Audio recorded at Buddha House Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 45-minute study session, Ven Jampa Ignyen examines three fundamental categories in Buddhist epistemology using Purbu Chok’s classical text on objects and cognition. He covers inattentive awareness—consciousness to which an object appears clearly, yet remains undiscerned (such as eye awareness perceiving impermanence without actually grasping it)—then moves to doubt, defined as cognition wavering between two alternatives, and finally wrong awareness, which incorrectly engages its object. Throughout, Ignyen employs detailed logical debate to clarify these distinctions: whether ordinary perception counts as determining awareness, how higher perception of previous lives differs from ordinary memory, and whether doubt and wrong awareness can overlap. The teaching is pitched at serious students of classical Buddhist logic and epistemology.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 09 M and C 2001 08 28.mp3
UUID: 848933ce-f957-4825-a50c-5b4ecf6409a9
Teacher: Ven Jampa Ignyen
Collection: y Mind and Cognition 2001 Month 07-09 (Ven Jampa Ignyen)
Date: 2001-08-28
Recorded at: Buddha House Adelaide
Duration: 45.5 minutes
Words: ~4,406
With the types of nonvalid awareness. And, again, here they’re called nonvalid. Here’s really, it’s a reflection of only the first moment is regarded as valid by the Sūtra School. So, again, this in the basic program, there’s really two texts on the mind that are recommended. There’s the text on Purbu Chok’s text on Lorig, called Lorik.
Actually, it’s called It’s called explanation of objects or object possessors and cognition. And there’s another text that’s called mind and mental factors by Yeshe Gyeltsen. So both of these texts are a fundamental text and very important. Although this type this text does cover mind and mental factors, it only does so quite briefly. So this will come up a little bit later on, I think on page thirty six of this text, we have mind and mental factors coming up, and a present one about page number twenty nine.
So today, we’ll see if we can complete up to that section of mind and mental factors. And then also, can supplement, say, this section of mind and mental factors in Purbu Chok’s text with the text of Yeshe Gyeltsen. Anyway, we’ve got a lot of material, and it’s not as if we’re going to completely master the material first time through. But it’s good to at least have an idea of what the texts are about and the basic issues that the text bring up, their subdivisions, the definitions of the various types of mind that are brought up in a text. In mind and mental in this text here, this text on objects and object possessors, then we’re basically dealing with the seven types of awareness.
Now I’m sure everyone knows the seven types of awareness. So we’ve actually how many have we done? We still got approximately three left. Which ones have we done? We’ve done four.
Right. Pseudo perception we’ve covered already. Yeah. Pseudo perception is not perception. No.
It isn’t. Pseudo perception is included, for instance, with incorrect belief. It could be in wrong awareness. Pseudo perception does fit into the seven, but a number of the seven. So today we’re dealing with inattentive discernment.
So inattentive awareness. So this is on page twenty nine. Now initially Right. If we this is covered quite quickly. So for inattentive awareness, we have the definition.
The common basis of cognition to which its real engaged object clearly appears And cognition unable to initiate determination of its real engaged object is the definition of inattentive discernment. Right. So that that definition, I think, reasonably straightforward. It’s referring to awareness to which the object does appear. In fact, it clearly appears, but the awareness is not actually determining its object or in a sense, it’s not ascertaining its object.
So that’s all. This this type of inattentive awareness we’re quite familiar with. Now underneath this, it gives a few debates. So we might just quickly read through those. Now having given that this definition, then the author goes on to say, however, it should be understood that the common basis of cognition to which its real object clearly appears and cognition unable to initiate determination of its real object is not posited as the definition of inattentive discernment.
That is because for sense awareness to which a snow mountain appears as blue, its real engaged object does not clearly appear. Since it’s in it’s engaged object, the white color of a snow mountain appears as blue. However, since the white color of the snow mountain, its appearing object clearly appears when there is no blue, its real object clearly appears. It is unable to initiate determination of that because it wrongly engages that. So there, we need to take the definition as initially stated where it has engaged object.
This is because when we’re talking about inattentive perception, we’re talking about objects which are actually potentially held by that awareness. Existent objects that are potentially held potentially can be held by awareness, which appear to that awareness, but in fact are not discerned by that awareness. Such as, for instance, our eye awareness at present, although the impermanence of objects, is always appearing to our eye awareness, our eye awareness is unable to discern the impermanence. And for that reason, objects appear to be fixed in nature. They don’t appear to be changing to us.
