
Audio recorded at Buddha House Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. Ven Jampa Gendun physically dismantles a pen in class to pose the central question: if this object truly exists independently of the mind, where exactly is the pen among its parts? In this 47-minute session from the Collected Topics series, he works through the distinction between specifically characterized phenomena — impermanent things that produce effects and appear to direct perception by their own unique characteristics — and generally characterized phenomena, the mental images grasped by conceptual consciousness. He explains why direct perception must have its object present while conceptual thought can operate on absent objects, using “tableness” to illustrate the general characteristic shared by all tables. The session builds to a key pedagogical point: what the Sūtra school calls an ultimately established, objectively existing thing is precisely the object of negation in the Middle Way school’s emptiness analysis. Suited to students following a structured Buddhist logic curriculum.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 13 CT 1988 04 12.mp3
UUID: b9a514d2-e6ca-4926-8ff2-5651e08c965b
Teacher: Ven Jampa Gendun
Collection: Collected Topics (Ven Jampa Gendun)
Date: 1988-04-12
Recorded at: Buddha House Adelaide
Duration: 47.2 minutes
Words: ~5,164
I hate to erase it. We’re looking at collected topics, the second subdivision of the first division. What is what is the subdivision we’re looking at? Anybody know it? That’s an established basis.
And we’re So last week, looked Where did we end up? Yeah. We looked at some examples of permanent phenomena. So we’re going to continue with looking into the definition of thing. Thing.
What is the definition of thing? Phenomena which is able to perform a function. Mainly, what type of function are we referring to? Function of producing an effect. For example, give me an example of a thing.
What’s an example of a thing? A table. Is the table able to perform a function? Yes. What function?
Okay, good. Discern. So I’d like to just briefly take another go back into this idea of there were how many phenomena synonymous or mutually inclusive with thing? Remember? What were they?
All right, good. I’d like to take a look at the difference between specifically characterized phenomena and ultimate truth on the one hand and generally characterized phenomena and conventional truths on the other. It’s important, as we’ve said, understanding the lower tenets, understanding the lower systems is an aid to understanding the higher tenets. It’s like stepping up a ladder. So if we keep going back again and again into what the lower tenets are calling ultimate truth, what they call specifically characterized phenomena, then when you come to study the higher tenets such as the middle way or the mind only school, then you will have an easier time understanding what they’re talking about.
The difference between specifically so there’s various mutually inclusive phenomena mutually inclusive with specifically characterized phenomena ultimate truth, compounded phenomena, impermanent phenomena thing I missed one. Product. Product, good. On the one hand and on the other is what? Permanent phenomena, uncompounded phenomena, non product, generally characterized phenomena conventional truth, on the other hand.
If we begin to understand the differentiation between these two. We can talk about them from a point of view of four features. The difference between, for example, specifically characterized phenomena and generally characterized phenomena. From the point of view of entity, this is going to be just a rough idea to help you develop an understanding of what we’re talking about. Entity from the point of view of four features: entity uncommon mode of appearance uncommon mode or way of appearance, the way it appears its unique way of appearing.
The third is perceiving subject. And the fourth is activity perceiving subject and activity. So, we’ll just give some from the point of view of entity. The entity just simply we can use another word, nature, from the point of view of their nature or entity, entity or nature. We talk about ultimate truths, for example.
Ultimate truths are said to be ultimately established because of their ability to perform a function. As we’ve been talking about in the main, we’re talking about the ability to produce an effect or the function of producing an effect. For example, you know, a flame has the ability is an ultimate truth. It has many effects. One of the effects is simply it produces the next moment of the flame in a continuum.
When the first moment of the flame gives rise to the second moment of the flame, gives rise to the third moment of the flame, and the last moment of the flame gives rise to smoke, for example. So it’s ultimately established because it ultimately is able to produce an effect. So that’s one type of effect, but also impermanent phenomena also have the function of causing or producing a consciousness which perceives them. Impermanent phenomena have the function of producing the consciousness which perceives them. For just simply stated, you know, a table has the ability to produce an effect of an eye consciousness which perceives table.
