Emptiness — 2013-03-31

Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. Kyabje Rinpoche opens this 100-minute teaching with humor about atoms and a playful promise: he’ll explain Buddhist philosophical tenets using Easter eggs. He systematically compares four schools—Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, and Mādhyamika—moving from materialism to increasingly subtle views. Using water perceived differently by hungry ghosts (blood and pus), gods (nectar), and humans, he illustrates how consciousness shapes perception through karma. He then examines Mādhyamika philosophy, showing how objects exist as nominal designations without inherent existence—a subtlety explored through careful analysis of a table and its parts, with care to avoid nihilism. Direct dialogue with practitioners working through the logical puzzles accompanies the teaching. Rinpoche concludes by showing how Je Tsongkhapa arrived at the most refined Mādhyamika understanding. Aimed at practitioners already engaged with Buddhist philosophical study.

File metadata (for organising)

File: 2013-03-31 – KR.mp3

Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche

Collection: Tenets

Date: 2031-03-13

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~5,484

So obviously, my explanation of the atomism of the Vaibhāṣikas has had a major impact on you. I see little Vaibhāṣika atoms on my table. Clearly, you weren’t quite convinced by Geshe-la’s explanation that his mug was constitutive of atoms, and you provided him with the building blocks, he hopes, of a new mug. So from now on, I will explain the Mādhyamika and Cittamātra view on the basis of Easter eggs. And hint hint, the view might be elaborate, but the egg is really small.

And therefore, the Chitamatras counter forcefully the view of the two lower schools, the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrantikas, which assert the existence of exterior forms, exterior matter, and say that the nonexistence of exterior forms is the subtle selflessness of phenomena. For these two lower schools of tenets, the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika, an object such as that little Easter egg exists independently of the valid cognizer perceiving it and actually that object and the valid cognizer, the Pramāna perceiving it are of different natures. However, according to the Cittamātra or Mind Only School, this egg actually appears as a result of previous karmic imprints deposited in the or set in the mind-basis-of-all. And when these imprints mature, the eye consciousness which perceives the egg appears and the appearance factor of that eye consciousness is the egg. Therefore, that appearance factor and the eye consciousness perceiving it are of one substance.

There is no egg apart from this. While all of the phenomena which we perceive are of the nature of the consciousnesses which perceive them. They are not consciousness. They are not those consciousnesses. It’s akin to the example of seeing one’s own reflection in a mirror.

When we see our own reflection in a mirror, that reflection is at of our face, is not actually our face, but we recognize that reflection as our face. For instance, if three beings, a god, a human being, and a hungry ghost were to perceive that self same glass of water, they would perceive it differently in keeping with their karmic imprints in accordance with type. A preta would see this glass of water in keeping with his or her previous karmic imprints as filled with blood and pus. And this would be established by a valid cognizer of that preta for that preta. He could actually enjoy the blood or experience the blood and pus.

A god or a deity seeing this glass would see it as filled with nectar in keeping with his or her own previous karmic imprints. This will be established by his or her eye consciousness and he would be able to experience it. Then human beings would see this glass as filled with water. This would be established by a human valid cognizer for a human being, and we could drink the water. This appearance of water, of blood and pus, or of nectar is contingent on the appearance factor of the eye consciousness which perceives it in a given category of being, which can be a human being, a preta or a god, and this depends on past karmic imprints.

For that matter, even among human beings, we can see that some looking at an object will see that object as attractive and pleasing to the eyes, and the others looking at exactly the same object will see it as unattractive and ugly. It is clear that this is due to karmic predispositions affecting the eye consciousness. Then if it was a case that the object from its own side was pleasing or unpleasing, there would be a consensus regarding this from the side of all observers of the object. Geshe-la suspects that this is quite rare and instead some will find an object pleasing and others unpleasing in function of their karmic imprints. The Cittamātra or the mind only school asserts that forms such as this egg are the mere factor of appearance of the eye consciousness perceiving it and therefore that this egg as a mere factor of appearance of the eye consciousness perceiving it is of one nature with an eye consciousness.

