45 min · 2,839 words · 18 April 1991
Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. This is a commentary on Candrakirti’s Entering the Middle Way explaining why a sprout is not truly existent, because it is not produced from self, from other, from both, or causelessly. It covers the four extremes of production, the schools associated with each, and why the seed and sprout are not the same entity. The talk ends as it turns to the faults that would follow if production from self existed.
File metadata (for organising)
Date: 1991-04-18
Duration: 45 min
UUID: 4a5b9d83-95eb-4bdc-b1ea-4b46c1271bfb
Words: 2,835
I must, for the sake of all sentient beings of myself, in order to lead them to complete happiness, achieve the state of Buddhahood. Once having achieved the level of Buddhahood, then I will be able to lead all sentient beings to a state of completely eliminated of their suffering and the complete in which they experience complete happiness. So we’ll cultivate the awakening heart for the next three minutes, thinking that in order to achieve this end I must listen to, reflect and meditate on the essence of the great vehicle, the meaning of emptiness, in order to be of the vast benefit to sentient beings. Quoting from a verse by Candrakīrti in his supplement and his Entering Into the Middle Way. We have been discussing the five reasons establishing non true existence, and now we’re explaining in detail the second of these five reasons, which is contained in this verse, stating that nothing whatsoever is produced from self, other, both, or causelessly.
If nothing is produced in any of these four ways, how can anything be truly existent? And we take as our subject a we take as a subject as sprout is not truly existent. And the reason which is presented is that it’s not produced in either of the it is not produced in in it is not produced in any of the four extremes of the modes of of modes of a production. It is not produced in any other four means of the modes of production. And this would be that the extreme of being produced from self, the extreme of other, both, or causelessly, and therefore a sprout is not truly existent.
So beginning with the first extreme of mode of production, that is the extreme of self in which, as said in Entering the Middle Way, that nothing is produced from self and the sprout is not produced from self. And the second extreme of mode of production, extreme mode of production is the extreme of being produced from other. Then the third extreme mode of production would be having taken both the extremes of self and other individually, then they’re refuted as to that they’re something is produced somehow by by means of both self and other. And the fourth extreme is modes of production would be to be produced from no cause, that would be causeless production. So we can determine from the reasons that the sprout is not produced from self, is not produced from others, not produced from both, and is not produced causelessly.
Because it’s not produced in any of these four ways, by means of that reason we can establish that the sprout is not truly existent. So we’re presenting four reasons and rely upon which we can come to a determination, that we should make use of reasoning in whatever determinations that we’re making whatsoever. We can’t make a determination on the basis of without reason. So therefore we’re making use of reasonings. So if we were to say that the flower is very good, taking that as an example, and how do we come to this determination?
What reasons can we use to support this determination, this conclusion? Well, we can go on to say, well, the color is very good, its shape, it has a very nice fragrance, and it’s very beautiful. And dependence upon these various reasons, then we can establish and come to the conclusion that it’s a very good flower, the flower is very good. And likewise, if we were considering another flower and we said this flower is not good, someone said this flower is not good, then how then, in dependence upon what, do we make that determination? We say, well because it doesn’t have a nice color, it doesn’t have a nice shape, it has a bad smell, it’s not pretty, and therefore can, in dependence upon those reasons, conclude that the flower is not a good flower.
So in both of these cases, whether it’s a good flower or not a good flower, we rely upon four different reasonings in order to come to some determination in order that we can say what we’re saying. In each of these cases we rely upon these reasonings and dependence upon that we can make a certain statement about the flower. So likewise, we’re going to take as the basis of our understanding a sprout. Entering the Middle Way speaks a great deal about sprouts. So it would be good to know what we mean by a sprout.
Sprout is something when you plant the seed in the field and you add water and fertilizer, etc, then you a plant grows. And when this pliancy is about a hand span high, then we call it a sprout or a sprout. So we want to come to some conclusion about this sprout. We want to conclude that it’s not naturally existent, that it’s not truly existent, we’re using the reasoning set forth by Nāgārjuna in making this determination. So we are trying to determine that the sprout is not truly existent.
And so the lower tenet schools ask the question, well, what reasons can you give for saying that the sprout is not truly existent? And we come to the determination that the sprout is not truly existent in dependence upon the fact that if the sprout were to be truly existent it would to be produced in either of the four ways of modes of production. It would either have to be produced from itself or produced from other. Well, me finish, okay? Produced from other, produced from both, or produced from causelessly.