We have to be very careful how we state that though. Actually, they do appear to be momentary, but we don’t actually discern it. So in fact, that’s an important instance of inattentive perception. So underneath that, then the instances of inattentive discernment or inattentive perception are sense perception holding blue, initiating doubt, reflecting did I see blue or not, And self perception experiencing mental perception holding any of the five objects such as form, etcetera, in the continuum of an ordinary being. Now, there, for instance, the first one, sense perception holding blue, initiating that reflecting, did I see blue or not?
So for instance, if we’re initially looking at an object like a blue car, and then later someone asks asks us, do we see the blue car or not? And we can’t remember. It’s an even though we were looking at it, it’s an indication that initially we had inattentive discernment or inattentive sense perception holding a blue car. And the second instance there is self perception experiencing mental perception holding any of the five objects such as form. And that instance is really from the Sūtra School point of view, where they assert that there is self perception.
So we have self perception viewing sense perception internally. That self perception is inattentive to the object of the sense perception it experiences. When it’s in the continuum of an ārya being and so on, it is possible that an ārya being could have self perception that is actually aware of its the object of the sense perception it is experiencing. Right. Okay.
We’ll just do a couple of these debates. Just reading through them may be useful here. So in regard to that, one person says, take perceptual valid awareness. So valid perception. It follows it conforms to the object defined.
Here when it said it conforms to the object defined, here the object defined is inattentive discernment. And it conforms to that meaning it it is that. So in other words, take perceptual valid awareness. It follows is it is inattentive discernment because it conforms to the definition of inattentive discernment, because perception is unable to initiate determination of its object, because it is not determining awareness. We say no pervasion.
Here, this is almost a convention. Determining awareness refers to conceptual awareness. A type of awareness that is actively determining its object. And of course, perceptual valid awareness is not conception. So, therefore, the author agrees with the reason but not with the pervasion.
So, therefore, the author here agrees with the reason given, but not the pervasion. In other words, the author accepts that there is, course, perception or perceptual valid awareness, but it doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s inattentive awareness. Doesn’t necessarily follow that definition there. And if the reason is given because it is not determining awareness, so therefore for perception the object appears but it doesn’t determine its object because it’s not determining awareness, then the author says no pervasion. It’s not determining awareness because it’s not conceptual awareness.
But that doesn’t mean to say that it’s awareness to which the object appears, but is not discerned. Then the author says in return, we say it follows perceptual valid awareness determines its object because perceptual valid awareness is a non deceptive cognition with respect to its object. If the previous reason is not established, take perceptual valid awareness. It follows it is not determining awareness because it is not conception. Here, in fact, we’re just taking over the conventions in the Tibetan and putting them into English.
And at times they appear a little bit arbitrary and perhaps simply setting conventions and not really saying a great deal. And certainly, there’s an element of truth to that. Is this saying that perception doesn’t determine things, only conception determines you? Oh, no. It’s just if determining awareness, that phrase, determining awareness, refers to conception, but perception itself does determine its object.
But it doesn’t mean to say that it’s determining awareness. Nges shes in Tibetan. It’s there are many conventions like this that come up. Like perception determines its object, but it’s not determining awareness because it’s not conception. But it also highlights that conception itself is in a way it’s actively determining its object moment by moment.
In a sense, we’re putting an effort from our side to, you know, hold the object, determine the object. Perception itself, like our sense perception, can be said to determine its object, but it doesn’t do it in this quite the same sense that conception does. In a way, it’s highlighting the difference between perception and conception. Although they both can determine their object. I can be inference, yeah.
But even like correct belief determines its object. Subsequent awareness definitely determines its object. Generally, when we say determine, we mean comprehend. But, again, that comprehend can be can be taken in a strong sense or a weak sense. So there’s a bit of flexibility there.
I know it’d be good if it was, you know, all neat and black and white and we could just, you know, have everything neatly segregated. Yeah. In general, it’s in some things that can be done, but something like awareness because awareness has a number, many different facets and many different aspects, And awareness itself interacts with the future states of awareness with its objects in different ways. When examining the whole issue of the nature of the mind, it it is going to take quite a it’s gonna take a rather involved and extensive process of what analysis in order to begin to develop an understanding of the mind. So in that respect, it’s it’s not difficult to understand that we’re going to require an extensive framework in which to comprehend the nature of the mind.
