Audio recorded at Buddha House Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 47-minute session, Ven Jampa Gendun opens with a question that sounds simple: why can a broken three-legged table still count as a table? The answer drives his explanation of isolates — a key term in Tibetan Buddhist logic — beginning with how thought consciousness uses mental images or meaning generalities rather than specific present objects, unlike direct perception. He introduces four types of isolates (meaning, illustration, generality, and self isolate), then focuses on the self isolate of pot and four phenomena equally pervasive with it. A sustained classroom exchange works through the Sūtra school distinction between substantially existent objects, like a table grasped directly by the eye, and imputedly existent ones, like a person known only through mind and body. Suited to students already working through the Collected Topics debate curriculum.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 33 CT 1988 06 21.mp3
UUID: 078f9d01-a6cf-4122-bb74-3bff9c5845bc
Teacher: Ven Jampa Gendun
Collection: Collected Topics (Ven Jampa Gendun)
Date: 1988-06-21
Recorded at: Buddha House Adelaide
Duration: 47.1 minutes
Words: ~5,064
The discussion of the second or the third of the eight subdivisions of the lesser path of reasoning is identifying isolates. When it says identifying isolates, it means by there’s no proper definition for an isolate. We’re beginning to develop an idea by understanding the nature of thought consciousness, the way it operates using as its object and a generic image, a mental image, a meaning generality or general meaning generality or a mental image, same word, of an object rather than the actual present objects as does in the case of direct perception. So all the various objects, you know, for example, the pots that we see, you know, we talked about we’ve talked about how the naming process works. Works.
Well, when we attach when we first make use of an appellation that is the first time we use the name or the the name of an object we apply the tag we put it on the object. The first time that it’s pointed out for this for example this is a table that we don’t attach that tag, that name table to the specifically characterized object which is present which are you know which is the form and color which our eye consciousness is perceiving at that moment. What we do is we abstract the general characteristic by making an image of that table and we associate that name table with this generally characterized phenomena, this mental image, meaning generality. That’s where this idea of generality, generality or object generality. And so therefore whenever we come up with another table, you know, it’s interesting we can call this a table, that’s no problem.
We can call these tables but then you know we can call something outside with four legs a table or we can call something with three legs a table, we can call a broken table table. So we would match up the actual present objects before us and that we’re seeing in the form of shape and color with our general mental image and then since it’s since there’s a it fits into the category, you know the meaning generality or the mental images operate by categories. They don’t operate with specific particular qualities or characteristics but just general categories of characteristics, you know, like shape and color. A table is a certain shape, a cat is a certain shape. So it operates on its abstracted qualities or categories.
And then for we associate this name with this category, this mental image, and then for this present object fits into this category and therefore we can now associate that name with this specific object which our eye consciousness is now perceiving. So in all the various cases of table and all the various cases of cat and pot there’s a factor of similarity. There’s something which is common, a common factor between every pot, common factor between every among every table. And this commonality is imputed by thought. It’s not an object of the eye consciousness.
And it corresponds to the which is being imputed by thought corresponds to the specifically characterized quality of for example in the case of table being opposite from non table. So all cases of table whether they’re short table, long table, three legged tables, two legged tables, four legged tables, wooden tables, metal tables, broken tables, short tall tables. They all have the general quality of being the opposite of non table. And then we talked about how the eliminative engagers, that is conceptual consciousness, they in the naming process eliminate everything that the object isn’t. They eliminate what is not table and that which is left over, the opposite of non table is what it understands to be a table.
Therefore it can be all the various short tables, long tables, three legged tables, two legged tables, four legged tables all have that common quality characteristic of being opposite and non table. And this is common. So the thought consciousness is able to impute, by impute here just means understands. The eye consciousness cannot see that this and this have the same quality of being opposite of non table. It doesn’t appear to the eye consciousness.
It’s something which is only appears to the thought consciousness. It’s imputed by the thought consciousness that between this table and that table there’s a common characteristic of being opposite and non table. It has to make this association between these two tables. So dependent upon these two tables it imputes a quality that this opposite that these have the quality of similarity characteristic of being opposite and non table. Yeah.
So just a word more about thought consciousness and direct perception. In direct perception we mean, you know, for example, sense direct perception, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, eye consciousness, hearing consciousness, things like this. They can operate together so you can have at the same time you’re seeing an object you can be thinking not necessarily in a dialogue, you know, like we sometimes we think of we think of thinking as if it were some words going on in our mind. This isn’t necessarily so. It doesn’t mean by by thought concept by conceptual thought we mean we’re making use minimally of some kind of mental image as an object of of our consciousness in place of.
