Audio recorded at Buddha House Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this nearly three-hour teaching, Ven Jampa Ignyen methodically unpacks the sevenfold reasoning, a classical Buddhist logical analysis that investigates whether any entity truly exists. Using a chariot as the anchor, he examines seven positions: Is it identical to its parts? Distinct from them? Does it depend on or possess them? Is it merely their assembly or their shape? Each position is refuted through careful argument, with contemporary examples—a Toyota, a pen, a clock—showing why our intuitive grasp is mistaken. He then applies the same reasoning to the self and the five aggregates, touching on rebirth and the continuity of consciousness. The core distinction throughout: how things nominally exist versus how we mistakenly perceive them as truly existent.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2012 11 04 01 – JampaIgnyenSelfDeception041112.mp3
UUID: a367345c-7cfb-425b-bca7-d0b698a0b2e3
Teacher: Ven Jampa Ignyen
Collection: Mind & Cognition (Ven Jampa Ignyen)
Date: 2012-11-04
Recorded at: Buddha House Adelaide
Duration: 173.9 minutes
Words: ~6,809
Right, so we just continue. Now we’ve redone the first and the second points. Now the third and the fourth on the second page: The chariot does not depend on its parts and the parts do not depend on the chariot. So really as the commentary mentions below in it the chariot actually does depend on its parts because the chariot is a dependent arising. But that’s not what is meant here.
This is just to make it difficult for us actually. The definition of a dependent arising is that which depends on its parts. So everything that exists is a dependent arising because everything that exists depends on its parts. Is it possible that there is something that doesn’t depend on its parts? Can we think of any example?
Space. Space depends on its parts. Space has parts. Has a western part, eastern part, northern, southern, upper, lower No? We have space inside the cup that’s permanent.
Yep, so that space has a part here that’s permanent and we have the space occupying our physical body. Right? If there wasn’t space here we wouldn’t be here. Well space itself depends on those parts. The body doesn’t.
Is that okay? That we have space in the glass. Right? That space in the glass is permanent even though the glass has been permanent and we’re moving it around. Is it the same space?
Ah Not quite the same space is it? Because the space in the glass that’s here is not the same as the space in the glass over here. Yep. So not the same space. So therefore space has parts.
We can divide space up. So space has parts. Okay? Okay. Now that’s all right.
A hundred percent you know I’m not looking at a hundred percent you know seventy five would be okay. Sixty would be alright. Forty five is not bad. Okay, so everything that exists has parts. What about consciousness?
Does our feeling have parts? We’re feeling at the present moment. Mental feeling. Does that have parts? Sorry?
Okay that’s good. Yes. Moments of feeling are in a sense like parts. And no matter how far down we go there’s progressively smaller and smaller moments. Feeling can be divided into its parts.
It depends on parts. But feeling itself is not physical, not made of atoms. So it’s not like a physical object that really becomes obvious that it depends on its parts. Oh well really the feeling itself could only it’s can only either be yeah. So we couldn’t have a feeling that has one part positive one part negative.
Right? Because it would it’s impossible. I mean it can change. In one moment it could be a positive feeling and the next moment a negative feeling arises but they’re not they don’t coexist in the retinue of the same consciousness. Feelings.
Yeah. Right, a negative feeling. You ever have a negative feeling arise? It’s established by its parts but generally the way that’s explained is that it has, you know, like former and later parts. So no matter how far down you go you can always divide it into parts in a sequence.
Like we have say a positive mental feeling arise and it endures for a certain amount of time. That enduring mental feeling has infinite an infinite number of parts. There’s no lower limit. So the feeling itself arises in dependence on its parts. Is that okay?
So really it said there’s nothing in the universe that doesn’t arise in dependence in reliance upon its parts. So if you had reason to, the chariot does depend on its parts. But what is meant here is that it doesn’t inherently depend because that would be a contradiction of terms. As soon as we put inherent in there it really means not depend. Something that inherently exists or truly exists doesn’t depend on anything else because it exists in and of itself.
The problem for us is that that’s how things appear to our sense consciousness. When we look at things they appear to exist in the way they appear. They appear in one way and the way that they appear they appear to exist in the way they appear. Can we put it that way? This is the natural tendency of things.