And the Cittamātra school therefore asserts that the eye consciousness perceiving the color blue and the color blue arise from the same karmic imprint. They are therefore both simultaneous and in addition of the same nature unlike the assertion in the Vaibhāṣika or Sautrāntika school which says that they are subsequent and of different natures. And therefore the Chitamatras assert that the subtle selflessness of phenomena is the emptiness or the absence of a difference of nature between subject and object. Even though the Chitamatras assert that forms and the phenomena observed are of one nature with the mind observing them, nonetheless, they assert that forms are truly established. The Mind Only or the Cittamātra view asserts that forms are truly established because even though this egg is actually of one nature, should I say the color and the shape of this egg are of one nature with the eye consciousness perceiving them, nonetheless, this egg’s capacity to bear the name form, object in other words, does not depend on the eye consciousness perceiving it. To take the example of Geshe-la’s table, that table has the capacity to bear a nominal designation as table which is independent of a conceptual mind affixing table to it or an eye consciousness perceiving it.

This is what is meant by the true existence of table in the Cittamātra tradition. And therefore, for the Cittamātra School, all composite phenomena and all emptinesses are truly established. Now the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika refute this true existence. There are two divisions you can see in your charts of Mādhyamika between Svatāntrika Mādhyamika and Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. However, the Svatāntrika Madhyamikas deviated somewhat from the thought of Ārya Nāgārjuna, whereas the pure presentation of Aryanagarjuna’s thought can be found in the Prāsaṇgika School whose foremost exponent is Ārya Candrakīrti.

As was prophesied four hundred years after the passing of Buddha Śākyamūni, Ārya Nāgārjuna will come into this world. And Ārya Nāgārjuna was prophesied to interpret faultlessly the intent of Buddha Śākyamūni in the perfection of wisdom sutras. Clearly explained in accordance with the perfection of wisdom or the Prajñāpāramitā Sutras that phenomena are neither ultimately established nor truly established. He did not, however, clearly assert that phenomena are not established by their own characteristics. Āryadeva, who was Nāgārjuna’s follower, developed Nāgārjuna’s thought but once again did not use the technical terms such as noninherent existence or nonexistence by its own nature.

The follower of Āryadeva was Buddhapālita who for the very first time can be said to have founded the Prāsaṇgika School. In that, he used specifically the technical terms which had been implicit in Nāgārjuna’s thought such as non inherent existence, non existence by its own nature, and so forth. After Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka appeared. Bhāvaviveka, who, following Nāgārjuna’s thought, nonetheless, disagreed with Buddhapālita and said that phenomena were established by their own characteristics and they were established by their own nature. Bhāvaviveka, although relying on Nāgārjuna’s works, disagreed strongly with Buddhapālita’s interpretation and countered his analysis powerfully.

Established the Mādhyamika lines of reasoning through relying on what are known as autonomous syllogisms, whereas Buddhapālita considered this was unnecessary and relied on consequences. After Bhāvaviveka, Candrakīrti in turn appeared. Candrakīrti was an exceptionally skilled scholar who, after analyzing carefully Nāgārjuna’s thought, asserted that Buddhapālita’s interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s thought relying on consequences, which gave rise to the Prāsaṇgika school was in keeping with Nāgārjuna’s thought, whereas Bhāvaviveka’s interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s thought relying on autonomous syllogisms, or Svatantra, which gave rise to the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika school, was not in keeping with Nāgārjuna’s thought, and he demonstrated this through numerous lines of reasoning in his major work, the Prasannapadā, a commentary on the root verses on Mādhyamika. Even though Bhāvaviveka countered forcefully Buddhapālita’s position, there has not been found a rejoinder of Buddhapālita to Bhāvaviveka. We do not know exactly why.

