59 min · 6,500 words · 11 August 2012
Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. The speaker argues that ethics cannot be fully naturalized through science, because biological and psychological findings on cooperation and empathy are descriptive and do not say what one ought to do. He contrasts duty-based ethics (such as the Ten Commandments) with Buddhist ethics, which he describes as virtue-based and aimed at reducing suffering through training the mind in well-intentioned action, with the ten non-virtuous actions as an example. The talk ends with questions on naturalizing and on moral intuitions.
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Duration: 1h 0m
UUID: 47c642cc-b692-4b3b-9a01-4d4af9155fd4
Date: 2012-08-11
Words: 6,496
It is on. Oh, right. Woah. Woah. Is it ever on?
Can we turn it down a little bit? I I feel like, I feel like the voice in the burning bush. Okay, I had, let’s see. I am a visiting fellow at the University of Adelaide in the philosophy department and I’m a visiting fellow in at the University of South Australia in social epidemiology and evaluation research. So I came to both of those honorary positions through, a course of study that was inspired by Kensur Rinpoche.
Basically what I have been trying to do for most of my professional life, since meeting Kensur Rinpoche has been trying to cash out in Western philosophical and scientific terms, the teachings that I’ve been receiving from him and the teachings that I’ve been studying. Today’s topic is ethics and ethics is one of those areas that western philosophers have traditionally said cannot be naturalized, cannot be made scientific. But nevertheless, there has been a huge push to naturalize, ethics over the last twenty, thirty years because of the nature of our modern condition. And that is with the decline of religion, which was the traditional guarantor, dictator and guarantor of ethical structure. We’ve had to find, we’ve had to look for an alternative source for to sustain, our ethical structures, our our our structures of law which are codified versions of ethics, and are structures of personal practice.
This has not been easy. Philosophers have attempted to do this through logic. And it doesn’t work very well. And one of the reasons why it doesn’t work very well is because of the naturalistic naturalistic fallacy. Fallacy.
First, sorry, I had put together a beautiful pictures and text PowerPoint presentation that would help me to go through this easily and help guide you easily through all of this. But, I don’t have a projector. So know that let’s just go on from here. If you want to flick through the slides afterward, that would be fine. I’m perfectly willing to let you do that.
But so if, you know, if religion doesn’t provide an ethical framework, why do we need to naturalize ethics? And by naturalizing ethics that means going to the sciences. In this case, it would be psychology, it would be biology, mainly these two, because physics doesn’t work, for ethics. And that’s because ethical behavior historically, the pursuit of the good in scare quotes, which is highly open to interpretation, makes for orderly groups and human beings are group living creatures. We’re social creatures.
Evolved the capacities that we evolved, evolved in group living situations. The problem is always that ethical behavior is optional for the individual. The individual can behave in any way he or she wishes. They can face the opprobrium of the group. They can, run into problems with the law.
All sorts of things like that. But whether or not they pursue an ethical course is really up to the individual. And so compelling reasons have to be necessary to make ethics work. And religion, generally speaking, provided both the framework and the compelling reasons why one should follow an ethical framework. And with, the rise of secularism, need to find, an alternative basis.
And this is this is a movement that really began in the nineteenth century with, the rise of Darwinism, and the increasing belief within scientific circles that that, maybe God might not be necessary, at all. And if God isn’t necessary, the structures of the church aren’t necessary. And if the structures of the church aren’t necessary, how do we justify ethics? How do we keep ourselves in line, basically? Individuals and if we can show that science, some that ethics somehow are scientific, they’re natural, then individuals can still opt out, but then they will be shown to be unnatural and somehow or other that’s supposed to matter.
You know, I mean, nature shows that there’s an awful lot of variation everywhere so whether something’s natural or unnatural is really, really a matter of interpretation. But that’s basically the idea behind naturalizing ethics. But as I said, there is a problem in the middle here and that is, the naturalistic fallacy. And that comes from David Hume who is one of the most famous of the British philosophers and a personal favorite. Hume said that there is no is from ought.
No, sorry. No ought from is. Put a different way, no amount of empirical fact can tell you how to act in a given situation. Peter Singer, probably the most influential philosopher, ethical, certainly the most influential, ethical philosopher to to, have arisen from these shores, puts it this way. You have a windfall, an inheritance, a lottery win, something like that.
