y Mind and Cognition 2001 Month 07-09 — 2001-07-31

y Mind and Cognition 2001 Month 07-09 (Ven Jampa Ignyen)
y Mind and Cognition 2001 Month 07-09 (Ven Jampa Ignyen)
y Mind and Cognition 2001 Month 07-09 — 2001-07-31
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Audio recorded at Buddha House Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. How do perception and conception interact in a single moment of awareness? Venerable Jampa Ignyen tackles this question in this 46-minute philosophical investigation using Tibetan Buddhist logical debate. He establishes that different types of awareness—sense perception, inference, feeling, discrimination—can sometimes share a single substance, particularly when self-perception observes another state of mind. An example anchors the discussion: someone with cataracts perceives one moon as two. But this oddity points to something more urgent: we habitually grasp at “true existence” in our conceptions, a mistaken awareness we rarely notice. The session emphasizes why recognizing these mechanisms of invalid cognition matters: all our suffering originates in such unrecognized mistakes. Pitched at students with existing background in Buddhist philosophy.

File metadata (for organising)

File: 01 M and C 2001 07 31.mp3

UUID: 63484cfd-608f-4c76-adbf-d93ad1bc7162

Teacher: Ven Jampa Ignyen

Collection: y Mind and Cognition 2001 Month 07-09 (Ven Jampa Ignyen)

Date: 2001-07-31

Recorded at: Buddha House Adelaide

Duration: 45.8 minutes

Words: ~4,687

Far better than watching TV. Very, very useful. Even though the benefit of something like Lorig is not evident in the beginning, The benefit does appear later on, but it isn’t it isn’t so easy. The text is somewhat difficult, and it takes effort to get the meaning of the text. So it’s excellent to put some effort into reading through the text and thinking through the issues.

In a sense, there’s nothing better that we could do than to reflect on these matters. Now so far we’ve in this term, we’ve just had one week, and that last week was really dealing with page twenty one and some associated issues. Now on page twenty two, then the author goes into a further topic here, the differentiation of substance. So this is to do with substance of awareness itself, that our awareness is like a substance. In Tibetan, the word is ze.

In Sanskrit, it’s dravya. And, yeah, it has this implication of substance or energy. And our awareness is a type of energy, it’s a type of substance, which is different than the substance of physical matter, not made of atoms and molecules. But it’s also impermanent, and it’s a compound. Our awareness is a compound of these impermanent moments.

So therefore, it’s a compound. These moments of awareness themselves are a type of substance, an essence, an impermanent essence that’s always changing, but it continues. But here, the substance of our different types of awareness is not the same. Substance feelings are not necessarily the same as the substance of our discrimination and so on. So here in this section, the author is talking about the differentiation of substance.

So here, in the beginning, the author starts with a debate, and the debate is where the perception and inference are substantially one. Now inference is correct conception. So therefore it’s awareness generated through a generic image. And perception, like our eye awareness, your awareness, and so on, those types of perception. There’s a debate here that they’re substantially one.

Are they substantially one? Is our conception and perception substantially one or not? No. Not one. Substantially one.

Being substantially one means they must be distinct. Okay. If we take matter, the table and the impermanence of the table are substantially one. Okay? Like that here.

The impermanence of the table is a characteristic of the table, a property of the table. The impermanence of the table cannot be separated from the table itself, although they’re distinct. They’re distinct, aren’t they? The table and the impermanence of the table are distinct. True?

Or is that True. But here okay. Before we get on to conception and perception, we need to have a few examples of what being substantially one and substantially distinct mean. Here, the this piece of wood and the and the bowl, are they substantially one or substantially distinct? They’re distinct and substantially distinct, aren’t they?

Because the substance of one is not the substance of the other. Our physical body is distinct in substance from the floor. The substance of the table is distinct from the substance of the book. But the impermanence of the table and the table itself are substantially the same, even though they’re distinct. And in fact, really, in order to be substantially one, there needs to be two things in order for there to be substantial same.

Okay. Similarly with awareness. Now the debate here is whether perception and conception are substantially one or not. Now, the debate continues. Perception and inference are substantially one because perception is substantially one with inference.

And then it said reason not established. So then it said take perception. It follows it is substantially one with substantially one inference because it is substantially one with self perception experiencing inference. No pervasion. So take inference.