And in fact, this what this text in a way is doing is giving a framework by which the various aspects or elements of the mind can be included and understood. Because simply from our side, looking at the mind and trying to discern how the mind works is not easy. And what this text is doing is simply it’s really giving us seven the seven fundamental elements of the mind. But then within that, it is also giving us a language or a terminology, a set of terminology that we can use to discuss the mind in these seven categories. Right.
And then he says, now a further debate. Take higher perception recalling previous lives. Lives. Higher perception recalling previous lives, which of the seven is that? Mental perception.
So a mental perception could either be where? Valid perception. Valid perception or Can’t be a valid inference. No, not correct belief. Subsequent awareness.
Awareness. Yes. So here, higher perception recalling previous lives is either valid perception or subsequent awareness. Or there’s a third possibility. Could also be It could be this one right here as well.
That’s one reason why it’s included here. Higher perception. Yes. Higher perception, recalling previous lives, is an instance of mental perception, and mental perception has three types. That is valid perception, subsequent perception, and inattentive perception.
That’s a good question. If it’s a memory, is it a perception? No. So if he’s recording previous life For ordinary beings, for sentient beings. So if it’s if it’s higher perception recalling previous lives, it’s perception.
No memory. No. Not a memory. No. It’s not No.
It’s not memory as such. It’s actually based on something different than memory. Sorry. It’s something called nyer len. That’s why I thought it was near me.
We often say, oh, this is a new life. Past lives. Here, if it’s for us, our memory is conceptual. Yeah. Well, it can be faulty, but it can also be correct.
Our memories can be correct awareness, can be what? Comprehending their object. But here, perception recalling previous lives is not conceptual. So anyway, the debate here is take higher recalling previous lives. It follows it is recalling awareness because it is awareness recalling its object.
We say no pervasion. Again, here there’s another convention. Recalling awareness is conceptual. Yep. In a way, it would depend on how you define memory.
If in fact, because we have these terms in English, that it’s possible broadly speaking that even higher perception, instances of higher perception may be called memory. But anyway, without going into that, here what he’s talking about simply is that higher perception recalling previous lives is not recalling awareness, although it is awareness recalling its object. Because recalling I think it gives under here, doesn’t it? If that reason is not established, then that follows. That is awareness recalling its object because it is awareness recalling its object, previous lives.
The previous predicate is unacceptable because it is not conception, because it is higher perception. Yeah. So that’s that’s reasonably straightforward, isn’t it? That okay? Well, it wouldn’t fit into this type of mental perception because this is talking about previous life.
Yeah. If one’s talking about the problem one had in the womb, for instance, then, of course, it’s this life, so it wouldn’t qualify on those grounds. But if one were to develop a higher perception of previous lives, then that wouldn’t that, of course, is referring to one’s previous life or ten lives before or whatever. And that higher perception functions differently than our normal memory. Oh, probably for us, it’s difficult.
I mean, if we recall something from when we’re very young, then that’s conceptual. Isn’t it? But that’s often we’re comprehending the experience or the object because it’s initially it’s sense perception which initiates conceptual awareness of that object. Whereas higher perception recalling previous lives is not conceptual. So it’s not something that’s gone firstly through, you know, the generation of a perceptual stage that initiates a conceptual awareness of the object.
It, in fact, is either through karma or through mantra or through generating Samādhi, it’s developing and using that as the empowering condition, then it’s gaining perceptual cognition or understanding of the object itself. So it’s going through a different process. Well, it would have been awareness. Of course, in the previous life. Our awareness existed in our previous life.
And the continuum of awareness has been maintained from then until now. But higher perception perception of that previous life is not going through the normal memory process that we’re used to in this life because it’s using for instance, the main condition that it employs is the development of concentration, single pointed concentration. So use having that as its what, as its main empowering condition, then that distinguishes it from normal memory. And it allows the perceptual comprehension of those events to occur. Well, that could be this one, high perception recalling previous life.
And there, it’s not like our memory at present. It’s like one’s actually there and living it, I would think. It’d be like a vision. If one actually has higher perception, It’s as if one is would be actually experiencing it. Whereas, at present, if we remember something in our life that occurred previously, it’s a it’s dark and a bit very hazy, and we remember it, but it’s not not sharp.
It’s not clear. But if it does achieve that clarity, then it’s perception and not conception. Yeah. So the implication here is that it’s very clear and sharp and bright, that type of high perception. So therefore, it’s not conception.
