Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 48-minute teaching, Kyabje Rinpoche exposes a fundamental contradiction within the Enumerators, a classical non-Buddhist Indian school: they describe the self as both permanent and unchanging, yet also as consciousness. If the self is consciousness, Rinpoche argues, it must perceive objects through the senses, and perception naturally produces happiness or suffering — directly refuting their claim that the self has no experiences whatsoever. He opens with a bodhicitta meditation on compassion and enlightenment, then develops a detailed philosophical comparison between Buddhist understanding of self (merely labeled, not inherently existing) and non-Buddhist concepts. The teaching moves through Buddhist tenet distinctions, examining how lower schools and ultimately Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka analyze selflessness. Pitched at practitioners with prior philosophical training and familiarity with this commentary series.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 1994-06-21 – 6A – 9th Chapter – KR.mp3
UUID: e406bcb6-0835-407f-bc31-9984b6fd9c23
Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche
Collection: Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra
Date: 1994-06-21
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~2,969
# 9th Chapter B Deeds 6a 1994-06-21
**Collection:** Rinpoche Recordings — Bodhicaryāvatāra – 9th Chapter Wisdom (1994)
**Duration:** 47.7 minutes
**Words:** 2,985
**Model:** Deepgram Nova-3
**Corrections applied:** 1
**Transcribed:** 2026-02-28 00:08
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We start by doing brief meditation on kind thought in accordance with bodhicitta enlightenment mind. Thinking I consider myself less important than others. Others are more important. With such perspective, I wish that all sentient beings be free of suffering, and I deeply wish that they be free of suffering.
And even if it comes that I alone take the responsibility to remove their suffering I will do it. Similarly I wish all sentient beings to be with happiness and I deeply wish that they be with happiness even if it comes that I alone have to take the responsibility to bring them happiness I take the responsibility. These two types of thoughts respectively are called compassion and loving kindness. One then starts thinking that way. Although I wish this thing regarding others sufferings and happiness but I don’t have presently the capability and the qualities to actually let that happen.
Looking for the source of capability I find that it is only that if I first become an enlightened being a Buddha that it is possible to remove other sufferings and to bring happiness to others. Because of such reason I must at any rate achieve enlightenment. To attain the state of enlightenment, we are all in the great vehicle teaching by learning about it. Regarding the great vehicle Mahāyāna teaching it is principally of two types the skillful method aspect and the wisdom aspect and here I will especially take an interest in the context subject of the class and the topic of wisdom. So please try to develop the right motive at this stage by thinking in that way.
The great teacher Candrakīrti in his classical writing on middle view called supplement to the middle says the self asserted by the hedonists, it is not an eater, it is not a permanent thing, it is not an actor, or it is not a doer, and so forth. Anyway, that’s reference, and in there what is mentioned is the teacher identifies how in the classical period the non-Buddhist although of different thoughts how uniformly they seem to have quite similar view about what a person, a self, or what an ego is. To go to this point firstly we shall recall last Tuesday evening’s class where the point was made clear that in Buddhist understanding there are two types of self or ego or identity one which is not to be denied which is merely labeled and nominally existing the other is one which needs to be negated because that does not exist and a truly existing self. So that’s with the Buddhist. Here from now this evening onwards, we go into the non-Buddhist, classical non-Buddhist view about what a self is.
And to go into that firstly, it is important to identify how in their viewpoint a self or a person is defined. In Buddhist viewpoint which is to be understood as the viewpoint of the highest middle way school, the highest Buddhist tenet, in that sense in Buddhist viewpoint, when there is reference about self or when self is mentioned, there are two types of self or ego or what a person basically is. One which is mere nominally existing and that is not to be denied it exists. The other is non existing self which is fabricated by ordinary beings misconception, ignorance as if it is truly there existing. Then going back to the first type of the self or ego, mere nominally existing self, what that type of self would mean is it is a self which is merely labeled on the basis of the label.
The basis of label are the aggregates of the person’s personality parts such as the body, the head, neck, limbs and other organs of parts and organs of the body plus the mind the person has. Based on the basis of these basis of label there is either through name or through concept or through mind. There is label given on this basis of label as a self, a person. So it is mere nominally existing because what is nominal is merely labeled and who does the labeling? The labeling is done by a medium of sound as an expression name or through concept of the mind actually labeling the context thing as such and such.