There is no amount of facts about the worthiness of the members of your family and the worthiness of a, of a poverty stricken individual in India that will allow you to decide whether to give the money to members of your family to make their lives better or give money to a charity to make the life of somebody in India better. There’s nothing there’s nothing in the facts of the case that will tell you what to do. You still have to have a background, a set of beliefs, a set of values that direct your actions in one way or the other. Okay? That’s Singer’s problem.
And the the embrace of of Hume’s, naturalistic fallacy, the recognition that this is a serious problem, and it is a serious problem, has, led in the twentieth century to a very, very, weird kind of ethics, a moral philosophy. It was very subjectivist. It was very, emotivist. It was based on feelings. It was based on projecting the feelings of others.
It was highly and it was quite anti naturalist. And so as a result of that, one of a woman by the name of Philippa Foote, who was an Oxford philosopher and was one of the women who was trained in around the time the second second world war. And was in this hotbed of male analytical philosophy, which would not have been, very conducive to her own flourishing, I wouldn’t have thought, said basically, hey boys, morality isn’t a free for all. You can’t just make up lines of thought and say, what would I do in this situation based on this feeling or that feeling? Human flourishing and human well-being has to be the aim of morality or what’s morality for.
And she was trying to bring it back to biology and say that flourishing and well-being is found first and foremost in our bodily, that is our natural biological nature. So virtue and she was the founder of twentieth century virtue ethics, leads to balance and well-being. Well-being. Okay? She had a fantastic very, very small book beautifully written called Natural Goodness.
I have some, books on this presentation that you can also access. Access. I, quite, following in Philippa Foot’s footsteps. Last year, I published a chapter in a book called, Exploring Wild Law, the Philosophy of Earth Jurisprudence, that was, edited by a young man in the in the law faculty at Adelaide University. And I extended her argument, to say that, you know, there are norms that exist in nature.
You know, we cannot exist within, there are norms of heat that we can tolerate. There are norms of cold that we can tolerate. We have to have certain levels of salt in our system, not too little, too much. We have to have certain levels of magnesium, oxygen, etcetera. And these values, these parameters beyond which flourishing and well-being cannot occur, provide the underlying, basis for the adoption of norms in the first place.
Individuals and groups may interpret these norms differently, what a good life and what the good requires, but there is something in biology that you can point to. It’s not that norms are entirely arbitrary. There is some basis for them. And yet a problem remains. Biological norms do not an ethical system make.
They only provide a plausible origin for where our norms might have come from. They you still have you still need something to deal with Singer’s problem. You still need a framework, for making decisions about what actions to take in a given situation under certain under given circumstances. So while philosophers were roiling around with this, meanwhile in biology, there was quite a lot happening. And there was quite a lot happening because there were two problems, related problems.
Those who were interested in evolution couldn’t get their heads around. They couldn’t seem to square it with Darwinism. Because selection is based Darwinism. On the struggle for existence, then selfishness, universal selfishness has to be the default condition, has to be the default condition. And if universal selfishness is the default condition, how on earth do you account for cooperation and altruism?
Because both exist everywhere in the natural world. So this was creating a real problem. And the population geneticists basically came up with what later became called the selfish gene, idea, which is that we yes, we are cooperative. Yes, we can be altruistic, but this is basically just a cover for what is deeply selfish. We are transmitting our genes.
We, you know, we get together in groups because there are certain things that make, know, that there are benefits to group living like safety and safety against predation and being able to, access resources that you can’t access otherwise. But basically it’s all about me And not only that, it’s all about my genes. So these two things, were exercising, a number of biologists. And one of the first attacks on, and it wasn’t conceived as an attack at all, but one of the first challenges to, this kind of picture of cooperation and altruism aren’t natural, they’re a real problem, I’m trying to explain them, was a young woman from England who was not extraordinarily well trained at the time named Jane Goodall. And she had been invited by Louis Leakey who was who had been digging up really interesting, ancient human bones in Africa.
She had been hired by him to come and study chimpanzees. So to give him an idea of what our ancient ancestors might have been up to, why how they might have been behaving. The idea being that they were probably closer to chimpanzees than they are to humans. So what can chimpanzee behavior tell us about ancient humans? At this time, behaviorism was the dominant view in psychology.
