aspects of Je Tsong kha pa’s presentation (AC, p. 13; zhol 637. 2-5)
114. Tb. lta ba
115. As per the doubt at the top of this page.
116. As per AC p.13 (zhol. 637.3):
Whatever appears to consciousness is either of its nature or
is neither established as one nor as different from it.
117. Ke-u tshang Rinpoche fleshes out the argument developed in Je Tsong kha pa’s auto-commentary:
. . . when analysis occurs and at that time, while common apprehended factors are not accepted, from the standpoint of the un-investigated and un-analysed, common apprehended factors are accepted. However, they are not asserted as of the nature of consciousness
Just as in the “Insight” section of Lam rim chen mo, the distinction between the two truths in Prāsaṇgika hinges on the type of valid cognisers used in establishing them (terminological valid cognisers establish conventional truths, whereas valid cognisers engaged in ultimate analysis establish ultimate truths), likewise the same process can be extended to Cittamātra. This in now way means that ultimate truth in Cittamātra and Prāsaṇgika overlap, it does mean, however, that is the distinction in the mode of analysis which enables one to distinguish the phenomenological status of the investigated object.
118. This whole section is a running commentary on Je Tsong kha pa’s auto-commentary, AC p.13 (zhol p. 637.4-5)
119. Tb. mi ‘thad pa
120. Which is precisely the Prāsaṇgika position.
121. As is some cases of cataract.
122. Most probably the anonymous commentary on Je Tsong kha pa’s “Essence of Eloquence”, “The Rosary of White Lotuses: a detailed analysis of the “Essence of Eloquence differentiating the interpretable and the definitive” (Drang nges legs bshad snying po’i mtha’ dpyod pad ma dkar po’i phreng ba, blockprint published at sku ‘bum byams pa gling, date unknown.)
123. i.e. Devadatta and Yajñadatta
124. AC p. 13, (zhol p. 637.3)
125. I have explained differently.
Those who explain Abhidharma
Or have become habituated to the Abhidharmakośa,
Analyse throughly whether this explanation
Is suitable or unsuitable.
If you view it as suitable, adopt it.
Since an awareness such as mine
Is not unmistaken regarding difficult topics,
If I am not, let another do so.
Master Vagiśvarakirtī : “An explanatory commentary on Abhidharmakośa”, (Chos mngon pa’i mdzod kyi ‘grel bshad, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 80, p. 19?)
126. A very tongue-in-cheek way of appealing to an experience the author claims not to have.
127. AC, p. 13; zhol 637.3
128. In other words, just how does another person’s mind appear to a telepath. The fundamental issue in these debates is how to avoid solipsism.
129. Tb. os med
130. Dharmakirtī: “Pramāṇavartikka”
131. Tb. rgol tshul
132. i.e. Dharmakīrti
133. Tb. pha rol
134. Emending ‘dzin to mi ‘dzin with dpe bsdur ma, vol. 98, p. 949.5
135. The following passages from Dharmakīrti ‘s Saṃtānāntarasiddhināmaprakaraṇa, “A thorough Analysis establishing other’s Continuums” focus on rebutting solipsism. The quoted passages follow a careful analysis of perception by an inferential valid cogniser of the mind of another. Both Ke-u tshang Rinpoche’s reading and the recension of Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 98, p. 949 present substantial textual problems. I have therefore adopted an eclectic policy of emendation in the light of meaning to reconstruct what must have been Dharmakīrti ‘s argument.
136. Tb. rnam par rtog pa
137. Emending gyis to gyi as per dpe bsdur ma, vol. 98, p. 949.7
138. Emending slu ba to mi slu ba as per dpe bsdur ma, vol. 98, p. 949.7
139. op. cit., p. 949.5 ss
140. Tb. mngon shes
141. Tb. rjen char
142. Tb. don
143. Emending snang bar to snang ba as per dpe bsdur ma, vol. 98, p. 949.10
144. Tb. rjes su byed pa
145. Dpe bsdur ma, vol. 98, p. 949.11 reads “by the force of the blessing . . .”
146. op. cit., Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 98, p. 949.8 ss
147. Dpe bsdur ma, vol. 98, p. 949.14 reads “since”
148. i.e. telepathy
149. A clear case of homoioteleuton. We emend mngon sum ‘di rnam pa’i rjes su byed pa to mngon sum du ni de’i rnam pa’i rjes su byed pa in keeping with dpe bsdur ma, vol. 98, p. 949.15.
150. i.e. another’s mind.
151. Ke’u tshang Rinpoche’s reading dang mi slu ba’i phyir tshad ma zhes bya bar is far preferable to that of dpe bsdur ma, vol. 98, p. 949.16 dang mi slu ba’i tshad ma zhes bya bar.