And then we can understand a table by having a quick mental image of it. The mental image doesn’t have all the specifically character isn’t all the specific characteristics of a table, but we can understand the general nature of a table through our mental image of a table. If this were not so then there would be many phenomena which we can never come to an understanding. It’s said that I think I mentioned once that for example there one way of dividing phenomena is into three three types obvious, slight slightly hidden, and extremely hidden. Obvious phenomena, slightly hidden, and extremely hidden phenomena.
Obvious phenomena are those types of objects, for example tables, pots, which we can understand initially through direct perception. For example, a table we can understand a table, we can perceive a table for the first time directly through our eye consciousness for example. There are other types of so that’s an obvious phenomena. Other types of phenomena which are slightly hidden. Slightly hidden phenomena would be such as impermanence, subtle impermanence, emptiness.
These are objects which must be understood initially in dependence upon inference, conceptual consciousness. After that we can understand them through direct perception, but the first initial understanding of, for example, subtle impermanence, emptiness comes about through conceptual understanding, making use of mental images of our idea about emptiness. First we understand, we develop a correct understanding through our ideas which correspond to the fact and then habituating ourselves become more and more familiar with that. Our mental image of emptiness becomes clearer and clearer more and more as if it were the actual object itself and this carries over into direct perception. And then there’s a third type of phenomena called extremely hidden phenomena.
These are, for example, the relationship between certain causes and effects that from skillful actions happiness arises and from unskillful actions suffering arises. This is said to be in order to understand this initially it’s necessary to depend upon scriptural authority. It cannot be established initially as far as time and place. That for example, know, the reason that we’re sitting here is because we’ve created some cause in the past, in a past life, and we cannot establish well what was that exact cause. You know, maybe a hundred billion lifetimes ago we we were here, we were we created some cause.
But we cannot establish that simply through reasoning nor do can we establish it initially through direct perception. It can only be established through some type of scriptural authority. So these are called extremely hidden phenomena. But anyway, this second type is is the most important here, is that there are certain types of phenomena, slightly hidden phenomena, which is necessary to come to a conceptual understanding initially before we can have direct perception, such as subtle impermanence and emptiness. So, you know, we can generate, for example, an eye consciousness perceiving the table, and then after the initial moment of eye consciousness there will occur a moment of a mental direct perceiver.
You know, there are four types of direct perceivers. I don’t if you remember this. Do you remember that from awareness and knowledge? Anybody remember what four types of direct perceivers are? It’s one.
It’s three. And self self knower self knowing direct perceiver. So those are the four types of direct perceivers. First we have a moment of the eye consciousness that is a sense direct perceiver apprehending the table. Subsequent to that there will arise a mental direct perceiver apprehending the table.
But for ordinary people, ordinary persons, this goes unnoticed. They cannot recognize this moment. So it’s as if it for ordinary people it doesn’t exist. And then consequent to that there will arise a conceptual perception of the table as some image about the table will rise induced by our direct perception of the table. We may think, oh, you know, we’ve the table, oh, that’s a long table or a short table, it’s a nice table, it’s a bad table, it’s a clean table, it’s a dirty table.
Anyway this is all so this conception even while we’re looking at the table will arise being induced by the eye consciousness. And so these two conceptual consciousness and direct perception can be operated at the same time. One is seeing merely the shape and the color and induced by that we develop ideas about that shape and color. But it’s as if the it’s because the the generic, the mental image of the table is weaker than the actual presence of that object through by the force of this direct perception. It’s as if we we engage in object as if we were reacting to the object, the present object as it actually is.
You know, we aren’t we don’t have the idea that we’re also reacting, experiencing that object in terms of a mental image, not just the object as we see it, but also in terms of mental image. For example, our idea about this object, our memory about the object. You know, you can see a person and you develop some dislike for the person or repulsion or attraction for that person. It’s not just the shape, obviously the eye consciousness is just seeing shape, but there has to be a feeling arises for good, bad, or neutral. in dependence upon good, bad, or neutral we develop attraction, aversion, or indifference, and therefore this is still operating at the same time, but we have the feeling that this is a beautiful person.
She has a beautiful body for example. I mean you have a feeling that that body is beautiful, but actually the body is just the eye consciousness just seeing the form and color, but it’s inducing our associations of mental images and we’re superimposing these mental images at the same time we’re seeing this object and it looks the object looks to us as if it were beautiful. But what we’re seeing is the object filtered through a mental image. Meaning there’s meaning generality of memory, ideas about the object not just the object itself. But we don’t have this we don’t have this feeling about it when we see the object.
