Audio recorded at Buddha House Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. Using the example of a child who learns to call both a 1975 Holden and a 1985 Toyota “car,” Ven Jampa Gendun unpacks one of the harder chapters in the Collected Topics curriculum: how conceptual minds identify and name objects. In this 46-minute session he reviews the three functions of expressive terms — names, conventions, and appellations — before introducing the “meaning generality”: the mental image built by eliminating everything an object is not (the “opposite of non-car”). He then examines what makes two things “the same type,” contrasting innate similarity (gum tree and pine tree) with similarity that must be learned (pot and pillar as both being “things”). The session closes by explaining why both thought-consciousness and terms are “partial engagers,” grasping only a generalized image rather than specific characteristics. Suited to students working through Buddhist epistemology and logic.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 31 CT 1988 06 07.mp3
UUID: 4a13a454-f085-4702-8859-3058d6c93569
Teacher: Ven Jampa Gendun
Collection: Collected Topics (Ven Jampa Gendun)
Date: 1988-06-07
Recorded at: Buddha House Adelaide
Duration: 46.2 minutes
Words: ~4,956
We completed the second subdivision. The three divisions of collected topics. So the three divisions of collected topics. For what? For what?
The three divisions? What are the three overall divisions? The heart of the matter. Good. So we’re looking at the lesser path of reasoning and that has eight divisions.
Yes? What were the first two? Color and establish base. So we’re on the third. What is that?
Identifying isolates. It’s isolates. Identifying isolates. So we we’ve been talking about the it’s not an easy topic. I don’t know why it comes so early in a topic like this.
This is in a very young monks would or nuns would be studying this, and I don’t maybe it’s just too confuse them. I think maybe it is. I have something like that. So we’re talking about the naming process. How is it that we are able to recognize objects and be able to name them correctly?
Covered this last session, but I think maybe we’ll review it, what was covered last session. I’ll review what was covered last session briefly, this idea about naming. So we talked about the fact that words possess three functions. You were here. You weren’t here.
You were here? So words or expressive terms, same words or expressive terms possess have three functions. They can act as names, they can act as conventions, and they can act as appellations. Names, conventions, and appellations. So maybe this detail, you know, if you find it interesting and you want to record it, that’s fine.
This is all leading up to the idea of trying to identify what an isolate is. So we’re going into a little bit of detail, so the important thing is that you get a rough general understanding. Words can function or act as names. That is they are able to lead the mind or direct the mind to a particular object, for example, pot. It’s better on the other side, but it’s on this side.
So this, that is the word pot. It’s not that this and this are different, aren’t they? Do know what the difference between those two are? The difference between this Between this and this. What is the difference?
Two dashes on one side. You’ve almost got a set of horns? It is a difference, isn’t it? Think about it. Anybody?
Yeah, that’s the question. What is there? That denotes the term pot, doesn’t it? The term pot. This is the term pot, the term, an expressive term, which has an object.
The object of this is being visually indicated by this. But this is expressing or determining a bulbous thing which has a flat bottom and is able to hold fluids. This is what this is indicating. This is what this will lead the mind to. This and the word pot, saying the word pot, have the same function.
So this is the term pot. This is just an indication of pot. So a name leads or directs the mind to the object, for example, pot. What’s it directing it to? It’s directing it to this bulbous thing with a flat bottom, which is able to hold fluid.
So that’s one function name. Then it can act as a convention. It brings the mind the fact bringing the mind the fact because the pot is able to hold fluids. So by it acts as a convention we understand that when we use the word pot, this term, that this object is able to hold fluids. An act is able to hold tea or water.
It has a purpose. It’s useful for some purposes and not useful for other purposes by saying this is a pot. I understand, Oh, this has a function of being able to hold fluids, but it can’t act as a photocopier or something like that. And then it acts as an appellation. So this is merely the first time that we use this term when we connect it with an object.
The very first time that our mother pointed to our foot and said, Foot. That term foot was an appellation. Like a tag we’re hanging on this piece of flesh at the end of our ankle. It became an appellation. So these are different functions that expressive terms or words can have.
They can act as a name, convention, or an appellation. Okay, so we’re trying to understand how a child comes to be able to recognize objects. You know, the mother points to let’s take a nineteen fifty-five Chevrolet. They actually aren’t Chevrolets. A a 1955 Holden.
Yeah, Holden. And you know it’s a thing. A 1975 Holden. Carrying on. Then another point, there’s something coming down the road with wheels, and the mother points to this nineteen seventy five Holden and says, Car.