The table acts as a cause giving rise to this eye consciousness acts as a cause of the eye consciousness perceiving table. So, you know, specifically characterized phenomena we’ve been talking about appear to direct perception. Direct perception what does the word direct here mean, direct perception? You know, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mental direct perception? Can’t trust the word to what?
Appears to direct perception because, well, okay, first what does the word direct perception here mean? There are two types of valid cognizers, aren’t there? What are the two types? Direct. That’s right.
In the direct perception, what does that word direct, what does the general meaning? It’s close, getting close. Now then? It does not depend on what? Inference to understand something.
Does not depend on what? And what does inference depend upon to understand this object? Reason, sign, experience, reasoning. Here we’re talking about conceptual consciousness which Inference is a conceptual consciousness. It depends upon a mental image, idea, thought, we can just say mental image in order to understand this object.
It does not understand the object directly. But a direct perception, such as eye consciousness, for example, understands this object directly not through the medium indirectly, or we can say of a mental image or an idea about the object. It understands the object immediately and not through any other medium, for example, of an idea, a mental image. So this is the word direct perception. Direct means we understand the object directly without any necessity to make use of a mental image or idea about the object.
So specifically characterized phenomena act as objects of direct perception. They appear to direct perception by way of their specific characteristics. For example, color, shape. These colors, these shapes, there’s uncommon, detailed, specific characteristics, such as their various colors or shapes or sizes or whatever, appearing to that consciousness. In this way the direct perception arises.
If there is no phenomena If there’s no impermanent phenomena present, then that object cannot be fully manifestly cognized. That object cannot be cognized, understood in detail if that object is not present. So a direct perceiver we’re talking about the limitations of direct perceivers and inferences with respect to their objects. specifically characterized phenomenon by means of their own uncommon specific characteristics, they appear to direct perceivers. If that specifically characterized phenomenon is not there, then an understanding which understands fully and in complete detail all the specific characteristics of that particular object cannot arise.
So we have to have the presence of an object in order to have direct perception. It must be in the proximate area. So this is a limitation, we can say, of a direct perception. Is that both inferential as well as well? Okay, yeah, we’ll come to that.
What do you think? What do you think offhand? Do you to have object present in order to understand something conceptually? No. Yeah, that’s right.
So that’s one advantage of a conceptual consciousness. Direct perception, we have to have the object present, right? Because it’s by its own uncommon characteristics, it causes the direct perception to arise. But with conception, we do not have object present because we understand the object through creating a mental image of it. So we can think about, you know, I can think about the United States, for example.
I can understand the United States, and I don’t have to be there. But if I were to have direct perception of it, I would have to have actual contact with it, in that proximate area, you know, visual contact. So that’s what we’re talking about here trying to differentiate between the natures or the entities of specifically characterized phenomena and generally characterized phenomena. So specifically characterized phenomena produce a direct perception. What is the difference between the object of conceptual consciousness and direct perception?
One thing about one thing. Okay, and when you think about an object, what is appearing to that mind as opposed to direct perception? A picture. Yeah. So I can understand a table both by direct perception or I can understand it by thinking about it, can’t I?
In one case, the very specific characteristics of a particular table, you know, with chips on the corner, etc, is going to appear to my mind. And dependence upon that, a direct perception arises. But if I think about the table, I’m going to the table doesn’t have to be present, but I’m not going to be able to think about a particular detailed table. It’s going to be my general idea table. You know, maybe general idea of brown table, general idea of short brown tables, but it will not have a particular detailed table.
It’s going to be my mental image of a table, and through that I’m going to understand table. Can you actually do that? Can you actually perceive the table without thinking about it? With my direct perception, yes. You see the By the force of the table appearing, casting its aspect, it impinges.
Throws it Chunks out. Yeah, from its own side. See, remember we’re talking about Sautrāntika, so these things are truly existent. They’re out there, hard and stable. It forces itself on my consciousness.