And so we in a way it’s difficult for us because things naturally appear in a particular way to us. They appear to be truly existent to us and we tend to affirm that. If they actually existed in that way then the universe would come to a grinding halt. The universe couldn’t function. It’s just an appearance.
Things appeared in a certain way to us. They appear to be existing in and of themselves. We look at a chair and there’s an appearance there as if the chair exists in and of itself from its own side independent of its parts and so on. But that appearance is just an appearance. What we tend to do is on top of that we affirm that mentally: Oh that’s how the chair actually exists.
So anyway everything depends on its parts but here the third point: the chariot does not depend on its parts. So here it means take the chariot both of those two positions that it inherently depends on its parts and its parts inherently depend on it. So those are the two, three and four are unacceptable unacceptable because if it were either they must be inherently distinct. Positions have already been explained as unacceptable. Inherently exactly.
Yep. It’s not that the Madhyamikas are denying that the chariot or the car depends on its parts. They fully accept that. And if we understood you know, if we understood things in just merely that way that’s correct. But what we tend to do is add inherently.
The way we look at things is that we hold things to arise inherently from their parts. All the parts arise inherently from would depend inherently upon the object itself. Right, so those two positions have been dealt with really by one and two. One being the chariot is not the same as its parts. The chariot is not other than its parts.
Right. Is that okay? Three and four? Right so it doesn’t inherently depend on its parts because if it did there’s no need for the parts because it already is inherently established. So the chariot does not inherently depend on its parts and the parts do not inherently depend on the chariot.
Okay then number five: The chariot does not possess parts. So we take the chariot or the car, the Toyota. The means by which a chariot or the Toyota inherently possesses its parts is for example: Devadatta possesses an ox or Devadatta possesses an ear is unacceptable because according to the first means of possession like possessing an ox the car and the parts would be inherently distinct in nature or in substance or in essence. Right, so possessing an ox a person possessing an ox the person and the ox are different substance. Right?
So that’s not how the car and the parts exist at all and that’s been covered in point number two in the second. So the first means of possessing possession they would be inherently distinct in nature. That can’t be. And according to the second or the latter means of possession they would necessarily be established as inherently one in nature. Right.
The second is like possessing an ear. So that’s a bit like the ear and the body are of the same substance. Or to put it another way, the ear is of the same substance as the body. Right? Which is not like a person possessing an ox, and that’s where the ox is really distinct in substance from the person.
Now the author then says both of these alternatives have already been refuted. The fact the possession which is like the car possesses its parts has been refuted because the car being of one substance and the parts being of one substance has been refuted in point two. And the second point that they’re inherently one in nature has already been refuted in point one. That is that the car or the chariot is not the same as its parts. Right.
Okay. Do we accept that both alternatives have already been refuted? So what we’re saying in the fifth point there is the chariot does not possess parts. It doesn’t inherently possess parts. Or it doesn’t possess inherently established parts.
Nominally we can say the chariot possesses parts. The non inherently existent chariot possesses non inherently existing parts. True. Because it’s a what? It does possess parts.
But here again it’s In a way this is a technique that is being used. When I say the chariot does not possess parts we look at it and think what does that mean? Of course it possesses parts. But because we so strongly hold to the chariot or the car being inherently established and depending on its inherently established parts we go to the extreme of saying the chariot does not possess parts. In a way to shock us a little bit into coming to an understanding.
It’s a little bit like there was a scholar called Gendun Chopel who lived in Tibet in the 1930s, 40s and he was a monk from Drepung and quite a good artist and a very good debater. He was very controversial. He became a communist which was quite radical in that early period especially when China became communist in nineteen forty nine and then proceeded to invade Tibet. But he had an interpretation of Madhyamaka as well and in his interpretation he really denied everything. He denied the existence of the object at all.
They didn’t anything there existed at all. And that is a particular technique that’s applied by a number of authors. Now whether Gendun Chopel I think went a little bit too far in his presentation but a number of authors do assert that because our self grasping of true existence is so strong that the object is really truly existent. It’s better to say the object doesn’t exist at all. It’s a bit like cold turkey.
In way it’s a bit like shocking us into confronting us to look at the question of true existence inherent existence. It’s bit like trying to get us to sober up more quickly. A bit like cold turkey. I think there is no object. So the challenges this strong grasping we have of things truly existing.
Cittamātra. Yep. The Chittamatran it is. Yep. Yep.
