Audio recorded at Buddha House Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 45-minute session, Ven Jampa Ignyen guides students through foundational arguments in a Buddhist philosophical text on objects and awareness. He works through a series of debates examining what it means for something to be comprehended by awareness, using the extended example of a rabbit with horns — a non-existent entity — to explore whether mental conception alone grants something the status of an object. He establishes that something exists only when comprehended by awareness somewhere in the universe. The talk introduces the seven types of awareness (valid perception, valid inference, correct belief, doubt, wrong awareness, and others) and explains how understanding develops gradually through these categories. He emphasizes that grasping what awareness actually is must precede the more subtle work of understanding selflessness. For serious students already engaged in Buddhist philosophical study.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 01 M and C 2001 05 01.mp3
UUID: 143295b3-5a58-4a97-a3e0-4d92294ec024
Teacher: Ven Jampa Ignyen
Collection: y Mind and Cognition 2001 Month 04-06 (Ven Jampa Ignyen)
Date: 2001-05-01
Recorded at: Buddha House Adelaide
Duration: 45.7 minutes
Words: ~4,576
So I hope everyone got a chance to do a little bit of reading during the path week. So in this section of the first ten pages that we’re presently studying with Laurie. So we’re really here. We’re on the object section, and we can check with the the contents page, page number two. So, really, from three to eleven, so the first nine nine pages of the text, more or less, is on objects and the meaning of what an object is.
So, of course, objects and object possessors is really the meaning of duality. Subject object. Object possessors are just subjects. They’re defined in terms of objects, and objects themselves are defined in terms of subjects or object possessors. So they’re related.
They’re dependent on one another. So in this text, firstly, objects are investigated. And the way the text is, the first part of the text on objects is categorized is that first we have a section where the author himself is introducing ideas of other other teachers and refuting their ideas. Then in the middle part, he’s positing his own system. And then after that, he’s dealing with any further issues.
So really, there’s like three sections here, but it’s not clearly, perhaps, clearly marked in the text. First part is really from page three to page eight. Then, really, the page nine, ten, and very top of page eleven is really eliminating any further dispute, the third section. So we started a little bit on page three with that first debate. Now this text, quite a lot of it is taught in the form of debates between they’re theoretical debates between the author and other people.
Sometimes these reflect actual debates that have occurred. Others, it’s a composite that the author has devised in order to set forth a point. So then about halfway down page three. Now these first two debates here are dealing with, the first definition that’s given. Here we’re starting on page three, and about two thirds of the way to the top of the page, we’ve got refuting other systems.
Then under that, one says, cognizing objects is posited as the definition of discernment. Discernment here meaning awareness, knowing. So if someone gives that definition, discerning objects, as the definition of our awareness, would that hold true? We need to reflect on this a little bit. What do mean by an object?
Object here meaning anything which exists. All an object is is something which exists. Now just looking at it superficially, it seems like it’s not a bad definition because that’s what discernment does. It in general, it’s cognizing objects. But the author doesn’t accept that definition.
And then after that, a further definition is given, the definition of object itself. That cognized by discernment is posited as the definition of object. Really, two definitions are given by one person. When it said one says, that means, of course, someone other than the author. Could be a fictitious person.
It could be an actual person that lived at some time in Tibet. And in fact, this was one way that the great masters in Tibet would comment on the works of others. They would introduce their views in a debate and go about refuting what what their view was. Here, we’re using this format in order just to clarify what objects and object possessors are. Right.
Now in terms of that first definition, cognizing objects. Now firstly, we’re investigating whether whether that in fact is the definition of discernment. Now we just skip that first debate. And then about halfway down the page, we’ve got again. Now if we now the author is saying now, again, we take that definition.
It follows if it is discernment, it must be discernment cognizing objects, because cognizing objects is the definition of discernment. Okay. Is that that reasonable? That’s pretty reasonable, isn’t it? So then the author says, if so, take discernment in the continuum of a person not comprehending objects.
Does that subject exist? Does that type of person exist? Okay. Here, if in fact, cognizing objects is the definition of discernment, then what about the discernment in a continuum of a person who’s who does not comprehend objects? A person not comprehending objects doesn’t exist.
Don’t they have awareness? Ah, this is more, of course, of what the the point that the author is making. Discernment doesn’t have to cognize an object. There’s types of discernment that don’t cognize comprehend their object. So, anyway, here the author is bringing up this instance, the discernment in the continuum of a person not comprehending objects.