152. op. cit., Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 98, p. 949.
153. A paraphrase of AC p. 12, (zhol 636.4)
154. i.e. the mind basis-of-all
155. This doubt is addressed by Je Tsong kha pa in AC p. 14-15 (zhol. 638.4 ss)
156. i.e. the reflections of reflections and reflections which arise from a non-conceptual samādhi (Geshe Yama Rinchen).
157. As Geshe Yama Rinchen points out, a very fine line must be tread here: while dreams and so forth have no object of observation, they necessarily have an object, an appearing object, and this appearing object, according to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha is suitable to be observed. It is impossible to posit a consciousness without an object: even a dream consciousness has an object.
The reason for which passages of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha may seem ambiguous is because the intent of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha is the refutation of exterior entities, not establishing that every consciousness necessarily has an appearing object.
158. As Je Tsong kha pa states in his auto-commentary on this stanza of Mahāyānasaṃgraha:
. . . all consciousnesses do not need to rely an existing [object of] observation and in particular since the mind basis-of-all, having been impelled as a basis of happy and bad transmigrations by former [respectively] virtuous and non-virtuous karma is not countered for even one instant until one dies, it engages under the force of impelling karma and not under the force of the observed appearance.
AC p. 15 (zhol 638.5-6)
159. Untraced quote.
160. There are numerous subdivisions of imprints according to Cittamātra. The three-fold one is:
1. imprints of manifest verbalisation (Tb. mngon brjod kyi bag chags)
2. imprints of the view of the self (Tb. bdag lta’i bag chags)
3. imprints of the branches of existence (Tb. srid pa’i yan lag gi bag chags)
161. i.e. the basis-of-all.
162. The two lower Realms, the Desire Realm and the Form Realm.
163. AC p. 16 (zhol 639.5)
164. A somewhat strange line, as Je Tsong kha pa give only one example, that of experiences in a dream.
165. AC p. 16 (zhol 639.5-6)
166. AC p. 16 (zhol 639.6-640.1)
167. i.e. paranormal powers such as telepathy, recollection of previous lives, clairaudience, etc.
168. Which is a succinct way of saying that the position is untenable.
169. i.e. beings and environments.
170. i.e. beings and environments.
171. This is an almost exact paraphrase of the first reason given in Je Tsong kha pa’s argument AC p. 17, (zhol 640.2).
172. AC p. 17, (zhol 640. 2-3).
173. Emending myal ba to myal ba pa as per Dharamsala 201.6.
174. AC p. 17, (zhol 640.4).
175. Emending myal ba to myal ba pa as per Dharamsala 201.6.
176. This whole section expands on AC p. 18, (zhol 640.5-6; 641.1)
177. Ke’u tshang Rinpoche’s version of the doubt formulated in Je Tsong kha pa’s auto-commentary carries a plural number instead of a dual and is therefore more general.
178. AC p.18, (zhol 641.1-2)
179. Instead of Tb. gnyis ka ,”both” AC p. 18, (zhol 641.2)
180. AC lists “five entities” but Ke’utshang Rinpcohe’s version of the passage omits the “five”
181. Tb. de nyid ka
182. Tb. de gnyis ka
183. Tb. de ga rang
184. Both the zhol (641.2) and the bla bgrang ma (11.6) recension of AC which I have consulted carry the latter version, “both of those” (Tb. de bgnyis ka).
185. The term “both of those” is a source of major debate. Geshe Yama Rinchen indicates that Khedrub pänchen asserts that both the five entities appearing to sensory consciousnesses and the five entities appearing to the mind basis-of-all are apprehended factors of the mind basis-of-all. This position would be corroborated by the reading “both of those” attested by both zhol and bla bgrang ma. It is interesting that Ke’u tshang Rinpoche’s expresses reservations about the reading ” Just those” but nonethless uses it in his quote of AC. This would indicate that the recension of AC he relied upon and which bore that reading must have been quite prestigious, hence the hesitations in questioning the reading, all the more so if it were a source of major debate.
186. Commentary and root text as per AC p. 20, (zhol 642.1-2)
187. AC p. 20, (zhol 642. 2-3)
188. AC p. 21, (zhol 643.2-3)
189. Emending na to ni in keeping with Dharamsala 203.2
190. AC p. 21, (zhol 643.1-2)
191. This whole debate hinges on the interpretation of the highly problematic passage in Je Tsong kha pa’s auto-commentary (AC p. 21, (zhol 643.1-2)) in which he states:
Objects of the mental consciousness . . . such as the Twelve Limbs, past etc. and imputations do not become the objects of the basis-of-all . . .