It’s like a mirror. And just like a mirror, whatever you put in front of it, it reflects in that mirror. The same way these objects, their consciousness simply is forming an aspect of whatever is presented in front of it, in that particular aspect, that particular shape you may say. So whatever you put in front of a mirror, it appears in the mirror. Whatever you put in front of the very direct perception, it appears in before that consciousness, before direct perception.
But on the other hand, conception, we’re creating. We’re understanding the object by means of our idea or our mental image about the object. We go back to our file and we come out with table, brown table, short brown table, short brown table in the meditation room. You know, we add up all these various images and make a composite of them. This is the way we understand the object, not by the object casting its aspect toward us, but by the mind creating its own aspect or idea about the table.
So in one case we can understand the very detailed aspects, the detailed uncommon characteristics. That’s what we mean when we say specifically characterized phenomena, that which appears to direct perception. When we say generally characterized phenomena, we’re talking about our general blurred image about what table is. When we think about table, something happens, some symbol mental image arises in our mind. Through that generally characterized phenomena we understand table, but we don’t understand a specifically characterized phenomena.
So, getting a feeling for the difference between generally characterized phenomena and specifically characterized phenomena. Maybe a sound, I don’t know. If somebody yelled in your ear, that would kind of impinge on your consciousness or something, cast its aspect. So there’s no other way to directly cognize an impermanent object except through direct perception. So this brings up an interesting point.
In order to impermanent objects cannot be fully realized. By fully I mean in all its unique characteristics, in all its detail, cannot be fully realized by merely hearing, thinking about, having ideas about the object. Therefore, this is what we mean when we say that specifically characterized phenomena cannot be expressed in words. In other words, we can say, for example, we can talk about a table, we can think about a table, but the actual table can never be expressed in ideas or words or symbols. The conceptual mind cannot know a particular table in its complete, unique detail.
In fact, like when we do visualization practices, we are working with mental images. We’re building up very you know, first it’s very blurred, it may not even exist, but anyway so you build up you’re trying to visualize Tārā. First you simply have a green mental image. This is not a color it’s a mental image of a color. Color is an object of eye consciousness.
Color green that appears to your mind is an object of mental consciousness. It is not an actual color. It’s a mental image of green. So you’re beginning to shape this mental image. Now you can get more and more detail of this mental image as you begin to stabilize it and add more and more details.
But that can only be an approximate idea of the actual thing itself. For example, a table. We have a mental image of a table, and we can develop a very detailed picture of a table or emptiness, something very abstract. We can begin to know and know and know more and more and more and more about emptiness, but it’s never actually emptiness. It’s our idea about emptiness.
We can never express in words, in concepts, an impermanent phenomena, a specifically characterized phenomena. It’s always a generally characterized phenomena. You know, even just the taste of brown sugar. If you try to explain to somebody, What is the taste of brown sugar? This is a traditional example they use.
You you can explain, you can talk about it, talk about it, talk about it, he actually has to experience it for himself directly in order for him to understand it directly. How does that relate to what I crudely perhaps understand as the Yeah. Look, We’ll come to that, okay, as we go and discuss this from a different point of view. We can say that permanent phenomena are conventionally established. We said that impermanent phenomena are ultimately established since they are ultimately able to produce a function, ultimately able to produce an effect.
Permanent phenomena are conventionally established in the fact that they lack this ability to produce an effect. The thought which apprehends permanent phenomena apprehends them at will, at its own will. So the object depends upon the consciousness rather than other way around, okay? So in direct perception, the consciousness arises in dependence upon object. In conceptual consciousness, the object arises in dependence upon the consciousness, upon the will.
We will ourselves to think about your mother, for example. Yeah? So, upon the will or the consciousness, the object arises. But this conceptual consciousness is obscured because it’s not able to perceive the full details of its object. You know, when you think about your mother, you are not perceiving the full details of the mother, or that is to say, of the mother who is a specifically characterized phenomena, impermanent phenomena.