So it was, you know, there was a real bias against the idea of imputing inner states at all. There was a very, very mechanistic view of everything sort of stimulus response. There’s something going on in between, what we do, you know, what it is we don’t know. And in animals, it’s inappropriate to actually suggest that anything’s going on. You know, they are basically stimulus response machines.
And he hired her because she was female because he thought females were more patient. He thought that men would go in there and sort of, you like, come on, do something, let me write this up now. And she ended up staying more or less, five decades there on and off, on and off. And and her time with the Gombe chimps, radically transformed the study, and understanding of chimpanzee behavior. And, there were others that followed a course, but she she was really a seminal figure.
And she was the first to describe behavior that looked empathetic in chimpanzees, as well as violent predatory behavior. Both of them, both of these, these two extremes really shocked, the world of ethology of, the study of animal behavior. So this is starting in about the 60s, right? And so in 1975, Ilya has spoken extensively on the subject. A Harvard zoologist by the name of Ed Edward O.
Wilson, who was one of the world’s leading experts on ants, which are probably the most cooperative and altruistic species on the planet, even more than humans in many respects because they will kill themselves. They will they will sacrifice themselves for the good of the nest, apparently without hesitation. Wilson suggested that the problem of cooperation, the answer to the problem of cooperation and also the answer to a naturalized ethics will come from the study of primate behavior. Because primate behavior, primates live in groups, they’re under the same kind of evolutionary pressures that, early humans were under and therefore, by studying social behavior in other primates, we will get an idea of how our own ethical structures arose. And he was suggesting that most animal behavioral norms are largely the products of genes, but in human beings, they’re more the product of living in tribes and clans.
That was called sociobiology. That was probably the very first attempt to articulate the view of of a naturalized ethics. But there were many, many facets of sociobiology, particularly the focus on genes, that made it objectionable to many. And the sociobiology wars are actually still being played out in evolutionary biology and psychology and sociology and things like that. Now one person who disagreed with this was a Dutch primatologist by the name of Frans de Waal.
Now Frans de Waal is a bit of a hero of mine. His model organism was, the bonobo, the pygmy chimpanzee. Jane Goodall was studying, Pan troglodytes, the traditional, quite large chimpanzee. And the bonobos are lovers, they’re not fighters. You know, there’s any kind of conflict in bonobo society, they have sex.
Any kind of conflict, they have sex. If anybody needs, wants to, you know, make an approach about grooming, they have sex. I mean, you know, they’re having sex constantly. Sex is the social grease in bonobo society. So you don’t have, females that don’t get together and help each other because they’re basically being beaten by, male chimpanzees as they are in Pantroglodytes.
That females are really, you know, they help each other in resource gathering and looking after the young and that sort of stuff. So bonobos are very, very different from, larger chimpanzees And they seem to be, showing cooperation and altruism, but most importantly, empathy with one another. And that is basically the ability to put yourself in someone else’s shoes and feel what they’re feeling. All of human interaction extent is based on empathy. Being able to imagine what your actions might mean for another person.
And so de Waal basically pioneered the scientific study of empathy because he went to psychology and said, well, what did the psychologists say about empathy? Well, the answer was nothing because empathy is an internal state that nobody can sort of parse apart, so nobody was looking at it. He literally had to pioneer the field. Okay? So as a result of that, we now have, a whole raft of studies in mice and rodents that have been showing really, really quite extraordinary things.
They’ve, you know, we now know that mice are, you know, if they’re in a cage with another mouse that’s in pain, that sensitizes them to pain. So they’re susceptible to emotional contagion like humans are. Emotional contagion is like when one baby starts crying, all babies start crying. They engage in calming behavior, what in humans would be called calming behavior. That is, a female mouse will position herself near a cage mate who is separated from her by a by by a cage that is in distress and will attempt to just be by it.
And it does seem to ameliorate the distress and they will stay there. But they will only do it to another cage mate to a cage mate, not a stranger, not an unfamiliar mouse. And they won’t do it to a male. They’ll only do it to females. And males don’t do it at all.
So it’s a gender specific kind of behavior. And most dramatically of all, in December, a lab at the University of Chicago, showed, rats. They had one rat in a Perspex box which constrains it and makes it like this. And this is like stress, stress, stress inducing for a rat or a mouse, being able to move. I think that it’s the perfect, model system for studying time pressure in humans, but that’s another story.
