Audio recorded at Buddha House Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. Using a student named Kimball as a live example, Ven Jampa Gendun works through a central Sūtra School distinction — imputed versus substantial existence — in this 35-minute session. The puzzle: you can point directly at a table to establish its existence, but not so with a person, who is not simply their body. The class then examines how language works: words function as names (directing the mind to an object), conventions (conveying an object’s function), and appellations (the very first moment a name is tied to its referent). The session ends with the formal definition of definiendum — a defined term meeting three qualifying criteria — and what it means for a phenomenon to be imputedly existent. Suited to students working through introductory Buddhist logic and epistemology.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 26 CT 1988 05 17.mp3
UUID: 4d18f36d-1e67-408d-a25a-c6c55e8a5472
Teacher: Ven Jampa Gendun
Collection: Collected Topics (Ven Jampa Gendun)
Date: 1988-05-17
Recorded at: Buddha House Adelaide
Duration: 34.8 minutes
Words: ~3,219
To understand Kimball, how do I go about understanding Kimball? How do I establish Kimball’s existence? First off, how do I Yeah. First off Yeah. How do I understand Kimbal’s existence?
How do I establish Kimbal’s existence? Through your obsession. Yeah. What do I perceive? Well, by looking at what?
Looking at Kimball’s form. Body? Is Kimball his body? Body. Do I look at Kimball or Kimball’s I know Kimball by looking at what?
Looking at Kimball’s body? No, think so. Who is he? Who is he you’re talking about? How do I know Kimball?
How do I establish Kimball’s existence for myself if I want to know whether Kimball’s in this room or not? Looking at what’s not take a long time. If somebody said, Is Kimball in there? There’s a telephone call. I’ll go see.
Would you say, I’ll go see? What would you say, I’ll go see if he’s in there? What would you do, go in there and what would you Could you look and see if Kimball lived? Could you establish Kimball by seeing whether he’s there? Pardon?
If you knew he was. If you didn’t know who he was, then you wouldn’t be using a convention, would you? You couldn’t use the convention You couldn’t because you hadn’t connected up the name with the proper object, had you? Let’s say you didn’t know the proper name, proper object. In order to establish Kimball’s existence, could refer to something else besides Kimball.
That would be his body. Kimball is not his body. Kimball’s body is not Kimball. In order to establish Kimball, refer to something other than that what you’re looking for. You have to refer to a second thing.
This is what they’re getting at when they say it’s imputedly existent. If it’s substantially existent, then you can refer directly to the object itself. It substantially exists. You don’t have to refer to something else in order to establish its existence. But in the case of, like for example, Kimball, you have to refer to something other than Kimball in order to establish Kimball’s existence.
You mean his body or his name or something? He would like to see his body or you maybe hear his voice. But in the case of a table, you can refer directly to a table. A table is substantially existent. Kimball is imputedly existent.
This table is substantially existent. It’s a Sūtra School. What’s the difference between kimbal and the table? When you see the table, don’t you see the legs and the top of the table? What’s the difference between, in this example, imputedly existing and substantially existing?
We say the table is substantially existing, but Kimball is imputedly existing. We say Kimball is imputedly existent because in order to refer to Kimball, in order to establish Kimball, have to refer to something other than technically something which is a different entity than Kimball, something which is not Kimball. What’s the difference? Don’t we have to refer to the legs and the top? I’m being introduced to the table.
This is a table, so I’ll introduce you. I can see what you’re saying, but there’s still the idea of abuse. I mean, I’m getting confused up with going through a mental process to recognize something and directly recognizing something. If you go through a mental process, then surely it’s imputing using mental categories that you’ve established, so you’re not actually directly kind of recognizing. That’s what I’m getting confused about.
I can I think I can see what you mean, though? What is the difference between a table and and Kimball? Well, because the thing that you used to to establish my existence isn’t the totality of of what that name refers to. Right. And that that’s the the only distinction I can certainly make here.
Can you is the is the table a an object of the eye consciousness, an object of apprehension by the eye consciousness? Yeah. There’s come one object of apprehension by the eye consciousness. I’d have to say maybe no. No?
Because all that can be obtained in the eye consciousness of the body, and that can be established by convention as and labeled with one name. But it Yeah, it’s because I have a mind as well, which can’t be perceived by the eye consciousness. But in order to apprehend, in order to establish Kimmel’s existence, don’t have to don’t have to see your mind, do we? The body would be enough, wouldn’t it? No.
It’s not enough? Well, you don’t have to see it. I’m I’m just I’m actually trying to get a distinction that you’re making. Just that the table can be labeled table, and there’s nothing there that isn’t table. Whereas, if there’s a label that’s me, it’s referring to something which is not just my body, it’s recognized by bodies.
Yeah. Does the eye consciousness table? Yeah. Is the eye consciousness apprehend Kimball? That’s the Yeah, well, this is where my confusion is.
What do you think? Well, I think they’re the same. They’re established by convention? Is the table established by convention or is it established by a valid cognition? What’s the diverse definition of existence?