It follows it is discernment cognizing objects because it is discernment, because that’s the definition of discernment according to you or according to this person. So then the author says, if so, take discernment in the continuum of a person not comprehending objects. Again, the same subject there. It follows it is discernment comprehending objects because it is discernment cognizing objects, and that reason is accepted by the opponent there. Then the author says that is unacceptable.
Why? Because it is discernment in the continuum of a person not comprehending objects. Okay. So the gist meaning there is that we can actually posit that it’d be a person who doesn’t comprehend objects. Even if there’s one object we don’t comprehend, we’re a person who doesn’t comprehend objects.
True? That’d be reasonable to say. So such a person exists. If the definition of discernment was cognizing objects, then any discernment in the continuum of such a person would have to cognize objects because that’s what discernment is. But because such a person exists who doesn’t necessarily cognize objects, then that can’t be the the definition of discernment.
Okay. So that’s not so difficult, is it? This is not meant to be a trick debate here. Yep. Discernment here is the same as awareness.
Awareness. Yes. Yep. Awareness, discernment, cognition are synonyms. What awareness is is just the knowing, the as the quality of knowing or potential for knowing that we have, that awareness that we have.
Is it true that all our awareness cognizes objects? It isn’t, isn’t it? We have some types of awareness that just don’t cognize their objects, don’t we? Like, all our hatred doesn’t cognize its object. If we have any hatred or and so forth within our continuum, that doesn’t cognize its object.
Also, does anyone understand emptiness here? Well, we have awareness not cognizing emptiness as well. What about selflessness? However, the author so is that okay? Is that first debate okay?
All that’s being said there is that if the definition for discernment is cognizing objects or that which cognizes objects, then there’s exceptions to that. If there’s an exception, it can’t be the definition. The definition of something has to work in every circumstance for it to be the definition. Otherwise, it’s not the definition. For instance, momentary is the definition of impermanence.
So if it’s impermanent, it’s it’s momentary. If it’s momentary, it’s impermanent. There’s no instance of impermanence which is not momentary. No instance of momentary which is not impermanent, and so on. Therefore, the definite it can be the definition of impermanence.
So here, we’re looking for a definition of discernment or awareness that exists in our own continuum. So cognizing objects is not the definition of our discernment. Is that okay? It’d be good if it was. We had no problems.
We’d understand everything. Whatever we turned our mind to, we would understand completely. Right. Now underneath this, then Purchokpa Rinpoche then states, though that last pervasion is stated in that way, we must accept that correct belief comprehending selflessness of the person exists in the continuum of a person who does not comprehend selflessness. So this particular statement is quite an interesting thing to state to say or to state.
So in other words, even though we don’t comprehend selflessness, we can have a correct belief about selflessness even in our continuum at present. And it’s said that that correct belief comprehends selflessness. See a few skeptical faces. Okay. Even even though we don’t comprehend selflessness, we can have a correct belief in our continuum which does which is said to comprehend selflessness.
Are you talking about too? Yeah. The author here is is making a distinction. There’s a certain type of comprehension that exists for correct belief, which is not fully qualified comprehension. Selflessness, it’s said that that actually comprehends selflessness.
By means of mere correct belief, by means of being a correct belief. In general, we don’t understand selflessness, but we do accept selflessness to exist. And in fact, you know, we would accept that this piece of wood here was selfless. Like, everything in the universe is selfless. And having a belief in that is a correct belief.
It’s correct belief because its object exists. So here, author is introducing this idea that even though we don’t comprehend something, we can have a correct belief about it. That correct belief, on a particular level, in a weak sense, actually comprehends its object. It has to be a correct belief. If we had the belief that the earth was flat, then that’s not a correct belief.
For one, its object doesn’t exist. Does we can have the conception of the earth being flat, can’t we? Does the object of that conception exist? Why not? Exactly.
So it’s not a correct belief. It’s actually conception. But in terms of a correct belief where the object does exist, it’s said that that type of correct belief does comprehend its object. But it comprehends it to the limit by which correct belief can comprehend. It’s a weak sense of comprehension.
Gradually, yes. Yeah. Exactly. All we’re trying to do here ultimately is to develop correct view. It is.
Yes. I like that. Yeah. Yeah. What you’re saying is if you’re told that the world is round, then you believe it.