It follows. If it is substantially one with self perception experiencing it, it must be substantially one with it because both it and the self perception experiencing it, our perception, are established as substantially one for any object, duration, or essence because it is awareness. Okay. So what is being said here? And in fact, here we’re examining awareness itself.

And we know within our continuum, we have perception, we have conception, and they continue, in their own substantial continuum. Are continuities of both perception and conception within our continuum. Also, the sūtra school point of view, there are four types of perception out there. What are the four types of perception? The sense perception, yogic perception, mental perception, self perception.

Right. Now perception, what does self perception do? It’s aware of awareness. That’s right. It’s aware of what’s internal, meaning the subjective, meaning awareness itself.

So here the author says, what about that type of self perception which is aware of inference? That self perception is substantially one with the inference it is observing or experiencing. Inference like correct awareness, correct conceptual awareness established through reason. Fire. That’s right.

You look at the smoke coming from billowing up from that distant mountain pass. And for instance, if you’re with another person, you have doubt about whether there’s fire there. And he says, well, look, take that distant smoky mountain pass. It follows there’s fire there because there’s smoke there. And we sit back and think, oh, that’s true.

If there’s smoke, there must be fire. And there’s certainly smoke at that distant mountain pass. And we think about this for a while, and then, oh, of course, there must be fire there. That is a a correct conception there generated by a reason. So that’s correct inference.

So for instance, for that person, when that correct inference arises, they also have a self perception observing that inference or experiencing that inference. Now what is being said here is that that self perception is the same, substantially the same as the inference it’s experiencing. Because that is the nature of self perception. When self perception is aware of another awareness, it’s not as if that other awareness is separated from it. Like, we have self perception over there and inference over there.

In fact, awareness is not spatially defined. It’s not physical. It doesn’t have dimensions. So what is implied here is that they mix together. The inference and the self perception of experiencing inference are like mixed together.

Oh, that’s possible. Definitely. And what happens there is that, like, we think of a song and it sort of plays along for a while and then we forget about it. At that point, it becomes unmanifest. It still exists there, but it doesn’t have enough potency to really for us to be aware of it.

It exists there. And then sometimes it becomes, you know, through one condition condition or another because the mind becomes very becomes a little bit quieter because we’re concentrating on the breath or something. We start to notice it again. And as we notice it, then it becomes manifest. It manifested.

You know, in a sense, it becomes stronger through us noticing it really. But yeah. Oh, to be the same. If if the fact of being substantially the same is established, that would be the case whether it was manifest or unmanifest. It’s just that when self perception experiences an internal state of awareness, it experiences it by being substantially one with it.

Whether it’s manifest or not, I don’t think really matters. But but it’s said that we can’t there is a statement just in in terms of this idea of manifest and unmanifest, that in terms of mental awareness, we can’t have two distinct, substantially distinct manifest mental awarenesses occurring at the same time. We can have one that’s manifest and others that are unmanifest. And that’s right. And that’s like we can have a main main thought, you know, like progressing along, and then if that becomes unmanifest, then other thoughts may may arise.

But we can’t have them both manifest. Substantially distinct, you know, a conceptual awareness being manifested at one. Two substantially distinct manifest conceptions at one. One. Oh, of course.

You can think of one and think of another and so on. Oh, well, that’s right. It can appear. But we do have many different types of awareness existing simultaneously anyway. We can have all of five senses existing simultaneously and manifest.

Here, well, here it’s only making a case now for self perception observing inference, for instance. Those two can be established as substantially one. In general, they’re not. They’re substantially similar. But this this will will get to a bit further down.

But the argument that or the point that the author is making here is that we can have awareness which is substantially substantially the same. Two types of awareness which are substantially one. Or they have the same energy. They share the same energy. Right.

So then as it says, in dependence on that reasoning, it is established that both conception and non conceptual awareness are substantially one. Here, why that’s saying that is, why the author is putting it in this way is that if we can find one example of something occurring, we can state that it does occur. So if we can find one example of perception and conception being substantially one, we can say that they are substantially one. Anyway, this is a convention that’s taken up. It doesn’t mean to say that every awareness therefore is substantially one, but because we found one example, it’s valid just to state it in that way.

And therefore, both mistaken awareness and non mistaken awareness are substantially one. Both sense awareness and mental awareness are substantially one. Both mind and mental factors are substantially one. Both valid awareness and non valid awareness are substantially one. Now the reasoning that’s used in order to establish that is just having self perception observing or experiencing another type of awareness.