Cittamātra view, the mind only view, is very good for understanding non duality. Yep. Yep. Yeah. Just talking in his context and the language used.
For instance here it says the chariot does not possess parts. That can be a bit confusing to us when we read it or the chariot does not depend on its parts. But the reason why the language is formulated in that way is to confront us because we so strongly grasp at things as being truly existent. So it’s like but then in the explanation it becomes clear then they put in inherently and in you know, through through there just so that oh, it means inherently. But we haven’t really understood what inherently means.
Means. Anyway, that’s So the chariot does not possess parts. Actually it does possess parts but an inherently established chariot does not possess inherently established parts. Okay then The sixth one is: The chariot is not the mere assembly of its parts. Now it’s getting progressively subtler here because we’re thinking that okay the parts are there, the chariot, the car is there.
Okay, you know, chariot is not the same as its parts, it’s not other than its parts, the chariot does not depend on its parts, its parts do not depend on the chariot, the chariot does not possess parts but at least the chariot then is it’s got to be at least the assembly of the parts. You bring those parts together in a certain way and then you’ve got the chariot. Then the chariot exists because it’s the mere assembly of its parts. The reason this has a particular order of presentation here. So anyway the chariot is not the mere assembly of its parts.
Now we take the chariot or the Toyota. It is also unacceptable to posit it to be the mere assembly of its parts because in that case even the mere assembly of parts such as the wheels, the bolts, nuts and so on that are collected in one place, collected together, but arranged with a slight separation and also they’re not yet complete. All the parts are there. A slight displacement would in consequence exist as a chariot. If it were the mere assembly of the parts then if we put the parts together but slightly displaced that would be a car.
I’m sure there’s bit of doubt about that. But of course if they were slightly displaced then they wouldn’t hold together very well. So again it’s a bit like the production line. If we slightly displace the parts so that the arrangement is pretty much as they’re arranged then there’s a point at which it doesn’t become a car. It’s not a car.
True? That’s a difficult one there because it almost seems like a minute we just displaced by you know a millimeter. Is it still a car? What about two millimeters? Three millimeters?
We separate them out a bit the parts. There’s a point at which they are arranged in a general order in which the parts should be arranged but it’s not a car. Okay. Yeah. Okay well it’s saying here slight separation but arranged with a slight separation and not incomplete.
Anyone disagree with this point number six? One to five are okay? Six has gone too far. Six is a bit was a bit like a cup. You know if we had a cup separated out the parts.
There’s a point at which there is a cup there but there’s a certain point at which the arrangement if we slightly separate the parts out it’s not no longer a cup. It’s no longer it’s yeah or the clock. If we have this clock and we separate out the parts how far do we have to separate them out before it’s no longer a clock? Not very much because the little cogs in there are not going to work after We separate the battery out a little bit that’s it And so on. Yeah.
Does this seem more like a pseudo point than a a real? Yeah. Right. Yeah. Yep.
Yeah. Right. Okay. Simpler is good. Okay then Yeah.
Yeah. So it’s a bit like this very good like with a pen. The pencil if we separate the parts of the pencil out there’s a certain point at which it still holds the arrangement of parts but it’s no longer a pencil. We have a bit of resistance to this. It’s because of that grasping this thing is really inherently existing there.
Okay we’ll just stop there. It’s about time for lunch. So we finished just the first part of number six. Good revision of six. Destruction.
Oh, thanks. I forgot to turn it off. If both the self and the aggregates were inherently one, then in consequence they would possess generation and destruction because the aggregates possess generation and destruction. The root of wisdom states: If the aggregates were the self, it would be generated and destroyed or it would arise and disintegrate. So this is talking about rebirth here.
What error would there be if the self possessed generation and destruction? Indeed, if it possesses those merely in name, there is no error. However, if it possesses inherent generation and destruction, there are three faults. It would be unacceptable to recall previous lives. Committed actions or actions that have been committed in the past would go to waste without having a result.
And one would meet with action the results of actions one had not committed. So further, if the if the self of former and latter lives were inherently separate or inherently different, they would be different unrelated states. Thus for that reason these three faults arise. Objection. There is no fault since even though they are inherently separate, they belong to the same continuum.
Right. So this is talking about past life and we had an I in our past life and there was an I in the life prior to that. And the I in this life exists and then we’ll have another I in our next life that we will impute upon our five aggregates our new five aggregates. So if the former and later lines were inherently separate inherently different then they would be different unrelated states. I think that’s clear.