You’re perceiving that correctly that the world is round. Or you’re conceiving correctly then. Conceiving correctly conceiving correctly that the world is round. Yep. Through belief.
Yep. And that can be said to be comprehending its object. But it’s not fully qualified comprehension. Gone out of space to look back and see the ground or Or that we haven’t actually well, if we were to go into outer space, we’d actually be able to see with sense perception that it’s around. Dealing on a level of conception, we can establish something to exist in a certain way through correct reasoning.
But even before the penny drops, so to speak, we can still say that correct belief comprehends the object. When the the penny drops, we actually comprehend. Sometimes that happens, doesn’t it? We’ll have a belief about something. Oh, yeah.
I accept it. I accept it. And then one day, it clicks. Oh, that’s what that means. Oh, is that all it is?
That’s the difference between, say, correct belief and valid inference. So even before the penny drops, we can say that that correct belief comprehends its object. But okay. Now in these two debates that occur on page three, then the author we’ve mainly here concerned with the second one. The author is stating that he doesn’t accept that to be the definition of discernment.
Then on page number four, for the second definition now the second definition is that cognized by discernment is posited as the definition of object. So now, actually, if anyone’s read forward, we’d realize that the author does accept this to be the definition of object. But he’s gonna have a look at this definition himself from different perspectives. Now according to this now for that second definition that was given back in the previous page, another person start makes a statement about that particular definition. Now one erroneously says, take a rabbit with horns.
It follows it is an object. Is a rabbit with horns an object? It’s an object of conception. Isn’t it? If it’s an object of conception, it needs to be an object.
Is something like a rabbit with horns? Here, we’re assuming that in the world today, there aren’t any rabbits with horns. Maybe there will be down downstream a little bit, but at present, we’re safe to use that as an example of a nonexistent being, like a unicorn and so on. Sorry? A rabbit.
A Viking rabbit. Okay. So here now the data rises about something which doesn’t exist. Is that an an object or not? So it has to exist.
Right. Now this person here is is examining this point, right, about whether that second definition holds or not. Because the second definition is that cognized by discernment is the definition of object. So we take a rabbit with horns. It follows, it is an object.
And we say why. We don’t accept that. Right? The author here doesn’t accept that a rabbit with horns is an object of any description. In no way does it fulfill the definition of an object.
So he says why. Then this other person says, because it is that cognized by discernment. Is a rabbit with horns cognized by discernment? It has to would have to be we have two options there. It’s either cognized by sense perception or mental perception.
The first one would be, you know, if we’re out in the field and we see a rabbit and maybe it’s got funny horn funny ears. Maybe we think they’re horns or something. Or otherwise, if we had a conception of a rabbit with horns, say a small rabbit with huge antler like horns on it or whatever. But does it cognize it? Does it comprehend it?
But if it comprehends it, it means that it does exist because the measure of something existing is that it’s comprehended by awareness. Just not being able to point to something doesn’t mean to say it doesn’t exist. But here, we’re taking the definition of something which exists to be that which is comprehended by awareness. If it’s comprehended by awareness, it must exist. If it exists, it must be comprehended by awareness.
In that case, what’s comprehending a rabbit with horn? Well, here the object here, the author is assuming that a rabbit with horns cannot be comprehended anywhere. Otherwise, it would exist. You can have a mental image of one. Ah, yeah.
But now the question is, does the conception of a rabbit with horns comprehend a rabbit with horns? Right. Right. It can hold it, but it’s not comprehending it. If it comprehended it, the rabbit with horns would have to exist.
Is that okay? That’s okay as well. Good. The main thing is just to think through the issues a little bit. Doesn’t matter which if we agree or disagree.
Oh, that will come slowly. That’s the easiest path. Okay. So the author is saying here. Now, they’re actually the one that’s debating in this debate is this other person, and they’re debating the author.
And they’re saying that take a rabbit with horns, it follows it is an object because it is that cognized by discernment, because it is imputed by discernment. And the author says, reason not established. I don’t accept the reason there. And then the this other person says, that follows because it is imputed by conception. Reason not established, says the author.
A rabbit with horns is not imputed by conception. Then the other person says, well, it is imputed by conception because it is imputed by the conception holding it. No pervasion, says the author. Okay. So what he’s saying here is that a rabbit with horns is this last thing.