However, as Ke-u tshang Rinpoche points out, as soon as the Twelve Limbs of Scripture are uttered, they become expressive sound, i.e. sound. As such, they are entities of the auditory consciousness and in keeping with the root text:
Objects of the six apart from organs and entities
Do not become objects of the basis-of-all . . .
they are necessarily objects of the basis-of-all, yet in his auto-commentary, Je Tsong kha pa gives them as examples of objects of the mental consciousness which are not objects of the mind basis-of-all
192. This would be an elegant way out of the problem since the Buddha has no mind-basis-of-all: it has become the mirror-like wisdom. The statement in Je Tsong kha pa’s auto-commentary might therefore be considered to refer to his speech.
193. AC p. 21, (zhol 643. 1-2)
194. Buddhist schools of Tenets consider that sound is matter (in keeping with physics for which it is the manifestation of the variation of pressure in a fluid, a gas or a solid). As such, Buddhist scriptures, in general, including Sūtras such as the “Heart Sūtra”, both are sound and matter (the Heart Sūtra cannot exist on the moon or in space). Here, Ke-u tshang Ronpoche is mooting the possibility that instead of being sound, and therefore matter, Buddhist scriptures might be non-associated compositional phenomena. As such, they would still be impermanent but would no longer be objects of the mind basis-of-all.
195. Tb. mtha’ gcig tu
196. AC p. 22, (zhol. 643.3)
197. Tb. bsgo gzhi
198. Tb. ‘gegs
199. What is implicit in this line of reasoning is that if the mind basis-of-all were non-virtuous, it could not exist in the continuum of an Arhat after Liberation, yet it does. Therefore, it cannot be non-virtuous.
200. AC p. 22, (zhol. 643.4)
201. AC p. 22, (zhol. 643.5)
202. As per the previous stanza of the root text:
Because of being the basis infused with imprints and
Because of engaging manifestly
The virtuous [and] non-virtuous in one continuum
It is established as unstained and neutral.
203. This whole section is an interwoven commentary on AC p.22 (zhol. 643.6-644.1).
204. This whole section is a running commentary on AC p. 22, (zhol. 644.1-2).
205. AC p. 21.
206. AC p. 23, (zhol. 644.2-3)
207. AC p. 23, (zhol. 644 3-4)
208. Tb. ‘gro ba
209. It is a basic presupposition of the Buddhist presentation of causality that a substantial cause is of a different nature from its effect (Asatkāryavāda), thereby allowing the real change taught in the Buddhist doctrine of the impermanence of composite phenomena, over and against the dominant view of non-Buddhist schools, such as Saṃkhya, according to which substantial causes are of the same nature as their effects (Satkāryavāda).
It then behooves the Buddhists to propose a relationship between substantial cause and effect which, while weaker than that of being of one nature, will nonetheless be sufficient to maintain a substantial continuum between cause and effect: what is proposed is the notion of similarity in type of substantial cause and effect.
Clearly, as Ke-utshang Rinpoche points out, it would totally inacceptable for successive instants of sensation, within one substantial continuum of sensation, to be of different type.
210. Tb. snga phyi
211. Tb. ‘jug pa
212. For Cittamātra, the instance given of a person is the mind basis-of-all of that being.
213. Vasubandhu’s “Thirty Verses” (Triṃśikā), stanza 3.
214. AC p. 22, (zhol. 643.6)
215. Tb. sim
216. i.e. an Elder Bhikṣu.
217. i.e. the auto-commentary to Je Tsong kha pa’s ” The Root of the Difficult Points of Mind and Basis-of-all”.
218. Probably a proverb or a saying common at the period among scholars.
219. i.e. seeds and imprints
220. Tb. tshig zur
221. The mind basis-of-all does not exist in the continuum of an Arhat or in that of a Bodhisattva on the 8th, 9th and 10th Grounds.
222. The great Gelug polymath, Pan chen bsod nams grags pa (1478-1554), 15th Ganden Tripa, was the author of Drepung Loseling’s monastic textbooks whose positions are often at odds with those of Rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469-1544), the author of Sera Je’s monastic textbooks. Their divergences on doctrinal points have fueled debates in the Gelug tradition for six centuries.
223. This stanza occurs at the end of Je Tsong kha pa’s root text.
224. i.e., if there is a time (upon the attainment of the state of an Arhat) at which both positings are absent, then eo ipso, in the light of the stanza, the predicate, not having a basis-of-all is avered as well.
225. i.e. his foremost disciples, Mkhas grub rje and Rgyal tshab rje.