If something is truly existent, it must be produced in either of these four ways, and since it is not produced in either of these four ways, it is not truly existent. Coming to a consciousness. Understood. Understood. So by produce we mean that which established, in dependence upon the aggregation of causes and conditions.
For example, we take a seed. When the seed exists, the sprout doesn’t exist. There’s no sprout when we have a seed. We take the seed which is the cause and we put it in the earth. We plant it.
These various factors of water, earth are the conditions. These two together, these causes and conditions, the seed, the water and earth together, coming together produce a result, an effect. So that is the sprout. So this is what we mean by production. Is that okay?
What would be a nontraditional sense? Like, being imputed by conception. Do you mean, like, that way? So, you know, two parents come together, they have a relationship. Out of it, a child is born, then that child is given a name, say for example, Tashi.
And dependent upon being given that name plus the birth of the child, then Tashi comes into existence. But here by production, we’re not talking about being produced in dependence upon being given names or being imputed. So we’re not referring to relying upon everything relies upon names, but now what we talk about production here is not relying upon names. We’re not talking about that way of being produced, relying upon names and conception. So that which is newly produced and dependent upon aggregation of causes and conditions, we say is — So, the entity which is newly established, in dependence upon the aggregation of cause and the condition, call that production.
That is the mode of production. That is what we mean by being produced. Something which is newly established and dependent upon an aggregation of causes and conditions is being produced. This is what we mean by production. So Nāgārjuna is trying to establish that the sprout is not truly existent, and the reason he gives to establish this, to come to this conclusion, to make this determination is that the sprout is not produced in either of the four ways of being produced — from itself, from other, from both self and others, or causelessly.
And if something is not produced in any of these four ways, it cannot be truly existent. And this is the reason he is giving to us, for us to come to the determination, you know, that this sprout is not truly existent. In order In order to come to an establishment of emptiness, we must seek a centrist position between the two extremes. And these two extremes are the one, a superimposition of nonexistent upon of an existent upon a nonexistent. That would be the case of eternalism, the view of eternalism.
And the second would be the extreme annihilationism, where what does in fact exist is deprecated to a point where it does not exist. And this would be the extreme of annihilationism. So the centrist position is between these two extremes, the extreme of annihilationism on the one hand and eternalism on the other. Yes. So so these all all four of these modes of production are represented four extreme views.
The first three, that is the production from self is eternalism, production from other is eternalism. Production from both self and other is eternalism. Causeless production is annihilationism. So if we were to ask, well, who in fact holds these various positions? Then with respect to the first position, that is production from self, Nāgārjuna sought to refute a specific non-Buddhist school which held the tenet of production from self.
And this was in Tibetan it’s called Granchen pa, and I think that’s translated as Samkhya. Samkhya, who held production from self. And then with respect to the those who held the the the position of production from other, And this was the Buddhist schools, the Great Exposition School, Sūtra School, the Middle Way School, the Mind Only School, and the Autonomy Middle Way School. These all held production from others. Then the there was then the And then the the school which held production from both self and others.
Then the school which held production from both self and others was the school of in Tibetan it’s called Jukpopa. I don’t know the Sanskrit, Jukpopa. And for example, they would in the case of a pot, that the pot is produced by a potter, someone who forms the pot. This was production from self and it was made from various substances whether it was gold or earth or clay, whatever, then this was considered other. Or in the case of a seed, that someone would have to make effort in planting the seed, and this was self, and that the earth and the water, etc, were other, that these things were produced from both self and other.
And then finally, the school which held the position of causeless production, this was Gangpopa. And they refuted the they did not accept the position of they did not accept the doctrine of karma. They said that things simply arose by themselves, that they arose from no particular cause. They accepted causeless production. So it is by means of refuting these four extremes of production, these four that we come to the position of the Consequentialist Middle Way school.
These four means that these extremes of production are assertions both of Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools. So Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti present extensive and varied reasons for refuting each of these possible modes of production, these four extremes of production. They refute with many types of reasonings, the possibility of production from self, then they go on and refute with various types of reasonings, the possibility of production from others, and then they refute production from both self and others, and then they refute causeless production. Then they establish that if something weren’t able to be produced, it must be produced in one of these four ways. Therefore, the fact that all four of these modes of production have been refuted, then nothing whatsoever can be truly existently produced.