And so you have a mouse in a box like this. And you have another mouse that’s got a black spot on it so you can see the difference between the two mice coming in and sort of like going around the cage and you know, just, you know, sort of freaking out because this cage mate is in a box. And it takes him about five days to figure out how to free the mouse, the other rat. And once he knows how to free him, it happens pretty much really, really quickly. They’ll be put in the experimental situation again, free the mouse, they go and explore and do what they do.
And in fact, the trained rat will not free a stuffed rat in a box, only a cage mate in a box, and will preferentially free the cage mate in preference to chocolate. So there’s a chocolate reward here and there’s a cage mate in a box. And you’d think that if the rat was totally self interested, then they would go to the chocolate first, eat the chocolate first and then free the other rat, right? I mean that’s kind of you to, you know, like self maximizing thinking that an economist might, might, come up with. But no, basically the rat will free the rat, the caged rat, and then they’ll both have the chocolate.
So, does this tell us that by the way, you can see this on YouTube. There is a video of this on YouTube, Not the chocolate bit that’s mentioned by the scientist, but it’s worth watching. It’s really quite, amazing. And, a third person in this pantheon has been a a an ethologist and behavioral ecologist by the name of Marc Bekoff, whose work is primarily with wolves. And he has used, the phenomenon of childhood play amongst wolves as an example of how, the rules of the pack, which is like a kind of morality, their norms of behavior are inculcated during play.
And and he, he has done quite a lot to, promote the idea that because animals, especially mammals display cognition, emotion and, and some kind of a rule, ruled behavior that we could recognize as morality, that we should extend our compassion footprint to take account of their suffering and their interests in ways that we currently do not. So, with all of this effort, ethics been naturalized? Answer, no. Why? Because even if we can demonstrate that cooperation, empathy, and altruism are biological.
Whoops. Even if we can demonstrate that they’re widespread in nature, this knowledge still is not prescriptive. It doesn’t tell us what we ought to do in a given situation. We still need a moral framework. We still need a system of beliefs in order to channel our action, in order to guide our action.
Now there are multiple types of moral frameworks. And I’m not going to go into any detail on these. But I will just mention three things. Okay. And this is basically around purpose.
The purpose of the action. There are virtue ethics or normative ethics, things that tell you what you should do to maximize the good, whatever the good is. Now, hedonist thinks that that’s personal pleasure and happiness. A stoic has different ideas. Philippa Foot has different ideas about what virtue amounts to.
Duty ethics or deontological ethics are basically they were formulated in best by, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant. And that is you act you act in accordance with the maxim that if you would want this action to be universal law. You know, if this were, you know, if your action were made universal, would you would you want to live in that world? You know, could you justify that? And so the idea of duty, is it that’s a very difficult, kind of an ethics.
And the only thing that, Kant thinks is unassailably, universalizable is goodwill across all times and places and religions. And the third, which is probably the most important for, twentieth century, ethics is are is what’s called consequentialism. It’s where the consequences of the action are most important. Utilitarianism is a classic example of that. It’s probably the most influential example of that and that is maximizing the greatest good for the greatest number.
Now, utilitarianism has a lot of really not so nice implications like, and Peter Singer has basically done a very good job of running these out to their logical conclusion. And he’s very consistent in his views and, people who, you know, he says that basically if you’re looking at the greatest good for the greatest number, you shouldn’t be saving premature babies at, you know, 24, 26 because basically they’re going to cost the society a great deal of money. They’re going to have problems all the way through. So now, whenever he speaks, there are frequently people who were premature babies or had had had, irregularities at birth are saying, you know, Peter Singer wanted me dead. And that’s not so nice, but that is the logical extension of the utilitarian view.
Although he is an extraordinarily, principled man and one of the few, western human beings who is arguably atheist who who tithes. He’s he he gives 10% of his income to charities around the world. He thinks that he thinks that tithing is is the right thing to do. So he’s not just a logic chopper. He walks the talk.
Okay. So an example of a duty ethics, I think, would be the 10 Commandments. And we can put those in what’s my time? Can somebody tell me what time it is? Really?
Oh, good. Good, good, good, good, good. So in the 10 commandments, you have a set of abandon we’ll put this in Buddhist terms, abandonments and cultivations. Okay. Sorry.
