Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 99-minute teaching, Ilia S. Durovic offers a detailed philosophical commentary on emptiness and the nature of the self, grounded in Tibetan Buddhist scholastic debate. He begins by contrasting the futility of defeating external enemies (more always arise) with the permanent victory achieved by overcoming inner afflictions through wisdom realizing emptiness, drawing on Śāntideva’s metaphor of covering one’s feet with leather. He then systematically develops the view that the self is not established from its own side, examining how this differs across Buddhist philosophical schools—from Sautrāntika through Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka—and explaining why only the self’s mode of existence as mere nominal imputation avoids logical contradiction. The teaching includes extended Q&A on subtle points: whether emptiness is an implicative or nonimplicative negation, the relationship between function and conventional designation, and how uncontrived thought of definite emergence fits within classical typologies of mind. Addressed to serious practitioners with prior exposure to Tibetan scholastic philosophy.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 30082016Salam copy 2.mp3
UUID: 059e16c0-1135-41f4-9819-9376f09c37b2
Teacher: Ilia S. Durovic
Collection: Rinpoche's Story
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~4,782
As is said in instead of overcoming all one’s fold, one ought to cover one’s feet with leather. Then in this world of ours, there is potentially an infinite number of mundane enemies. And however many one is able to overcome, more will arise. However, Śāntideva adds, the enemies of the afflictions are different. Once overcome, they never arise again.
Now how is the enemy or how are the enemies of the afflictions overcome? They are overcome through the application of their antidote. And what is their antidote? None other than the wisdom of realizing emptiness. Therefore, we should strive at gaining a realization of emptiness.
It’s a very beautiful way of thinking actually because in the case of the foe or the enemy of the afflictions, once overcome, they never arise again. And this is the meaning of the term in Sanskrit translated by in Tibetan, the foe destroyer. The foes are totally destroyed. Whereas in the case of enemies as they are renowned to the world, then, however, many die, more will arise. And this is why it is said, the afflictions, which are afflictions, are abandoned by the eye of wisdom.
Here, the antidote to the afflictions is the wisdom realizing emptiness. And it is the antidote to the afflictions because its mode of apprehension is directly contradictory to the mode of apprehension of phenomena of the afflictions which are rooted in the ignorance grasping at a self. Now why is the mode of apprehension of the wisdom realizing emptiness directly opposite to the mode of apprehension of the ignorance grasping at a self? Because their objects of observation are directly opposite or contradictory. And this is why it is said the afflictions, which are afflictions, should be abandoned by the eye of wisdom.
Now here, as was explained, the root of the afflictions is the ignorance grasping at an I. And this eye is apprehended by ignorance as being established from its own side. So the key is to posit emptiness on the basis of the I. And once one has understood the mode of apprehension of the eye by ignorance, then the eyes not being established from its own side is a direct opposite of it of this. This is the object which is realized by wisdom.
So there is much to be analyzed from the wisdom aspect of the path. Whereas from the method side of the path, there’s actually very little to analyze. Instead, one should endeavor to generate one’s mind in the aspect of love, compassion, and so forth. Now regarding the method aspect of the path, initially, one should endeavor to understand dependent origination and to understand that phenomena are not established from their own side. Once that understanding dawns, it is quite straightforward to understand that phenomena are mere conceptual imputations.
Now when we say that all phenomena are empty, that is indeed true, but what matters is emptiness which is posited on the basis of the I. Therefore, the subject emptiness must be understood on the basis of the I. Now here, there are fundamentally different outlooks on the I. The non-Buddhist philosophers of ancient India, the Tīrthikas, considered that the I was permanent, one, and independent. In other words, permanent.
Whereas Buddhists consider that the eye is neither permanent nor one nor independent. In other words, fundamentally impermanent. There are excellent reasons for both of these viewpoints. So in brief, therefore, the non-Buddhist philosophers of India assert that the I or the ātman is permanent. The Buddhists, on the other hand, assert that the I is impermanent based on Buddhist scriptures and logic.
Now from the Buddhist standpoint, there are valid or correct and invalid or incorrect minds. And the mind which perceives the I as impermanent is a valid or correct mind. Now keep in mind that this debate occurs within the context of an acceptance of past and future lives. It is in that context that one can speak of an I or a self which is permanent, one, and independent. Otherwise, it makes no sense to have this discussion.