That’s the only thing we really need to take note of here. A rabbit with horns is imputed by the conception holding it. It’s true, isn’t it? A rabbit with horns, it’s only measure of existence or it’s what it because it doesn’t exist, does it? All it is is imputed by the conception which holds it.
Good. That’s that’s a good point. Well, it doesn’t really matter what example we give. Anything that doesn’t exist. We could say an elephant riding a tricycle, you know, in the middle of the room would be another example we could use.
Anything that doesn’t exist. We can have a conception of it, but merely having a conception of it doesn’t mean to say it’s gonna exist. Mhmm. Sorry. That’s another example of some something that doesn’t exist.
Yeah. If there’s a coiled rope on a path and it’s dim and we walk along the path and we see it, we may think it’s a snake and we jump back. Actually, there’s no snake there at all. But initially, we have a conception of it being a snake. That conception which holds the rope to be a snake exists, but the rope being a snake doesn’t exist.
I don’t want discernment as well. No. Well, that conception is discernment, but it doesn’t comprehend its object. The definition of comprehension? Comprehension means to understand.
No. It doesn’t have to correct belief is conception. We can comprehend things without sense perception. But can we comprehend things that aren’t true like Not We can comprehend that are not truly existent. Absolutely.
We can comprehend things even if we hold them to be truly existent. Otherwise, we’d be in trouble because we tend to conceive everything as being truly existent, don’t we? Yet, within that, we still comprehend objects. Okay. So the point that’s being made in this debate at the top of page number four is that things which do not exist are not comprehended by awareness.
They’re not comprehended by conception and so on. So even though we have a con a conception of a rabbit with horns, that conception itself doesn’t comprehend the object. Is that okay? Or does anyone want to True. True.
Just ourselves believing that something exists or not doesn’t affect where some whether something exists or not necessarily. But the point or the purpose of doing this type of examination is to begin to develop an understanding of conception because our misconceptions of the world are in fact types of conception. And it perception. Yeah. Yes.
And we need to be able to differentiate what is a misconception from for instance, what is a correct conception? And gradually, in the process of, what, of developing understanding, then we need to understand clearly the steps in the process by which certainty is attained in relation to objects. And in fact, that there is a in general, there is a series of stages that has gone through. We’ve already I think on page number two, just to go to this briefly. On the right hand column on page number two, we have a set of seven types of awareness.
Now we can mark these in again. That is valid perception at the very top of the list. That’s the first valid inference is the second number two, then dropping down to subsequent awareness is the third. Correct belief is the fourth. Inattentive awareness is the fifth.
Doubt is the sixth. Wrong awareness is the seventh. And we should keep in mind those seven because there those seven include all types of awareness that are possible. And in a sense, the process of developing understanding about anything is progressing from wrong awareness is progressing up that scale from wrong awareness to doubt, to correct belief, to valid inference, to valid perception. But in order to eliminate wrong awareness, one needs to begin to come to a comprehension of what wrong awareness is.
And here, the example given is the conception of a rabbit with horns. And then the question on that is, does the conception which holds a rabbit with horns, does it comprehend its object? Now the author is saying no. He’s saying that he he accepts that a rabbit with horns is imputed by the conception holding it. That’s okay.
But simply being imputed by conception doesn’t mean to say that it’s being comprehended or cognized by that conception. Mhmm. Of many different matters, doesn’t it? It it does. Well, it’s a it’s the same thing.
It’s just here, in fact, these great masters in the past in both Tibet and in India have examined this issue of awareness in great detail and have come to formulate or define the processes by which comprehension is developed very carefully. And these these masters are actually basing what they say upon what the Buddha himself set out very extensively. And what they’re saying in brief is that there is a way of comprehending even the subtlest and most difficult to comprehend objects in the universe if the correct conditions are put in place. But to begin this process, we need to initially understand what objects are, what object possessors are. Now in terms of object, what objects actually exist and what don’t exist?
Now we accept that object and existence are synonyms, but we have various conceptions where we we think that we’re actually comprehending an object, but the object itself doesn’t exist. For instance, the truly existent I. We have conception of the I that we take to be valid awareness, but, actually, that I doesn’t exist. So this is, like, an example of that. So here we’re taking a a more easily comprehended example, the conception of a rabbit with horns.
Right. Now the author here is saying that a nonexistent entity is imputed by the conception holding it. Now in the second stage of this debate on page four, it states, now we say to him, take a rabbit with horns. It follows it is the object of discernment. Why?