Then there is a tradition of explanation of this, which relies on the caste system of ancient India. Buddhapālita was of the Brahmin caste, whereas Bhāvaviveka was of the Kshatriya or the warrior caste. And it was because of this caste difference that it was felt inappropriate for Buddhapālita to compose a rejoinder to Bhāvaviveka. And it is said that Buddhapālita took the oath to answer to Bhāvaviveka when he was reborn later on in the Kshatriya class, the warrior caste. And he was reborn as Candrakīrti in the Kshatriya caste and then demolished Bhāvaviveka.

Then although this tradition of interpretation exists, Geshe-la cannot say whether it’s a case or not. However, Candrakīrti was really of the warrior or soldier caste. Geshe-la must say that that looks quite similar to this tradition. Then the Prāsaṇgika tradition counters the Cittamātra assertion that phenomena as apparently and fairly established phenomena are truly established and it posits a subtle selflessness of phenomena. Then in Bhāvaviveka’s Svatāntrika Mādhyamika tradition, it is asserted that phenomena arise at the intersection of, on the one hand, the characteristics of the basis of imputation and on the other hand, the imputing mind, both necessary.

To understand the distinctions between the Svatāntrika and the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika view, one must clearly understand the distinctions between three actors, the basis of imputation, the imputer and the imputed phenomenon. If we take the example of Geshe-la’s table, the parts of the table such as the table’s feet, the table’s top and so forth are the basis of imputation of the table. The term table is the imputed phenomenon. The mental and sensory consciousnesses which impute table are the imputer. The Cittamātra assert that the imputed phenomenon, the table exists within the basis of imputation and is not contingent on the imputing consciousness.

However, the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika counter this view and say that it is dependent on both the basis of imputation of the table, in other words, the parts of the table, and on the imputing consciousness that the imputation of the term table is possible. In this way, they refute the idea that things are truly established. And this lack of true existence of forms is what is known in the Svatāntrika tradition as subtle the subtle selflessness of phenomena. Therefore, in comparison with the Cittamātra view, the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika view is more subtle. Then the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika assert that their view cannot be refuted by any other view.

Unfortunately, the Cittamātra say exactly the same thing regarding their view. And therefore, for ourselves, we actually have to determine by ourselves which view is in accordance with reality. However, before doing this, we must initially understand the positions of the various systems of tenets. Otherwise, when the Chitamatras and the Madhyamikas present their understanding of form, we will be unable to posit a difference between them. And we risk to think that whichever viewpoint presents forms as more beautiful as the one we want to adopt.

That’s not the way to do it. Even though the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika come to refute the fact that phenomena are truly established, they nonetheless accept that phenomena are established by their own characteristics and that they are established from their own side. The Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, however, assert that not only are phenomena not truly established, but they also are noninherently established and not established by their own characteristics. Then for us to understand exactly what is meant by phenomenas not being inherently established and not being established by their own side is very difficult unless we analyze carefully. What is meant by this is that even though the basis of imputation of table is that on which the imputation table is imputed, Nonetheless, tableness does not reside within the basis of imputation of table and is not of the nature of the basis of imputation.

So the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika assert that if we observe the basis of imputation of table, which are parts of table, then we can see that table actually exists dependent on these bases of imputation. The Prāsaṇgika on the other hand assert that while there exists an imputation of table on the basis of basis of imputation of table which are the components of table, There is no table from the standpoint of the basis of imputation nor is there a table from the standpoint of the characteristics of the basis of imputation. Then I would like to ask you from your own perspective, is there such a thing as table within the basis of imputation of table or not? What is your private opinion on the topic? So check your own minds.

Does it seem to you that there is a table from the standpoint of the basis of imputation, the parts of the table or does it seem to you that there is not a table from the standpoint of the basis of imputation, the parts of table? How is it? And if you say there isn’t, then you are in keeping with the Prāsaṇgika view. However, please be careful. Don’t say that because you think the Prāsaṇgika view is the best.

Check your own minds. It seems that the there is nothing in the basis of imputation. But when I keep going down and drilling down into it, in order to avoid nihilism, I have to, in my mind, introduce something else like a dependent origination or interdependentness? Is this I think there isn’t table on the basis of imputation because if I take apart that leg from that leg from that if I take it apart, there is no tableness within the parts. So is that a good way of coming not a good way, is that a valid way of coming to understand that it is that it has parts and therefore doesn’t exist on the basis of the imputation?