Similar reasoning to before. But that’s not actually the case. They are related. They’re causally related aren’t they? What the eye did in a previous life has an outcome for the continuation of that eye in the next life or in a subsequent life.
So objection: there is no fault since even though they are separate they belong to the same continuum. Even though they inherently exist the I inherently exists in our past life, in the present life, and in our future life they belong to the same stream of consciousness. So there’s no fault. But here the author says that is unacceptable because if they were distinct in nature or in substance or in essence they would not belong to the same mental continuum. Inherently distinct in nature.
For example Maitreya and Upagupta or John and Jim. So is that okay so far? So as the Madhyamakāvatāra states: Dependent phenomena such as Maitreya and Upagupta do not belong to the same continuum because they are separate. It is not logical that those states possessing distinct characteristics belong to the same continuum. So for instance, in this life there are two people.
We don’t say they belong to the same mental stream. They’re just separate individuals who have their own stream of consciousness from the past through the present into the future. So those two beings are unrelated and separate beings. If we say that the I in the past life, the I in the present life and the I in the future life are inherently existent, those I’s would also be separate and unrelated. That consequence would inevitably arise.
Is that okay? He was talking about past and future lives in the stream of consciousness that joins one life to another. Now what does happen during the death process is that the sense awareness subsides, and the mental awareness, the coarse mental awareness subsides. Course mental awareness there being conception, the eighty types of natural conception subside right down to the clear light. But the clear light awareness, which is the subtlest possible state of awareness, remains manifest through the death process and then into the intermediate state, into the new life, and so on.
So it’s a stream of consciousness that connects one life to another. Although the coarse levels of consciousness subside during the death process. So that stream continues. But there is no I imputed to that stream which is inherently existing exists in and of itself. So therefore what the I has committed actions committed by that I in a past life can reemerge a result, manifesting on an I in a later life.
This is what this is talking about. Layer consciousness is the mind only view, storehouse consciousness or foundation consciousness. No. It’s just mental mental consciousness. Oh yeah, mental consciousness itself does.
What’s mental mental consciousness? Well it’s implied that well mental consciousness has coarser and subtler coarser subtle extremely subtle and very extremely extremely subtle elements to it. The seeds imprint the mental consciousness, the sixth consciousness of the six. But in the mind only school they posit a separate foundation consciousness that supports the imprints. The mind only school.
But the higher schools say there’s no need to posit that sort of awareness. Just ordinary mental consciousness is enough. It retains the imprints. Right then the self is not other than the aggregate so what have we done there? So we’ve gone through the first point: the self is not the same as the aggregates.
The self is not other than the aggregates. Right. So many issues that come up just in that first point. Now the second point is similar to the chariot analysis where the chariot chariot is not other than its parts but here the self is not other than the aggregates. So in a sense we can say the like the aggregates are parts.
But really the it’s a little bit different because here we’re talking more about the aggregates as the basis of designation. Now what one of the differences between the chariot and the self here is that the basis of designation of the person is physical and mental. Isn’t it? Whereas the chariot is just all physical. So it’s a bit more difficult in that regard because awareness is a subtler level subtler state than the physical world.
Then Self is not other than the aggregates, refuting the position that both the self and the aggregates are distinct. If the self were inherently distinct from the aggregates, then that self would not possess the generation, destruction, and abidance of the aggregates, because it would be a separate unrelated state to the aggregates. For example a horse does not possess a hump and so on since it is established as a separate entity from an ox that has a hump. So similar to the argument before with the chariot the self is not inherently different from the mind body continuum. Without thinking about the I that’s really the basis of designation of the I.
Either the body or the mind itself. The mind represented really by three mental factors and consciousness. Because they’re the ones that we most often point to as I. So the mind body continuum does arise, does abide, is destroyed. And if the eye were not related to that then the eye would not arise, abide and be destroyed along with the aggregates.
It would be a separate separate state that sort of just, you know, cruised along above all that and wasn’t affected by it but the self is not that. Is that okay? If there were separate unrelated entities like a horse and an oxen with a hump then what happened to the horse would not happen to the ox. What happened to the ox would not happen to the horse. But the eye and the mind body continuum are not like that.