226. One of the leaders of the Rākśasa demons.
227. i.e. the afore-mentioned stanza in footnote 222.
228. The supporting and supported mind basis-of-all.
229. The last three Ground of a Mahāyāna Path of Meditation, i.e. the 8th, 9th and 10th Ground.
230. Tb. len pa’i rnam shes
231. One of the major reasons of this distinction is that the mind basis-of-all is an inattentive mind and, as such, cannot exist in the continuum of an Arhat or a Bodhisattva on the Pure Grounds, i.e. the 8th, 9th and 10th Grounds.
232. This verse refers to the first mode of engagement of the mind basis-of-all, it “engages like the continuum of a river.”
233. This verse refers to the second mode of engagement of the mind basis-of-all, the adventitious occurence of the engaging consciousnesse “out of the encounter with their object just as waves occur out of water.”
234. Tb. yang srid
235. A clear allusion to “Taking the Three Bodies on the Path” in Anuttarayogatantra.
236. Tb. la gtan nas. Both Lhasa 201.8 and Dharamsala 208.7 read la gtan nas.
237. For the Cittamātrins asserting the severance of the continuum upon death after a remainderless nirvaṇa, it is self-evident that the “mind basis-of-all whose type is severed” cannot be transformed since it ceases to exist. For those who do not assert the severance of the continuum upon death after a remainderless nirvaṇa, there can be no “mind basis-of-all whose type is severed” since even the consciousness of maturation of an Arhat is of the same substance as the mind basis-of-all which is its substantial cause and, by extension, it is of the same type (cf. p. 41).
238. This whole section, AC p. 24, (zhol. 645.3-6)
239. Je Tsong kha pa’s root text, stanza 12
240. Je Tsong kha pa’s root text, stanza 15
241. We have followed Dharamsala 209.2 and AC 645.4 which both read ‘phangs pa’i ‘bras bu over and against Lhasa 201.17, ‘phags pa’i ‘bras bu.
242. Tb. phyogs
243. Tb. ‘chol ba. Ke-u tshang Rinpoche draws out the crux of Je Tsong kha pa’s critique of the notion that the matured consciousness could be anything but neutral: according to Ke-u tshang Rinpoche, this would lead to the collapse of karmic causality. This conclusion remains unstated in Je Tsong kha pa’s auto-commentary.
244. Untraced quote.
245. Tb. gnod byed
246. AC p. 25 (zhol 646.3)
247. See AC footnote 161 for the variant readings with Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 26.8-9.
248. AC p.26 (zhol 646.6-647.1)
249. AC p. 24-25 (zhol 645.4-5)
250. AC p.26 (zhol 646.6-647.1)
251. i.e. distinguishing between fully-characterised maturations and merely nominal ones.
252. Tb. rgyun chags su
253. The five omnipresent mental factors which are always associated with any main mind, including the mind basis-of-all: contact, attention, sensation, discrimination and intention.
254. Sk. svabhāva, Tb. rang bzhin
255. AC p.27 (zhol 647.3-647.6)
256. i.e. the supporting basis-of-all, the mind basis-of-all and the supported basis-of-all, the seed basis-of-all.
257. Tb. mdung khyim is attested in both the dpe bsdur ma recension of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha as well as that of Vasubandhu’s bhāṣya . E. Lamotte in his magisterial work, “La Somme du Grand Véhicule d’ Asaṇga (Mahāyānasaṃgraha)”, Université de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste, Louvain-La-Neuve, 1973. p. 34-35 translates from the Sanskrit, naḍakalāpa, “bottes de roseaux”, “sheaf of reeds”. The meaning of the metaphor is the same.
258. Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76. p. 14.8-13
259. Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76. p. 14.13-17
260. AC p.28 (zhol 648.1)
261. AC p.28 (zhol 648.1)
262. Tb. sgo byed
263. Jasmine (Jasminum grandiflorum Linn).
264. Cf. our emendation in AC, footnote 179.
265. AC p. 29 (zhol. 648. 5) ss.
266. Vasubandhu : “Trimśika”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p.4.20-21; 5.1
267. Tb. sems med lnga. The five mental absences are listed in in these two sets of verses:
1. The state of a God bereft of discrimination
2. A transcendental meditative equipoise
3. A meditative equipoise on cessation
4. Deep sleep
5. Fainting (and comas)
The great polymath, Butön Rinpoche (1290-1364) states explicitly in his commentary on Asaṇga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya:
At the time of the five mental absences, although the continuum of the six collections
is severed, it arises later . . .