So I won’t cover the view of the non-Buddhist philosophers in detail. I would encourage you to listen carefully to teachings such as this one and not to remain in a blissful state of ignorance. Otherwise, you wish to fall asleep. So the mode of study of the Buddhist view is one involving repeated study. And in this respect, it is different from ordinary topics of education.
So the reason for which the I is impermanent is that it depends on the aggregates. It is posited in dependence on the basis of imputation which is which are the aggregates. It relies on the aggregates. And the aggregates themselves, the five aggregates are impermanent. There is a consensus about this.
Where doubts arise is the mode of dependence of the eye on the aggregates. So all of the schools of tenets from Sautrāntika to Svatāntrika Madhyamaka downwards consider that the person is both substantially and imputedly existent. This is a very delicate point. Now if we focus on the view of Cittamātra and Madhyamaka, then it is considered that the person is both imputedly and substantially existent.
When we say that the person is imputedly existent, this is best understood with an example. Let us take your translator, Ilya. Then when we observe the aggregates of Ilya, the mind observing the aggregates recognizes this as Ilya and imputes Ilya. It thinks this is Ilya on that basis. Or when we observe Chris, Hiro, or Jesper, then the mind which on the basis of the observed aggregates thinks this is Chris, this is Hero, this is Jumper, is the mind which imputes an existence on that basis.
All of the lowest schools of tenets, in other words, from Sautrāntika downwards as well as the non-Buddhist schools of tenets without exception, consider in addition that the person is substantially existent because they consider that under ultimate investigation, something can be found for the person. In other words, the person exists or is established from its own side, and what they posit as what can be found as the person under analytical investigation is consciousness. So here, when one refers to the mental consciousness as the instance of the person, this is obviously not something which can be apprehended through visually observing the form aggregate of the person. Then in addition, actually, are other characteristics of the person such as the autonomy of the person, but we shall set that aside. So in brief, the lowest schools of tenets consider that the instance of the person is a mental consciousness precisely because it is that which we feel deep within ourselves to be the eye.
So the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka view is fundamentally different. For Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, persons are only imputedly existent. And Prāsaṇgika’s understanding of imputed existence is different from that of the lower schools. It’s an understanding of imputed existence as mere normal and conceptual imputation. Then in this respect, we can say that the outlook on the person of Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka and of the lower schools is fundamentally different.
For Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, the person is only imputedly existent. For the lower schools of tenets from Sautrāntika Madhyamaka downwards, it is both imputedly and substantially existent. All phenomenon in addition to the person are either to one or the other. They are either established from their own side or they are not established from their own side. If they are established on their own side, then they are necessarily imputedly and substantially existent.
If they are not established on their own side, they are necessarily only imputedly existent. It’s rather good if you analyze yourself directly, isn’t it? It’s particularly nice when one examines one’s own self instead of always examining others. Then since there are only these two possibilities, there is no third possibility apart from these. If one were first to contemplate the situation in which the person is said to be established from its own side, what exactly does this mean?
This means that the person is findable within the aggregates under analysis. Then at this point, there is a large number of debates regarding the nature of this findability and what is found. But we can see under investigation that the person is not findable within the aggregates. And therefore, the opposite position, which is that the person is not established from its own side, The position is a position which on the one hand has more arguments in its favor and on the other hand harms reasoning less. So when the lowest schools of tenets assert that under conceptual investigation, what is found within the aggregates as an instance of the I is the mental consciousness, this is a position which is open to much criticism.
Keep in mind here that we are not saying that the mental consciousness is the person or that the person is the mental consciousness. This is actually false. What we are saying is that the mental consciousness and the person are of one nature but different different isolates. Then it is only through repeated analysis that we will eventually understand this difficult position according to which the eye is not established from its own side. The eye is unfindable within the aggregates.
So when Prasanika Madhyamaka asserts that the person is a mere nominal and conceptual imputation, and the basis of establishment, are the aggregates, What is being asserted is that the person does not exist from its own side. When we say the person does not exist from its own side, this entails that it is a mere conceptual imputation. So here, not being established from its own side, contrast being established from its own side. The eye not being established from its own side is the emptiness of the eye. And once we understand that the eye is not established from its own side, the doubt which might arise is afterward, does the eye exist?
The eye does exist. How does it exist? Its mode of existence is as a mere nominal and conceptual imputation. This is how it exists. So at this point, a major doubt which might arise is that after all, this emptiness is perhaps not a nonimplicative negation.