And those two awarenesses are said to be substantially one. Is that okay? Anyone disagree with that? Good question. Oh, it can be there, the perception, non conceptual awareness is self perception, and that’s substantially one with inference that it is experiencing internally.

Okay? What it means is that if you’ve got self perception in, you know, manifest internally, that self perception can view any of any state of awareness that we have in our continuum, manifest or unmanifest. Now if it’s observing, if it’s experiencing inference, then it’s substantially one with inference. If it’s experiencing if it’s a main mind and it experiences a mental factor, then main mind and mental factor are substantially one. If it is valid awareness and it’s experiencing a non valid awareness, then valid awareness and non valid awareness are substantially one.

If it is that basically covers, I think, the categories there. That’s all that is really being said. In brief, what it means is that self perception is substantially one with the awareness that it is experiencing. Because the higher schools don’t accept self perception. But we need to understand the mechanism of self perception.

Right. Now there’s a few debates here. How do we feel about reading through a couple of more of these debates? That okay? We’ll start off.

We’ll just do one. The very bottom there. Now at this point, the author is going into some discussion on conception. And so one says here, right at the bottom of twenty two, free of conceptual substance is the definition of free of conception. So what’s conceptual substance?

It’s the energy of our thinking. All our thoughts are conceptual. But we do have awareness which is free of conception. It’s true, don’t we? We do have non conceptual awareness.

Now if someone gives the definition of non conceptual awareness as free of conception, that which is free of conceptual substance, then there may be some difficulties with that type of definition. What’s an example of non conceptual awareness or or that which is awareness free of conception? Eyesight. Yeah. Eye awareness.

Sorry? Yeah. All our sense awarenesses are free of conception. They’re nonconceptual, nonconceptual, in other words. But then free of conceptual substance, is that a good definition for free of conception?

So the author says, we’ll take self perception experiencing conception, which is this example that we’ve been talking about. But, okay, self perception experiencing conception, the internal state. It is free of conceptual substance. It follows it is free of conceptual substance. Is it free of conceptual substance?

It’s substantially one with conceptual substance, so it’s not really free of it. But this other person then says, why? And then the author says, oh, because it’s free of conception. Because it is con it is perception, and the root assertion is established. Is that okay, that reasoning there?

If we have self perception viewing conception, if we were to say, we’ll take that as an example. It’s free of conceptual substance because it is free of conception, because it is perception. And the and you would have to the author is telling this other person, you would have to accept that reason. It’s true, isn’t it? That self perception viewing conception is perception.

Is that okay? No. It’s perception. Here, we’re using terms in a particular way that in order to what? We’re using terms in a specific way to accord with this particular text.

And when we talk about perception, we’re not using it in the often in the in a general way in which it’s used. Here, we’re using it in terms of being that which is non conceptual awareness, meaning awareness which is not using a generic image, such as sense perception and so on. But self perception experiencing conception is perceptual. Therefore, it’s, non conceptual. So, anyway, on the next page, then the author says, we’ll take that subject, perception, self perception free of conception.

It follows it is not free of conceptual substance because it is established as substantially one with conception regarding any object, duration or essence. Here, object means that self perception is substantially one with the object that it takes for the duration that it takes that object and in terms of the essence of both its object and itself. All it means is that self perception is substantially one with its the the awareness that that it’s experiencing. So then after that, the author then says, well, take conception. It follows self perception experiencing it is established as substantially one with it regarding any object duration or essence because it is awareness.

So this also is a very a pervasive reason that’s given by the author here. In other words, just as we’ve we’ve mentioned that self perception is always substantially one with the awareness that it’s experiencing, and that’s pervasive at any time, any place. Now regarding that, then that other person may say back to the author, well then take such a self perception, the self perception, experiencing conception. It follows it’s not conceptual substance because it’s perceptual sub it follows it is not conceptual substance because it is the substance of non conceptual awareness. We say no pervasion.

What it means there is that that self perception, viewing conception, is really the substance of conception and the substance of perception both. So therefore, it’s not free of the substance of conception. Does this make any sense? Does it make sense to talk about awareness in terms of substance? Energy.

Right. So underneath there, then the author gives the definition of free of conception, which is that which is free from conceiving cognition holding a potential conflation of sound and image is the definition of free from conception. Conceiving cognition itself is conception, holding a potential conflation of sound and image. Sound there is generic sound. Image there is generic image.