“The beams of the sun explaining the commentaries on Abhidharmasamuccaya” Mtsho sngon mi rigs dpe skrun khang, p. 170
268. Vasubandhu : “Trimśika”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p.4.4-5
269. AC p. 30 (zhol. 649.1)
270. AC p. 30 (zhol. 649.2-3)
271. Vasubandhu : “Trimśika”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p.3.10 reads:
Upon Arhathood, that is countered.
272. Unidentified quote.
273. Tb. ‘khor gsum refers to: the presence of subject in the reason, the forward entailment (every instance of the reason is an instance of the predicate) and the reverse entailment (every instance of the opposite of the predicate is an instance of the opposite of the reason). Hopkins’ “Tibetan-Sanskrit-English Dictionary” in mss. form misconstrues this term which has a very precise, technical usage in debate terminology and asserts that it refers to “agent, action and object”. What ‘khor gsum means in debate is actually that none of the three relationships which must exist in a correct consequence are present. If someone were to assert the following consequence:
It follows that the subject, Socrates, is a philosopher, because of being Persian.
One’s opponent would shout ‘khor gsum, since :
1. Socrates is not Persian
2. All Persians are not philosophers and
3. Everything or everyone who isn’t a philosopher isn’t necessarily not Persian.
274. Spelling mistake not averred in the mss. we have access to.
275. Zhol 648.5 reads bstan instead of brtan.
276. This whole section, AC p. 30 (zhol. 649.3-5)
277. Tb. dri myam pa
278. Stanza 13 of the root text, AC p.22 (zhol. 643.3)
279. Stanza 13 of the root text
280. Stanza 18 of the root text
281. AC p. 30 (zhol. 649.5)
282. This is a very troublesome line attested by Dharamsala 214.7 as well since clearly what is impermanent is suitable to be a basis infused by the imprints: the mind basis-of-all is impermanent and is the basis infused by the imprints. Je Tsong kha pa, himself, in his auto-commentary gives a completely different conclusion:
This teaches that phenomena which are of different continuums or non-simultaneous are not suitable to be [posited as] infused and infuser.
283. Stanza 17 of the root text.
284. AC p. 30 (zhol. 649.6)
285. AC p. 30 (zhol. 650.1)
286. Untraced quote.
287. AC p.31, zhol 650.5-6
288. AC p.31, zhol 650.6
289. Mahāyānasaṃgraha Upanibandhana, Tb. Theg pa chen po bsdus pa’i bshad sbyar (“Ancillary explanations to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha”), Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 538.21-539.3
290. This is the sort of quote we would expect to encounter to corroborate the interpretation of both given by some of the commentators. However, such a quote is not to be found.
291. AC p.32, zhol 651.1
292. AC p.32, zhol 651.2 ss
293. Mahāyānasaṃgraha Upanibandhana, Tb. Theg pa chen po bsdus pa’i bshad sbyar (“Ancillary explanations to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha”), Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 538.21-539.3
294. Emending zhol 651.6 kun gzhi rnam pa yang gnyis so to kun gzhi rnam par shes pa yang gnyis so in keeping with bla brang ma 17.4 and dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 539.1-2.
295. Tb. gzhi’i dngos po
296. Tb. tshad
297. In all Buddhist Tenet systems, emptiness and selflessness are non-implicative negations.
298. Tb. lhan cig dmigs nges
299. While Gyelwa Gendün Drub uses the concept of simultaneous observation extensively in his “Ornament of Reasoning”, I have been unable to find any reference to the meaning generality of vase and the conception apprehending vase being simultaneous observations. Obviously, they are, and just as obviously, they cannot be of one substance since the conception apprehending vase is an impermanent phenomenon, whereas the meaning generality of vase is a permanent phenomenon.
300. The First Dalaï Lama, Gyelwa Gendün drub (1391-1474), composed the Tshad ma’i bstan bcos chen mo rigs pa’i rgyan.
301. AC p.34, zhol 653.1-2
302. Tb. ‘jog byed
303. Asaṇga: Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 31.1-6)
304. This whole section is drawn verbatim from AC p. 34, zhol 652.6-653.3
305. Tb. gtso bo’i dbang du byas
306. AC p. 34, zhol 653.3-4
307. i.e. the afflicted mind’s mental factors.
308. AC p. 34, zhol 653.6-654.1
309. AC p. 34, zhol 654.2
310. Ke’u tshang Rinpoche fleshes out the meaning of this difficult quote from Asaṇga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha:
Because that which is the cognition of happy and bad transmigrations, death and birth arose from the seeds of the limbs of existence.
Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 31.8-10
pointing out that, in keeping with the Cittamātra view, cognition “appears as” happy and bad transmigrations. Experienced reality is therefore merely a factor of appearance of the cognition perceiving it.