It looks as if this object is beautiful in itself rather than we’re imposing this idea of beauty upon that object. Yeah. I think if you see some of these women in black, like some of these big African women, they put these big hoops in their their lips. It’s a of beauty and looks grotesque to us. Are they putting the rings on the necks?
The index is stretched. As all to the men they’re very beautiful. So with respect to isolates, isolate is the the actual Tibetan word is is and if the actual Tibetan word just simply literally you would you would translate it as reverse. Reverse. So this word isolate is like taking the meaning rather than, it’s taking what the word is trying to get at rather than actual word itself and taking that as a word as using as now being translated.
I think Jeffrey Hopkins probably translate as isolate, or I know his students do. Isolate. So it’s like we’re isolating an object. We’re we’re removing everything the object isn’t, and everything that’s left over is this object that’s been isolated. Object has been isolated.
So in general there are four types of isolates. Four types of isolates. There’s a meaning isolate, an illustration isolate, a generality isolate, and self isolate. Now actually this is a little more we only really want to concern ourselves with one of these, but I just the other ones are quite simple and you’ll probably never deal with them again. You’ll probably never hear them again.
The first meaning isolate that is simply the object’s definition. For example, the meaning isolate of a pot, the meaning isolate of pot is what? Bulbous thing with flat bottom and able to hold fluids or something, able to perform the function of holding fluids. That is the meaning isolate part, simply the definition of the word, of the definition of the definiendum. So then there’s the illustration isolate.
So this is simply an instance, an object which is an instance what do you say, an illustrative instance, an instance or an example which illustrates an object. For example, the illustration isolate of thing What would that be? An illustration isolate of thing. That’s board. Yeah.
Pot board. Yeah. Table. Table. All these are are instances of illustrating thing.
So those are just illustration isolates. And then the text the next two are synonymous. Generality isolate and self isolate. They’re synonymous. So this is when it becomes a little more difficult.
For example, if we use a pot as the basis of an illustration, what is the generality isolate or the self isolate of pot? Now generally when they say isolate they mean they’re gonna they mean one of the both of these because they’re synonymous. You know when they use the word isolate without saying whether it’s a meaning isolate illustration isolate they mean when they say isolate generality isolate and self isolate. So we’ll just call an isolate. So the isolate of pot is the mere pot which is focused upon by a thought consciousness.
The mere pot which is focused upon by a thought consciousness. That does not conceive of any particular pot or even of the meaning of pot. So the mere pot focused on by thought consciousness. And this thought consciousness does not conceive of any particular pot whether it’s a gold pot, silver pot, clay pot Neither any particular pot or even of any or even of the meaning of pots. Not even thinking, well, this is a bulbous thing with flat bottom able to hold fluids.
This is focusing upon mere pot. No particular pot and not the meaning of what pot is. Sudden, there are And this is the way it’s actually presented in the text, how they go about explaining what an isolate is. They just give you examples. So there are four so there there is what we have to become familiar with.
There are four phenomena which are equally pervasive with isolate with the isolate of pot. Now we’re we’re just going to base this understanding on in this initially in terms of pot. We never can talk about an isolate abstractly. We always have to say the isolate of the eraser, the isolate of the table, isolate of person. Everything has its isolate.
The isolate of an object comes into existence that’s simultaneous with the object. Now there are four phenomena which are equally pervasive with the isolate of pot. There are four phenomena four phenomena which are equally pervasive with the isolate of pot. Okay. What does the word equally pervasive mean?
Yeah, that’s right. Mutually inclusive. So if if a and b are equally pervasive, what what does that mean? If if if an object is what a it must be it’s pervaded by being b. If an object is b and b.
And another technicality a and b are different. A and B are different. If it is A, it’s pervaded by B and B. If it is B, it’s pervaded by B and A. This is what we mean by equally equally pervasive.
So there are four phenomena which are equally pervasive with the isolate of pot with the isolate pot. And this, you know, you have to play with that this idea in your own mind. Actually, this is you know, you would debate about this and sort of just to debating about it, then you would start to build some feeling for the idea of what an isolate is. I think now you you sit I think you with this background information which normally you don’t get perhaps you’ll develop some a better idea. I remember when Lama Lhundup was here, Lama Lhundup?
Yeah. He said, we talked about isolates once in Tenets. I think we were discussing the Tenets and he said, Westerners have no idea what an Isolate is. I don’t know. It’s hard to under Anyway, we’ll we’ll we’ll present it then we’ll see if we can get some feeling for it.
So there are four phenomena which are equally pervasive with the isolate of pot. So for example, same as pot. Alright. You know, we talked about same and different, right? You know if we had used the word identical, identical with pot, same as pot, identical with pot, same as pot.