The object of valid cognition. Yeah. Where would the other one? Established by valid cognition. Is there one that says established by valid cognition?
Anyway, object of valid cognition. Is there anything which is an object of valid cognition existing? Is there any difference between the status of a table and you? What do mean what’s status? The way it’s established.
The way its existence is established. A table can be established by an eye consciousness? Can Kimball? Yeah. Is it object of apprehension by an eye consciousness?
Not even established. By an eye consciousness? But not You cannot be established by an eye consciousness, but a table can. No. I can be established by eye consciousness.
Yeah? A table can be established by eye consciousness. Your existence. Then you’re the object of apprehension by eye consciousness? What do you mean by established by an eye consciousness?
But I’m making it I’m perceiving with my consciousness. I I establish that concept or, you know, a label. Does an eye consciousness label? No, eye consciousness doesn’t matter. So an eye consciousness, does it does it establish the existence of Kimball?
No. It can’t just establish the existence of a table? I mean, don’t see all the table, do you? You don’t see this backside, do you? You infer that it’s there, but you don’t see you just don’t see it.
You don’t see all the parts of the table, do you? You’re okay. Why do think you have to hear to have clairvoyance? You see all the parts of kimbal. Isn’t all of the table able to be seen all the parts of kimbal able to be seen by direct perception?
What part of Kimball cannot be established? If it can’t be established by awareness, it doesn’t exist, does it? It’s not the object of the valid cognition, I think. Well, how do I perceive this mind? How do you?
For Kimball to exist, do you have to establish his mind? No. So there is a valid cognition which perceives all parts of Kimball. So what is the difference between the way the table is established and the way Kimball is established? Or is there a difference?
Maybe there’s no difference. The status of the table and the status of Kimball. Anybody? Take a guess. See, what brought this up was that you were saying that it seemed you seem to be saying that there was a difference because with a person you have to infer something, rather than you didn’t.
But then it seems to me that because they’re both established, okay, they’re they’re they’re validly cognized as being existent, but but then you you then label, you know, you establish you use convention. And that happens in exactly the same way. So somehow, you establish the Is is the table establishing in dependence upon convention? Or not dependent upon or not or not establish in dependence upon convention? I think it’s established in dependence upon convention.
So the eye consciousness does not establish the existence of the table. See, this is I think this is the point, because I can perceive that, but to establish that it’s a table, I need to refer to past experience and convention. Yeah. Well, there’s a difference between establishing a table and establishing a table as a table. To know it’s a table, to know that a table is a table is quite different than just knowing a table, knowing the table.
The eye consciousness can see the table, but it may not know that it is a table. And you’re right, that would require conceptual cognition. Knowing it as a table, just establishing the table’s existence itself, not establishing the table as a table. So the question is the same way of establishing that first simple way, which is simply perceiving whether I can be established purely on seeing my body. How is it?
We can say that the table is established and dependent upon an eye consciousness and not a Is it dependent upon the convention? Table Is the existence of the table dependent upon convention? I I think it must be. It was a very ideal example with convention. Why the German word is a Tisch.
You might do that when you could do that. What would be the difference? You’d call a bus and a car? Everything. And then your mommy would say, No, no, no.
The process of elimination, everything that’s not car. That’s the way the generic image is formed. Generic image is formed by eliminating everything that’s not, for example, pot or not car. That’s right. So we have a generalized Yeah, that’s what We use this as an identification which applies to all types.
It’s an appearance. For example, the appearance of not a non car. Not a non car. Generic image of non car Our car is not a non car. We form these generic images by process of eliminating, by having pointed out to us that, No, this is not a car.
And then we’ve eliminated something from We’ve learned a little more about non car. And then, not non car is what we use as a means of identifying that which is car. In this sense, use words to develop these We can use words to develop these generic I’m using the word generic image. We can say mental image. Same thing, mental image.
Words or expressive terms. Just to go into a little bit about words. Expressive terms that differentiate from meaningless sounds, maybe like a dog barking or the sound of running water. They don’t refer to anything, whereas words or expressive terms have some reference, some object which they refer to. So they have three different functions, three distinct functions: name, convention, and appellation.
Convention, and Name, convention and appellation. For example, the term pot, the word pot, the term It leads it has the ability to lead the mind to or directs the mind to a thing which is what was it? A bulbous thing with a flat bottom able to hold fluid. I think that was our definition of pot. By using that word pot, it’s able to lead the mind to that which is a phenomenal bulbous and has a flat bottom, it’s able to hold fluids.
So this is what it’s meant by a name. This is where a name leans to mind. It also has the term pot. The name pot can also lead the mind to understand, to brings to the mind to the fact that because a pot is a bulbous thing with a flat bottom and able to hold fluids. It’s good for holding it’s good for pouring tea and water and things like this.
It also leads the mind to the use of the object. What is not very useful for, for example, a pot is not useful for don’t know. What is a pot not useful for? Your face. It’s not good for eating.