When we think about anything, we’re using a fusion of generic sound and generic images. So any awareness or that which is free from conceiving cognition, holding a potential fusion of sound and image, and which is free of that is free from conception. One of the reasons why we’re talking about conception in this way is to gain a clear idea of what conception is so that we are able to identify conception. Why do why are we bothered with identifying conception? We need to be able to identify conception so that we can then begin to determine what is a valid conception and what is a non valid conception.

Why do we need to do that? Because all of our problems from beginning this life have come about through non valid conceptions. So that being the case, have an interest in understanding what conception is and how conception works and what type of substance it is, what type of energy it is. Okay. How are we doing with this?

We do some more debates or self perception, when it’s experiencing conception, is one with in substance with that conception. So therefore, it is it is it has conceptual substance. It’s mixed with conceptual substance. It’s mixed with the substance of conception. And pretty much that’s how we are.

You know, when we look inside and try and work out, you know, what our different states of awareness are, then they all tend to be pretty much, you know, mixed with one another, don’t they? It’s hard to hard to look in terms of how far feeling ends and that’s where feeling ends, then we have discrimination. Discrimination ends there, then we have contact, then we have equanimity is over there. Oh, look. There’s a bit of compassion here.

There’s a mental awareness. Mental perception that’s lasting for a moment is there and so on. It’s hard for us to separate out the substance of our awareness, isn’t it? It tends all to be, like, mixed together in this soup of experience. Some things are more prominent than others.

So the purpose of this type of study is to help gain an idea of what actually exists within our mental continuum. What are the possibilities? So there’s many different ways that we can look and observe the awareness that we have within our continuum. See the if it’s awareness, then it either has to be valid or non valid awareness. Why objects are different?

No. Objects are different. Like, when we have self perception viewing conception, that conception itself has an object. Or if we have self perception, for instance, viewing eye awareness, then that eye awareness has an object, but we’re not particularly concerned with the object here. All we’re dealing with here is the substance of the awareness itself.

The sense awarenesses, they have external objects, of course, depending on the sense. But the sense awareness itself is internal. Then, of course, we have conception, and conception can take any object of the past, present, and future as its object. So here we’re concerned in this particular section with the substance of awareness itself as it arises. It’s an impermanent substance.

It arises, it abides, it passes away. And how does that substance interact with the substance of other states of awareness? How is it all developing developing moment by moment? How does it interact? Where do these thoughts come from?

Of course, we have a lot of input through the senses. We have colors and shapes and sounds and textures and smells and tastes and so forth. All of these are coming in on a regular basis. And then beyond that, we have conception. The sense awareness is really not they’re only a problem for us to the extent that our conception is a problem for us.

In a way, the sense awarenesses are quite neutral. It’s the way we think about them that creates some difficulties for us, potentially creates difficulties for us. But we need to be aware as much as possible of the the way that awareness develops moment by moment. And for this reason, we’re looking at, these different types of awareness and whether awareness is substantially All different types of awareness are substantially one or not. Now up until this point, it’s clear that there are some types of awareness which can be substantially one.

Others are not substantially one. Many of the the states of awareness that we have also are causally related. One gives rise to another. And if our awareness is causally related, if two states of awareness that exist in our continuum are causally related, then they can’t be substantially one because they exist as cause and effect. In order to be substantially one, they must exist at the same time.

So whatever exists in one moment can never be substantially one with what exists in a subsequent moment. It can be of the same substantial type, but it can’t be substantially one. Right. We’ll just we’ll just go on with a further debate. So regarding that, he says, this person says again, it follows, it’s about halfway down the page.

It follows if it is perception, it must be non mistaken cognition free of conception. So if it is perception, it must be cognition free of conception. That’s halfway down page twenty three. Just starting regarding that he said. It follows, if it is perception, it must be mistaken cognition free of conception.

Why? Because non mistaken cognition free from conception is the definition of perceptual discernment or perception. If that is affirmed, take sense awareness to which one moon appears as two moon. It follows it is non mistaken cognition because it is perceptual discernment. Reason not established.

Take that subject. Take that sense awareness to which one moon appears as two moons. It follows it is perceptual discernment or perception because it is pseudo perception. We say no pervasion. Okay.

So that’s a minor debate there. We do also have pseudo perception. We did do the definition of pseudo perception at one stage, didn’t we? Anyone remember the definition? Non mistaken cognition free of conception is the definition of perception.