It might be an implicative negation because it seems to imply something. Now the difference between implicative and nonimplicative negations was covered a couple years ago here in Tenets. So this is one of the major doubts which arises at present when in dependence on this understanding that the eye is not established from its own side, one gives rise to an uncontrived thought of definite emergence. One will have entered the path of accumulation. And when this uncontrived thought of definite emergence becomes spontaneous, then one will have entered the path of preparation.
So one progresses from path to path in function of the deepening of one’s understanding of emptiness. And in the previous section, translated, it’s not definite emergence, which becomes spontaneous. It’s renunciation, a realization of emptiness. So one progresses, therefore, in terms of the deepening of one’s understanding of emptiness. Now at the level of the path of preparation, though one realizes emptiness without depending heavily on lines of reasoning as at the level of the path of accumulation, and therefore, one has a spontaneous realization of emptiness.
This realization is nonetheless conceptual. In other words, the mind realizing emptiness is blended with a meaning generality. As one becomes more and more familiar with this meditation, eventually, one perceives emptiness without relying on a meaning generality at the level of the path of seeing. Now at the level of the path of seeing, one abandons the abandonments of the path of seeing, and we shall not enter in detail in them here. Suffice it to say that one abandons the apprehension of phenomena as being established from their own side.
And in as much as this apprehension is rooted in reasons, it is said to be an imputed apprehension. In our own case, even though we pay lip service to phenomena not being established from their own side, When we investigate the way we understand the world, we can see that deep down, we are profoundly convinced that phenomena are established from their own side, and this is what is progressively abandoned during the path of seeing. And the emptiness of the eye at this point becomes the noble truth of cessation. So what do you think of this presentation of the truth of cessation? So you don’t have to answer.
I’m just casting this question at you. It is at this point that the very sensitive distinction between Prāsaṇgika and the lowest schools of tenets arise. Since for Prāsaṇgika, Madhyamaka, the noble truth of cessation is an emptiness. It is therefore an ultimate truth. Whereas for the lowest schools of tenets, the noble truth of cessation is a conventional truth.
Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka considers that the suchness or the thusness of the I becomes the truth of cessation. This is considered impossible in the lower schools of tenets. So you may have heard about this before then setting Cittamātra aside. Svatāntrika Madhyamaka considers also that the truth of cessation is a conventional phenomenon. For Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, at the level of the path of seeing, one abandons the afflictions of the path of seeing, and this cessation of the abandonments of the path of seeing becomes the noble truth of cessation.
Now here, one is in no way saying that the noble truth of cessation exists at present within our mind So the position of the lowest schools of tenets, specifically, Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, according to which the noble truth of cessation is a conventional truth is a terribly awkward one since it is extremely difficult to posit anything in that school which is a noble truth of cessation. All the instances posited present problems. On the other hand, the position according to which it is the noble truth, it is the thusness or the suchness of our mind which becomes the truth of cessation is a very elegant position. Now this issue of the nature of the noble truth of whether it is a conventional or an ultimate truth is a very difficult one. We will start talking quietly about it in the future.
There is a stanza in Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā in which it is said, that which is a dependent arising, that is emptiness. This stanza clearly implies that the dependent arising and emptiness are synonymous or have one meaning. This does not mean that they are one or identical, but they are synonymous. In other words, when one understands the dependent arising, one has understood emptiness. When one understands emptiness, one has understood the dependent arising.
So therefore, once one has understood emptiness, one has understood dependent arising. Once one has understood dependent arising, one has understood emptiness. Now in the case of the eye, once one has established that the eye is not existent from its own side, in other words, that it is empty of existing from its own side, the question which arises is does it exist? Naturally, does. But how does it exist?
It exists as a mere conceptual imputation out there. Its nonexistence from its own side, therefore, implies its existence as a mere conceptual imputation. And here, the following debate arises. It follows that the emptiness of the eye is not a nonimplicative negation because it is an implicative negation. It is an implicative negation because the sound uttering it implies another affirmation, the I’s being a mere conceptual imputation.
So this will be our topic of discussion today. So we have already covered nonimplicative and implicative negations in this class. As you remember, the definition The definition of a nonimplicative negation is a negation which after the sound which utters it has negated its object of negation does not imply another affirmation. Whereas the definition of an implicative negation is a negation which after the sound which utters it has negated its object of negation does imply another affirmation. So the example of an implicative negation is the case of the fat Devadatta who does not eat by day.
