Compendium of Valid Cognition — 1993-11-12

48 min · 1,906 words · 12 November 1993 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Compendium of Valid Cognition (Khensur Rinpoche)
Compendium of Valid Cognition (Khensur Rinpoche)
Compendium of Valid Cognition — 1993-11-12
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 48-minute dialogue, Kyabje Rinpoche debates a Western student on the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka view of valid cognition—that all phenomena lack inherent existence. He contrasts this with Mind Only and other Buddhist schools, explains how karmic seeds ripen within this framework, and clarifies how enlightened beings maintain aggregates through the accumulation of merit and wisdom. The discussion culminates in a sustained logical analysis of Western materialism: if mind arises from matter, does it die at death? Rinpoche methodically refutes this claim by examining what it means for mind and body to be “one entity,” deploying precise philosophical argument and concrete examples including the Tibetan term metok. For practitioners comfortable with abstract Buddhist logic and philosophical debate.

File metadata (for organising)

File: 1993-11-12 – 24B – KR.mp3

UUID: 196b93d4-fd26-4a8e-a111-1726b40dbf9e

Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche

Collection: Compendium of Valid Cognition

Date: 1993-11-12

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~1,917

Oh, yeah. Yeah. Oh, good. Very good. So that’s according to the consequence of middle way school, all phenomena are empty of inherent existence.

According to sutras, according to Great Exposition school and mind only schools, they say all phenomena are inherently existent. They’re not similar with respect to that. Yes. Okay. I will.

Yeah. So, yeah, you can present your Western views. So, you know, I’ve discussed the existence of rebirth, the existence of the Three Jewels, the existence of karma as actions and their results, and the existence of liberation. How do you see these subjects? Yes.

If I understood the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school right, I’m not sure if I understood it right, things appear to us to come into some form of existence according to a cooperative cause, causing a seed of karma to ripen. What is the cooperative cause if nothing nothing has inherent existence? What is the cooperative cause? First of all, is that view correct? In this view, it is correct.

What would be the cooperative cause? So the things appear to inherently exist due to cooperative causes which are karma. Something causing it. There’s a karmic seed to ripen, I think that’s the expression you use. Things appear to exist due to ripening of karmic seeds.

And something causes the seeds to ripen. There is a cooperative condition or something like that. Okay. Things appear to inherently exist due to cooperative conditions which cause karmic seeds to ripen. This is an understanding I think I’ve got.

This I hear it. First of all, is that correct? If it is correct, then what in essence is the cooperative cause because that would then tend to lead to something that doesn’t exist? Hmm. So it seems I was wrong, what you said you would not.

So the mind only school says that all phenomena appear due to the activation of latencies within the mind. And these phenomena are inherently existent. My view was purely a mind only school interpretation. And in the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school, karmic seeds then just ripen up on their own. What causes the ripening of new karmic seeds according to the First of all, it seems that my ideas come from the mind only.

That’s basically what we that’s basically the answer. First of all, I’m trying to I’m trying to establish where is it, you know, the the idea. You know, first of all, this idea that I well, this idea that I so you can see that where it’s come from. And then I think that’s the view. I think that’s answer is is this explanation I think have.

Is that correct? Is that what just repeated what was said. Fine. Okay. I’ll I’ll take this.

But So in the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school, there is simply concept. Everything is simply a concept. I think what I think what you might like to be asking, I’m only second guessing. Please help. Is that according to the Consequentialist Middle Way School, everything is merely imputed.

And what is imputed is determined by the ripening of various karmas. What is it that activates this karma? What is it that activates those? That what you might like to ask? Yes, please.

I don’t know. Funny. And the So, you know, we we call things a flower, a cup or a table, a person, a light, using various concepts. And these conceptions arise not from karma but in dependence upon a previous type similar to themselves — a type of conception which is similar in type to a previous similar type.

So in the mind only school, that all phenomena established through the activation of latencies within the mind. There are no external phenomena. But in the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school, it is not just the activation of karmic latencies, phenomena also exist external to the mind. So it’s not merely that phenomena are established not merely by activation of latencies of karma within the mind, not merely dependent upon that because phenomena do exist externally. So in the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school, the phenomena are not established by the activation of latencies within the mind.

If they were then they would not be external to the mind. How does the liberated mind maintain the aggregates, the imputed inherent existence of which it has just refuted? How does it maintain the inherent? Would you repeat that? Contaminated aggregates come about by the force of ignorance.

Contaminated aggregates come about by the force of ignorance. How does a mind which is destroyed, overcome ignorance maintain its own aggregates as in the case of Śākyamūni Buddha once he became enlightened? The A bodhisattva superior who assumes a contaminated aggregate under the force the though they do not have ignorance, they have the latencies of ignorance along with knowledge obstructions.

Under their force they assume contaminated aggregates. But a Buddha does not assume to contain aggregates due to by the power of having brought to consummation the accumulation of the two collections. A Buddha assumes aggregates for, you know, within the two types of bodies of a Buddha, the truth body and the form body. A Buddha has a form body which is constituted of the enjoyment body and the emanation body. So Buddha has aggregates which are are assumed under the by the power of having brought to consummation the two accumulations of the two collections.