So in that sense it is nominally merely labeled. Therefore on the basis of these component parts of the person which are basis of label through name and concept it is merely labeled as self and within that nature as merely labeled self or person or ego there is undeniable functioning from the part of that merely labeled person such as it is possible as we can observe that there can be whole possibility that I’m going, I’m eating, I’m well, I’m sick and so forth. It is undeniable that there is mere nominally existing self or person. And in the teaching here the emphasis was made on the part that it is only through sound, name and through concept through mind that it is labeled as self or a person in that it is existing as merely labeled, nominally existing self. Like with the case of the self which is considered existing there mere nominally in the similar way every phenomena all phenomena should be considered as merely labeled.
Apart from their existence as merely labeled phenomena there’s no other way they exist. There’s no other fashion about them. There’s no other fashion of their existence. So it would be clear that like with the self which is merely labeled everything is merely labeled and in that fashion they exist in that way. Therefore existing as merely labeled it is merely labeled by sound and concept that itself is sufficient enough to say that it exists meaning whatever phenomena that it is nominally existing because it is labeled by sound or concept that itself is sufficient for its existence.
Sufficient for something to exist in that way and it doesn’t to be necessary that if something exists mere nominally, mere label, that it should as well exist truly or inherently that is not necessary or to paraphrase if something exists as merely label that it’s always good enough as to say it exists. That does not become a ground to say that it exists truly or inherently. That is not necessary. Because it exists as merely labeled that itself indicates it is not inherently existing it is not truly existing meaning whatever phenomena in this case the self or the ego so that indicates that because it is merely labeled through sound and concept it is not truly existing, it is not inherently existing, it does not exist totally independently from its own side but that also because it exists as merely labeled and although it does not that way it does not exist truly or inherently that does not mean it is not there at all it does exist so as a conclusion we need to be very clear with these two points and it would be extremely helpful if we have these two points clear the first is because it exists as merely labeled therefore it is not truly there but if something’s therefore it is not truly there or inherently there.
The second point is because something is not truly there or inherently there does not mean that the thing is not there at all. So these two are the points. So that’s a Buddhist distinct way. Obviously, now with regards to the presentation or the whole theory about self or ego by the classical non-Buddhist, we can say obviously at that time in classical period there were so many schools of thoughts spiritual system therefore there were many non Buddhists in the classical period but amongst them three outstood as distinct as main spiritual systems and those three were the Enumerators, the Particularists, and the Nirgranthas. So these three can be seen as the main representatives of the classical non-Buddhist idea about self then and because of that then we can start by looking at what is the understanding of self as explained by the enumerators and as regards that enumerators would say the self has five qualities.
Then what are the five features about this self? Regarding the five features, as we just ahead went through the teacher Candrakīrti’s quote in accordance to that, we can say the first feature is the self is the eater, the one which eats. And the reason why it is called according to that school, the self is the eater is because the self is the one which experiences the results which are happiness and suffering. So in brief, this self is eater because self is the one which experiences happiness and suffering as a karmic result. The second feature described about the self is that it is permanent.
It is explained to be permanent because it is not born as well it does not perish. It remains eternal in the same state, unchanging. The third feature is that it is not the creator of all composites. And here the word composites, according to their use, refers to consequences and results. And they explain that the self is not the creator of all composites in the sense that no result or consequences ever comes out from this self.
In that sense it would be seen that this self is not a cause. It is not an entity of cause type producing results. It does not produce any results at all. The next feature is it is without any characteristics and by that that school mean that it does not have the three characteristics. It is not a particle, it is not darkness, and it has will power.
Now what that means is with regards to it is not a particle, it means it is suffering. So in their code language, particle refers to suffering. And by darkness, actually, the second characteristic is darkness. And by darkness, they means suffering ignorance so by particle they mean suffering by darkness they mean suffering and by willpower they mean happiness so this school explains the fourth feature about self as the self does not have any experiences of suffering, neutral, and happiness. Well, the next feature is it is without any activity.
The reason why it is explained to be without any activity is because it is with everything or to use the scriptural language it pervades everything and that very reasoning because it is everywhere it pervades everything there is no need for it to go and come and all sorts of other activities to be performed. Or they describe the self in another way where it is explained to be having three features that it is permanent because it does not get born and it does not perishes, it is independent because it does not depend on causes and conditions. It is single because it does not have any parts or portions. So it has these three characteristics of being permanent independent and single whichever of the two ways of looking at the self either it is through the five features or through the three characteristics or three features in brief is what classical non-Buddhist school called the enumerators explains about self. And in brief, accordance to that theory, the self is basically explained to be a permanent entity.