So, at that moment this expressive term car is an appellation, like a tag being hung on this. Now, what is it being hung on? What’s it being connected up to? After this association has been made, the next time the child sees, for example, a nineteen eighty seven Toyota, it says car. But that’s not the same object it saw before.
Before it saw the nineteen seventy five Holden, blue. Here it’s a nineteen eighty five red Toyota. How does it know that it can correctly label this thing a car? Just from that one time when the mother pointed and said car, point it’s a nineteen seventy-five Holden, Blue Holden. What’s happening there?
It’s recognizing the shape. Recognizing the shape, but it’s not the same shape, is it? Holden in a nineteen seventy five It’s roughly the same. Roughly the same. So what does that mean?
It’s not actually identifying the nineteen seventy five Blue Holden as a car, or is it? Is it identifying something other than a nineteen seventy five Holden as a car? He doesn’t see it with his eye? His mother’s pointing? When he applies the term car to another object, what do mean?
He doesn’t see the nineteen eighty five red Toyota? Yeah. Does see it, but he’s not applying that term to a specific red color or particular year of make. What is he applying it to? To generalize each of that particular object.
Okay. If you were only applying this name to the nineteen seventy five Holden, then he could never carry over that name and quickly identify other types of cars other than a nineteen seventy five Holden. The only time he could say car was when a nineteen seventy five Blue Holden was in front of him and said, Oh, that’s a car. You told me that was a car last year. Saw it.
But he’s able to recognize other cars correctly as cars. So he’s not tagging he’s not using his appellation of the term car. He’s not tagging it on the nineteen seventy five Holden, but he’s developed a meaning generality, a mental image. He’s applying it to the mental image of a car. What a mental image of a car.
He’s applying the term car to his mental image of a car. Now, how did he arrive at the mental image of a car? So we’ve been discussing this a little bit. So the eye consciousness. So, the eye consciousness.
That’s what he sees with his eye consciousness is his general image of the car. And the wheel of the car. Some. Some. But when he sees a Nike in car.
So his general image of a car must be a blue nineteen seventy five Holdman? No. Must be something that has a certain form that’s wheels. If it was a black screen, couldn’t be a car. So how does he arrive at this?
We talked about the words are what we called just like thought, consciousness. They’re called partial engagers or eliminative engagers. He arrives by the opposite of non car. He eliminates everything that isn’t car, and that which is left over becomes his general image, his mental image of car. So everything which is the opposite of non car, he’s able to recognize it as being similar in type to what he saw before and labeled car.
And then he can say, quickly identify, Oh, this is a car because it’s the opposite of non car. So he refers to his general image, which he has on file in his mind, and he says, This is an opposite of non car. Opposite of non car is like, you know, a person may be a black person, you you have a black person, a white person, a red person, a yellow person, but the shadow they cast is all the same. It’s not red, it’s not white, it’s not black. So there’s a general shadow cast by all these specifically characterized people, but you have a general idea of who they are.
You can identify them by their shadow without having to know what specific color they are. This is the person, this is the person, this is the person. So, it becomes like the generalized image of all these various people becomes the meaning generality or the mental label. This is a right through process of elimination, eliminating everything that the object is not, the opposite of not car. That’s a little bit So we can’t yeah.
We’re getting to this idea of It’s probably just not these two things. No. Yeah. I would say, rather to your mother, What will happen, generally, is that his mother points to this thing. It says, Cat.
Maybe, yeah. And so it’s Cat. So then, okay, what he’s going to eliminate he’s probably going to eliminate the ceiling. All this is happening here the ceiling, the floor, the door, maybe his mother. But he’s probably going to he’s not going to probably when he sees a dog, he might go, Cat, cat.
So what he’s eliminated hasn’t been enough. So he said, No, no, not cat dog, not cat. So he chops off another piece of his mental image. He’s refining it. He’s refining it, eliminating more and more.
And this process is going to have to go on until he never makes a mistake. He may make a mistake ten years down the line. Somebody calls a zebra they see a zebra, know, and they’ll say, There’s a horse. Well, a zebra is not a horse. You may not know that.
See, our mental image of a horse probably takes in zebra, And so that’s actually if you were talking to a zoologist, he would say, No, you’re being correctly identified. An animal over there is not a horse. So we still have some incorrect, over broad mental images, but generally they work so well that we’re pretty sure of ourselves. So there’s going to be a process of narrowing down through the process of elimination exactly what we mean every time we say cat. Now this can be a white cat, a green cat, a black cat.