Reese. Okay, Reese. So the oh, that’s. So when I analyze, I can’t find a table, but it still appears from its own side as if it as if it is inherently there even though when I analyze, I can’t find it. It is exactly as Chris, the director says, indeed under analysis, it seems that the table does not exist within the basis of imputation of table, therefore does not exist from its own side.

And yet the table appears to exist from the side of the basis of imputation to our minds. This appearance is due to the innate apprehension of a self of phenomena, innate self grasping. Then what Safo says is also quite correct clearly. That is how one should think. If table did exist within the basis of imputation of table, then when we discard the parts of table, the legs, the base, the top, we should find table within one of those parts.

Then the table is not the base. It is not the legs. It is not the top. Should we say that the table is the collection of all of these? Then if we were to pile all of these items in a haphazard keep in a corner, we would still not say it’s a table.

So it is not the collection either. Then Lilly’s answer is a very profound answer. Indeed, it is most dangerous to fall into the extreme of nihilism and when we analyze the table under ultimate analysis, nothing is found. Nonetheless, the table can function as a table to support the glass and so forth and this capacity of the table to function as a table is the mere existence of table as a designation or as a noun. This is what enables the table to function in this way.

Could it be that in another Then that is indeed very possible. Generally speaking, the basis of imputation and the imputed phenomenon table share a very close connection since it is on the basis of imputation that we can actually place things such as Geshe-la’s glass, the Easter eggs, and so forth. If we take the example of Geshe-la’s hand, Geshe-la’s hand is not Geshe-la himself. We would all acknowledge it. However, when we observe Geshe-la’s hand, we think this is Geshe-la’s.

Likewise, we would not say that Geshe-la’s head is Geshe-la. Nonetheless, if Geshe-la’s head was hit by a stone, we would say Geshe-la has been hurt. This is because we impute Geshe-la on the collection of the bodily parts of Geshe-la. We impute Geshe-la on the collection of the parts ranging from the top of Geschila’s head all the way down to Geschila’s feet, yet Geschila is unfindable within these parts. Then since the nominal designation Geshe-la is unfindable within the parts of Geshe-la, Geshe-la is said to be noninherently established or not established from his own side.

However, before refuting the inherent existence of table, it is absolutely critical to understand the mode of existence of table. Otherwise, we risk or we run the risk in refuting the inherent existence of table of actually refuting the existence of table and the falling in the extreme of nihilism. It is upon understanding the mode of existence of table that we can safely refute the non inherent existence of table and the non existence of table from its own side. And therefore, initially before refuting the inherent existence of table, we must have a very sound understanding of the actual mode of existence of table. And then once we have that and only then, we must identify what this inherent existence of table or existence of table from its own side is, what is known as the object of negation.

And then this is what is refuted. So it’s the same thing as going to the shooting range. When we go to the shooting range before shooting, we must have identified our target correctly. Otherwise, there are problems. The same thing as that.

And therefore, before refuting the non inherent existence of table or the non existence of table from its own side, we must have a very clear sense of what the mode of existence of table is and then cause the noninherent existence of table to rear its ugly head. And at this point, mentally we will be able to separate them, refute the inherent existence of table without refuting the actual mode of existence of table. Then if we have caused the inherent existence of table to dawn forcefully, when we refute it, there is no risk of falling into an extreme of nihilism which asserts that even table does not exist at all. This is why Śāntideva said it is extremely important before refuting the inherent existence of table to have made it to appear clearly to the mind, to clearly understand the object of refutation. Then I must recognize there are some statements of Geshe Gendun Chopel which are quite troubling.