Dreams are yes. They’re perception. In fact, they’re not perception. They’re pseudo perception. The non conceptual awareness that can be initiated by various conditions such as karmic latencies and so on.
What? Is dream awareness? No. It’s not sensory awareness. It’s mental awareness.
Yep. Oh, okay. Page sixteen. Sixteen. Yeah.
I think it was explained previously, but okay. We’ll check that one a bit later. That’s a bit off the topic. Okay. So we have inattentive awareness.
And that definition at the very beginning there generally holds. That can be said to hold. So really, it’s awareness to which its object appears, but that awareness doesn’t determine the object. And the classic example is, for instance, know, we’re listening to music and we are sitting there reading something, but we don’t read something on the page. We hear the music instead.
Or otherwise, we’re reading something and someone’s talking to us and we don’t hear what they say. The object appears, but it’s not determined. So then after that, we have doubt. So on page thirty one, cognition wavering between two alternatives or two alternate objects by its own strength is the definition of doubt. Mind concordant with doubt and feeling etcetera in the retinue of it waver by the strength of doubt, but do not waver to two alternatives by their own strength.
So in other words, in order to be doubt, it must waver by its own strength. It can’t waver by the strength of something else. Because if we have when we have doubt, doubt itself is a mental factor. It’s not the main mind. The mind itself can waver to an object.
For instance, should I go this path or should I go that path? Is this the way or is that the way? Even though the mind is wavering, the mind is wavering by the strength of doubt. Doubt is wavering by its own strength. So only doubt fits the definition there.
So if doubt is classified, there are three. Doubt tending to the fact, doubt tending away from the fact, and even doubt, even handed doubt. So an example for the first one is doubt reflecting, sound is probably impermanent. The example of the second doubt tending away from the fact is doubt reflecting sound is probably permanent. And even doubt, even handed doubt is, for example, doubt reflecting sound could be impermanent or permanent.
Right. We’ll just read through some of the these debates. There’s not many of them there. Now one says in this regard, what’s wrong awareness and doubt are exclusive, exclusive? Meaning, they have no common basis.
Meaning, there’s nothing which is wrong awareness which could be doubt. Okay? What is wrong awareness? Wrong awareness the definition of wrong awareness is on the next page. We could just skip across and just have a look at that for a second.
So about two thirds of the way down a page on thirty two, we’ve got cognition incorrectly engaging its object is wrong awareness. So is there a common basis between doubt and wrong awareness? What if you had a doubt about two different things? Mhmm. Like, should I go this way?
Should I go that way? And they’re both the wrong way. Doesn’t matter. Still is doubt there. But they’re they’re both but it’s a wrong awareness because neither of them are gonna take you where you wanna go.
Well, here it’s only doubt all doubt is is wavering between two alternatives, even though they’re both wrong. I mean, we’re trying to get to Brisbane and we’re headed towards Perth, we’re either gonna take the high road or the low road to Perth. Still one’s in doubt about which way to go. Yeah. If in fact okay.
We’ll go into this because this is this is what this person is saying here that their doubt and wrong awareness are exclusive. So we say in regard to that, it follows if it is doubt, it is necessarily not the wrong awareness because those two are exclusive and the reason is accepted by the other person. So then the author says Purbu Chok says, if so, take doubt strongly holding sound is probably permanent. So we have a doubt that’s saying, oh, sound is probably permanent. Holding to that.
A little bit of doubt, but probably permanent. It follows it is not wrong awareness because it is doubt. And then because it is doubt tending away from the fact. That’s true, isn’t it? It’s doubt tending away from the reality there.
If so, take that subject says Purbu Chok. It follows it is wrong awareness. Why? Because it is conceptual wrong awareness, because it is wrong conception. That is pervasive.
Why? Because wrong conception and conceptual wrong awareness are equivalent. And that follows why? Because states wrong conception and wrong conceptual awareness are equivalent. So we have a scriptural source for that, which is good.
Yeah. Okay. So what have we done so far? Now the author is saying there is a common basis between doubt and wrong awareness. And doubt holding sound is probably permanent is wrong awareness.
It’s doubt because it’s doubt tending away from the fact, but he’s also saying that that is wrong awareness. It follows wrong awareness and doubt are not exclusive. So this is the first section of thirty two because wrong conception and doubt are not exclusive. Because doubt strongly holding sound is probably permanent is both wrong conception and doubt. So that’s that’s okay.