It can be a three legged cat. It can be a Persian cat, a Burmese cat. They’re all opposite of non cats. It doesn’t matter what specific characteristics they’re going to have. In general, probably by the shape, he’s going to know when he sees a cat.
And this is the way he identifies cat. He can say, This is a cat. So he’s developing an image which is the opposite of non cat. What appears to his consciousness is the opposite of non cat. And he refers to this and he’s able to quickly associate this name because his name was associated not with any specific cat or nineteen seventy five Holden, but to the generic image, the meaning generality or the mental image.
Since he’s associated with this, and then he says, Well, corresponds to this general image, then he can take this name and now he can apply it to this object. If he applied it to the earlier object itself, there would be no association between the nineteen seventy five Holden and the Toyota, the nineteen eighty five Toyota, because one was red, one was blue, one was big, one was small. He’s applying it, he associates it with the generic, with the mental image or the meaning generality, and then he’s able to apply it to a specific cat or a specific car. A visual thing, almost as if the mind is producing this photograph. But it’s not actually like that at all.
So it’s sort of it’s actually data that’s kinda built up, and it’s composite. It’s not necessarily Yeah. They use that. Yeah. That’s quite a quite right.
We generally use the word appearance. I don’t know any other way to translate the term. I mean, auditory appearances, and then you can have all these. But it’s not necessarilyit’s not a visual appearance. It’s in collections, isn’t it?
What, the appearance? The appearance that you’re suspecting with the appearance, I think. Don’t know if I talk about that anymore. It’s just a question. In what way?
In what way? Is it recollection? Then we talked about type. These are the two important factors. Developing an understanding of what we mean by This word generic image is another translation of the term meaning generality, which is another translation of the term mental image.
Generic image, general. Generic, generic image. So we talked about how, for example, we see a gum tree. A pine tree, an oak tree. We think of those as being as the same type.
Actually, idea of same type is quite an important concept. In what way can we understand that a gum tree, a pine tree, an oak tree are the same type, but a pot and a pillar aren’t the same type? How do we make this differentiation? Am I incorrect? Maybe I’m not right.
Why is a gum tree and a pine tree an oak tree? Do we say they’re the same type? Would we naturally say that? All trees. How about Okay, would you say they’re the same type?
Not type. What would you say? Same what? Well, I’d say they’re all trees, but they’re not They’re the same what? If you wanted to make some general statement, Oh, those are over there.
Those are all the same. How about if you had all the same types of trees? If you had a short pine tree, tall pine tree, a medium sized pine tree, would you say those are all the same type of trees? The same type of trees? In what way are they same type?
They’re all pine trees. They’re all pine trees. How do you know that? Because you just told me. If you hit the same type.
Are blue and green the same type? It depends. How about man, child, woman? Are they the same type? Do you think?
Okay. Would you say the same type? Hard to say. You are after sensing, I don’t know. No, we have to How we understand?
See, in order to identify something, like the nineteen seventy five Holden and the nineteen eighty five Toyota, we have to determine that they’re similar in type. Otherwise, we won’t associate them with the same generic meaning generality or mental image. Somehow we have to understand, Oh, this is similar in type to what my mom told me was a car. How do we determine similarity of type, that two things are the same type? Depends on the class.
You know? Like, let’s see if you’ve got different sorts of trees, but, you know, trees has to stick on bushes or something. So they’re all the same kind of type of vegetation in the trees. But all with cars, they’re all the same type of vehicle. It depends on vehicle vegetation.
It depends on what overall class and kind of soil you can. So you can you can never you wouldn’t make any general statement that these are the same type. You would have to be making only specific specific context. These are the same type vegetation. These are the same type You couldn’t make any general statement that these are the same types.
These two are the same type. These three people are of similar type. Yeah. So you know it would be obvious they’re similar in type to, in what way they’re similar in type if I said they’re similar type. A gum tree and a pine tree are similar in type.
You would say, Oh, similar type as being trees? I mean, would be obvious to you. From this. Yes, but for a pillar in a bowl, a pillar in a pot, are they the same type? Well, we have to go on the same object.
They say the same type because of their existence, but there you would have to add on definitely you’d have to add what kind of context they’re a similar type. But when you say a pine tree and a gum tree and an oak tree, you say, Oh, they’re similar to that. There you wouldn’t necessarily it would obvious. It would naturally make that association, whereas the other one wouldn’t naturally make that association. Is that you think?