It’s obscured, it’s blocked from seeing that. The mind, which takes a generally characterized phenomena, takes as its object a generally characterized the mind, which takes a permanent object, takes a generally characterized phenomena as its object. From the point of view of the nature conceptual consciousness can understand objects which are not present, but it cannot understand their details. Direct perception can understand the details of an object, but cannot understand an object which is not present. So we begin to see the limits and the advantages of one type of consciousness over another.
From the point of view of uncommon mode of appearance, just the way it appears, the unique way of appearing, So a specifically characterized phenomena is a phenomena which appears by way of its own specific characteristics and becomes the appearing object of a direct perceiver. All the qualities, all the characteristics of a specifically characterized phenomena appear to a direct perceiver, but we don’t necessarily ascertain them. For example, this table. When my eye consciousness sees the table, all the specific characteristics of this table are appearing to my eye consciousness, but my eye consciousness does not ascertain all those characteristics. For example, it’s impermanence, subtle impermanence.
Subtle impermanence is appearing to my eye consciousness, but my eye consciousness does not ascertain it. I have to first understand that through conceptual consciousness, and that will finally aid for my eye consciousness to ultimately see the subtle impermanence of the table. So we have many things which appear to us, but what we call but they are not ascertained. Many things are appearing to us. When I look at that table, it’s subtle impermanence is appearing to me.
Anything which is a specific characteristic of that table is appearing to me, but I don’t understand it. My consciousness is not understanding it. It can, but it’s not. It has the potential to. Okay, so there’s uncommon features of a table.
Okay, there’s a question. What is the common okay, table has uncommon features, right? You know, this chip on here, and this grain pattern, and being a rather strange table to begin with, with these legs. What is the common characteristic of this table? It’s function.
A common That’s good. So what is it that pervades all tables? What is it that’s common with every table? This appears to a conventional consciousness. This is the generally characterized phenomena.
The factor by which we understand that this is a table, that’s a table, that’s a table, this is a table. There’s a common characteristic, a general characteristic. And each of these tables has particular, specific characteristics, but there’s something common about them by which we can understand this is a table even though they’re quite different. This has four legs probably, this has these two legs. Different shapes, different sizes, many different designs, but we can understand that this is a table, this is a table, this is a table.
There’s some common element, some common factor running through all these different objects, and we understand those. This is the generally characterized phenomena, this factor of being table, which is common to all tables. This is what would take the mind. This is what I mean by a generally characterized phenomenon, the factor which pervades all the instances of table. When we think about table, this is the factor that we’re thinking about.
And then when we see something, we go back to our file, we check our program, we check back in our file, it matches up with this general factor, and then we say, that’s a table. So we check back with our mental image, which is this general factor which runs through all the instances of table. This is the uncommon mode of appearance. Then there’s the Okay, from the point of view of perceiving perceiving and that’s the uncommon. Yeah, the uncommon mode of appearance is the specifically characterized phenomena in that this particular chip, this particular grain, this particular type of leg disappears through direct perceiver.
But what is it that you know, makes me understand that this is a table and this is a table, though they’re quite different. There’s something there’s some factor which is the same. That is their tableness. Right. Yeah?
This is a generally characterized phenomenon. This factor of Common. Yeah, common or general. This factor of being tableness. And this is the way I understand things.
Even though these are quite different, still I’ve learned that I’ve I’ve been able to understand that there’s something similar, that even though the detailed, even though the specifically characterized phenomena is in fact completely different, or not quite different, there is something similar. There’s some general factor. This general factor is the generally characterized phenomena. That is my mental image of the table. It’s the tableness of both of these two.
This is what I refer to when I want to understand something. When I want to understand what this thing is, I go back to my file of mental images, I go through this one. This fits in with my idea about what a table is. And therefore I understand this, when I think about it through my file, through my symbol, which I understand this thing. I’m understanding this object, the specific characterized phenomena, through my generally characterized phenomena, my mental image, my idea about the table, my file design.