If actually, the doubt holding that sound is probably permanent, It’s strong enough to be included within wrong conception. Is that okay? Yeah. Well, in order to be both, it must fit the definitions of both as given for instance by Purbu Chok here. So doubt holding that sound is probably impermanent is cognition incorrectly engaging its object.
Whereas you wouldn’t say that that’s wrong awareness if it was doubt holding that sound is probably impermanent. I mean, there’s degrees there. Even handed doubt, what’s that? That’s probably not wrong awareness. But No.
There are instances of doubt which can be wrong awareness. For instance, doubt tending away from the fact, we could say in general is wrong awareness And doubt, both. It’s getting very close to correct belief. But there if there’s any wavering, then it means that it’s still doubt tending to the fact. So it’s not correct belief.
Really, correct belief there is one is, you know, made up one’s mind, but that’s how it is. One is, you know, set on that conclusion. Hundred percent. It’s one of the root afflictions. Afflictive doubt is one of the six root afflictions.
Right? But that’s doubt in relation to the four noble truths. Doubt in relation to the path, in fact. What the path is. Other types of doubt are not I don’t know if that’s a valid doubt.
But is it an affliction? It’s yeah. Doubt doubt is generally well, even arhats who have overcome affliction can have doubt. So some types of doubt would be regarded as afflictions and others not. Because it’s said that, for instance, an arhat has overcome afflictive ignorance, but not non-afflictive ignorance.
And through that non afflictive ignorance, if they’re asked about, you know, what’s the name of the shopkeeper over the road? They might not know. They’d have doubt about it. That’s not afflicted. That’s coming from non-afflictive ignorance.
And that sort of doubt is not an affliction. Because an arhat has overcome afflictions. No. It’s heading in the right direction. So it’s Afflictive afflictive there would generally be determined by what other mental factors it is associated with, would make it afflictive.
If it’s associated with ignorance, it’s probably with afflictive ignorance, then it’s afflictive. With afflictive ignorance, then it’s afflicted. Afflicted. Very much, I think. Yeah.
Just to examine our own state of mind in the present. Take note. Oh, that’s where the mind is. Simply that in itself is beneficial. Because it’s all what mindfulness is is really doing that every just checking moment by moment where, you know, mindfulness of body, mindfulness of feeling, mindfulness of the mind itself, mindfulness of dharma.
Yeah. It’s really just having a look and saying, oh, the mind is like that. Oh. Ignorance. Neutral feeling, boredom, difficulty, headache.
So nice feeling. Attachment. Right. So, accordingly also, Dendar Lharampa states, the assertion that all wrong conception possesses the aspect of definitely determining its referent object is unacceptable. That is because in consequence, conception strongly holding sound is probably permanent, would not be wrong conception.
And therefore, conception and doubt are not exclusive, etcetera. In that particular text, it does indicate that there are common ground, common basis, or there’s some common ground between wrong conception and doubt. But there also talks about wrong conception definitely determines its object. So that process of actually determining determining the object can even be possessed by wrong conception, which is definitely holding something the wrong way. So to determine something, it doesn’t necessarily mean it comprehends, even in a weak sense.
Right. So then wrong awareness. There’s definition and classification. So someone here says, cognition mistaken to its conceived object is the definition of that which is wrong awareness. What’s wrong with that?
Cognition mistaken to its conceived object. Anything wrong with that definition? Awareness definition is only bringing into account awareness which has a conceived object, so that must be conception. But wrong awareness can also be non conceptual. So then we say to that, take sense awareness to which a snow mountain appears as blue.
It follows it conforms to the definition, meaning, is cognition mistaken to its conceived object? Is sense awareness to which a snow mountain appears blue, cognition mistaken to its conceived object? No. Why not? Does it conform to the definition?
Is it cognition? Is that sense awareness holding a white mountain snow mountain to be blue? Because it appears blue, doesn’t it? Here we have eye sense awareness that’s holding the snow mountain to be blue. Is that cognition mistaken to its conceived object?
No. Why not? It has no conceived object. I this is where these sort of debates are very helpful because then that indicates that actually our awareness is not conceiving anything. We have to differentiate between I awareness and mental awareness, which may be conceiving of something.
Is that okay? So here it says it conforms to the definition. Why? Because it conforms to the object defined. It is in other words, it is wrong awareness.
If so, take that subject.