No. The pine tree and the gum tree and an oak tree are the same are similar in type. They’re really, obviously, identified as two. Would you say if I made a statement, would you say, Similar in type, but in what way? Would you question?
Or would you say, Oh, yeah, I think so. Yeah, would you accept? I mean, I wouldn’t have to go on to Would it be obvious what I mean when I say similar type then? But if I said a pillar and a pot were the same type, then you’d say, Well, how are they similar? They’re similar in type because they both exist.
They’re not. From that standpoint, yes, I agree. Do you think one is more obvious than the other? More obvious than the The similarity of type when I say a gum tree, an oak tree and a pine tree are similar type. When I say a pillar in a pot and a door are similar in type.
So then I would have to go on to explain the similarity of type is not obvious. You’d have to have some specific reason why in what context. That make any sense? No, you don’t agree? Would you say this similar in type?
If I said clay pot and a clay pillar this similar in type, would you say, Yeah, I agree. When you see a tree you saw a pine tree and then you see an oak tree would you naturally perceive a similarity of type? You naturally perceive that this thing over here and this thing over here were similar in type. Would you do that? It’s distinct perceiving a pillar in a pot.
It would not make that association of similarity of type naturally. Maybe just by seeing it with your So this is what is meant by similarity of type. That two phenomena are said to be of one type if someone who is trained in terminology, someone who understands the names of things. Naturally, the important word is naturally develops the mental conception of them as similar. Two things, two phenomena are said to be of one type or a similar type.
If someone who is trained in names or terminology, someone who knows names, understands names of various objects, naturally develops a mental conception of them as similar due to merely perceiving them. By merely perceiving them, he naturally thinks that they are similar in type, similar, that they’re similar. When somebody sees an oak tree and then over here he sees a pine tree, there arises the thought he would naturally conceive of them as these two objects are similar in type, where he would not have that natural this would not naturally arise with respect to a pot and a pillar. Does that make sense? Does anybody question Dispute that?
Yeah? But you naturally saw over here you saw a gum tree and over here you saw a pine tree. Innate, that the similarities of two objects is not something that you have to learn, that you would naturally connect these. You would naturally connect a gum tree and a pine tree being you would be aware you wouldn’t connect a pot and a pillar as similar in type, even though you may go on to say, Well, they’re both things. They’re similar in type because they’re both things.
This you would have to go on to learn. They are similar in type as from the point of view of being things, but you would not naturally or innately connect these two as being similar in type. This is the way you connect up the nineteen seventy-five Holden to the nineteen eighty-five Toyota. So So our ability to understand quickly which phenomena are of a similar type or not and in which context is essential in the naming process. If we don’t understand what are similarities in type and which are similar in specific context, then we can’t we wouldn’t be able to name things correctly.
You know, we can go on to name things as a pillar in a pot as being similar type from the point of view of being things or existence or phenomena. If we can understand them as being similar type from that point of view, but this isn’t innate, this is going on, we have to learn this. But this is also necessary to be able to develop this understanding of similarity in type through learning, but also the innate process of being able to understand it. You know, a gray cat and a black cat are both similar in type because they are both what? By identifying them as similar in type, then we can they are both the opposite of non cats.
Therefore, we can apply the convention or the appellation that we associated with the mental image to this specific instance, even though it’s unlike anything we’ve ever seen specifically. But generally, it’s an opposite of non cat, and therefore we can apply it. We’ve never seen this particular cat before. We’ve never seen that Burmese three legged, one eyed cat before. We can correctly name it cat even though we’ve never seen it before.
So we talked about conceptual consciousness and thought consciousness as being eliminative engagers, partial engagers. Why was that? What was you know, we talked about direct perceivers and direct perception and conceptual thought. One was an established engager and one was eliminative engager. The way thought consciousness operates using the mental images eliminating it doesn’t see all the specific characteristics.
You know, it only sees the generally characterized phenomena. Remember this? A long time ago. It does not perceive the specific characteristics of its object, but only a generalized that is, what does it see? It sees the opposite of non cat, sees the opposite of non pot.
It does not see the cat with the particular whiskers with the conceptual consciousness. You know, with this spot here and this long claw here or whatever. It takes as its object of apprehension the mental image of a cat, which is the opposite of non cat. This is the appearance. So it’s only taking partial characteristics, you know.