That’s the first. So one phenomena which is equally pervasive with pot is that which is the same as pot. All right? There’s a little bit of hint. Then the second is pot which is same as pot.
So the first is the first phenomena. So this is this is one phenomena. This is a phenomena same as pot. And then the second phenomena is the pot which is same as pot. So for the four phenomena which are equally pervasive with the isolate of pot, the first is same as pot is equally pervasive with pot.
It means anything which is same as pot is pot. Anything which is pot is same as pot. That might not shake you up too much. So the second is the pot which is the same as pot. Anything which is a pot is the pot which is the same as pot.
Anything which is the pot which is the same as the pot is is a pot. Alright. That’s what it says. The third is I don’t know how to spell it. The definiendum somewhere in there, there’s defend the endum.
The definiendum of a bulbous thing having a flat base able to hold fluids. The definiendum of maybe not a see they don’t have these articles in Tibet. Defendiendum of bulbous thing with having a flat bottom able to hold fluids is equally pervasive with pot. Whatever is a pot is the definiendum a bulbous thing with a flat bottom able to hold fluid. Whatever is definiendum of a bulbous thing having a flat bottom able to hold fluid is pervaded by being pot.
Yeah? Okay. There’s one more. And this one we have to go back to some information that we’ve already learned or that we’ve at least been exposed to. That that which possesses that which possesses that which possesses the three qualities of possesses the three parties of imputation existence of that which possesses the three qualities of the imputation-existence of bulbous.
What do we what’s the what is the difference between these two? Does anybody see what the difference is? What is the definite what is the definition what is the definition of definitum? It’s that which is defined, isn’t it? That which is defined.
What did we gave the definition of definienda? I think a couple weeks ago. That which is that which possesses three qualities of imputation-existence. It’s the definition of definienda. So what do we we simply we simply this we substitute we define definiendum here rather than saying definienum of a bulbous thing, etc.
That which possesses the three qualities of imputation-existence of a bulbous thing. That’s etc. So we’re saying exact same thing aren’t we? Yeah, this here we’ve defined what If somebody said, What do you mean by definiendum? Then we just plug in this.
That’s the definition of defininum. So these are the four phenomena which are equally pervasive with the isolate of pot. What are the three qualities of a definiendum? Do you remember? Anybody remember?
Sixty-four thousand dollars. You win a free trip to Kangaroo Island. I think it’s it’s clear what in the in the handout from last time that the print there’s printed sheets. We I gave you I gave you the information before I got before I found this, but it’s, it’s almost exactly the same as my my, translation, so it doesn’t make any difference. But this is probably a little bit better than mine, I’m assuming.
So on this on this page five on the back there. Page five. Three qualities. Definiendum that which possesses the three qualities of imputation or existence. That’s the definition of a Definiendum.
And what are those three qualities? In general it must be a definiendum. So anything which is has the three qualities of imputation or existence. What do we mean by imputation or existence? You think it exists.
Do you think if something exists that’s imputational? Does the the table have imputation? Is it is a table what is the what is the complement? What is the opposite of imp imp imputation existence? Substantially existent.
That’s right. So is a table substantially existent or imputation existent? Give me an yeah. Just give me an example of of both. It’s it’s substantially existent and imputationally existent.
Anybody? A wild stab. According according to the Sūtra School or according to whoever you like John Smith. Is the table substantially existent or imputedly existent? I think we discussed this once.
I remember when discussed non associated compositional factors. Is that giving you a hint? So what does it mean to substantially exist? What does it mean to imputedly exist? What substantially exists?
We’re talking about the Sūtra school. So some things some phenomena substantially exist, some phenomena imputedly exist. So what does it mean when you say imputedly exist? It’s very it’s not easy to say, and especially from the Sūtra school. It’s not it’s not there’s some debate.
It’s not so easy. Anyway, for example, is a person a person is a person imputedly existent or a substantially existent? Why? So the body the human is because the the person is imputed to the body and mind. Therefore, he’s imputed existent.
So it’s imputed to its parts. Isn’t it is where is the table? In the case of a table, is it imputed to what? Is it imputedly existent or is substantially existent? Why?
Does exist from its own side? Doesn’t a person exist from its own side? We can’t see the mind, but we can see the table. Is that is that a distinction? Have to compute that the mind exists.
I guess. That’s the infer infer infer? Then I cannot then the the inside of this table I mean, by the atom in the middle of this table isn’t purely existent, where the atoms on the outside are substantially existent. So is is a table substantially existent or imputedly existent? Why?