Is that a little bit clear? Yeah. See, The tableness is what? Is that permanent or impermanent? That cannot be an object of direct perception.
I do not see with my eye consciousness the tableness of this object, do I, or do I? No, your eye consciousness doesn’t see it. Yeah. Otherwise, a child would know that this a baby would know that this is a table, but he doesn’t. He has to think about it.
He has to develop his file. Has to develop people, Oh, is A, B, C. This is table. This is floor. This is a rug.
He’s being taught. He’s developing his images. It’s a file of generic images. And this is conceptual objects of concepts. Common.
That’s the common. Yeah, I’m using the word general and common and specific and uncommon. Right. Yeah, so this is the way we can understand it. We don’t and we’ll get to this a little bit later, but technically we don’t see a table, for example.
We see a color of a table, we see a shape of a table, but we don’t see a table. So this is by way of their appearance, by way of their perceiving subject and activity. Here’s where we get into the idea of ultimate consciousness and conventional consciousness. Specifically characterized phenomena act as a cooperative condition or just a cause. Specifically characterized phenomena act as a cause for the consciousness which directly perceives them.
For example, this table acts as a cause from eye consciousness seeing this table. The eye consciousness perceives all the detailed characteristics of this table. For example, that the table exists the way it appears. Here we get into the idea of we’re getting into some difference between the Sūtra school and the Middle Way school. The eye consciousness of seeing the table sees the table the way it actually exists.
There’s no difference between the way it appears and the way it exists. It sees the table, the way the table exists, the mode of existence of the table as being table. This is what we call sometimes naive realism. It’s simply accepting the way it appears to be the way it exists. The way it appears is the way it exists.
The table appears to eye consciousness, for example, is the way it exists. This is in contrast to the upper schools, for example, middle ways, which state that the way it appears is in fact not the way it exists. In the sūtra school, table appears to have a final nature of being a table. There’s no question about having to name it a table, to conceive of it as a table. From its own side, it is a table.
It has an inherent quality of tableness, of being a table. But, you know, as we may know, in the higher school, for example, the mind only school, that this is not its final nature, its final nature of being a table. This is somewhat an important point, but I’m not making it very clearly. Object appears to us to exist independently of our mind. The object is as if the table is forcing itself on our mind.
The table is forcing itself on our mind and the response, I. E, consciousness perceiving the table arises. The table truly exists. Its final mode of existence is that it’s ultimately a table. If we analyze it, we will find a table.
Understanding this, this is the very object of which is the negation, the object of refutation of the mind only school. And in fact, the table doesn’t exist this way. You know, in order to come to an understanding of emptiness, we go through one method is through what is called the four point analysis. And the first point is to identify the object of refutation. The object of refutation, according to the Middle Way School, is exactly what the Sūtra School says exists.
So if you understand what a specifically characterized phenomena is fully, you will understand the object of negation, that which is to be refuted according to the Middle Way School. We’re talking everything that we’ve been saying about specifically characterized phenomena. The more we can build up an understanding of that, the more we can begin to identify the object which is to be negated in the theory of emptiness according to the Middle Way school. So what are some of the things we said about the specifically characterized phenomena, about their mode of being, about how they exist? What are some of the ideas we’ve got?
The way direct perception perceives it. That’s right. How does it perceive it? How is direct perceiver perceiving? How does it appear to direct perceiver?
As if it exists from its own side. Yeah. What does that mean? Without dependence. Yeah.
It appears to be a table. It appears that ultimately there’s a table there, and that’s the way it exists. Okay. Okay. Do you have a pen?
May I borrow a pen? Can you take this one apart? I think you should go and take the end up. Okay. Let’s try I think it’s okay.
We’ll just try to develop some idea about what we mean. You know, we see this pen and it’s difficult. See, the problem is even though the object of negation, that is the specifically characterized phenomena as posited, as asserted by the Sūtra School, is appearing to our eye consciousness, it doesn’t appear to our conceptual consciousness. A specifically characterized phenomena is appearing to our eye consciousness, but when we think about it we can’t see the specifically characterized phenomena. We don’t see the actual pin.