A verse by Nāgārjuna where he points out that the two bodies of a Buddha firstly the truth body is attained through the consummation of the collection of wisdom and the form body is achieved through the consummation of the collection of merit. Yeah. An assertion. An assertion. I mean you have many assertions in the West.

For example, the assertion the non existence of rebirth, the non existence of karma as actions and their results, the non existence of liberation. So these are all examples of assertions that Westerners have. I’ve been present assertions from the point of view of Buddhism. And I’d like to hear some Western assertions which might be in conflict with the assertions I’ve been putting forth. You have a lot of them.

There’s no mind apart from matter. That mind arises in depends upon matter. Therefore, when you die, the mind dies. Let’s examining that. You know if we in terms of what is being asserted is that the mind and the body are one entity.

If they are in fact one entity, are they inseparably one entity indistinguishably one entity? Is the mind and body indistinguishably one entity or are they distinguishably one entity? For example, emptiness of form and form are one entity, but they are distinguishable. There’s emptiness on the one hand, there’s a form on the other. So is this the type of one entity that you’re referring to if the mind and the body are one entity?

In which the mind and the body are distinguishable, but they’re one entity? So we have to determine what we mean by one entity. Is it indistinguishably one entity or not? But the the leaves and the roots aren’t one entity. So if they’re indistinguished if the mind and body were indistinguishable, when you saw the body, would see the mind?

Do you see? Is that the case? When you see the body, do you see the mind? The body and arm are one entity. But if we lose our arm, if we destroy our arm, do we destroy the body?

So we’re going we’re going to debate. So the the body and the arm are one entity. If we the arm, do we destroy the body? So they’re distinguished so the mind and body are distinguishable single entity. Or are they not as When you see when you see the body, it is But it is distinguishable.

Well, yeah, we’re just so if it’s distinguishable, it’s not indistinguishable. So what is your answer? So, the for example, what we mean by indistinguishably one is the flower and metok. Metok is the word for flower in Tibetan. The flower and metok are indistinguishably one.

If you see one, you see the other. If you see a flower, you see a metok. If you see a metok, see a flower. They’re indistinguishably one entity, identical. So would you say if you see a flower, don’t see a Metok?

That if you see a flower you don’t see the metok or if you see a matok you don’t see a flower? So if you see one, do you do you necessarily see the other? A case where you see the flower and you don’t see the metok. What would be a case of that? An occasion.

To see to see a Metok, you don’t have to know the name Metok. If someone said, Hey, look at that that great beautiful metok. I might think he’s talking about the the drapes on on the top, and I think he’s talking about the glass. I don’t see the flower until until it was explained until the concept is there until I can correctly impute. If if if an American person came in the room?

Still would you not see that person? Would you see him or not? You don’t have to that he’s American. You don’t have to know that person is American to see an American. So I mean he’s he has he’s in general previously been imputed as an American person.

It’s not necessary for you to know that he’s an American person in order that he had been previously imputed to be an American person. If he hadn’t been designated or labeled as American, then he wouldn’t think of himself as American. So nobody around? Doesn’t he have parents? Does he have relatives?

So there’s no phenomena which has not been imputed by conception. So there’s no American person who has not been imputed to be an American person. If you had been the it’s not a kind of American. American. How about himself?

If you said that to the American person, the American would probably get angry with you. So a corpse which has been dead would have a mind because it has a body because the body and mind are inseparably one. There’s a body therefore there’s a mind. An American, I have to get off the subject. Does it have a mind?

A corpse? Does does a corpse have in mind? Corpse does have a is not an occasion of mind. Yeah. So is there warmth in the body?

If there’s a mind, there should be warmth. In the corpse. Is there warmth in the corpse? So essentially you’re saying that that mind is inseparable from the body. Inseparably one.

However you want to call the body. Can we have if if there is no corpse, can there can the can the consciousness remain? Before it’s deteriorated. Oh. So before the deterioration corpse, of is there a consciousness in the body before it’s deteriorating?

Corpse. Just as the eyes can see, would mean, out of respect for the life of the mind, that we should never bury the body until it’s completely putrefied. We’re not talking about body. We’re talking about corpse. Corpse.

Right. Isn’t it the same thing? What’s corpse if it’s not a body? Well, we’ve got an amputation situation here. Is it a is it a corpse body?

Ro don. Ro?

Key terms in this teaching

Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
contaminated aggregates zagchä kyi phung po (Tib)
The aggregates of an ordinary being that are contaminated by the seeds of delusion and therefore pervaded by suffering because they are controlled by delusion and karma. LYWA
Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
Prasangika Madhyamaka u ma thäl gyur pa (Tib)
The Middle Way Consequence school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Consequence school accepts mere consequences known to others and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
rupakaya form body; zug ku (Tib)
The form body of a fully enlightened being; the result of the complete and perfect accumulation of merit. LYWA
two accumulations sambharadvaya (Skt); tsog nyi (Tib)
Also called the two collections or two types of merit, they are: the merit of virtue, which develops the method side of the path by practicing generosity and so forth, and the merit of (transcendental) wisdom... LYWA
two bodies of a buddha sang gye kyis ku nyi (Tib)
The truth body or dharmakaya, the result of the wisdom side of the practice and the form body or rupakaya, the result of the method side of the practice. LYWA
Vaibhashika jedrag mawa (Tib)
The Great Exposition school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Great Exposition school asserts truly established external objects but does not assert self-knowers. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

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