Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 63-minute teaching, Kyabje Rinpoche examines Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika’s assertion that all phenomena, including the self or “I,” are mere conceptual imputations. Working from Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen’s tenets, he analyzes how this understanding of the I differs fundamentally from lower Buddhist schools, which identify it with mental consciousness. Using concrete examples—observing another person taking notes, moments of internal self-doubt—he shows how the I arises as a spontaneous conceptual imputation rather than an object found within body or mind. He contrasts this with non-Buddhist and lower schools of philosophy, then invites students to examine the view through their own meditation and offers guidance through their questions. Suited to practitioners studying Buddhist philosophy.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2015-09-22 – KR.mp3
UUID: 7c3fb806-500e-4658-8983-1e71f52bee36
Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche
Collection: Emptiness
Date: 2015-09-22
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~2,517
So within Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen’s presentation of tenets, the presentation of Prāsaṇgika view is subdivided into two. The first is definition of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika and the second is the mode of assertions of Prāsaṇgika. The mode of assertions are themselves subdivided into four sections. The first is the base, the two truths. Excuse me, the base, the view.
The second is the two truths. The third is the presentation of the path and the fourth, presentation of the result. So we have already covered the definition of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. It is on page 30 of Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen’s tenets. But for the sake of convenience, I’ll give a shorter definition.
Prāsaṇgika Madhyamikas who assert that all phenomena without exception are not established from their own side. So the first subdivision of the mode of assertion of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika is as was said the basis, the view which is to be ascertained. The basis, the view which is to be ascertained refers here alternatively to either to the subtle interdependence or to emptiness. In other words, it can either refer to the relationship leading from subtle impermanence to emptiness or alternatively to the relationship leading from emptiness to subtle interdependence. So regarding this first subdivision, the basis, the mode of ascertaining the view in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, there is no difference in whether one passes from the presentation of subtle interdependence to emptiness or alternatively from the presentation of emptiness to subtle interdependence.
These two are synonymous. The only difference between them is one of name. So if we take the case of passing from subtle interdependence to emptiness, let us take the case of one of the most important phenomena to be considered, the I. Whether we are referring to one’s own I or to the I of another, the reasonings are the same. By one’s own I, we mean the I within one’s own continuum.
By the I of another, we mean the I in the continuum of another. So regarding the I in Tibetan, in English, I, it is obvious that it does exist. This is based on personal experience. The question is the mode of existence of the I and we have to endeavor to understand its mode of existence through experience. Now generally speaking regarding other phenomena such as the table in front of Geshe-la, houses, books or for that matter, the five sensory consciousnesses, we understand through direct experience their existence.
The issue arises as far as the I is concerned. So in English for instance, when you say I or when you write I, others pay attention to what you say. This is a sign of the importance of the I but what is critical for us is to ascertain the mode of existence of this I. So in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, it is asserted that all phenomena without exception are mere conceptual imputations. Now if we take the case of the eye, it is clear that once we are able to posit the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika view on one base, in this case the I, we can extend it from this base to all phenomena.
So the first step is to get a clear understanding of the existence of the I. Not just an understanding but an ascertainment by means of a valid cognizer which makes it extremely stable and solid. So when we refer to one’s own I and the I of another, in other words, the I within our own continuum and the I within the continuum of another, It is critical for us to be able to link these two I’s and this is something we have to do based on analysis and experience. The Prasangika view is an extraordinarily clear view. Actually, if one sets oneself from the standpoint of Prāsaṇgika and one observes the views of the lower schools of tenets, one has a sense of dissatisfaction.
The views seem unnatural. They seem contrived. This is not the case of the Prāsaṇgika view. Now this is an understanding which it is not easy to get. So if we analyze carefully the notion of the I of another, the I within the continuum of another from the standpoint of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, Then we can see that this I is none other than a person and if we take for instance my own case when I am teaching here and you attend the teachings, you will naturally have a moment of doubt.