And we are able to make this determination in dependence upon these reasoning set forth refuting these four extremes of production. So with respect to this first extreme of production, the extreme of production from self, which was held by the Tongchamba, and they assert that the sprout and the seed are of the same entity and the same nature, that the sprout exists at the same time as the seed. If one holds this position that the sprout and the seed are of the same entity, the same nature, and that the sprout exists at the time of the seed, then one is asserting production from self. But both Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti refute this possibility in stating that the sprout and the seed are not the same nature, they are not the same entity, and the sprout does not exist at the time of the seed. So if you were to think about this and were questioned, Does the sprout exist at the time of the seed?
What would you answer? Does the sprout exist at the time of seed? So if were to accept that the sprout and the seed were the same nature and that the sprout existed at the time of seed, then you would be asserting the production from self. So what do you think? Does this sprout exist at the time of the seed?
But if we were to question, well, the sprout and the seed the same nature? Same entity. Same nature. Same nature or same entity? Not just same.
Same nature or same entity? Same nature. So maybe you could ask what what do you mean by same nature? What do you mean by same entity? So the sense of being same entity and same nature are the same.
And what we mean by them are that other than the sprout other than the seed there’s no sprout, and other than the sprout there’s no seed. If two things are of the same entity, if there’s nothing, there’s no sprout which is other than the seed, and there’s no seed which is other than the sprout. For example, take this flower. In Tibetan language, flower is metok. So there’s no other there’s no other entity.
The metok is no other entity than the flower, and the flower is no other entity than the metok. They’re the same nature, they’re the same entity. There’s not a metok which is other than a flower, and there’s no flower which is other than a metok. Same entity, same nature. So just as in the case where the flower and the metok, we can’t posit something which is a metok and is not a flower, and we can’t posit something which is a flower and not a metok.
Likewise, if seed and the sprout were one entity, the same entity or same nature, we could not posit a seed which was not a sprout or a sprout which was not a seed. But we can easily understand that the seed and the flower are other than one another. We’re planting seeds in the field, there’s no sprouts at that time and no one would identify the seed as a sprout. On the other hand, once the crop has begun to grow, there’s a green shoot coming up, at that time there’s no seed and we can identify that object as a sprout. And therefore we can differentiate them, identify them as being different entities or having different natures.
So they have the seed and the sprout have distinct identities and therefore do not have the same nature. In the case of the flower and the metok, we cannot distinguish between, well this is a flower and it’s not a metok, or this is a metok and it’s not a flower. We cannot make that distinction as to an entity, that they’re different entities. In fact, they’re the same entity. But in the case of the flower, the sprout and the seed, we can make that distinguishment.
We can identify them individually as distinct, and therefore they are not the same entity. So we can go on to refute that the sprout and the seed are the same entities, since their identities can be distinguished as distinct from one another, and additionally that the sprout does not exist at the time of the seed. So Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti use the reasoning that the seed and the sprout are not the same entity and that the sprout does not exist at the time of the seed in order to refute production from self. So merely what we’ve said thus far does not constitute a proof. We have to specify what faults would accrue if the production from self did in fact exist.
What faults would accrue? What faults would there be? So if we were to ask just in general, is there any purpose? Is there any meaning? Is there any point for a plant to arise from a seed?
And we would say, well of course, because once a plant, once a sprout
Key terms in this teaching
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- Mahayana teg chen (Tib)
- Literally, Great Vehicle. It is one of the two general divisions of Buddhism. LYWA
- Samkhya drang chen pa (Tib)
- Early non-Buddhist philosophical school; the so-called "enumerators," because they advocate a definite enumeration of the causes that produce existents. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- true existence den par yö pa (Tib)
- The concrete, real existence from its own side that everything appears to possess; in fact, both self and phenomena are empty of true existence. LYWA
- two extremes tha nyi (Tib)
- Eternalism, seeing things as having an intrinsic reality, and nihilism, seeing things as having no reality at all. LYWA
- Vaibhashika jedrag mawa (Tib)
- The Great Exposition school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Great Exposition school asserts truly established external objects but does not assert self-knowers. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.