311. Bla brang ma 18.3, in a divergent and probably less accurate reading has ‘di yongs su smin pa rnam smin gyi ngo bor gyur pa yin pa’i phyir ro (“. . . because its complete maturation becomes of the nature of maturation.”)
312. Tb. zlog pa
313. This whole section AC p.38, zhol 656.5-657.1
314. AC p.39, zhol 658.1
315. AC p.39-40, zhol. 658.1
316. AC p. 40, zhol 658.3
317. Sk. viśeṣa, Tb. bye brag. Je Tsong kha pa’s argument hinges on an understanding of two concepts:
1. generals and particulars
2. the two types of relationships in Buddhist logic ( “being related as of one nature” and “being related as arising from”).
The general and the particular of a given phenomenon can only entertain a relation of identity of nature and can never be in a causal relation. Since both the mental consciousness of Devadatta and that of Yajñadatta are particulars of mental consciousness, they are necessarily of one nature with it.
We refer the interested reader to Dan Purdue’s “Debate in Tibetan Buddhism” for an elementary presentation of these topics.
318. One of the classic examples given for a non-existent along with the horns of a hare.
319. Tb. mi ‘dra
320. AC p.40, zhol 658.5-6
321. AC p.40, zhol 658.6 – 659.1
322. AC p. 42, zhol. 660.1-2
323. Sk. sāmānya, Tb. spyi refers to “universals” as understood both in Aristotelian logic and late mediaeval philosophy, specifically the works of John Duns Scotus (1266-1308). I have shied away from using the term “universal”, unlike my old friend Georges Dreyfus, because of the semantic charge the term conveys for the philosophically trained.
324. Sk. vyakti, Tb gsal ba.
325. AC p. 42, zhol. 660.2
326. Tb. lung
327. Here, Ke’u tshang Rinpoche is referring specifically to the Nyāya school of realism which considers that generalities exist independently of the particulars they subsume. In this respect, the Nyāya understanding of sāmānya is remarkably similar to Plato’s presentation of Ideas. Cf. George Dreyfus: “Recognizing Reality. Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations”, SUNY Series in Buddhist Studies, State University of New York Press, New York 199, p. 127-188.
328. Tb. rjes su ‘gro ba It is a bit of a misnomer to refer to generalities “succeeding” to their instances as Ke’u tshang Rinpoche does here, since this is precisely where Nyāya and the Buddhist schools differ sharply: for Nyāya, generalities do not succeed to their instances or particulars, they exist sub specie aeternitatis, independently of them.
329. This is the crux of the realist argument, espoused by the Nyāya school: the generality or the universal, pillar, exist independently of any individual pillar of which it is a generality.
330. Since all particulars of pillar are of one nature or substantially one with their generality, pillar, if would follow that all particulars of pillars would also be of one nature or substantially one with each other, i.e. there would only be one pillar, which is obviously nonsensical.
331. In other words, if the individual pillars are not substantially one with their generality, pillar, then they are not pillars and eo ipso become non-pillars.
332. This whole section, AC p. 42, zhol 660.2
333. This whole section, AC p. 42, zhol 660.4
334. This consequence fleshes out and at times summarizes AC p. 42, zhol 660.2-4
335. This whole section AC p.42-43, zhol 660.5-6
336. Tb. skabs su
337. In a meditative equipoise on the Truth of Cessation, all seven collections of consciousness are absent and only the mind basis-of-all remains.
338. Reading gnyis po with zhol 660.6 against bla brang ma 22a.2, gnyis pa and both the Lhasa and Dharamsala versions of Ke’u tshang Rinpoche’s commentary.
339. Tb. mnyam
340. AC p. 43, zhol 660.6-661.1
341. AC p. 43, zhol 661.1-2
342. AC p. 43, zhol 661.2
343. These are Je Tsong kha pa’s reflections.
344. AC p.42, zhol 660.4
345. Vasubandhu.
346. AC p.47, zhol 663.6-664.1
347. i.e. Asaṇga and Vasubandhu.
348. AC p. 44-45, zhol. 662.3-4
349. This is by far the most logical position regarding the relation the supported and supporting basis-of-all can entertain in what is, after all, a strong idealistic system.
350. Reading with Dharamsala 224.1 and zhol 662.4 ma thon.
351. i.e. it is a given. Here Ke’u tshang Rinpoche suggests, with great tact, that it is unclear whether Je Tsong kha pa, actually endorses the position espoused by the Pibrīttiguhyārtha, viz. that the supporting and supported mind-basis-all are of one nature and different isolates and seems to imply that he himself has some reservations regarding that position.