What happens to the eye affects the mind body continuum. What happens to the mind body continuum affects the I. So they’re related. In that case, Prasannapada states as syllogism well known to others: basis imputed by name as the self does not exist as the object held as the self because it is uncompounded. For example, it would be like a flower in space.
Okay that’s a particular type of syllogism that’s expressed there. I’m just trying to think of the offhand I can’t remember. The context of that particular assertion. We’ll just leave that for the time being. Again if the self is inherently distinct from aggregates, would be necessary to observe the self as distinct from the defining characteristics of specific aggregates such as that suitable to be formed and so on.
For example, it would be like observing form and mind to be distinct in accordance with the order of formal later reasoning in the Root of Wisdom the eighteenth chapter states: If it were other than the aggregates, it would not possess the characteristics of the aggregates. So that’s clear. The self, the does possess the characteristics of the aggregates. True? Is that okay?
So the self is not inherently distinct from the aggregates, in other words. Because what happens to the aggregates affects the I. What happens to the I affects the aggregates. And we define the I in terms of aggregates or the mind body continuum. I’m hot, I’m cold and so on.
I’ve got a toothache aching as a part of the physical and so on. All of those indicate that there is the eye and the underlying aggregates are not distinct not inherently distinct. Indeed, though there are numerous difficult points to be explained in the reasoning that refutes one and distinct, they are not elaborated here. So again the author brings this to mind: there are other issues really that are raised in this sort of a debate but we don’t have the space to bring them up at present. So how these reasons resolve the remaining positions?
The self does not depend on the aggregates. The aggregates do not depend on the self. Again the self does depend on aggregates and the aggregates do depend on the self but not inherently so. By refuting either inherently one or inherently distinct in that way also either position of the self depending on the aggregates or the aggregates depending on the self are refuted because it would be unacceptable for those two to exist as inherently distinct and the proposition that they are inherently distinct has already been refuted. Okay we’re sort of pushing ahead a little bit here but the reason it’s set out is very similar to the chariot.
And there’s just a few other extra elements that have been brought up such as the past life implications. All that for us in the West where past and future lives is not an object that is often debated out in the streets or in the pubs it’s sort of an added extra. Can A little bit there. Yeah. It’s an application.
Really what is being said there is that the mind itself if you look at the latter four aggregates they have an ongoing continuum. That even though individual states of awareness like feeling and so forth have a beginning and end, the subtle mental consciousness is a continuous stream and is not severed by the severing of the physical body or the disintegration of the physical body. So that’s an assertion deep within Buddhism itself. It depends on this presentation that the mind is not physical. It’s not a so it’s really an outcome of that sort of assumption.
Okay so then the fifth one: The self does not possess the aggregates. The position that the self possesses the aggregates is also unacceptable because it does not escape the faults of the position of being inherently one or distinct in either mode of possession. This accords with a former explanation of the chariot. So the self does not inherently possess the aggregates either like Devadatta possessing an ox or Devadatta possessing an ear either of those two modes is refuted. So the self does not inherently possess the aggregates.
And that becomes an issue because it seems like the I has the aggregates. The I possesses feeling, the I possesses a body, the I possesses consciousness. But it doesn’t inherently possess any of those things. And number six: The self is not the mere assembly of the aggregates. Also it is unacceptable that the mere assembly of the aggregates is the self because since it is stated that it is imputed as the self in dependence on the five aggregates, the five aggregates are the basis of imputation and the person is the imputed existent entity and because it is unacceptable that the base of imputation is the imputed object.
Okay, so The five aggregates are the basis of imputation. The five aggregates are not the eye but they’re the basis of imputation of the eye and the person is the imputed entity. Merely imputed on the five aggregates. Not only that the basis of imputation is not the imputed property. Basis of imputation like form feeling and so forth is not the mere imputed object.
That is unacceptable. It’s not the property. I think here if regarded as being the property then the fifth fault also arises: it does not possess the aggregates. Really the aggregates in the eye exist in terms of the basis imputed and the entity imputed upon that basis and it’s not that one possesses the other or one is the property of the other. We can’t differentiate them.