Because it is the object of the discernment holding it. Then take a rabbit with horns. It follows it is the object of the discernment holding it. Now, here the author is trying to prove back to the person that a rabbit with horns is in fact the object of the discernment holding it. Does everyone accept that?
Anyway okay. No takers on that. So take a rabbit with horns. That follows. It is the object of the discernment holding it because it is the object of the conception holding it.
Reason not established. Take that subject. That follows why? Because it is selfless. So here, the author is stating that if it if it’s selfless, then it is the object of the conception holding it.
It’s not an object, but it’s an object of the conception holding it. Is this splitting hairs? You’re probably wondering why are we bothered about this little bit of an area here. What vast importance or what great great meaning lies there? Do we feel that way about this particular No.
Actually, this is not so difficult to understand. The fact of our own selflessness is much more difficult. So we can well, of course, these debates, what they’re here for is for us to understand selflessness. Selflessness is much more difficult to understand than these debates. Coming to a comprehension of our own awareness, what our awareness is, is far easier than understanding selflessness.
So, I mean, if we think that we could go to straight to selflessness and just understand that, you know, just have think have a conception of selflessness and just concentrate on that, it’s gonna be very difficult for us to understand it. We can sit down and just think of selflessness till the cows come home. But just doing that, we’re not gonna comprehend selflessness. It’s impossible. Like with emptiness, we can think emptiness.
We can go out and think emptiness, emptiness. But it’s it’s not just that, of course. Initially, it’s easier for us to develop an understanding of awareness because it’s really within awareness itself that our comprehension of selflessness will arise. So, okay, what the author is saying here is that something like a nonexistent entity is imputed by the conception holding it. We can also say it’s the object of the conception holding it, but it’s not an object.
For it to be an object, it has to be comprehended by awareness. And the horns of a rabbit is not comprehended by any awareness anywhere in the universe. Is that going too far? Yeah. Yeah.
Oh, there are comprehension. When we taste a cup of tea, our taste is comprehending. Our tongue is comprehending the taste of the tea, isn’t it? Well, we should know if we don’t know. Who else?
No. It’s not an object. He’s taking that definition and saying, oh, wait a minute. A rabbit with horns is in fact an object because it is cognized by discernment, because it’s cognized by imputed by discernment, because it’s imputed by conception, because it’s imputed by the conception holding it. Now, the author says, okay, the the last reason you gave is okay.
The rest are not. He’s not the author is not saying there’s anything wrong with the definition. He’s saying that the, you know, your instance there, a rabbit with horns, can’t be used to prove or disprove the definition. That’s all it. Now in the third part there, again, he says and this other person then says to the author, Purchokpa Rinpoche, take valid awareness.
It follows objects are cognition. Again, this this is not so important, this particular debate. Why? Because objects are cognized by valid awareness. But we do need to understand this debate here as well.
So if he says to the author, take valid awareness. It follows objects are cognition. Is that true or not? Are objects cognition? Are objects awareness?
Why not? They’re separate from awareness? Are they awareness? Is this is an object here, isn’t it? Is this awareness?
No. Not even the mind only school would say that’s awareness. Yeah. Awareness is an object. Where it exists?
Because it exists. Because existence and object are just, what, are equal. If it exists, it’s an object. If it’s an object, it exists. That’s an object, but that’s not cognition, is it?
It’s not awareness, is it? That’s right. It’s like apples are not oranges and oranges are not apples is what you’re saying. Like that. Yeah.
Yeah. That’s not awareness. Does anyone have any doubt about whether that’s awareness or not? In a mind only school, it’s the substance of awareness, but not awareness itself. Anyway, that’s without going into that issue.
Okay. So that now he’s saying back to the author, take valid awareness. It follows objects are a cognition. Actually, objects are not cognition. Some objects are, but objects in general are not.
Is that okay? Can I just go back to that being that is not not awareness? Are you saying that’s not awareness because it hasn’t it cannot comprehend? Yep. That can’t comprehend anything.
Yep. It’s as simple as that. Yep. Doesn’t know anything. Well, in fact, that’s half of the work that we’ve got to do is just clear the clear up the terms.
Once we clarify the terms, it makes it much more much easier to get to the meaning. Because I say that the old man of meaning is held up by the walking stick of words. And at present, our walking stick is not too not too steady. So it’s hard for meaning to get a chance.