352. Tb. tshig zin
353. Tb. brling ba
354. Tb. don byed nus pa’i rdzas yod
355. Tb. rang rkya thub pa’i rdzas yod
356. Tb. brtan pa mi ‘gyur ba’i rdzas yod
357. Tb. rtog pas btags tsam gyi btags yod
358. Tb. gdags gzhi gzhan la brten pa’i btags yod
359. Tb. rang nyid gzung ba chos gzhan gzung ba la bltos dgos pa’i btags yod
360. The passage in question is misattributed to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and is actually found in Asaṇga’s Yogācāryabhūmiviniścayasaṃgraha (Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 74, p. 482.12-17)
The first instance of this misattribution can be traced to the “Great presentation of Tenets” of ‘Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (1648-1721) (“Grub tha’i rnam bshad”, kan su’u mi rigs dpe skrun khang, p. 417. 20-418.2) and he has been followed, in this respect, by the main luminaries of later Gelug scholasticism, Dkon mchog bstan p’ai sgron me (1762-1823), the third Gung thang Rinpoche as well as the great Mongolian scholar, Ngag dbang dpal ldan (1797-?) who, one must assume, relied on his work. Unfortunately, Jeffrey Hopkins, in his translation of ‘Jam dbyang bshad pa’s “Great Presentation of Tenets”, has perpetuated this misattribution (cf. “Maps of the Profound”, Snow Lion, 2003, p. 373).
361. Tb. spyod yul
362. Untraced quote. This blanket statement will be refuted in the following lines.
363. Tb. tshugs thub po
364. Tb. ‘khon dzin
365. Tb. tshig pa
366. Tb. rnam ‘tshe
367. Tb. rgyags pa
368. Tb. ‘chab pa
369. Tb. g.yo
370. Tb. sgyu
371. Tb. rang ldog
372. Tb. gzhi ldog
373. i.e. their subtle selflessness of persons.
374. AC p.47, zhol. 664.2
375. This whole section down to “would not be virtuous” fleshes out and reformulates the lengthy doubt Je Tsong kha pa expresses on AC 47-48, zhol 664.2-6
376. Asaṇga: “Abhidharmasamuccaya”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe sdur ma vol. 76, p. 157.14-15
377. Asaṇga: “Abhidharmasamuccaya”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe sdur ma vol. 76, p. 159.14-15
378. i.e. it is not the case that everything which is neutral is necessarily not a matured cause, because Vasubandhu, in his Abhidharmakośa, teaches that there are no matured neutral causes.
379. Vasubandhu: “Abhidharmakośa”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe sdur ma vol. 79, p.13.5-6
380. Asaṇga: “Abhidharmasamuccaya”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe sdur ma vol. 76, p. 157.14-15
381. i.e. in the Formless Realms.
382. This refers to the analysis in Je Tsong kha pa’s auto-commentary (AC p. 47, zhol. 665.2-3):
. . . if imprints became fully-characterised virtuous or non-virtuous [ones], from that standpoint, in the Formless Realm as well, fully-characterised form would exist, inasmuch as the explanation of being subsequently related as form would exist in a fully-characterised fashion there, because the seeds of form would exist. In the two Lower Realms, fully-characterised non-virtue would also exist.
383. AC p. 48, zhol. 665.3
384. AC p. 47, zhol 665.4
385. AC p. 48, zhol 665.4
386. op. cit., zhol. 665.5
387. Vasubandhu: “Abhidharmakośa”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe sdur ma vol. 79, p.13.5-6 quoted above
388. Somewhat of a paraphrase of AC 48, zhol. 664.4
389. AC p. 48, zhol 665.5
390. AC 48, zhol. 664.5
391. Tb. sems med
392. In other words, even during deep sleep or a coma, one accrues virtue from vows which have been taken, for so long as they have not been completely destroyed.
393. AC p. 48, zhol 665.4-5
394. Reading kyi with zhol 667.5 against bla brang ma 25b.6 kyis.
395. Dharmapāla (530-561) of Nālanda University was the greatest Cittamātra scholar of his age. His main disciple, Śilabhadra (529-645) became the main teacher of the great Chinese pilgrim and scholar Xuan zang (circa 602-664) who disseminated Cittamātra in China.
396. As mentioned previously, the author of the Pibrīttiguhyārtha is unknown.
397. Floruit unknown.
398. Tb. dbang du byas
399. Emending Lhasa 223.19 bsgom pa na to bsgo mkhan in keeping with Dharamsala 228.5 and subsequent usage in the Lhasa version.
400. Tb. snga ma
401. Tb. sngon
402. This whole section, AC p.52, zhol. 678.6-679.2
403. i.e. the supporting and supported basis-of-all.