He was an exceptional scholar. So what Geshe Gendun Chopel says is there is no need to identify clearly the object of refutation, which is the inherent existence of table. We just refute using analysis, whatever can be refuted and at the end of the process of any way whether we have tried to refute it or not, table will still be there since reality does exist and the pain of bumping into a table or the pain of crashing in the mountain will exist whether we have refuted table or mountain or not. And the example Geshe Gendun Chopel gives is imagine we throw heap of things into a blazing fire. Then those which are combustible will burn, but those which are incombustible will not burn of any way and will be left when the fire has burnt out.

Even though Geshe Gendun Chopel is an exceptional scholar, nonetheless his presentation is contradictory with that of Śāntideva. Then Geshe Gendun Chopel was a phenomenal scholar and extraordinarily sharp acumen. He asserted, for instance, that there are no valid cognizers in the minds of sentient beings. Then I will explain this to you with an example. It’s quite interesting.

In the example Geshe Gendun Chopel gives to show that there are no valid cognizers in the mind of ordinary beings is the following. Imagine someone who is walking along a road all alone without carrying anything. He meets a first person and this first person looks at him and says, just where are you carrying that goat? Then he looks at the man strangely and keeps on walking. And a second man comes up and says, just where are you dragging that goat?

So he still doesn’t say anything. He continues walking. But when the third and the fourth man say to him, just where are you dragging that goat? He’s going to turn around to check whether he is actually pulling a goat or not. This means that his initial ascertainment that he was walking alone on the road is not a valid cognizer precisely because doubt has arisen.

It’s not incontrovertible. Then if we were to analyze carefully all of the examples of the great scholar Gendun Chopel, I think we would be in great trouble. Likewise, when we naively look at our table, the initial reaction to say this is a table, it self evident. There is no doubt whatsoever that this is a table. And we think we have a valid cognizer within our mind regarding this table.

And then if someone who is rather sharp comes up to us and says, just how precisely do you know this isn’t an emanation of the Buddha? Then doubt arises in our minds because it is said that the Buddha emanates as tables, as bridges, as roads and so forth. And then the moment this doubt arises, we think, well, maybe this is not a table. Then if we start analyzing this carefully, we will face great difficulty. Then if the Buddha emanates as a stream, that stream looks exactly like a stream.

Yet it’s an emanation of the Buddha which means it is a Buddha. Now something cannot be both at the same time a stream and a Buddha since these two are contradictory or incompatible. And then we are left in a state of doubt. When one analyze analyzes, there is danger. And therefore, please analyze for long and in-depth.

Don’t just stick superficial analysis like in superficial examples. Assert that phenomena are both inherently established and established by their own characteristics as well as established from their own side. The refute this and assert that there are no phenomena which are ultimately established, inherently established, established by their own characteristics or established from their own side. And at present, we have reached the most subtle view of all, the Mādhyamika Prāsaṇgika view. If we are going to put effort at generating a view of emptiness within our mind stream, this is a view we should strive at generating.

And we should strive at generating such a view in accordance with Aryanagarjuna’s presentation of the Buddha’s teachings in the perfection of wisdom sutras. And not rely on the high claims of some who say my view is profound and of extreme benefit even though their view is at odds with the view of Ārya Nāgārjuna. A view which is at odds with that of Nāgārjuna is at odds with the intent of the conquerors and cannot be a correct view. If we do not rely on the teachings of Ārya Nāgārjuna, there is a very big risk of being mistaken with respect to the view. And there were numerous teachers in Tibet who fell into this situation.

Likewise, in India, Bhāvaviveka, or more recently in Tibet, the great Jonangpa scholars fell into this extreme also. We should therefore follow carefully the teachings of Ārya Nāgārjuna. Unfortunately, there are many following the teachings of Ārya Nāgārjuna who do not understand it. Then there are some who, let alone not following Nāgārjuna, try to refute Nāgārjuna. Je Tsongkhapa underwent tremendous effort to try to explain clearly the view of Nāgārjuna.