When we think about it, what we’re understanding is our mental image, our idea about the pen. So this is the barrier. This is the problem coming to an understanding of the object of negation. When we think about pen, we don’t understand an actual pen. We’re understanding the idea about the pen.
If we could see the actual pen itself to think about it, can immediately understand the object of negation of the Middle Way school. I’ll explain a little more. When we see this pen, you know, when I say this, it becomes difficult because if I say that this pen appears to exist from its own side, independent of my mind, you are seeing that with your eye. When you think about it, what you’re thinking about is not the pin itself, it’s your idea about the pin. So this takes you have to work with the idea, with the reasoning process.
This object appears, this pen appears to exist as a pen, independently of your mind. Out there, objectively, solidly, that’s the way it appears to your eye consciousness. That’s the way it appears to it. When you think about it, you’re no longer going to see that, but that independently objectively existent pen. But we have to be able to conceive of that in order to understand conceptually what it is we’re trying to refute, what it is that’s appearing to direct perception.
It’s as if there’s two parts to our mind. The conceptual part is trying to understand what the non conceptual or direct perception is thinking about, or what is seeing. Conceptual part of our mind, a reasoning part of our mind, is trying its best to form an idea about what the direct perception is seeing. Conceptual conscious only sees generic mental images. It doesn’t see what direct perception is seeing.
So we have to use our reasoning over and over again in order to understand, What is it that my direct perception? What is it that my eye consciousness is seeing? To think about it, I no longer see what my eye consciousness is seeing. I’m seeing my idea about what the eye consciousness is seeing. So again and again we have to refine our understanding.
So what is it that our direct perception is seeing if we begin to talk about it roughly? The eye consciousness is seeing a pen which exists independently of the perceiver, that is the eye consciousness, objectively without depending upon the eye consciousness or naming, for example. But we begin to use reasoning to see if this is the way it appears, does it in fact exist this way? So we begin to analyze. Whenever you make analysis, and even if we were to make an analysis, in order to analyze something you have to break it down.
That’s what we mean when we say analysis. Even if we have a hole, our mind can hold that hole, whatever it is. It doesn’t know whether it’s army with many soldiers, for example. But when it begins to analyze, it has to break it down into parts. Immediately upon that, it’s not going to be able to hold the whole in its mind.
It’s not going to see the part, it’s not going to see the whole. If we want to understand what is the nature of this pen, we’re going to have to begin to break it down into its parts. So we begin to look at it. We understand to some degree that the pen appears to exist independently, objectively. Now, it should be findable if it exists independent of the mind.
It should be findable within its parts. So we’re going to make an analysis. Is this the pen? No. No?
Good. Very good. Is that the pen? No. Okay.
Is the ink in this tube the pen? Is the tube the pen? Is this metal tip the pen? Okay. There’s nothing left over.
So this thing which appeared to us to exist objectively, independently of our mind, this thing really solid, concrete out there, when we make analysis, we cannot find it. It’s none of the parts and there’s nothing left over other than the parts, which is the pen. Is the collection of the parts the pen? Is that a pen? That’s not a pen.
Is that a pen? Okay. What happened? We had an objectively existing pin there, what appeared to be objectively existing pin, which didn’t depend upon my mind, But when we performed an analysis, we couldn’t find that objectively existing pen, which didn’t depend upon my mind. It’s empty of that pen.
This object is empty of such an object. But what happened when we put it together? Lisa? It’s a pen. But how did it come into existence?
What is its mode of existence? What way does it exist? Does it exist objectively? Independent of my mind? What happened when I finally put it together?
What happened? Somehow, in my mind, appeared pin, didn’t it? What caused that? Right. Come on.
You’re not a good one. Yeah. So it’s called pin. Mind says, It can see pin. The pin is dependent upon my mind.
If my mind couldn’t conceive pin, the pin wouldn’t appear to me. Does it? What what appears