Then clearly, inasmuch as Devadatta is fat, if he doesn’t eat by day, it implies that he eats by night. So this is an implicative negation. The example of a nonimplicative negation is Brahmins who do not drink alcohol. So emptiness is a nonimplicative negation. But the question which arises is might it become or be an implicative negation.
That’s the doubt. So what is the emptiness of the eye? The example you should give is the eye not being established from its own side. Now, clearly, even though the eye is not established from its own side, the doubt that the eye might not exist cannot arise since after all the eye performs a lot of activities such as going, coming, and so forth. We do exist.
But then what is the mode of existence of the eye? The eye exists according to Prāsaṇgika as a mere conceptual imputation out there. Let us therefore meditate on the eyes not being established from its own side as the meaning of the emptiness of the eye and on this emptiness being either an affirmative excuse me, an implicative or a nonimplicative negation. Mhmm. K.
Please open the playbook, page one. We recite one, three, four, page five, number six, nine, or three, verse one and three.
Then please ask some questions. So I’m just wondering if the ears of the rat of a rabbit can perform the function of the ears of a rabbit. The ears of a rabbit. Ease of a rabbit can perform the function of the ears of a rabbit. Is it possible that the horns of the rabbit can perform the function of the ears of a rabbit?
Saying they’re both mental imputations out there. Horns of a rabbit. What do you give us an example of the horns of a rabbit in? So it’s a correct doubt, but you see in, it is not sufficient for something to be a mere conceptual imputation out there for it to be an existent. It must also be able to perform a function.
And the ears of a the horns of a rabbit are definitely a mere conceptual imputation out there, but they cannot perform a function. That’s the difference. What’s the reason why? Because they don’t exist. Okay.
Ralph I’ll toss the microphone back to Ralph. If I can continue the question further, it would seem to me as if nominal conceptual designations being what we see as conventional truth boils down to a popularity contest. And the reason I say this is as follows. Let’s say the object in front of Geshe la, which we will refer to as a table, I suddenly call a bed, and I turn it off on its its side and lie on the legs. Although it might be an uncomfortable bed, I can probably get away with it.
Now all of you might call me mad, but if I didn’t have a friend of mine come over and say, oh, yes. I agree with Ralph. It’s a bed, not a table. Then suddenly, we have a popularity contest as to what actually is the object. So Krishna said, this is my table, and you want to break my table and turn it into a bed.
And I said, no. No. He wants to put it on the floor and to sleep on it. It doesn’t become a bed. Because.
Who exactly is gonna look at it and say this is a bed? If if I say this and and I have a friend of mine, we both say it performs a function of a bed and suddenly it is. My my point is the following. Let’s say an arhat walks through the door. Who?
An arhat. Oh, and the arhat says, well, all phenomena without exception do not have characteristics from their own sides. We have not heard of Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka philosophy, and we say this person is a madman. So how can we tell the difference between an an arhat and a madman when the majority of people will argue that he is mad or she is mad? Let’s be gender normal specifically.
So that’s the point we’re trying to convey. So everything goes down to the performance or does it perform the function? And it it to me, that seems like a popularity contest as to whether one believes it performs the function or not. What you’re saying is very true. This is exactly what happened to Milarepa.
When Milarepa said, to Milarepa, the world is mad, but to the world, Milarepa is mad. So, basically, to continue answering your doubt, if we were to put this table on the ground and someone were to sleep on it, would it fulfill the function of a bed? Yes. It would. Would everyone who came in the room looked at that and looked at that table say, this is a bed?
No. They wouldn’t. The same thing is when I put my cup of tea in my hand, then my cup of tea rests on my hand. So my hand performs the function of a table. Would you say it’s a table?
It depends how many of my friends I have in the Oh, Okay. And I’m having trouble understanding a part of the explanation for how does the I exist. So it exists as a mere conceptual imputation. I don’t have a problem with that, but I don’t really get the bit about out there. Could Geshe la explain a bit more about that term out there?
So the term out there in a mere conceptual imputation out there in this direction really that counters the existence of things existing from over there. In other words, of things existing from their own side. I’m wanting to ask a question regarding nonimplicative negation and the implicative negation of this kind and loss. So the emptiness of the eye as a from its as nonexistent from its own side or doesn’t exist from its own side as a nonimplicative negation, it is being asserted on the basis that there is nothing that is being affirmed as I understand it. On the other hand, the doubt is that there is an affirmation that it is a mere nominal conceptual designation.
I prefer the latter, but Is there no the preference is for the former, is it? Why? Quick quick question. Why? I think why?