Je Tsongkhapa’s explanation was not accepted by a majority of Tibetan scholars. And since Je Tsongkhapa himself did not accept the view of most of the Tibetan scholars of his time as well, he wished to travel to India to study directly with the great Indian scholars. And he made preparations to travel to India to study with Acharya Nagabodhi and Maitripa to understand the actual thought of Nāgārjuna. And the great Nyingma scholar and practitioner, Chödrak Gyatso asked Je Tsongkhapa not to travel to India and Vajrapāni actually manifested within the continuum of Chödrak Gyatso and answered the doubts which Je Tsongkhapa had in a poem which was called The Rosary of Nectar. And these doubts were partially cleared by this poem and Je Tsongkhapa ceased to make plans to travel to India.

And Je Tsongkhapa, after engaging in an extraordinary accumulation of merit as well as purifying large numbers of obstructions and making single-pointed prayers while analyzing the great treatises was eventually able to have a direct vision of Ariya Mañjuśrī. Or it does happen for people to have visions of Mañjuśrī. What was extraordinary uncommon in Je Tsongkhapa’s experience was that he met Mañjuśrī the way we would meet another human being and conversed directly with him. And then relating in this way as a teacher to a student, Je asked numerous questions regarding the view from Mañjuśrī and Mañjuśrī in turn answer Je Tsongkhapa’s questions as a teacher answers a student’s questions. And these answers of Ārya Mañjuśrī were extraordinarily profound.

Je Tsongkhapa retained them and did not forget them. And Mañjuśrī said to Je Tsongkhapa, if you still do not understand, ask your teacher, Rendawa, and he will clear your doubts. Even though Je Tsongkhapa addressed his doubts to Rendawa Zhonnu Lodro, Rendawa was not able to clear them completely. And Mañjuśrī said to him, when that happens, set what you understand as a foundation, analyze it well, purify your numerous obstructions, engage in the accumulation of virtue, and later on, you shall understand. Then Je Tsongkhapa, in keeping with the instructions of Mañjuśrī, put tremendous effort, purified his obstructions, and analyzed carefully the authentic scriptures.

And eventually, he had a vision of Buddhapālita. And then after having this vision of Buddhapālita, Je Tsongkhapa studied in-depth Buddhapālita’s commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā known as the Buddhapālita commentary in Tibetan, and he gained the unmistaken Prāsaṇgika view in dependence on that. Having gained the unmistaken understanding of the Prāsaṇgika view while relying on Buddhapālita’s Buddhapālita commentary, Je Tsongkhapa generated tremendous faith in Buddha. Then because of the tremendous faith which arose in Je Tsongkhapa was reflecting on the kindness of the Buddha in teaching interdependence, Je Tsongkhapa wrote the Praise of Dependent Origination which is known in Tibetan as the lesser essence of good explanations. And he was reciting it on a pilgrimage when a very famous Tibetan scholar of the period, Bodong, actually heard them.

And Bodong Rinpoche thought these might be the words of Nāgārjuna. They sound very beautiful. Then as Bodong Rinpoche continued to hear the words of the Praise of Dependent Origination of Je Tsongkhapa, he eventually thought that these can’t be the teachings of Nāgārjuna, maybe it was composed by And at the end of the smaller essence of eloquence of the Praise of Dependent Origination, there is the verse, I have composed this in dependence on the teachings of Nāgārjuna and of Candrakīrti. And when Bodong Chogle Namgyal heard this, he said to the singer of this praise, who exactly composed this? When Bodong Chogle Namgyal heard this, tremendous faith was born in his mind for Je Tsongkhapa, and he requested an audience with Je Tsongkhapa.

Unfortunately, when Bodong Chogle Namgyal arrived, Je Tsongkhapa had already left this world. And Bodong Chogle Namgyal then cast into space the mandala of gold and of silver which he had prepared for this audience with Je Tsongkhapa. It is said that it actually landed in Tuśita. Then this presentation, the presentation of the Mādhyamika view, which Je Tsongkhapa made is a an unmistaken presentation and I don’t say this because I am of the Gelug tradition. Je Tsongkhapa had relied on numerous teachers of other traditions in Tibet.