404. Tb. de dag. Much hinges on whether de dag is read as a dual, in keeping with ancient Classical Tibetan usage and Je Tsong kha pa’s general usage in his Root text and auto-comentary or as a plural, in keeping with the usage at the time of Ke’u tshang Rinpoche. As a dual, i.e. “both”, de dag would refer to the future supporting and supported basis-of-all whose seeds lie within the basis-of-all at present; as a plural, they would refer to all phenomena. I am, personally, sympathetic to the first reading.
405. idem.
406. idem.
407. AC p. 52-53, zhol 679.4-6
408. Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 288.13-15
409. Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 288.13 reads de
410. Tb. cig car du
411. Tb. gzhan du byed
412. This whole section draws heavily on the Pibrīttiguhyārtha which states:
The seeds of the imprints of the limbs of existence exist for as long as the matured result has not arisen. The seeds of the view of the disintegrating composite and the seeds of the afflictive, elaborating imprints exist until the antidote arises. The seeds of virtuous and neutral elaborating imprints for Hearers and Solitary Realisers also exist until an utter Nirvāṇa is attained. Those of the Tathāgatas, until the vajra-like [samādhi], [for] mere Stream-Enterers, occur uninterruptedly.
Pibrīttiguhyārtha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 879.20-880.5
413. This is a concise reformulation of the doubt brought up by Je Tsong kha pa in AC p. 53, zhol 680.4-5
414. AC p. 53, zhol 680.5
415. This whole section, AC p.54-55, zhol 681.4-6
416. Tb. khyad par
417. i.e. on Bodhisattvas who have attained Dominion and Arhats.
418. AC p. 60, zhol 686.4
419. Ke’u tshang Rinpoche does not list the fourth topic, “Teaching the times of engaging and countering” listed above.
420. AC p. 60, zhol 686.6
421. This whole passage is a very elegant reworking of AC 60, zhol 686.6-687.1
422. The crux of this difficult distinction is that while the matured consciousness cannot actually be the object of the afflicted mind, since it is mistakenly apprehended as a Self by the afflicted mind, it can be called its object.
423. AC p. 60, zhol 687.2
424. This whole section is a running commentary of AC p. 60, zhol 687.3-4. To the difference of Je Tsong kha pa’ auto-commentary, Ke’u tshang Rinpoche credits the opponent with a meaningful doubt.
425. “It” obviously refers to the afflicted mind.
426. i.e. the opponent accepts that whatever obscures an Ārya’s equipoise, is necessarily obscured.
427. Tb. gtan du ‘byung. Reading confirmed by Dharamsala 232.5. Ke’u tshang Rinpoche develops Je Tsong kha pa’s argument:
. . . if it were pleasant, the mind would have to be pleasant, however, it would follow that in an ordinary being an unhappy mind would never occur at all because, from that standpoint, a pleasant mind would always, manifestly occur
AC p. 63, zhol 689.4-5
and points out that the same line of reasoning is also valid for unpleasant sensations, and therefore the sensations associated with the afflicted mind can only be equanimous.
428. The Pibrīttiguhyārtha states:
Although having a joyful aspect, it does not have a sensation of delight . . .
Pibrīttiguhyārtha, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 76, p. 833.11
429. Which, obviously, refers to ignorance here.
430. Tb. ming phyogs mtshungs pa
431. In other words, does, for instance, the afflicted mind of a being of the Desire Realm belong to the Desire Realm or not?
432. Vasubandhu: “Trimśika”, Bstan ‘gyur dpe bsdur ma, vol. 77, p. 3.10-4.3
433. i.e. the afflicted mind.
434. Ke’u tshang Rinpoche relies on the Dhargye Tengyur recension (the mainstay of the dpe sdur ma Tengyur) of this verse of the Trimśika:
gang du skyes pa de yi ‘o [gzhan]
which diverges significantly from that used in Je Tsong kha pa’s autocommentary:
gang du skyes pa de yi gzhan.
The differences are of considerable importance as far as they suggest major differences in teh relatinship between the consciousness basis-of-all and the afflicted mind. The Dhargye recensions’ version should be translated:
Wherever it arise, is it’s. The others . . .
whereas Je Tsong kha pa’s autocommentary’s version should be translated:
Wherever it arises, [so do] the others.
435. AC p.64, zhol 690.6-691.1
436. i.e. calm abiding.
437. AC p. 64-65, zhol 691.3-4
438. AC p. 64-65, zhol 691 4
439. Tb. ‘dod nyon dgu pa
440. i.e. mental consciousness
441. i.e. the afflicted mind.
442. AC p. 65, zhol 691.5