Because because we employ the word I and That’s not a good reason. In it well, it it is an it it amounts to an imputation onto something, and it’s the What’s an imputation on what? What is the imputation? On what? I have an I I make an I draw an inference as to what that eye constitutes, what what what is the mode of existence of that eye, And in as much as I’m employing it for a purpose, the purpose is satisfied by inferring an affirmation.
There’s a little bit of this. So it’s only a little bit of a point in your objection because the emptiness of the eye might perhaps imply the eye in some sense. So about Ralph’s doubt about majority vote vote and mental imputation, I wanted to ask you. So I want to ask both of you. So if I put my table down on the floor, you’re gonna sleep on it?
I want you to answer precisely. So If I put the table on the ground and someone lies down to sleep, are you going to sit to think that’s a bed or not? You know, it’s a bit Jesus. You’re not naturally. The the Hyundai.
I’m referring to these these mobile vehicles that tourists get on. They they drive around, and then it actually goes into
The water. Uh-huh. So my question is, is it a boat or is it a car? Now it becomes a little bit more subtle. One example, the table might have been poor, but the the idea behind it is is what I’m getting at is is where do you draw the definition?
Where is the the subtlety, the fuzziness between whether this vehicle was a car or a boat, for example? That circumstance, what we’re really creating is a metaphor, and the metaphor can translate from being a metaphor into being the designation, an appropriate designation. Okay. And, Susie? I’m talking about the rough question.
You know, the about he what he give an example is a course form. Right? But what what is the subtle form? You know, like, some some of us don’t know, you know, like, in Vietnam now, it’s a lot of monk. They come out and they they study really study Buddhism, So, obviously, in a case like that, the most important thing is study.
Right? Apart from study, there’s no way to to defend against that. Yeah. But the communism, they want to control the religion. And they that way, they they keep they ask the, you know, the ordinary military people go in there to be a monk and study hard, you know, to to control the Yeah.
Yeah. Okay. Another? I’m really interested to know Geshe la’s answer. Lam Rim sets out emptiness in accordance with the view as the object of meditation.
So how did Buddha know what he was meditating on before he realized emptiness? Before Buddha attained full enlightenment, it is through meditating on cyclic existence and the antidote to cyclic existence that he was able to progress along the grounds and paths. And principally on the uncommon Buddhist teaching of dependent origination. Can you actually explain why the link can link can try to get that emergence is a conviction without reason within the sevenfold division of awareness? Five fold, you mean.
Is it five fold? Yes. Five fold. Hello. So there’s no definiteness about where we put the mind of uncontrived definite emergence within the seven fold division of minds.
Then if we put it we we can put it within conviction. If we put it within conviction, probably it is a conviction which is without reason within the five ones. So what exactly is the uncontrived thoughts driving for liberation? It is a state of mind, which after after focusing on the faults of cyclic existence strives for liberation. But what sort of reason do we have to believe that liberation exists?
We do not have that many strong reasons. Because this uncontrived thought of definite emergence arises principally through focusing on the faults of samsaric existence and much less through focusing on liberation. Another? Yeah. Just following on from that, I thought that that there would be a reason, and that is based on the inadequacy or the faults of cyclic existence, which is therefore a rejection of those faults.
So if one if one is rejecting it, then one must be implying the opposite. That is the opposite of the faults. In other words, the qualities. And that to me would seem a good enough reason for to have conviction with reason rather than without reason. Then it doesn’t matter.
If you don’t want to accept that it is a reasonless conviction, why not? Then you can place it in any of the five convictions you wish. The convictions which are reasonless, the convictions which have an unascertained reason, the convictions which have an unestablished reason, the conviction which are opposite to reason, and so forth. But what matters is that if you investigate where to place the uncontrived mind of definite emergence within the sevenfold division of mind and awareness, I don’t think you can put it anywhere else but in conviction. 20?
Only one question now. Just to follow from Chris, what would be the relationship between conviction and faith? Would conviction be something which is built up from a foundation to the point where it just becomes completely solid, you know, like a a super? Or is it just another way to think? No.
There’s no relationship between conviction and faith. Conviction is an understanding, but it’s an understanding which is not yet a valid cognizer. It may not be fully grounded on a reason. Faith is not based on any reason whatsoever. Yes.
I must recognize that subdivision of conviction seems to have a relation with faith. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Thank you.
Stop here tonight. Thank you. Page nine. Is Ilya’s seminar coming on September 3rd?