They don’t inherently exist in that way. That second point is interesting: it is unacceptable of imputation. That the basis of imputation is the imputed property. Okay then the next page. The point of these reasons is a little difficult to comprehend and as quoted before in Just as the chariot is described, in dependence on an assembly of parts, so too the relative person is described.
in dependence on the aggregates. It has a specific mode of specific mode of issuing the potency of some sūtra’s words. The autocommentary of the Madhyamakāvatāra also states: The reasoning must be So in other words: We apply this reasoning and we understand this reasoning By coming to an understanding of the proofs themselves in detail so elaborating out the proofs until we develop some degree of certainty And in that process we start to eliminate doubt about what is meant in relation to the words. And once we get the words sorted out and it takes a long time to get the word sorted out then it’s possible to begin to understand the meaning behind the words. The meaning itself is often very simple.
The words expressing the meaning are often very complicated. So this process is inevitable but gradually through pursuing that we come to an understanding of the meaning. Also there’s a further error that if the assembly of the self is the self then action and agent would become one. So the assembly of the aggregates itself is the self then action and agent would become one. Also some of our system refute the assertion that the continuum of the aggregates is the self by this reasoning.
Okay, we’ve looked at the idea that the assembly of the aggregates is the self and refuted or rejected that possibility. But if the aggregates themselves and the person the self were one then the agent of the action and the action itself would become one. So that’s implying that the I who’s the agent is employing the five aggregates in a certain way. In a certain But they are differentiated. The agent and the action are differentiated therefore the self and the aggregates need to be differentiated in order to establish the existence of the agent and the action.
Is that true? For instance like the eye feeling something or thinking something. So the eye is engaging the aggregates to do the work of the eye. Although they coexist, the agent is distinct from the action itself so the action of the mind or the action of the body. If they were one we couldn’t distinguish between the agent and the action.
Also some in our own system refute the assertion that the continuum of the aggregates is itself by this reasoning. So some assert the instance of a person is stream, the ongoing stream of the five aggregates. That’s the instance of the person. Right. It’s probably yeah.
Yeah. The Tibetan term there for the action and the agent is kowa and chepa. Cha cha. And karma is lay. So it’s a different term than karma.
But sorry I could but in fact the three are defined in terms of köwa, chepa and lay. And the lay there which is karma or the lay there which is the same word as karma is often defined as the object of the three things: the agent, the action and the object of the action. Anyway, look, without going into that Anyway! There is an assertion by some of the lower schools that the continuum of the aggregates is the person. The fact that the aggregate this moment by moment continuation of the five aggregates from one moment to another to another is the instance of the person, is the self in other words.
But that’s refuted by the higher schools. In the higher schools the instance of the person is the mere I imputed upon the basis of designation which is the five aggregates not the continuation of the aggregates. And so it’s saying that this reasoning also helps in refuting that assertion. The distinction of the action and agent prevents the continuum of the five aggregates being asserted to be the instance of the person. Doesn’t matter.
Yeah, one of the things is that we’re just raising issues for seven fold reasoning really Because they’ll come up again later so it’s good to at least think a little bit about these issues. And then the seventh one there is the self is not the shape of the aggregates. It is also unacceptable that the shape of the aggregates is the self because then the mind and so on could not be posited as the self since the shape exists as a physical state alone. So if the self were the shape then the shape being physical would mean that the self would have to be physical. But what does that mean when we see another person we see the shape of that person coming in the distance, the shape of their face.
The shape is not the person so what is the person? What are we seeing with the eye consciousness? What process is going on there? But the eye is seeing something, right? Memory distinction is going on.
But we say we saw George. Is that a lie? I saw George yesterday. It’s wrong. Okay.
Did we see George? I mean yeah. We’re not lying are we? Mean that would stand up. Like because the Prasangikas here the consequence school are saying that we accept the ordinary conventional usage right?
And this is a point they make before. Now we say we saw George and we set it in a court of law. They would have to be accepted, right? But can we actually see George? So we’re lying if we say we see say we saw George.
Right. So the eye consciousness cannot see George. So the eye consciousness itself doesn’t see George. So what is George then? Is George a label?
So is George a word? A name? Okay George is a name but eye consciousness certainly can’t see a name because the name is sound isn’t it? So Right. So you’re saying that conceptualization is playing a role in the right.
But we do say we saw George and that has meaning doesn’t it? Yeah. So what are we actually seeing? Eye consciousness. Shape of George.
All right. Yep. We’re seeing the shape of George. We’re not actually seeing George. We’re just seeing the shape of George.