When we see a pot, this is what we like a water pot. You know, identify this as pot, this is a pot, but the conceptual consciousness is not taking you know, a pot has a maybe it’s got a handle on it. An actual specifically characterized pot has a handle and a spout and some nice designs and some nice colors, but this is not what is appearing to the conceptual consciousness. It is simply the opposite of non pot. So it’s not taking a specifically characterized pot, but a generally characterized pot.
So therefore, this is why it’s called a partial engager. It only takes, it does not apprehend all the features of its object, but only partial features of the object. In this case, simply the shape. So it’s only taking partial, a part of the features. In every instance, no matter what color this is, no matter what shape this handle, maybe it’s broken, maybe it’s got a crack in it, It’s always opposite of non pot.
We’ve talked about conceptual consciousness as being a partial engager. Also terms, names are eliminative engagers, partial engagers. They, like consciousness, have an object. This has an object. This word up here, pot.
The term pot has an object. But it’s too, it’s not referring to we this word pot, the term pot, it’s not referring to a specific pot with green flowers on it and red stems or whatever, and maybe that crack here, spot here. It’s not referring to any specific pot. It’s also a partial engager in that it takes it merely is referring to the collection of a bulbous thing which has a flat bottom and is able to hold fluids. And a collection of all these features.
This collection is what the term pot is referring to. It’s not referring to all these things individually. No one word. This pot is also a product, it’s also impermanent, it’s empty, it has many, many features, many, many characteristics. No one word is going to be able to refer to all these features.
So the term pot refers to the collection of all features together, the collection of all the characteristics. It does not refer to all the various features individually but as a collection, taking this as a collection. So the word pot, it has two objects of expression. Two objects of expression. The actual the actual part, the bulbous thing with a flat bottom and able to hold fluid, and the image which arises in the mind upon hearing the word pot.
There’s the actual pot. So the word pot, the term pot, it has two objects. One of those objects is an actual pot and the other is the image which arises in the mind upon hearing the word pot. So pot is the object is the main object of expression of the term pot. So there’s the term pot, the term pot.
Yeah? That’s this. This is not able to hold water. Never know why it can hold water, but it refers to something. It’s referring to something.
It has an object, we say. There’s a whole class. There’s three types of object possessors or subjects. Object possessors or object possessors or subjects. There’s consciousness, terms, and persons.
They are things which have subjects. They are subjects which have objects or they are called object possessors literally. So here we’re talking about terms. Consciousness, terms, term, expressive terms, we’ll say. Consciousness, expressive terms and persons.
They are object possessors. Or another way to translate that is to say they’re subjects because they have objects. So the term pot, it refers to something as an object possessor, it refers to something. And what it’s referring to, the term pot refers to pot and also refers to the image which arises in the mind when the mind hears the term pot. And what is this image?
What is this image? What is this image? It’s an appearance, isn’t it? Yeah, that’s right. So what is it?
It’s the appearance of opposite of non pot. This term pot refers to both an actual pot, a specifically characterized phenomenon, and a generally characterized phenomenon, that is the opposite of non pot, our own mental image of pot. The appearance of the opposite of non pot, The appearance of the opposite of non pot. Something appears in your mind when you hear the word pot. What appears is the opposite of non pot.
So this word refers to the appearance of the opposite of non pot and pot. Appearance as opposite of non pot. So when you tell me that opposite of non pot, you tell me that mental image inside the mind? Yeah, that’s right. Is it opposite of non pot?
Is that Yeah, I like that. Yeah, that’s a good question actually. Is a pot the opposite of non pot? Is the opposite of non pot permanent or impermanent? It’s permanent.
It’s It’s not a bulbous thing which has a flat bottom and able to hold fluids. It’s not a pot. Then you’re saying the opposite of non pot is not pot. Is the opposite of non pot, pot? Is it pot pot?
Yes. The opposite of non pot is pot. Yes. So then the opposite of non pot is impermanent. Is mental image a pot a pot?
Is the opposite of non pot a pot? It’s a pot. Because other than non pot, it’s a pot. You can pour things in, pour tea in it. Yeah?
Right? Have you ever seen one? Have you ever seen opposite of non pot? Can you find one in the kitchen? Is it opposite of non pot in the kitchen?
Or is it what color is it? Could you hold it? Is it yeah, what color is it? If it’s out in the kitchen. All of this, I can probably see that’s a thick one.
You could find it an instant of opposite of non pot. But could you find opposite of non pot? No. You could find some example of opposite of non pot. That’s right.
But you couldn’t find opposite of non pot? Could you could you No. Then there’s no, is there such a pot? No. It doesn’t exist.