Okay. So in the thou shalt nots, we have no other gods, no graven images or likenesses, no taking the Lord’s name in vain, no killing, no adultery, no stealing, no bearing false witness. Okay? And on the cultivation side, you have keeping the Sabbath day holy and honoring your father and your mother. Now, what you can see, I think, from this basic ethical framework is the exhortation for the preservation of a social order.
It is all of the things, the other gods, the graven images, the Lord’s name, the Sabbath, all of those things maintain the identity of the group. We are followers of Yahweh. And everything else, honoring your parents is making sure that you you you honor authority. You honor the people who gave you life, who taught you first, And killing, adultery, stealing, and bearing false witness are all things that have to be have to be prohibited if the group is going to function well. You can’t have people killing other people.
You can’t have people, you know, racing off each other’s spouses. You can’t have, you know, people stealing. You can’t have people, you know, you know, slagging off against their neighbor and, you know, in false ways. It’s far too it’s far too internalized internally destabilizing for the group. Does that do you following me on that?
Okay. And one of the great things of one of the great innovations of of Judaism, actually, was the formation of an identity as a nation. You know, there was a monotheist, you know, there was a monotheist, a pharaoh in Egypt, Akhenaten. But he didn’t he didn’t come up with an ethical framework. He didn’t come up with anything other than, you know, it’s the sun folk.
The Jews came up with not only a god, but a reason for a god, a way of living, and a sense of group identity that had practices, ethical practices that gave them an identity as a people. And there are some scholars who say, and I think it’s true, that the imputation of monotheism, I don’t want to say the invention of monotheism, I could die and I could be completely wrong. And if I meet Saint Peter’s, it’s like, sorry. I don’t think it’s right. But I don’t want to diss monotheism.
It was a hugely important modern innovation. Okay. Now, what sort of ethics are Buddhist ethics? I think a short answer to that is they’re clearly virtue ethics. They’re aimed at a form of the good, which is conceived as reducing the suffering of the self and reducing the suffering of others and eliminating the suffering of others.
We’ll say in the first instance, let’s we’re not going to talk about I’m not going to talk about enlightenment. I mean, I know nothing from enlightenment. You know, all I know is the struggle to, you know, to try and behave ethically in my everyday life. I’m hoping, you know, I’m I’m hoping I in in in some lifetime, I will achieve enlightenment. But but ethics are not what that is about.
They are the foundation for any other practice. But I’m not talking about enlightenment. I’m not talking about liberation in the first instance. I’m just talking about ethics as a human practice. Okay?
So that’s reducing the suffering of self and others. Okay? And it is quasi consequentialist because the motivation, the intended result is all important. The actual result is less so. If you are motivated to help, even if your actions go awry, they go against your intention, it is the intention to be of benefit.
It is the intention to behave ethically. It is the intention, not to harm that is most important. In consequentialism, read proper, it’s the result that counts. It’s the result that counts. Okay, so let’s take a look at the 10 non virtuous actions.
Okay. Okay. Okay. Famously, these are three of body, four of speech, and three of mind. And in the Noble Eightfold Path, Three three of the eight relate to ethics.
And that’s, right speech, action, and livelihood. Okay, but let’s concentrate on the 10 non virtuous actions. What you can see here, I mean, here you can see those might be for preserving social order. But they might not be also. Lying is a whole lot more difficult.
Refraining from lying is a whole lot more difficult than refraining from bearing false witness. That means non deceptive action, non deceptive speech, no deception of any kind, not just slagging off against a friend or a colleague or a neighbor. It’s a whole lot harder. Harsh speech, that is like telling a dog not to growl. Know?
Malicious speech and idle chatter, gossip. I mean, the grease of the world. Right? You know? I mean, and ill will, not even to think badly of someone, not even to wish someone ill, covetousness, wrong view, whole other category.
We won’t even we’ll just put that to one side because that covers a lot of different things. But you can see that these would be, if they were adopted, they would preserve social order pretty well. But you can see also that the intention of them is not social. It’s to undergo some kind of internal transformation. This is all happening within the mind of the person who is practicing ethics.