Nothing like that. It’s not good for holding up houses. The word also conveys the sense of the object’s function. This is what we mean by convention, that which it conveys the sense of an object’s function. The fact that a pot is good for holding fluids, tea and water.
So it gives a sense the word pot is able to give the sense because it refers to the naming from the point of view of name, it refers to a bulbous thing able to hold fluid. From the point of view of convention, it would give us the sense of the function of the objects that it’s useful for holding liquids. So this is what is known as, in this sense, would be known as convention. So the definite term name and a convention name simply leads the mind to that, for example, in the case of pot, that which is bulbous and flat bottom and able to hold fluids. But the same word used from the viewpoint of being at convention, which they’re both conventions and names, the word pot, it would give us the sense that it’s useful for holding tea or water.
The word pot can only lead the mind to the specific object after the name has been learned, after there’s been a connection made between the object and the name. You have to build up a connection. It has to be pointed out that this is a car, this is a pot. The name is applied to the correct object. When this is initially done, the very first instance that a name is applied to the correct object, then it’s referred to as an appellation, just like a tag that you’re putting onto it the very first time.
Appellation? Appellation, appellate court. A double p, e a double l, a t I y. What does it mean? What is appellation?
Does that come from the same words? Like appellate court? Yeah, that’s convenient. So this is the very first time we connect up the name, the term, and the correct object. In a sense, it’s been used an appellation.
Appellation. Sounds like mountains in the United States. Appalachian Mountains. Once the appellation has been learned, there’s been this connection named, that is, we say that the name has been learned, then the relationship between the pot and the meaning has been ascertained. Relationship between the pot and the meaning.
The name pot and its meaning has been ascertained. Subsequently to that, whenever you say, you know, you’re able to use it as a convention or to say it or understand it. If somebody says, Bring me the pot, and you can say that or somebody can hear that and you understand the thought consciousness associates that name that has been learned with the object that was first identified the very first time that you connected the name with the appellation, the appellation with the object. It’s able to identify the object while you’re using the convention. Once you’ve learned the appellation, once you’ve connected the term pot with the correct object.
Subsequently, when you use that name, it becomes a convention which you can identify the correct object when you’re using the convention. We can go into that further, but this is kind of just to build up to the last of the few definitions in this second section, second subdivision called established base. Actually, is a very difficult subject, I think. How naming works. Language, I think.
So the few definitions which are left, the first one is definition of definiendum. What did we say what definiendum was? Name definition. The for definition. So defininums have definitions and definitions have defininums.
That which is defined. Which is defined like a pot is a definienum, and a bulbous thing with a flat bottom and able to perform the function of holding fluid is the definition of a pot. It’s definition. So the definition of a definiendum. It’s an imputed existent phenomena having three qualities.
An imputed existent phenomena having three qualities. You may ask, what are those three qualities? Because when you see that, it is So if we apply this to a base, that is, part, we’ll apply it. So we say that part is the definiendum, and in this it is that which illustrates part. Or you could say, if you make it general, it becomes more difficult.
Say, Is that which illustrates itself? Or if we apply it to this, It is that which illustrates pot. The definition of the definiendum pot is that which illustrates pot. It cannot be the illustration of another phenomenon. That’s the second quality.
It cannot be the illustration of another phenomenon. This cannot illustrate that which is able to support a beam or rafter. Which is what? That which is able to support a beam? So this cannot be the illustration for that which is able to support a being.
It is established in terms of a definition. It is established in terms of a definition. It is established in terms of a bulbous thing which is flat bottom and able to perform a function of holding fluid. It’s established in terms of that, of its definition. Actually, word definition can be translated as its nature, in terms of its nature or definition.
Now, what do we mean by So what do we mean by imputedly existent? Is that anybody? What is imputedly existent? We talked about that, I think, a bit imputedly existent. Is this table imputedly existent or substantially existent?
You, Jenny, are you imputedly existent or a substantially existent? Are you existent? In what? So, You could use that, isn’t it? Yeah, that’s good.
So I am just quoting from the book here. It says, What is the reason for saying Imputedly existing phenomena? It is because it is established as an object of awareness in terms of an example. It is established as an object of awareness in terms of an example and dependence upon a convention. It is established in terms of awareness, in terms of an example, and dependence upon a convention.
in dependence upon a convention. It is established as an object of awareness in terms of an example, in dependence upon a convention. So what does that mean? It depends upon a convention. So it depends upon what?
Depends a convention. We said convention was what? Convention — essentially it’s a word, isn’t it? A name, a word which is used in a particular way, in a way that conveys a sense or function. It’s dependent upon being named.
It is established as an object of awareness in terms of an example. All we’re saying is that an imputed existence phenomenon is established by means of an example being named. It must be named for it to be established. For example, another way of putting this is a person is imputedly existent. This is in the Sūtra School which we’re talking about here.
Imputedly existent in general means that we have to refer to another object in order to understand this first object.