Now if we go back a little bit, pseudo perception. Exactly. Cognition mistaken to its appearing object is the definition of pseudo perception. Right. So therefore, any cognition mistaken to its appearing object is not perception.

It’s not regarded as being perception. Because it is regarded as being pseudo perception, something which is like perception but not actually perception. Is that okay? Sense awareness we can’t have a wrong sense awareness, can’t we? Such as sense awareness holding one moon to be two moons.

If in fact, if one has a problem with one’s eyes, when one looks at the moon, one may see two moons. So that’s eye awareness to which two one moon appears as two moon. That type of awareness is pseudo perception. It’s not perception because it’s mistaken to its appearing object. And then okay.

So the author is going here discussing a little bit the nature of perception itself. So initially he was talking about whether perception and conception could be substantially one. Then he gave the definition of conception. Now he’s talking a little bit about perception, distinguishing these two things: what is perception and what is conception. In dealing with what is perception, he’s given the definition of perception, is non mistaken cognition free from conception.

And then he’s brought up an example of sense awareness which holds one moon to be two moons. Although that sense awareness, it’s not perception because it doesn’t fit the definition of perception, because it’s not non mistaken cognition free from conception. And that is because it’s pseudo perception because it’s cognition mistaken to its appearing object. So then after that, he says, if that reason is not established, so right at the very end of that debate, take that subject. Take sense awareness to which one moon appears as two moons.

It follows it is pseudo perception because it it is awareness to which the nonexistent clearly appears. So it’s pseudo perception because for it two moons clearly appear, and two moons don’t exist. Is that true that two moons exist? Here, we’re talking about around the earth. There’s only one moon.

So two moons don’t exist there, so it’s a nonexistent object. So, therefore, it’s awareness to which the nonexistent clearly appears. Therefore, it is, non and it is non conceptual wrong awareness, that type of sense perception holding one moon to be two So then again, he goes on with a further debate. Take sense awareness to which one moon appears as two moons. Oh, Oh, we won’t go into this debate history.

We’ll leave that. That can be homework. One can read through that. We jump down to about third of the way down page twenty four, also one says, take sense awareness to which one one moon appears as two moons. It follows the nonexistent appears to it.

Why? Because it is awareness to which the nonexistent clearly appears. We say there is no pervasion because since when one moon is not two moons, if one moon appears to such awareness as two moons, it is posited as possessing clear appearance of the nonexistent. Yeah. Here, it’s more a question of convention.

Anyway, all we need to know about this particular section is that there is something called pseudo perception which is not really perception, like eye awareness to which one moon appears as two. That is pseudo perception because it’s awareness or it’s a sense awareness to which the nonexistent clearly appears. Now under that then he says, the opponent to Dharmakīrti then says to him, it follows one moon appears to it. If you have actually, this area is fascinating. If we had the time to debate it through, it is very, very interesting.

Unfortunately, we don’t have much time, and so we’re skimming over these debates, I guess in an effort to get an overall appreciation of the text. But at times, think we’re we’re failing miserably at really gaining an appreciation of the text because we just don’t have enough time to go into depth on these issues. Because the more one can dwell on these points, the more one begins to see more meaning one begins to see within them. Because we’re not here debating really this eye awareness of someone with cataracts who looks at the moon up in the sky and sees two moons. That’s of course, not the purpose.

Here we’re trying to discern what non valid states of awareness are. The reason we’re trying to do that is because we’re full of non valid states of awareness, and we don’t recognize them at present. So we have to start with very simple ones, like awareness to which one moon appears as two moons. And it’s often, we look at it and we think, well, what’s this got to do with anything? God, awareness to which one one moon appears as two moon?

So what? Let’s get down to the crux of the matter. The crux of the matter is that we are always affirming things to be truly existent. Now we’re our even true existence appears, you know, to our awareness all the time. We are grasping a true existence.

Things appear to us to be true existence. There is no true existence from here to the ends of the universe, but that appears to exist to us. We have awareness. This in here, we’re talking about conception to which the nonexistent appears. True existence appears, but we cannot discern it.

We don’t even understand the mechanism by which it happens, by which it occurs. So this is why we’re talking here about having an eye awareness to which one moon appears to be two moons. We have this with conception grasping a true existence. Its reference its appearing object. Its focal object exists, but we then hold that focal object to be truly existing.

It’s similar to the fact of looking at the moon. The moon does exist, but holding that to be two moons is wrong. Our conception viewing another object and holding that object

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