Is teaching tenets or not? And the moment you think is Geshe-la teaching tenets or not, what is the person, the I in the continuum of another you refer to? It is Geshe-la. Likewise for your translator, if you think is Ilya translating this teaching or not, the moment you think is Ilya translating that I in the continuum of another you refer to is the name Ilya. So here I wish you to have a spontaneous conceptual understanding and this is the best type of conceptual understanding.
Now when we speak of spontaneous minds, there are various types of spontaneity but the spontaneity which is the best to hear is that one. For instance, right now, I am thinking Tenzin Lhamo is taking notes. She’s taking notes very fast. Then that conception Tenzin Lhamo is taking notes very fast induces the notion of an I in the continuum of another, in this case Tenzin Lhamo So for instance, if we take the case of Tenzin Lhamo taking notes or writing, when I observe this, I think using Tenzin Lhamo’s hand which is writing as a basis of imputation and imputing Tenzin Lhamo on the observed entity, Tenzin Lhamo is taking notes. Now this is a conception within my own mind stream.
And therefore, regarding the I within the continuum of another, there is a conception which imputes this I within our own continuum and there is a conception which imputes this I within the continuum of another. Now in the case of our own eye, the eye within our own continuum, this is an I with which we have great experience. Now, regarding the I within one’s own continuum, the conceptuality which imputes this I is present only within one’s own continuum. But the question which arises is what is the mode of imputation by which this conceptuality within our own continuum imputes our I? So it is self evident that our I exists.
This is something which has already been decided. It is not an issue. What is an issue is its mode of existence. This is what calls for analysis and a seeking for the source of this I. It is beyond doubt that all of us have a natural innate sense that there exists an I deep within our aggregates.
And this eye is identified by all the schools of tenets from Svatāntrika Mādhyamika downwards with the mental consciousness. So since in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika to the difference of the other schools, the I is a mere conceptual imputation. The question which arises is how it is imputed by conceptuality. And if we take a simple example, someone attending these teachings on tenets and asking himself or herself mentally the question, have I understood after listening these teachings? Then at that point when they ask themselves mentally, have I understood?
That I which occurs within the thought process is actually within the conception linked to the I of the person. Now clearly, when we ask ourselves have I understood correctly, this induces a sensation. For some it may be a sensation of happiness and comfort, for others it may be a sensation of hardship and difficulty as they have to strive to understand. These sensations are intimately bound with the experience of the I. In other presentations, one uses the example of accusing someone falsely of having stolen something and saying to that person, you thief, you have stolen this.
And at that point, the innocent person has a very strong reaction and says, I, I have stolen nothing. Now this experience of I at that point is what we are talking about. Some of you may understand this, quite a few I suspect do not but what I would suggest is when you go outside that you observe your own mind and try to gain experience of how the I arises. When we assert in Prāsaṇgika that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations, the mere eliminates phenomena existing from their own side. And therefore, once we have understood that let us say the I is a mere conceptual imputation, this is totally incompatible with the I being found within the aggregates.
If this was compatible with the I being found within the aggregates, we would end up with two different I’s. Not just one. There’s one. There aren’t many eyes. There’s only one.
There aren’t two eyes. When we assert that the eye is a mere conceptual imputation, the term mere here excludes the I being found within the aggregates which are its basis of imputation and actually excludes the I being established from its own side. The term mere indicates that the I is only a conceptual imputation. In brief, within one’s own continuum, once one has established existence dependent on mere conceptuality, existence dependent on conceptuality alone, in other words, existence dependent on spontaneous conceptuality, one has countered existence from its own side. This is why Je Tsongkhapa in his The Essence of Eloquence Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive says the non-Buddhist philosophers, this refers to the philosophers of ancient India, do not accept that the I is any of the parts of the body such as for instance, the head, the limbs and so forth.
And developing on this understanding that at the time of death when the body is cast into flames, neither the head nor the limbs nor any part of the body passes on. These non-Buddhist philosophers since they accept the existence of future lives are forced to accept the existence of an ātman. And therefore the the non-Buddhist philosophers accept the existence of a self which is permanent, one and independent. The lower Buddhist schools of tenets, in other words the schools of tenets beneath Prasanika, Mādhyamika do not accept the existence of such a permanent one and independent self but they do accept the existence of an I which can be found within the aggregates and this I which can be found within the aggregates, they identify with the mental consciousness. It is only Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika for which the I is a mere conceptual imputation.