Yep. Alright. That sounds reasonable. Any everyone else agree with that? Well we no it’s not really a question of being wrong it’s really just examining, you know, what’s going on here.
In this seventh point: the self is not the shape. So the person is not the shape. George is not the shape of his physical body. That’s what we’re seeing, you know, when we see that see the person moving along and their distinctive shape and features. Instantly do we have to think about it to recognize George?
It’s an interesting process. It’s almost as if it’s instant. We see someone and instantly we recognize. We instantly discriminate George, is it done on a sensory level? Well, of course, with the eye sense consciousness, it always has the five omnipresent mental factors, doesn’t it?
And one of those is discrimination. So is the eye consciousness itself discriminating the physical the body of George. Yeah. So is it actually recognizing George? The physical body of George.
But it does have discrimination, doesn’t it? Because it’s one of the omnipresent mental factors. Yeah, so it recognizes. So the eye consciousness recognizes the body of George. So it recognizes George.
Is George just a label? But a label is just what? A word isn’t it? Well, wait a minute if you say he’s a label you mean like a word. Right, but if you say George is a label by label do you mean like a word?
The word George. So a word is a sound though isn’t it? George is not a sound. So George is not a label. No sorry about this.
This comes up in debate about this. Yep. George is not actually a label. George is a person and a person is an impermanent entity which is neither physical or which is neither form nor awareness. Right?
So it’s not it’s not form it can’t be sound. George can’t be sound. George can’t be shape. George can’t be anything physical. George can’t be anything mental either.
George can’t be feeling. George can’t be discrimination. George can’t be consciousness. But George is imputed upon the five aggregates that George possesses. That’s all.
Good! This is talking around the seventh point: the self is not the shape of the aggregates. Right so in all of this what we’re trying to do is just get an idea of what the person is. So we’ve been using the sevenfold reasoning here to as almost like a prompt to investigating these issues. These issues are quite subtle and they’re not apparent they’re not obvious to us.
So this type of text and there are various other texts that are similar to this are very useful in just giving key points to contemplate in investigating the nature of the person. Like ourselves who we are as individuals. This we need to know. Kids often want to know what the I is. They’re very good at thinking through or challenging these issues.
Yeah, Buddha nature. Well Buddha nature is of two types. Buddha nature what is Buddha nature? Tathāgatagarbha? Yes the heart of the thus gone one.
The inner essence of the thus gone one. Yeah that’s Buddha nature. What Buddha nature is is just the stained mind of the present moment which we have in abundance. Stained mind in the present. That’s our Buddha nature.
That’s not the person. It could be the basis of imputation of the person but not the person. That’s the impermanent Buddha nature or the evolving Buddha nature and the emptiness of that mind is the permanent Buddha nature. It all depends on the emptiness of that Buddha nature because because that stained mind of the present moment is empty of true existence it can change and evolve into the state of enlightenment. For sorry?
Oh, the emptiness of the mind is emptiness. Śūnyatā. Yeah. That emptiness of our current contaminated mind is our Buddha nature. That mind itself is there’s no self there’s no inherent self there within it but it’s just it’s awareness.
No, we wouldn’t say the mind itself is emptiness. It’s empty of true existence but it’s not emptiness because emptiness is permanent and the mind is impermanent. So we wouldn’t say: The mind is emptiness. Although we do in the Heart Sūtra it says: Form is emptiness or form is empty really. It says it that way: Form is empty.
Emptiness is form. Meaning that form and its emptiness are of the same nature, inextricably like the chariot and the parts of the chariot, they are the same nature, same essence. The chariot and the emptiness of the chariot are of, you know, talking of the same nature. Okay we should stop there. Everyone’s busy and they need a break before they start work again tomorrow.
Anyway Anyway, good to think through these topics and investigate these issues because there’s no other way that we can develop understanding of them other than by engaging them and thinking about them. Since we’ve lived from beginningless time if there was any other way it would have already been bestowed upon us. But since it hasn’t then the work is ahead of us. Now I wish to thank everyone for the coming to the course. It’s been I would just do a quick dedication.
Due to the merits of these virtuous actions, may I quickly attain the state of a Guru Buddha and lead all living beings without exception into that enlightened state. May the supreme jewel bodhicitta that has not arisen arise and grow, and may that which has arisen not diminish but increase more and more.