And, you know, these you know, what is right in right speech, right action, right livelihood is not piety. It’s not duty. It’s taming one’s mind. It’s doing no harm, and it’s being of benefit where possible. Now, taming one’s mind, you’re joking, right?
That’s not social order. That is a profoundly different type of ethics to the one, to a duty ethics. And it actually is one these, 10 non virtues, the ancient Greek philosophers, many of them would have recognized and followed as a spiritual practice, as a spiritual practice. So what becomes clear here is that you can cooperate and you can be altruistic you can be empathetic all you like, but what you have to do above everything else is restrain yourself. You have to act against your nature.
You have to act against your impulse. So you can have the capacity for cooperation, affection, empathy, all these things can be natural. And you can even follow rules to preserve social order. But it’s not the same as the capacity for well intentioned action. And that appears to be what the purpose of of Buddhist ethics in the first in the first instance, training the mind to act in a well intentioned fashion.
And why is that? Basically, you’re acting in a well intentioned fashion, you don’t have to look after your behavior, it takes care of itself. It’s not a distraction. You are not distracted by, oh my God, I did this in this situation, I did that in that situation, You did the best, your intention was clear, it was good, move on. You do the best, you know, and it keeps your general situation much cleaner and simpler.
I mean, doesn’t mean you’re not going to encounter difficult things and complex situations, but it keeps things a lot more on an even keel. And so can we, naturalize ethics? Absolutely not. But I think that I, you know, I for one, will wait for the next discovery out of, you know, animal studies to see how much like us they are. But I don’t think that we’re going to find an animal species that has a set of rules that makes the members of that species behave in a way that they cannot, I mean, could not conceivably act in a biological situation.
You don’t, you know, you maintain relationships because they basically maintain your sense of self harmony. You don’t prey on others in the group because somebody else going to, you know, call you to account. That’s not ethical behavior, that’s rule governed behavior. I think that ethics is something that has to come, that has to be internalized and acted from that. And I am, I have a lovely picture of Kensur Rinpoche here, but you can’t see it.
And I just wanted to respectfully thank, my teacher for leading me to, being able to think about these things at all. Thank you. Okay. Do I have time for questions? Questions?
Oh, good. All crystal clear. Nobody’s got a qualm, a nothing. Yep. What do mean by naturalize?
Naturalize, it has a very specific it’s a term of art in philosophy. And it means to draw on what is found in the natural sciences, like psychology, biology, etcetera, to provide a basis for ethics. And that’s it’s it’s that’s all it is. It’s basically look it’s it’s looking because if we haven’t got religion, all we’ve got is social custom. And social custom is variable across cultures and across places and across all kinds of things.
It’s even variable across, baboons. And if, just a quick word on that. There was a baboon troop that was living off a dump. I think it was in Kenya. And the hierarchy of this baboon troop was really, really well established.
You know, you have your alpha males, they basically get first pickings of everything. They monstered the, you know, the B level males and they monstered the females and all that sort of stuff. So there was a consignment of poisoned meat. It was meat that was really, really off. So all the alpha males got stuck into it and they all died.
And they were afraid the troop was going to fall apart. And ten years later, Stanford scientist, Robert Sapolsky, who’s done a lot of work on stress response, he went back and took a look and it was a matriarchy. The females had taken over and the females were really happy. They were, you know, they were everybody was pretty happy. And there was nobody, beating up on females and the males were, you know, weren’t wasting a lot of energy and dominance displays.
But all matriarchies aren’t beneficent in ancient Greece. Every spring they would take the harvest king out and rip him to pieces with their hands. So that was a matriarchy too. So I’m not saying that matriarchies are intrinsically good. But, but so if you haven’t got social if social custom is too fragile a basis for ethics, you have to find Now, all of philosophy east and west can be looked at in as a as a as a human search for a reliable foundation on which to base our practices and our knowledge.
And science is considered the most reliable source of universal propositions, possibly even the sole source. I don’t know if that’s I don’t think that’s true. But that’s the way. Yeah. That’s why you naturalize and that’s what naturalize means.
Yeah. Quite horrific. Yeah. They’re not studying ethics. They’re not studying ethics.
What they’re doing is they’re studying cooperation. They’re studying altruism. They’re studying empathy. You I mean, they do horrific things to animals. I mean, just horrific.