And it is in dependence on them that he eventually gave rise to this unmistaken Mādhyamika view. Composed five great treatises on the view. He composed one commentary on the Madhyamaka Vatara, one commentary on Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra,, one commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna, the two greater and lesser treatises on the stages of the path. And finally, he composed the essence of eloquence. And if we wish to study the works of Buddha Śākyamūni on the view, the works of Ārya Nāgārjuna on the view or the works of Je Tsongkhapa on the view, definitely this will happen.

And it is only in depending on the works of these or in dependence on the works of these holy beings that we can hope for the Mādhyamika view to arise within our minds. Otherwise, how could this happen? Think of the effort Je Tsongkhapa himself had to make. And therefore, I make prayers that through your efforts, the view of Mādhyamika dawns within your mind streams later on. You understand how to train in compassion and bodhicitta.

And once the view of the middle way has dawned within your mind streams, you will be able to progress towards full enlightenment. And just as a bird can fly from one side of the ocean to the other side relying on its two wings, likewise, I pray that from your side relying on the two wings of method and wisdom, you will be able to cross the ocean of cyclic existence. And then I sincerely hope that through relying on the center created through the kindness of our teachers, we will eventually be able to progress up to the ground of Buddhahood. We have all received clear explanations on how to train in love, compassion and bodhicitta and Geshe-la hopes that the other topics which we have received explanations about will give rise to powerful karmic imprints arisen from hearing within our mind streams. Then if we practice in keeping with our understanding continually, consistently, things will go well for us.

However, if whenever difficulties arise, we put our practice aside, we shall not progress. Instead, it is when difficulties arise that we should put special effort in our practice. Therefore, please proceed in this way. And we have tried to proceed in this way during the last two months in some of teachings. I myself as the person or the teacher explaining the teachings have tried to proceed like this and you yourselves as listeners have also tried to proceed in this way.

In my opinion, among all the people who live in Adelaide, those who are the wealthiest, those who are the richest in the full sense of the term are yourselves who are thinking of your future lives. What you have understood, what you have kept within yourself will never be destroyed and this understanding can never be stolen away from you. This is true, Regarding all of our material possessions, our houses, our cars, we cannot take them with us. And at the time of death, we will have to leave them aside and in our next next life, it will be as if we never had them at all. Even though we do need these things, they are not terribly important.

It might not be appropriate not to have them. Thank you very much. I was delighted to teach here during two months. I hope this has been of benefit to you. From my own side, it has been of tremendous benefit to me.

And I must say, I have been spoiled during my two months stay here by a wonderful kindness in Tenzin, Tenzin Dorje, who took me wherever I wanted to go and showed me whatever I wanted to see. Even though Tenzin has a lot of work and he actually has to take care of both of Rinpoche’s household in India and of the center here, nonetheless, he also took care of Geshe-la. In addition, he is in the process of moving and has a lot of work at his own house. Then I was very comfortable during these two months. It felt like a vacation.

I hope in the future we will have such occasions again. Thank you very much. We will stop here for today. Then if you want to ask some questions about emptiness specifically, please do. That’s good.

Thank you. Thank you. And thanks to my English teacher. I will have no difficulty in traveling now thanks to your Thank you. Thank you.

Can say thank you to everybody.

Key terms in this teaching

basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)

Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA

Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)

The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA

dependent origination pratityasamutpada (Skt); ten drel (Tib)

Also called dependent arising. The way that the self and phenomena exist conventionally as relative and interdependent. LYWA

Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)

The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA

mind basis of all alayavijana (Skt); kun zhi nam shä (Tib)

A main consciousness posited by the Cittamatra school, the consciousness they say is needed to carry karmic imprints. LYWA

Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)

The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA

selflessness of phenomena chö kyi dag me (Tib)

The absence of a self in phenomena - all things other than the person. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka view, the most subtle form is their lack of inherent existence: they do not exist from their own side. LYWA

true existence den par yö pa (Tib)

The concrete, real existence from its own side that everything appears to possess; in fact, both self and phenomena are empty of true existence. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.