Don’t you have to isn’t it imputed to its parts? Isn’t it imputed just as a person is imputed to its parts in the Sūtra school? A person is imputed to the mind and body, a table is imputed to his legs and the top? What’s the difference? Well, I think it’s like yeah.
What I came out before is that if you’re if you’re if you see smoke, therefore, you can infer fire. So there’s but there’s nothing really hidden but with a table. So it’s just a sort of thought again. So we anybody? Wanna take a guess?
Is there any difference between a person the mode of existence of a person and the mode of existence of a table in the Sūtra school. Not the mode of existence. As far from the point of view and substantially existent and imputedly existent. And their motive existent. Are they both imputedly existent or since ancient existent or is one other than are they different or and why?
Difference is that the person is selfless, but the table is not. The table is not selfless. The person is selfless. Aren’t all phenomena are selfless? But in the Sūtra school, the table is not selfless in terms of black being an object to use our personal self.
So isn’t that? That’s part of the system as the person doesn’t have a table. The exists, but the person doesn’t accept. Person doesn’t exist. Only imputation of one of those.
The person is merely imputed? Isn’t it don’t we have a base here? The the legs and the top, in dependence upon those impute table? That’s a question. Yeah.
No? Oh, yeah. So the person exists also. Okay. Yeah.
You’re you’re getting you’re getting warmer. How in order okay. I maybe it’ll be hard to arrive at actually. And just simply in the in the Sūtra school when they talk about imputedly existent, we talked in order to understand a person you have to refer to another object. You have to refer to mind and body.
And dependence upon that we understand person or we impute person. But in order to understand table we don’t have to we refer to the table itself. We don’t have to we don’t have to understand any other object than the object itself. So therefore we say that the person is is imputed and it imputedly existent and the table is substantially existent. In order to understand person we have to refer to another object, the mind and body.
And dependence upon seeing eye consciousness, seeing mind and body, we say we see the person. But in the case of a table, the eye consciousness actually sees the table. There’s no other object it has to refer to. There’s no other object which has to be seen first, and then we understand the object. What are you saying?
I mean, what’s the difference? Mean, are you saying that because with a person, because a person is more than just physical body, that we have to understand that they have more than the physical body by referring? So the person is neither the mind nor the body. But by seeing the mind and body, we say we see the person. We understand that we see the person.
By seeing a person’s body, see this this isn’t sufficient for us to say that I see the person. We impute the person. We understand the person in dependence upon seeing the body. But we don’t have to do that with the table. Just by seeing the table, the leg of the table, we say we see the table.
We don’t have to say that this this is enough this is sufficient for me to say that I see the table, that you actually see the table. If that was a body, if we were understanding body, that would be substantially existent. The body is substantially existent. That’s right. Yeah.
The body, the legs, and the mind are substantially existent, but the person is is imputed to that, that body, the combination of mind and body. So that also, definiendums are imputedly existent. Definiendum — that which possesses the three qualities of imputation-existence is a definiendum. Right?
Why is it a definiendum imputedly existent? Don’t understand about seeing the object. Say again. What is like you know, let’s say this. in dependence upon seeing that which flat bottomed, bulbous thing flat bottomed, able to hold fluid, Dependence upon us in that we say we see the we see the pot.
So the actual thing itself is the bulbous thing with flat bottomed able to hold fluid. Dependence upon that we impute pot. We impute this name part to that or the definiendum. So the definiendum of so definiendums are imputedly existent. Definiendum of a bulbous thing.
The definiendum has that which is so in general it’s a definiendum, the three qualities. It’s established on it must be established on its illustration. It’s established on its its what did I say? Established on its own base of illustration on its own example, you could say, on its own example. So, the definiendum of let us say pot is established upon this example which is a bulbous thing.
And it’s only a definiendum of itself and not of another. And the definiendum the pot is not a definiendum of a pillar or a table. So those are the three qualities of imputation-existence. So I don’t know if that helps much. So we’ll another another example.
So what is the definition of impermanence? Just: momentary. Momentary. The four phenomena equally pervasive with the isolate of momentary. So every phenomena has as has an isolate.
Momentary is is a phenomena, the word has an isolate, and then it has four isolates which are equally pervasive with it. What do you think this first one is? Can anybody tell me what the first one is? Same as One second. What momentary?
The momentary, which is the same as momentary. Third. What do you think the third one would be? Anybody? Of impermanence.
The definiendum of impermanence. Does impermanence have a definiendum? Isn’t momentary the definition? Is there a definiendum of impermanence? So it was the definiendum of bulbous thing, by the way?
Why would it be in this case? Is momentary a definition or a definiendum? Uh-huh. So what would this be? Definiendum of impermanent.