And one the things that Marc Bekoff’s work has been really instrumental and Jane Goodall’s work had been really instrumental in doing is getting scientists and universities to better understand the emotional capacities of their workhorses like mice and rodents. I mean, we really don’t use primates, for example, really aren’t used much anymore. You know, they, and rightly so. But the things we do to mice and rats is just insane, you know, it’s just, but we do find things out about human physiology because we can’t, experiment on humans, but more and more and more we don’t need them. We’re learning, you know, the more is known so that things can be done on computer simulation.
But it’s terrible. It’s horrible. It’s a holocaust every year. You know, it’s just, it’s incredible. Yep.
Anne? Oh, absolutely. Absolutely. Totally. Totally.
Did everybody hear that? Yeah. It is utilitarianism. Yeah. Yeah.
But the fact that we will help beached whales be freed means that we have compassion for animals. The fact that, you know, we now have, you know, you go into the supermarket and you’ve got multiple choices for free range and barn raised, you know, eggs from, free range and barn raised hens. Know, people are much more aware of what happens to pigs. People are much know, I mean, the live animal trade, has been basically gutted for ethical reasons. So we see Yeah.
And shows like what what what was it called? Kill it, it, cook it, eat it. You know, there was some kind of show on television that had something about people, you know, okay, you you’re know, going to see what it’s like to kill the thing that’s on your plate and what has to be done to it in order to come to your plate. I never watched and I’ve got the stomach for it. But, yeah.
Yeah, thanks. Anything else? Should we go ahead? Yeah? There are two, I have two responses come to mind.
I mentioned that in the twentieth century as a result of the naturalistic fallacy, Hume’s law basically. That twentieth century moral philosophy really went off on a sort of like, you know, everyone’s intuitions are different. You read analytic philosophy and they will give, you know, they will give an example of a thought experiment acting as though everybody in the world can imagine that scenario. I couldn’t imagine most of them, you know. Moral philosophy in the late twentieth century was almost entirely built analytical moral philosophy was almost entirely built on the trolley dilemma.
You know, it’s two tracks. Have you ever heard it? Oh, it’s ridiculous. I mean, because this is something that happens every day, right? You know, you’ve got a train, you’ve got two tracks and then they cross and you’ve got, how does this go?
Right. Okay. All right. A train is going along a track. It is going to hit five people unless you shove this fat person on on the waiting on the boarding onto the track and it’ll derail it’ll it’ll derail the train.
Do you push that person onto the track in order to save the five? And then it’s like, you know, five Nobel Prize winners, five children, five, you know, at what point would you be willing to do something horrific in order to, you know, what is morally blameless or, you know, blameless in this. So everybody’s intuitions are really, really different. So I don’t think there’s anything natural about what goes on inside the head, Number one. Number two, what was the second one?
Menopause, menopause, menopause. I think I’ve lost it. I’m sorry. Does that help at all? It’s like you because we assume that there is a nature of reality.
We will never know because we are single mind streams. We are single streams of moment after moment after moment after moment of mind. My mind will never merge with yours. You know, know, the Hindus basically say, you know, we’re all part of, you know, Brahman, you know, but the Buddhist don’t say that. And, so we can use language to describe what we experience, but it’s very, very fallible.
So trying to naturalize based on a natural experience, highly problematic, highly problematic. But we know we have states of mind and by analogy, we assume that others who are like us have states of mind. Now, you cannot defeat the brain in a vat, you know, the matrix kind of argument, you just can’t defeat it. Yes, this could be a computer simulation and, you know, we’re all just, you know, we’re all just projections of this and everybody else around you is a zombie and we’re basically on the Truman Show and everybody else is working on, you know, working toward the show and you’re by yourself. I mean, there are all kinds of scenarios that we can have, that’s one of the reasons why just what you get up to in your own head is really unreliable, which is why things like this and teachings and the examples of accomplished masters are so very important because our empirical experience of ourselves is really, really flawed.
Pictures do of of books that can be read. I have the the website, some search terms for that video for the rats freeing each other, that sort of stuff. I’ve got I’ve got all that on my computer too if you’re. Thanks for that. Mine’s getting up tough.
Oh, good. Good. Good.
Key terms in this teaching
- two extremes tha nyi (Tib)
- Eternalism, seeing things as having an intrinsic reality, and nihilism, seeing things as having no reality at all. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.