And therefore, from Svatāntrika Mādhyamika downwards, this is how the spontaneous or innate mind imputes an I on the mental consciousness. Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen, Je Tsongkhapa in his commentary on Candrakīrti’s commentary on Āryadeva’s Four Hundred Verses says this is not the understanding in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. In Prasanika Mādhyamika, both the accumulator of karma and the experience of the fruition of karma. In other words, the one who experiences pleasant or unpleasant sensations are said to be mere conceptual imputations out there. Therefore, once one understands the Prāsaṇgika view according to which all phenomena and the I specifically are mere conceptual imputations, in other words exist as conceptual imputations, in other words exist in dependence on conceptuality alone.
At this point, one will have countered the view that the I can be found within the aggregates. In other words, that the I is established from its own side. It is not the case that this is automatic, this calls for effort. It is through reflection on interdependence that the view of emptiness arises. Otherwise, one would immediately have realized emptiness.
Now, for all of the schools of Buddhist tenets from Svatāntrika Mādhyamika downwards, there is no relationship whatsoever between the I and conceptuality. In other words, when we have experiences such as I am happy, I am comfortable or I am miserable, I am in pain. For these lower schools of tenets, this is unrelated to conceptual imputation. Now if we analyze their views carefully, these are very odd views. Now in the context of generating the motivation or meditation during a couple seconds, let us reflect on whether in addition to the I being a conceptual imputation, there is as the lower schools of tenets say something else from the side of the I or not.
And this is something we should not decide dogmatically but we should investigate and analyze. Then while you are meditating, reflect on the fact that the I which is meditating, the sense of I am meditating is something which arises naturally, which is uncontrived and this is present spontaneously. How this is related to conceptuality is for you to examine. I’m not saying you have to accept the Prasanika view. It is perfectly all right to accept any of the lower views such as Svatāntrika Mādhyamika or if you prefer you can be Vaibhāṣikas or Sautrantikas but you should examine by yourself for the view you are most comfortable with.
So let us meditate you in a couple of seconds. I will take at present only two questions, two short clear questions. Thanks, Geshe-la. The significance of out there in the definition of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, one who asserts that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations, why add out there? I mean, that’s an important distinction that’s being made.
I’m just wondering what is that distinction, please? The term out there in phenomena are mere conceptual imputations out there if it is well understood eliminates the idea of phenomena existing from their own side. Another question. Quick, quick. My question is in regards to Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen’s tenets.
It’s on page 33 of the Tibetan. It talks about direct valid cognition and saying that an instance of non-conceptual direct valid cognition is the sense direct cognition apprehending form. I was just wondering if Geshe-la could clarify that because I that seems to be odd with the rest of Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen’s presentation. Where is it in the English translation? It’s I’ve got a slightly different page numbering, but it’s probably page 33.
It’s just above page 34 in the An instance of the second. No. It’s a sense direct cognition apprehending form. This is the first. And this is the second is the yogic direct cognition.
Is it that you don’t understand what is what it is an example of? Sorry, no, I don’t understand why it’s the sense cognition apprehending form is said to be non conceptual. So the prasanika system is a little bit different. We’ll talk about it later. Just one question.
So the topic of discussion will be understanding that according to Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, the I is a mere conceptual imputation. How does this eliminate the view that the basis of imputation of the I is established from its own side? So this must be based on a good experiential understanding of what the I is and then an analysis of the mode of existence of the I. By groups of two please, different than last time.
Key terms in this teaching
- atman dag (Tib)
- Self; as opposed to anatman (no-self), the Buddha’s explanation of selflessness in the Four Noble Truths Sutra. LYWA
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- two truths den pa nyi (Tib)
- The two ways of relating to phenomena, as conventional or all-obscuring truth, the truth to a worldly mind, and ultimate truth, the truth to a mind engaged in ultimate analysis. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.