The reason why that school explains the self to be permanent is because they explain if the self is impermanent then the time one dies there will be no rebirth to a person or a self by the very reason it is impermanent. It is understandable according to them therefore it is understandable that this self or ego must be a permanent entity due to which it becomes possible for a person even if one dies in this life there is a continuity of being born in next life and so forth. Anyway, that still is the ego or self presented by them as a merely nominally existing self, not the one to be refuted. In their case, it is the self which is nominally existing. And if that’s the case, what do you think?
Is it a good theory or not? Let’s say if the self is permanent as they explain then wouldn’t that mean that the self will have no birth and death? Anyway, this is the theory of self which when looked even from the lower Buddhist tenets perspective is seen to be mistaken. The reason why that is so is because firstly, let’s list who are the lower Buddhist tenets. Well, they are the Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrantikas, the Mind Only, and the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka the old explanation of self being presented by the non-Buddhist in that way where the self is explained to be permanent, independent and single they find it to be mistaken that self cannot be of such nature.
That very understanding is called the gross of person refuted by the lower Buddhist tenets. And then later on the lower Buddhist tenets even go further in trying to establish what a self or person is and they find that instead of seeing the self as permanent, independent, and single, one may still view the person as existing substantially or in substance as self sufficient entity. Now that as well is a mistake and that understanding is a mistaken perception, mistaken view about person or self is called the subtle selflessness of person. And to paraphrase, the subtle selflessness of person is the person devoid of self-sufficiently existing in substance. Anyway, it will become clearer as we go, and these two then are the two selflessness a person as understood by the lower Buddhist tenets.
But when analyzed from the perspective of the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, the highest Buddhist tenet, those two understandings about selflessness of person by the lower Buddhist tenet are very gross. And that’s why in the Prāsaṇgika system those two understandings of selflessness of a person become the gross selflessness of a person. Then we would have the natural outcome of question, what is subtle selflessness of person according to Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka? Well, that is emptiness of inherent existence of the merely labeled self. So that is the subtle selflessness of a person.
We can look at it more clearer by first is say that upon the aggregate which are the basis of label there is a merely labeled I which exists mere nominally and which is undeniably functioning. And that is mere nominally existing self. Now that mere nominally existing self, it is empty or it lacks inherent existence or existing concretely independently from its own side. So that is the subtle selflessness of a person, the emptiness of inherent existence of that mere nominally existing self. So that’s how this selflessness of person is understood differently within the Buddhist tenets when compared between the lower tenets and the highest one.
To look at the self as explained by the non-Buddhist tenets and with earlier understanding of the Buddhist concepts of self need to counter the misunderstanding about self of the classical non-Buddhist. And going to that point, we just went across the self explained by school, the Enumerators, where the self is explained to be a permanent entity. On top of that, they as well say, when asked whether it is inanimate matter or is it consciousness. They explain it is consciousness. It is an entity which is mind.
So they essentially speak is, what a self or ego is, they essentially speak it is a permanent entity in the aspect of consciousness. But in that assertion, there’s a huge inner contradiction itself because from one point they are saying the self is permanent. On the other side, on the other hand they say yet it is a consciousness. It is a mind. And we can see there naturally would have to be a huge contradiction within that.
Now how there is a huge inner contradiction in saying the same entity is permanent as well as consciousness or mind? That is because if it is consciousness or mind then obviously it would be one which experiences happiness as well which experiences misery, pain, suffering and so forth. How that is so is because if it is a consciousness it would obviously engage in the five avenues of senses plus the sixth the mental faculty. For example, it would engage in that consciousness or mind would obviously engage in perceiving form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and abstract mental reference. And if it does that, then it goes without saying when such consciousness encounters delightful form, sound, smell, taste and touch and abstract ideas, there will be experience of happiness.
Whereas during the time when such consciousness encounters unpleasant objects, sounds, smells, touch, and mental abstract ideas, will be experience of pain, dislike, suffering, and so forth. Therefore, the earlier assertion by that school that it is not doer as well as not a recipient of any experiences would be self refuted, self contradicted. Now, on the other hand, within the same point we can look at other contradiction there is, which is if it is a consciousness then it necessarily is a subject which has an object on which it acts. Now if it does that, then we can say with reference